• Read more about Evidence given by senior officers at the Taylor Inquiry

1. The Taylor Inquiry was set up to establish what happened during the disaster and its causes, with a view to learning lessons that could prevent such events from happening again. It was a departmental inquiry, rather than a statutory public inquiry, meaning it was not a court, or course of public justice, and did not operate in that way. Unlike at a criminal trial, witnesses did not have to swear an oath before they gave evidence. 
    
2. Nonetheless, in his opening speech, Mr Collins, Counsel to the Inquiry, set out a “hope that all who are involved in this Inquiry appreciate it is vital that an accurate account be given even if that involves admissions of errors.” He added that “the avoidance of any such disaster in the future is more important than the justification for what occurred on this occasion.”
    
3. In total, 60 SYP officers were called to give evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, ranging from PCs who had been on duty at the Leppings Lane end to senior officers. This meant that SYP accounted for more than a third of all the witnesses called. 
    
4. Concerns have repeatedly been raised about the accuracy and completeness of the evidence some of these officers gave. As set out at the start of this chapter, the Taylor Interim Report expressed the view that senior officers had been “evasive and defensive” in their evidence. It further stated that the quality of the evidence given by police officers “was in inverse proportion to their rank”.
    
5. The focus of the IOPC’s investigation was around the accuracy of the evidence and whether any officer sought to deliberately mislead the Taylor Inquiry. In particular, the IOPC looked at the evidence that senior officers gave in relation to two broad topics: supporters’ behaviour and police tactics and actions to control the supporters.
    
6. Investigators identified a high degree of consistency in the evidence senior officers gave to the Taylor Inquiry in relation to whether:
    
   • SYP was responsible for monitoring the fullness of the pens
   • SYP had previously closed the tunnel leading from the concourse at the Leppings Lane end to the centre pens of the West Terrace (Pens 3 and 4)
   • SYP had previously deployed cordons of officers on the approach to the Leppings Lane entrance to check supporters had valid tickets for the game
      
7. However, when some junior officers gave evidence, they offered different perspectives; some described previous police actions to close the central tunnel, including at the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final at Hillsborough Stadium. 
    
8. The evidence the senior officers gave appeared to contradict what they had said in internal meetings.
    
9. For example, as set out at paragraph 10.21, at the meeting on 26 April, Ch Supt Mole stated that there was a known contingency among senior officers to close the tunnel when the pens were full. He was the first SYP officer to give evidence to the Taylor Inquiry on 24 May. He was asked about the tunnel closure at the 1988 Semi-Final, where he had been match commander, but said: “I have no recollection of closing the tunnel in 1988.” In reply to further questions, he then stated: “I have no information of anyone putting a serial or barrier across that tunnel.”
    
10. This prompted Lord Justice Taylor to intervene and ask: “You are saying nobody closed off the tunnel in 1988?” Ch Supt Mole replied: “I am aware of that suggestion, and I have made enquiries and can find no confirmation of that. I certainly have no recollection, and those Officers who were present have no recollection of it.”
     
11. By the time Ch Supt Mole gave evidence, SYP had recorded on its HOLMES database a significant number of officer accounts that had mentioned the tunnel being closed at the 1988 Semi-Final. References to tunnel closure had been removed from some accounts by this date. This calls into question the extent and rigour of the enquiries Ch Supt Mole claimed to have made about the issue.
     
12. When he gave evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, Supt Greenwood was asked how he would respond to the centre pens of the West Terrace becoming full. He suggested he would have simply alerted the PCB and stated: “I did not know of the arrangement in terms of what would happen if they got full.” He was then asked if he had any idea what action he would have expected to be taken as a result. He replied: “No, because we had never reached that stage.”
     
13. However, a range of evidence shows that both before and after the disaster, Supt Greenwood drew colleagues’ attention to the crushing incident on the West Terrace at the 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final at Hillsborough Stadium.
     
14. In his evidence on 31 May and 1 June 1989, Supt Murray was asked whether he had thought it would be necessary to block the tunnel when Gate C was opened on the day of the disaster, allowing large numbers of supporters in over a short space of time. He said he never considered it and denied any knowledge of the tunnel being closed at the 1988 Semi-Final.
     
15. Supt Murray was asked whether any officers “were concerned to keep a watch on the filling of Pens 3 and 4 of the Leppings Lane terrace?” He replied: “There was no one who had a specific duty as such.” He was not asked directly what his own duties regarding the filling of the pens were.
     
16. Insp White was on duty on the inner concourse at the Leppings Lane end, a role he had performed many times before. At the Goldring Inquests, he recalled that when he received a copy of the Operational Order for the 1989 Semi-Final, he had gone to see Supt Murray. He said that Supt Murray told him that he should not follow the approach he had previously taken to filling the pens in a sequential fashion and instead should leave all pens open and allow supporters to find their own level. He added that Supt Murray said “that he, up in the control box, was in the best position to see if anything was developing in those pens.” Insp White repeated this point twice more in his evidence.
     
17. Ch Supt Mole, Supt Greenwood and Supt Murray were all highly experienced officers, who had worked at Hillsborough Stadium many times, at high-profile and ordinary matches. Yet when giving evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, they broadly indicated that the police had no responsibility for monitoring the pens and were either evasive in answering questions about past practice to close the tunnel or flatly denied any knowledge of it having taken place in 1988. 
     
18. This denial or omission appears to echo the removal of references to tunnel closure from the SYP proof of evidence submitted to the Taylor Inquiry and from SYP officers’ accounts.
     
19. If these senior officers had acknowledged that SYP had previously closed the tunnel when the pens were full, it may have indicated a significant failure on the day of the disaster: the failure to follow past practice and prevent supporters from entering full pens.
     
20. It was therefore of considerable significance when some more junior SYP officers giving evidence to the Taylor Inquiry described precisely the practice of closing the tunnel—echoing the evidence that had been given by some supporters. On 5 June 1989, Ch Insp Creaser, another officer with a lot of experience policing matches at the stadium, stated that he believed the tunnel had been closed at the 1988 Semi-Final. He later explained that though he had not been involved on that occasion, there were “several times when I have taken that action”, including at the 1987 FA Cup Semi-Final. 
     
21. Ch Insp Creaser also told the Taylor Inquiry that the reason he knew the tunnel had been closed at the 1988 Semi-Final was because he had “seen sight of a statement of a former Sergeant Higgins” which mentioned this. This referred to Police Sergeant Trevor Higgins (PS Higgins). 
     
22. The Taylor Inquiry team had not seen the account of PS Higgins but requested to. Over a month later, on 7 July, a member of the team reminded Hammond Suddards that the account had still not been provided. Documents show that the account was sent to Hammonds Suddards for review on 9 June and returned with suggested amendments on 12 June. There were then two further reminders from the Taylor Inquiry team before the account was delivered on 12 July. Many other accounts were delivered to WMP and the Taylor Inquiry in this period.
     
23. The evidence suggests that SYP did not forward the account of PS Higgins with due expediency. By the time it was delivered, the Taylor Inquiry was no longer hearing oral evidence, so there would have been no chance to call PS Higgins as a witness.
     
24. Nonetheless, two other officers referred to previous tunnel closure in their evidence and a third account was read to the Taylor Inquiry, from a police constable who stated he had closed the tunnel at the 1988 game, following an instruction from another officer. However, the police constable could not remember who that officer was.
     
25. Given this evidence, SYP’s legal representatives informed the Taylor Inquiry team that the force accepted that the tunnel had been closed in some way at the 1988 Semi-Final. However, in subsequent written submissions SYP maintained that the tunnel had been closed in 1988 by junior officers acting on their own initiative—not at the instruction of senior officers. This, SYP argued, explained why it had not been mentioned in the SYP Operational Order and why senior officers were not aware it had taken place.
     
26. In his Interim Report, Lord Justice Taylor concluded that, given how full the centre pens were, “the tunnel should have been closed off whether gate C was to be opened or not. The exercise was a simple one and had been carried out in 1988.” However, he commented: “Unfortunately, the 1988 closure seems to have been unknown to the senior officers on duty at the time.”
     

27. Several supporters who had been at the 1988 Semi-Final gave evidence to the Taylor Inquiry that in 1988 SYP had deployed cordons of officers, some distance from the Leppings Lane turnstiles, to check that supporters had tickets. Those who did not have tickets were turned away. According to the evidence given by supporters, this process:

    • prevented those without tickets from approaching the turnstiles—thus reducing the total number of people in the turnstile area
    • controlled the flow of supporters down Leppings Lane
       

    Therefore, the use of cordons helped avoid a build-up outside the turnstiles. Some supporters said that they were surprised not to see cordons in place at the 1989 game.
     

28. This was supported by the evidence of an assessor employed by the FA, who told the Taylor Inquiry that at the 1988 Semi-Final he saw police officers checking tickets at two points. When asked if this had been “a formal system of filtering people”, he said he was not certain. 
     
29. Ch Supt Mole was asked about this issue, including by Lord Justice Taylor, who pointed out that there was a good deal of evidence that supporters had been asked to produce their tickets in 1988. Ch Supt Mole suggested this was simply a by-product of the fact that there had been a steady flow of supporters towards the turnstiles, which allowed officers to ask people for tickets. He stated: “that might be the misperception that someone has of what was taking place.”
     
30. Both ACC Jackson and Supt Marshall suggested at the Taylor Inquiry that operating a cordon system would be difficult. Supt Marshall told the Taylor Inquiry that “an enormously strong Police presence” would have been required to filter the crowd effectively on Leppings Lane.
     
31. ACC Jackson stated: “I mean what you would require in a situation like that is certainly several hundred Police Officers to try and form some cordon to prevent the people crushing up to the turnstiles.”
     
32. This comment was strikingly similar to the wording that had been agreed as an “appropriate answer” at a meeting between Mr Metcalf and ACC Jackson, Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray on 22 May. This meeting had been set up to talk through the “main points of criticism”. 
     
33. In relation to the use of police cordons outside the ground, the appropriate answer developed at the meeting was: “To have had any effect on the chaos which developed at Leppings Lane, something like 400 more Officers would have been needed, with a view to forming impenetrable cordons to block off both ends of the Lane and to send out sallies of Officers to disperse the crowds.”
     
34. Another appropriate answer agreed at the meeting was that the arrival of supporters en masse would have reduced the potential effectiveness of cordons: “Any action taken to filter or slow down the movements of the crowds would only have caused problems elsewhere. As it seems that some three to four thousand people arrived between 2.30 and 2.50p.m., if some sort of block had been put on to allow, say, only one thousand through, the other two thousand would have had to be either contained or dispersed, with consequent nuisance and problems to local residents or even with the possible consequence of their moving down Pennistone [sic] Road, to confront supporters of Nottingham Forest.”
     
35. In his evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, ACC Jackson stated: “From what I could see, they arrived in the last fifteen minutes, about 4,000 people.” This number had not been cited in his initial written account. In response to a subsequent question, he added: “the situation in Leppings Lane would be extremely difficult because of the topography and the residents. You would start pushing the crowd then back on to the main road, back into the residential area, and probably back to the flashpoint, I should imagine, where Notts Forest fans were coming.”
     
36. ACC Jackson stated at the Goldring Inquests that he was in the Directors’ Box at the stadium by 2.40pm. The Directors’ Box did not offer a view of outside the stadium. It is therefore not clear how he could have seen the situation outside the Leppings Lane entrance in the last 15 minutes before the game, when he claimed he saw 4,000 supporters arriving.
     
37. The meeting at which the appropriate answers were agreed was one of various occasions where SYP officers received support from the legal team, before they gave evidence to the Taylor Inquiry. Part of the stated reason for this was that a public inquiry was unfamiliar territory for police officers who were accustomed to criminal trials. 
     
38. It is normal procedure for officers to receive some support and preparation before cross-examination. Solicitors or more senior officers might advise them of questions they may be asked and identify potential issues or discrepancies in their evidence. However, the evidence set out by the IOPC suggests that SYP’s preparation for the Taylor Inquiry went further than this, with senior officers and a member of the legal team preparing and agreeing “appropriate answers” to likely criticisms. In one instance, this resulted in a witness using an appropriate answer as the basis for his evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, even though other evidence tends to indicate he would not have been able to give that account from his own personal experience.
     
39. The Taylor Inquiry was not a court. There was no legal requirement for officers, or any other witnesses, to provide the whole truth, as long as they did not mislead. Therefore, there was no bar to the use of agreed appropriate answers, as long as these answers were not inaccurate or misleading.
     
40. Nonetheless, it was certainly contrary to the spirit of the Taylor Inquiry and its intent and could be seen as an attempt to limit the evidence SYP put forward to the Inquiry.

• Read more about The accuracy of officers’ accounts submitted to the Taylor Inquiry

1. More than 700 officers had their accounts submitted to the Taylor Inquiry. In the course of its investigation, the IOPC received specific complaints about the accuracy of the accounts given by seven officers. In two further cases, the IOPC identified material that raised questions about the accuracy of the evidence the officers concerned had presented.
    
2. Each of these instances is covered in a complaint or conduct report, and the complainants and officers concerned have been informed of the outcomes.
    
3. This section summarises some of these, where the matter under investigation is relevant to the overall understanding of the disaster and specifically to allegations that police officers exaggerated or fabricated stories about the behaviour of supporters.
    
4. Though normally a plain clothes officer, Detective Constable James Oakes (DC Oakes) was on duty at the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final in uniform. He was part of a serial of officers stationed inside the turnstiles at the Leppings Lane end and was close to exit Gate C when it was opened. After the match was halted, DC Oakes assisted in the rescue effort.
    
5. He produced an initial account dated 17 April 1989 that is the source of the complaint against him. In this account, DC Oakes described his experiences on the day, from 8.30am until a post-incident debrief in the North Stand. He referred to attempting to resuscitate two supporters. He wrote that as he tried unsuccessfully to resuscitate one of these two, the supporter “was vomiting beer.”
    
6. When this victim’s blood alcohol level was tested during the post-mortem, it was found to be zero, a point emphasised by Dr Popper during the original inquests.
    
7. However, the comments made by DC Oakes became the subject of a formal complaint from the family, that the account was fabricated and that it had been drafted in a way that conveyed the impression that supporters were drunk. 
    
8. For health reasons, DC Oakes could not be interviewed by the IOPC or called to give evidence at the Goldring Inquests. However, after a lengthy period of correspondence, he agreed to provide the IOPC with a written response to the allegations.
    
9. In the written response, DC Oakes explained the reasons he believed the supporter had vomited beer but acknowledged that this was incorrect and stated he regretted that this comment had caused undue distress to the family. 
    
10. In response to the allegation about the overall tone of his account, DC Oakes commented that everything he wrote was “what I believed to be true and not influenced by anyone else.” The account included references to supporters being intoxicated, attempting to enter the ground without tickets and being aggressive outside the ground. Many other SYP officers also made similar comments in their accounts; DC Oakes’s account does not stand out as giving markedly more emphasis than others to such comments.
     
11. There were two specific points he mentioned that were not supported by other evidence; these were a comment that he saw two supporters being arrested for selling forged tickets, which did not appear in any arrest records, and another that he saw a supporter pick up a match programme from next to someone who had died.
     
12. Police Constable David Scott (PC Scott) was a mounted officer on duty outside the Leppings Lane entrance. BBC cameras recorded him swinging his arm and striking a Liverpool supporter in the crush before the game. This footage was shown on news reports in the days following the disaster. In his original written account, PC Scott explained that he had acted to protect his horse from supporters who were threatening to burn it with cigarettes. He added that when he inspected his horse later, he found lumps on its back legs and said the horse’s coat appeared singed.
     
13. His account was supported by the statement of Phillip Webb, a farrier who looked after SYP horses. Mr Webb stated that he had seen multiple circular burn marks on the horse. Both repeated their claims in subsequent statements.
     
14. The injuries to the horse were accepted as fact by the Taylor Inquiry. WMP investigated complaints about the actions of PC Scott and sought, unsuccessfully, to identify the supporter who had been struck. No disciplinary proceedings were recommended, but PC Scott received management advice about his future actions.
     
15. However, after PC Scott’s account and Mr Webb’s statement were published online by the HIP, the IOPC received a complaint that they may have been exaggerated. The complainant suggested that if the injuries were as bad as claimed, the horse would have needed veterinary treatment, but there was no record of any such treatment. He also suggested that SYP would have taken photos of the injuries; again, there were none.
     
16. To investigate the complaint, the IOPC reviewed the video footage of the incident involving PC Scott but did not see any signs of the horse being in distress, as might be expected if it was being burned. Investigators then took statements from other members of SYP’s Mounted Section. Though some recalled hearing about a horse being burned, none had seen the injuries. The SYP press log showed that the head of the Mounted Section had expressly denied that a horse had been burned but said it had been threatened. 
     
17. The IOPC appointed an expert witness—a professor specialising in equine surgery—to review the evidence and explain how a horse might react if it was burned. She stated she would expect a horse being burned multiple times to show signs of distress, such as kicking out or swishing its tail. She saw no video evidence of either. To assess the likely impact of a cigarette burn on a horse’s skin, she conducted a series of tests (with all appropriate consents) to the body of a horse that had recently been euthanised. These included applying a lit cigarette to the horse’s skin: it did not result in the kind of marks that Mr Webb had described.
     
18. The IOPC then reinterviewed PC Scott and Mr Webb. When shown some of the evidence that the IOPC had gathered, Mr Webb changed his account and stated that he was not sure if he had actually seen any burn marks. He said it was possible he had made the statement to WMP because he was disgusted at what he had heard from PC Scott about the burns, rather than having seen them himself. PC Scott made no further comment. 
     
19. The IOPC also established that PC Scott and Mr Webb knew each other socially; PC Scott attended Mr Webb’s wedding.
     
20. The claim that supporters burned a police horse with cigarettes was a damaging allegation that painted a picture of supporters being either sufficiently cruel to deliberately cause the injuries, or sufficiently insensitive as to not realise that they were doing so. The evidence gathered by the IOPC indicates this alleged incident did not take place. 
     
21. Based on the evidence gathered, in June 2017, the IOPC referred PC Scott and Mr Webb to the CPS, requesting a decision on whether both individuals should be charged with the criminal offences of perverting the course of justice and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. In December 2017, the CPS announced that no charges had been authorised against either individual. The decision was challenged under the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme. The evidence was reviewed by a different prosecutor, who upheld the CPS decision.
     
22. The evidence was also set out in a separate complaint report. Having reviewed it, the IOPC’s view was that, if he had still been serving with the police, PC Scott would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, for falsehood or prevarication.

• Read more about Development of the proof of evidence

1. On 19 April 1989, in the first meeting between SYP and Hammond Suddards after the disaster, Mr Metcalf told those present, including DCC Hayes, ACC Anderson and Ch Supt Denton, that the force would be expected to submit a proof of evidence to the Taylor Inquiry. Though there was no official requirement to do this, it was what a (non-police) party represented by Mr Metcalf had done during a previous public inquiry.
    
2. There was some discussion among the officers present about what should be covered in the proof of evidence. DCC Hayes concluded this topic by stating that SYP had little experience of public inquiries and asked Mr Metcalf for some guidance on what should be included. Mr Metcalf suggested some broad headings during the meeting, which he confirmed in a letter to DCC Hayes the following day. These were:
   
   "1. The South Yorkshire Police: history, geographical area, manning and organisation.
   2. The policing of sporting events: the statutory and common law background to Police involvement.
   3. The approach of the South Yorkshire Police to the policing of major sporting events: the history of such operations and the current standing operational orders.
   4. The specific background to Police involvement in the match to be played at Hillsborough on 15th April.
   5. Details of the manpower and organisation for the match.
   6. The events which occurred.”
    
3. In the letter, Mr Metcalf also advised DCC Hayes: “In our view, it will be necessary to have statements from as many as possible of the Officers who were deployed at the ground on that day”.
    
4. At some point between 19 and 24 April, DCC Hayes appointed Ch Supt Wain to take responsibility for production of the proof of evidence. Ch Supt Wain was, at the time, divisional commander of the Rotherham division of SYP. He was a highly experienced officer who had worked as a detective, led major investigations and run major incident rooms. He had also been match commander for a large number of football matches. At the Goldring Inquests, DCC Hayes confirmed he had specifically chosen to delegate the task of producing the report to Ch Supt Wain as he saw him as “an extremely good communicator, an extremely good administrator.”
    
5. At a meeting in DCC Hayes’s office on 24 April 1989, this responsibility was confirmed. DCC Hayes instructed Ch Supt Wain and his team to have a draft report ready for a meeting with the legal team on 26 April.
    
6. The minutes recorded that, by the time of the meeting, Ch Supt Mole had already produced initial drafts of content relating to headings 4 and 5 and Ch Insp Beal, who was not present at the meeting, had begun drafting the content for heading 3. The other headings were then allocated to different members of the team.
    
7. At the meeting on 26 April, Ch Supt Wain gave the first draft of the proof of evidence to Mr Metcalf and Mr Woodward. He advised all present that the document had been “hastily pulled together” and pointed out: “We have not taken any evidence yet with which to back up the comments contained herein.” However, he said that they “should be able to validate it given time.”
    
8. He added that “Parts IV and V in particular ought at this stage to be treated with care.” These were the sections relating to the background to the police operation for the 1989 Semi-Final and the events of the day; SYP had produced the document in five sections, rather than adhering to the six Mr Metcalf had recommended.
    
9. The minutes recorded Mr Woodward describing the document as “magnificent”.
    
10. There were two major topics of discussion during the meeting. Firstly, the lawyers asked whether the police were responsible for monitoring the capacity of the pens and closing the tunnel to the centre pens of the West Terrace if capacity was reached. This was with reference to the case of Harris v Sheffield United (see paragraphs 9.151–9.153). As detailed in chapter 9, Ch Supt Mole stated that there was a known contingency among senior officers to close the tunnel when the pens were full; both DCC Hayes and the legal team sought to confirm whether this was documented anywhere.
     
11. The second major topic was that Mr Woodward asked the officers present what had changed between the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest at Hillsborough Stadium and the parallel game in 1989. After Ch Supt Mole detailed some specific changes that had been made to the Operational Order, DCC Hayes stated: “Now there were other changes and I think this is what Mr Woodward wants. People tell me for example, that they had never seen at other similar football matches to this one so many non-ticket holders arriving, so much alcohol brought to the football matches, and therefore having to be consumed or disposed of at the turnstiles.”
     
12. ACC Anderson and Ch Supt Wain then gave examples of stories they had heard from officers about Liverpool supporters’ consumption of alcohol. None of these three officers—DCC Hayes, ACC Anderson or Ch Supt Wain—had been on duty at the game, so all were relying on information they had received from those who had been present, which they all acknowledged during the meeting.
     
13. Following this meeting, the draft proof of evidence was updated substantially to become the document known as the Wain report. Both the topics discussed at the meeting on 26 April were covered in detail, but in a way that did not replicate the full breadth of the discussions.
     
14. For example, on the subject of closing the tunnel, the Wain report overlooked Ch Supt Mole’s comments at the meeting and only included references that indicated it was not a safe or appropriate tactic. It also included several references to the roles and responsibilities of SWFC stewards, including a comment that “over the years, the clubs [sic] attention has been drawn to the fact that stewards were not performing their duties to the full.”
     
15. Some 15 paragraphs were allocated to a discussion of the case of Harris v Sheffield United. Towards the end of the section, the Wain report made clear that the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final was not covered by the contractual agreement that had been in place with clubs following the conclusion of the case. 
     
16. In part 4 of the Wain report, relating to police planning for the 1989 Semi-Final, there were multiple negative references to the behaviour of football supporters generally, plus some specific references to previous matches involving Liverpool. 
     
17. There were also multiple points of comparison between the 1988 game and the 1989 one—including comprehensive details of changes in the number of officers on duty at the two games.
     
18. In the very first draft of the proof of evidence, part 5 consisted of a chronological summary of the events of 15 April 1989, from 2pm to 3.33pm. In the Wain report, part 5 was over 100 pages long and quoted extensively from 81 officer accounts. Full versions of these accounts were also included in an appendix.
     
19. In a section with the subheading “Events to 2.30pm”, numerous quotes were included from officers about supporters drinking large amounts of alcohol and/or attempting to enter the ground without tickets. Some of these were potentially misleading. For example, in an extended quote from Supt Marshall describing supporters “drinking openly”, he commented: “all of the fans I encountered were Liverpool supporters”. This arguably gave the impression that only Liverpool supporters were drinking. However, as he was on duty at the Liverpool end, it was in fact no surprise that he only encountered Liverpool supporters.
     
20. The subsection on the emergency response also included several accounts where officers referred to their efforts being hampered in some way by the actions of supporters under the influence of alcohol.
     
21. At the Goldring Inquests on 20 April 2015, Ch Supt Wain was directly asked about the reasons behind the inclusion of this material, and whether it stemmed from discussions at the meeting with the legal team on 26 April 1989. He confirmed that was the case and that he had picked up “a concern among senior officers to ensure that any evidence about changes in fan behaviour was highlighted”.
     
22. At the Goldring Inquests, the barrister representing Ch Supt Wain pointed out that of the 81 accounts appended to version B of the proof of evidence, 31 officers stated they had witnessed the consumption of alcohol and a further 29 either referred to the effects of alcohol on supporters or made other observations about the involvement of alcohol. This therefore appeared to support Ch Supt Wain’s assertion—both at the Goldring Inquests and in his prepared statement to the IOPC—that the focus on alcohol consumption in the proof of evidence reflected the evidence of the SYP officers.
     
23. However, it overlooked the fact that SYP had control over which accounts it chose to include. According to dates on SYP’s HOLMES account, up to and including 8 May 1989, some 429 officer accounts (including seven statements) had been registered. There is no clear explanation of how the 81 accounts used were chosen. 
     
24. Having reviewed all these accounts, the IOPC has established that 44% of them included a reference to Liverpool supporters behaving in a way that could be seen as negative. By comparison, 72% of the accounts referred to in part 5 of the Wain report referred to negative supporter behaviour. This indicates that the accounts SYP selected for inclusion over-represented these issues.
     
25. These topics were then reintroduced in a section under the subheading “Observations”, which was written in a different style to the rest of part 5. As the subheading suggested, it was mostly comment; however, it did not accurately reflect the evidence of the preceding sections. More significantly, the section as a whole squarely pointed the finger at supporters, with a series of observations that had not been substantiated in the evidence included as part of the Wain report, or since. Examples of this were:
     
    • “Saturday 15 April 1989 was a warm and sunny Spring day, which should have provided the perfect atmosphere for a major sporting attraction. Instead, however, it would appear that many visiting spectators used this as an opportunity to find local public houses and off licences where they could purchase and consume alcohol, to the extent that in so doing their arrival at the stadium was seriously delayed.”
    • “The situation was exacerbated by the obvious influx of a large number of Liverpool supporters who did not have a ticket.”
    • “Despite substantial police resources which had been allocated for the event, senior officers found themselves suddenly and unexpectedly overwhelmed by several thousand spectators who had converged on the Leppings Lane entrance within a few minutes of the designated time for kickoff, many of whom being the worse for drink embarked upon a determined course of action, the aim of which was to enter Hillsborough Football Stadium at all cost; irrespective of any danger to property or, more importantly, the lives and safety of others.”
       
26. Strikingly, the Observations section was introduced with the comment: “the Chief Constable is content to make a number of observations which he feels may be pertinent to the Committee of Enquiry”. This firmly placed the responsibility for these observations on CC Wright.
     
27. On 9 May, the 288-page Wain report was given to the legal team. In a phone call before the legal team received it, ACC Anderson told Mr Metcalf that the draft was two inches thick. Mr Metcalf replied that “this was not too bad and that if we could cut it down to 1 inch thick with just a few crucial documents included as appendices to the report itself, then I would be really quite satisfied.” Having seen the draft, Mr Metcalf spoke to ACC Anderson again later that day and informed him that they intended to edit part 5, which would “be limited to factual comment up to about 2.00pm” on the day of the disaster.
     
28. The legal team edited the document extensively. The submitted version included no officer accounts. Clear points of comparison between the 1988 and 1989 Semi-Finals, such as differences in officer numbers, were mostly removed, as was the section on Harris v Sheffield United. The references to supporter behaviour on the day were cut, but some earlier references to previous matches involving Liverpool supporters were retained. Most notably, the section on the events of the day was cut from over 100 pages to just seven, and ended at 12 noon, when the turnstiles opened. The submitted version included the following explanation: “With a view to avoiding comment prejudicial to the Enquiry this background material does not seek to cover the tragic events which followed thereafter.”
     

29. The majority of the observations were removed from the version submitted to the Taylor Inquiry, leaving only a section of three paragraphs, with a very different tone: 
     

    “The South Yorkshire Police has been deeply involved with the tragic events which occurred on Saturday 15 April 1989. Police officers and civilian personnel involved in the operation have been deeply grieved by the death and suffering which they witnessed on an occasion which should have been an enjoyable sporting event. Many have had to seek professional counselling.
     

    “For those most directly involved, memories and a deep sense of sorrow will remain with them for the rest of their lives, particularly those officers who tried so desperately to save the lives of men, women and children.
     

    “The Force extends it sincere condolences to the relatives and loved ones of those who died.”
     

30. By the time the Wain report was handed to the legal team, there had been some significant developments in terms of the evidence that the Taylor Inquiry had requested from SYP. Notably, the accounts of the SYP officers on duty now had to be submitted to the Taylor Inquiry—a decision that led to the review and amendment process described in the previous chapter. This may explain why the legal team removed references to officers’ accounts from the proof of evidence.
     
31. At the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Wain acknowledged he was responsible for the proof of evidence, regardless of its authorship. Under cross-examination, he also accepted that the document he had overseen was potentially misleading.

• Read more about 10. SYP’s presentation of evidence to the Taylor Inquiry

What was investigated?

The IOPC investigated:
The evidence that was put forward on behalf of SYP, or by individual officers, to the WMP investigations, Lord Justice Taylor’s Inquiry, the contribution proceedings, and the inquests, or in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, considering:

a) whether any police officer gave or produced evidence that was inaccurate, false or deliberately misleading (or was involved in attempts to do so) 
b) whether such evidence contained inaccurate, misleading or irrelevant criticism of supporters’ behaviour 
c) whether the ‘Wain Report’ was an accurate and complete picture of the evidence 
d) whether any police officer was party to, or directed the production or selection of, evidence that was inaccurate or misleading, including irrelevant criticism of supporters’ behaviour and evidence regarding operational police tactics/actions to control supporters

This chapter focuses on the evidence presented to the Taylor Inquiry only, looking at the written submissions from SYP and the oral evidence given by individual officers.
 

What was found?

• The IOPC has found clear evidence the ‘Wain report’ was an internal draft of the proof of evidence SYP was required to provide to the Taylor Inquiry and was edited substantially by the legal team before submission. This is a different sequence from that proposed in the HIP Report which suggested that SYP expanded its proof of evidence to create the Wain report.

• The proof of evidence did not include any information about SYP being involved in monitoring safety in the pens, or about previous police tactics to control access to the centre pens at the Leppings Lane end by closing the central tunnel. There had been references to both of these topics in the Wain report. 

• The widely reported claim that supporters deliberately burned a police horse with cigarettes outside the stadium was not true. Detailed investigation found no evidence to support the claim; when this was put to a key witness, he changed his account of what had happened. 

• Before senior officers gave evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, most attended a meeting with Mr Metcalf, where those present agreed some “appropriate answers” that they could use in response to some of the expected questions. In some cases, officers then used these appropriate answers in their evidence, even where they included information the officer could not have known at the time.

• In their evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, several SYP senior officers stated, to differing degrees, that they had no knowledge of police actions to close the tunnel at the 1988 Semi-Final (or on other occasions) and that they did not see the police as having responsibility for monitoring the pens. This contradicted what some of them had said at internal meetings. 

• In SYP’s closing submissions to the Taylor Inquiry, delivered on 6 July 1989, there was no mention whatsoever of past actions to close the tunnel. This submission was written by the legal team, and SYP did not have sight of it before it was submitted. 
 

Significant new evidence 

The IOPC took statements from many of those involved in the production of SYP’s proof of evidence and from several officers who gave evidence to the Taylor Inquiry. In some cases, this required multiple requests, culminating in agreement that written statements could be provided without interview, where the witness was in poor health. 

As part of its investigation into the allegation that supporters had burned a police horse, the IOPC appointed an expert witness in equine health, who provided a comprehensive report.

1. In his Interim Report, Lord Justice Taylor made some deeply critical remarks about the quality of evidence SYP had provided to his inquiry. At paragraph 280, he commented that—with some exceptions—senior officers had been “defensive and evasive witnesses.” He then extended this criticism at paragraph 285, writing: “It is a matter of regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede they were in any respect at fault in what occurred.”
    
2. Reflecting that “the police case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk, and to blame the Club for failing to monitor the pens”, he concluded: “Such an unrealistic approach gives cause for anxiety as to whether lessons have been learnt. It would have been more seemly and encouraging for the future if responsibility had been faced.”
    
3. It has since been alleged that the evidence presented by SYP and its officers was not just unrealistic, as Lord Justice Taylor described it, but deliberately misleading.
    
4. The HIP Report commented that a document known as the ‘Wain report’, because it was produced under the direction of Ch Supt Wain, “placed significant emphasis on ticketless fans, alcohol and crowd behaviour.” The HIP Report showed that such emphasis was, at best, disproportionate. It also called into question the accuracy of some of the material in the Wain report, which it suggested was SYP’s main written submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
    
5. There were also questions raised in the HIP Report about the accuracy of the oral evidence some senior officers gave to the Taylor Inquiry.
    
6. Having reviewed the material cited in the HIP Report and received a referral from SYP that acknowledged the concerns about it, the IOPC made the evidence presented by SYP one of its terms of reference. The IOPC also received some complaints, from family members of some of those who died and from some supporters who were at the game, about the written and/or oral evidence given by certain officers. These were investigated under this term of reference.
    
7. The core of this strand of the investigation was to examine the evidence that was presented by SYP to the Taylor Inquiry, from written submissions to the Inquiry transcripts, and to compare this to other evidence. That included accounts given by officers at other times, to establish if there were any significant differences, and looking at a wider range of material, including photographs and video footage from the day of the disaster, to assess if anything said in evidence was inaccurate.
    
8. To investigate the accuracy and completeness of the Wain report, the IOPC conducted a close comparison of the three different versions of the proof of evidence that were in the archived material held by the investigations. By looking at documentary evidence—in particular meeting minutes and correspondence between senior SYP officers and SYP’s appointed solicitors, Hammond Suddards—investigators were able to clarify the sequence in which the three versions were produced and gain a greater understanding of who had been involved in drafting the various iterations. This was corroborated as far as possible through interviewing the senior SYP officers involved in producing the Wain report and members of the legal team.
    
9. The evidence clearly showed that the Wain report was the second internal draft of the document that would eventually become the proof of evidence, provided to the legal team on 9 May 1989. It was 288 pages long and included extracts from 81 officers’ accounts. The section covering the events of the day of the disaster amounted to over 100 pages. It was then radically edited by the legal team, to just 122 pages, and submitted to the Taylor Inquiry on 12 May. The extracts from officers’ accounts had been removed and the section on the events of the day reduced from over 100 pages to just seven, with no details whatsoever of events beyond 12 noon.
    
10. This sequence of events is different from that set out in the HIP Report, which suggested that the substantially longer Wain report was produced after the shorter version had been submitted. This is significant because it means that, rather than ‘expanding’ its case with more information, as the HIP Report suggested, SYP (via its lawyers) actually reduced it prior to submission.
     
11. The fact that the Wain report was not presented as evidence to the Taylor Inquiry means that it is primarily of investigative interest in understanding the development over time of SYP’s proposed evidence to the Inquiry.

• Read more about Conduct matters investigated

1. The IOPC also recorded and investigated several conduct matters relating to SYP’s collection of evidence. These focused on the actions of senior officers involved, including Ch Supt Denton and DCI Foster, but also CC Wright, DCC Hayes, ACC Anderson, Ch Supt Wain, Ch Insp Beal and DI Jones. The main allegations related to the officers either overseeing, or being directly involved in, a process to amend accounts, removing factual information which would have been of significance to the Taylor Inquiry. In some cases, officers were also alleged to have pressured colleagues to amend their accounts.
    
2. Having reviewed the evidence in the conduct report, the IOPC’s opinion was that DCI Foster would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, in relation to the allegation that he directly or indirectly brought undue pressure to bear upon those SYP officers who refused to make changes to their original accounts.
    
3. However, none of the officers would have had a case to answer for misconduct in relation to the amendment of accounts.
    
4. Though the evidence clearly showed there was a deliberate and concerted effort to amend the accounts—and that officers up to CC Wright were aware that amendments were being made—there was not (and still is no) duty of candour that applied to non-statutory public inquiries, such as the Taylor Inquiry. This meant that, as long as they did not mislead the Taylor Inquiry, there was no obligation for police officers, or any other party, to disclose information which might undermine the version of events they had portrayed or wished to portray, unless they were specifically asked for it. 
    
5. In simple terms, officers and, by extension, the force were legally entitled to present their best case within these parameters. 
    
6. However, it could also be suggested that there was a greater public interest in enabling the Taylor Inquiry to thoroughly examine all the causes of the disaster. By amending accounts, as part of presenting its best case, SYP did not act in that public interest.
    
7. This is one of the reasons the IOPC welcomes the introduction of a new, stronger statutory duty of candour for all public officials, including the police, as set out in the Public Office (Accountability) Bill.

• Read more about The trial of Mr Metcalf, Ch Supt Denton and DCI Foster

1. The extent and consistency of the amendment process led the IOPC to refer several individuals who had been involved in overseeing or implementing the process to the CPS, for decisions on whether they should face criminal charges of perverting the course of justice and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. 
    
2. Having reviewed the evidence, the CPS announced that Mr Metcalf, Ch Supt Denton and DCI Foster would be charged with perverting the course of justice. The three men went on trial on 19 April 2021. However, on 26 May 2021, having heard arguments from legal experts for the prosecution and the defence, the judge, Mr Justice William Davis, ruled that the defendants had no case to answer. 
    
3. This was because the offence they were charged with was perverting the course of justice in relation to the amendment of officer accounts presented to the Taylor Inquiry. Before the trial, a different judge (Sir Peter Openshaw, who had been the judge in the trial of Ch Supt Duckenfield and Mr Mackrell) ruled that as the Taylor Inquiry was a non-statutory departmental inquiry, it was not a course of justice. The case against Mr Metcalf, Ch Supt Denton and DCI Foster therefore required the prosecution to demonstrate that the amendment of officers’ accounts that were submitted to the Taylor Inquiry could also have affected the Popper Inquests or the subsequent criminal investigation conducted by WMP—both of which were courses of public justice. The judge concluded that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate this. 
    
4. Of the 68 amended accounts that were submitted by the CPS, Mr Justice Davis identified just four where he believed the amendments were significant enough to potentially mislead and therefore support a charge of perverting the course of justice, if the Taylor Inquiry had been a course of justice. However, he acknowledged that a key part of the prosecution case related to the consistency of the amendments and the impact this had on the overall body of evidence SYP presented.

• Read more about Explanations for the amendment process

1. Mr Metcalf, Ch Supt Denton and DCI Foster were all interviewed by the IOPC under caution in relation to their role in amending officers’ accounts. Mr Metcalf provided a prepared statement to the IOPC and did not answer investigators’ questions, as is his legal right. 
    
2. In the prepared statement, he explained his rationale in reviewing the accounts was “to keep the statements as factual as possible, to clarify inconsistencies or ambiguities within statements and between other statements, to remove comment and irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence, to tone down intemperate language, and to allow the witness to present the whole of their admissible evidence.” He accepted that in following this rationale he may, on occasion, have inadvertently suggested the removal of some factual content but emphasised this was not his intention. He further stated that his review comments were advice, not instructions. In a later response to the IOPC, he highlighted numerous instances where he had not suggested the removal or amendment of comments that appeared to criticise senior officers or that referenced communication difficulties on the day. 
    
3. While reiterating that he did not at any point intend to remove any facts from officers’ accounts, Mr Metcalf stated to the IOPC: “I am willing to accept that in a small number of cases my exercise of judgement could be criticised.” The IOPC’s evidence indicates that this significantly underplays his role. At his recommendation, factual information was removed repeatedly, following a consistent pattern: in particular to remove any reference to SYP having previously taken action to control access to the centre pens or close the central tunnel. While it may have been beneficial or desirable to SYP to put forward a set of accounts without inconsistencies, this did not assist with the Taylor Inquiry’s role of understanding how the disaster had occurred. 
    
4. Ch Supt Denton also exercised his right not to answer investigators’ questions. In a prepared statement provided to the IOPC at the start of the interview, he accepted “full supervisory responsibility” for the amendment process. However, in this statement he said that “amendments of the recollections were undertaken purely to ensure that they complied with the advice of the legal advisors and the requirements of formal witness statements for legal proceedings”. 
    
5. At the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Denton was asked for his views on some of the amendments. He accepted that in a couple of instances, facts had been removed and should not have been but argued that this was the result of errors of judgement and not anything more intentional.
    
6. DCI Foster provided a prepared statement to the IOPC and answered investigators’ questions. He confirmed he was the person mostly responsible for implementing amendments to officers’ accounts but consistently stated that he was acting in line with legal advice. When investigators asked him how that applied to the accounts that SYP reviewed and amended in-house, rather than through Hammond Suddards—a review process he had been central to—DCI Foster stated that he was following the broad principles and direction set by the legal team.

• Read more about Officers’ awareness of the amendment process

1. Very few officers recalled being asked to amend their accounts themselves. Instead, most said they were presented with a typed version of the account and asked to read and sign it.
    
2. The majority of officers did sign the amended accounts, effectively giving their approval to the changes. Some stated they did so in full knowledge of what had been changed and why. 
    
3. Other officers stated that they were aware that their accounts had been reviewed but had signed the amended versions without checking them thoroughly. When shown the amended versions, they were surprised at the extent of the changes.
    
4. A further group stated they were not told about the amendments at all before being asked to sign the typed version of their account.
    
5. One such officer was Police Constable Gary Cammock (PC Cammock). A series of handwritten notes on a copy of the fax from Hammond Suddards show that there was some discussion with PC Cammock about proposed amendments to his account (see figure 9E). 
    
6. The first note was dated 7 June 1989 and stated that PC Cammock had been seen and had agreed to the deletion of some swear words, as suggested by Hammond Suddards. However, the note continued: “he is not inclined to alter his criticism of the briefing.” This referred to comments PC Cammock had made about the main briefing given to all SYP officers on duty at 10am on the day of the disaster. He described the microphone system as “next to useless” and said he and others round him “could hear very little of what was actually said.” He added that this led to officers having to check the operational orders “to see exactly what we were supposed to do.” Hammond Suddards had suggested he review this.
    
7. A second note on the same fax was made by DCI Foster on 8 June. It instructed that the account should be retyped as amended. There is no indication that there was any further discussion with PC Cammock before this.

Image

Figure 9E: Notes made by SYP officers regarding the amendment of PC Cammock’s account (Source: SYP Archive)

1. PC Cammock told the IOPC that he did not remember being asked to sign an amended version, nor being spoken to by any senior officers regarding his account. When shown a version of the account with changes marked on it, PC Cammock acknowledged he had initialled the deletion of swear words but stated: “I do not think I would have agreed to that paragraph [regarding the briefing] being removed.”
    
2. Some officers who signed amended accounts have since gone on record to say they were pressured into doing so.
    
3. They described different degrees of pressure being placed on them, ranging from being threatened with transfer or dismissal, to one officer being told that if he didn’t agree to the amendments, his account would not be submitted to the Taylor Inquiry. 
    
4. Two of the officers said that after refusing to accept the amendments, they were sent to see DCI Foster. A third believed he had seen a different senior officer, but DCI Foster separately stated he had made the amendments to this third officer’s account. DCI Foster recalled meeting some officers regarding their accounts but denied putting pressure on them.
    
5. A fourth officer said that he was called in to see Ch Insp Beal and that one of the others who had refused to accept the amendments was there at the same time as him. 
    
6. Ch Insp Beal accepted he “may have been tasked to speak with officers about amending statements” but said this would have been on legal advice. In a later statement to the IOPC, he directly denied having met this fourth officer.
    
7. While the evidence is inconclusive in relation to Ch Insp Beal’s alleged interaction with this fourth officer, Ch Insp Beal accepted—during the Goldring Inquests—that he had been involved in the amendment of a specific set of accounts. These were the accounts of four communications officers who had been in the PCB at the ground on the day of the disaster.
    
8. The amendments to all four accounts were proposed by Mr Metcalf in a fax sent to Ch Supt Denton on 19 May 1989. Mr Metcalf noted that the officers had “slightly different perspectives as to exactly what happened in relation to the communications problems.” He suggested that they should “be seen again to go through their recollections of this crucial period.”
    
9. This only happened in one case, of a civilian communication officer. The other three accounts were amended by Ch Insp Beal, without him contacting the officers who had produced them. None were aware that their accounts had been amended; two felt the changes were minor. The last of the group had more substantial amendments made to his account but told the IOPC that the new text actually clarified the situation. 

• Read more about Nature and scale of the amendments

1. The IOPC’s investigation has established that, via the two amendment processes, a total of 327 SYP officers’ accounts were amended. This was 133 more than identified in the HIP Report and amounts to approximately 1 in 4 of all SYP officer accounts relating to the day. 
    
2. Of these amended accounts, 297 were sent to WMP.
    
3. The IOPC analysed all the amendments in depth, including 
    
   • looking at the amendments thematically
   • examining how closely the amendments that SYP made as a result of the first amendment process reflected the advice from Hammond Suddards, which in practice in almost every case meant Mr Metcalf
   • comparing the amendments made in the second review process, conducted wholly by SYP officers, to those made in the first, based on input from Hammond Suddards
      
4. In addition, the IOPC re-examined the accounts that were not amended, to establish if any included the kind of content that was removed from or amended in other accounts. This was to assess the consistency and rigour with which the amendment process was applied.
    
5. The suggestions provided by Mr Metcalf included the following: 

1. The comments received resulted in amendments ranging from changing a single word or phrase (for example, “panic” to “extreme urgency”) to substantial cuts or changes. Some of these were of minimal consequence: for example, in response to the suggestion to end the account at “Mexborough”, three paragraphs were cut. This was the account of a police sergeant who had been on duty: the three paragraphs detailed the officer’s return to his home police station and the response of his colleagues over subsequent days.
    
2. In other instances, potentially significant information was removed. The suggestion that an account could end at “off duty on page 3” resulted in the deletion of the following sentence: “At the time of the incident there seemed to be no communication between the officers directly involved on the ground and officers in the control room and no senior officer could be seen to be in charge of directing officers at the Leppings Lane end.” While it could be argued that the first half of this paragraph was comment or speculation—in that the officer said there seemed to be no communication—the second half described what he saw (or didn’t see).
    
3. In the accounts that were amended in-house, some of the marked changes were extremely similar to those suggested by Hammond Suddards. For example, on one account the phrase “a sound of panic” was changed to “a sound of urgency”—an almost direct repeat of a wording change cited in the table above.
    
4. Of the 327 amended accounts, in 85 cases, the amendments were purely corrections to spelling and grammar or matters of style.
    
5. The stated rationale for the review and amendment process was the removal of opinion and comment. Of the 172 suggestions for amendment made by Mr Metcalf, 16 specifically referred to text in the officer’s account being “comment”—thus inferring it should be removed or amended—and others were described as including “hearsay”, “impressions” or in two instances “personal and graphic” recollections.
    
6. The amendments SYP made based on these comments frequently went beyond the removal of opinion—for example, deleting aspects of officers’ recollections of events both at the 1989 Semi-Final and at previous games. The amendments also went beyond the correction of information, with changes that removed certain details often altering the meaning of a sentence.
    
7. Having established the full extent of the amendments, the IOPC then refined this analysis, looking at the amendments made in relation to six themes, agreed with the CPS as a useful means of analysing them for the purposes of demonstrating to a jury the extent and impact of the amendment process.
    
8. Content that referred to communication issues—such as problems with police radios—was amended in 40 accounts (31 on the basis of suggestions from Hammond Suddards). Typically, the amendments involved changing generic comments (for example, that radios weren’t working) to individual ones (that the officer’s radio wasn’t working). However, the IOPC identified at least 80 accounts where comments about communication issues were not amended.
    
9. Comments about aspects of police planning and tactics, including pre-match briefings, an apparent shortage of officers and a lack of coordination in the rescue effort were amended in 31 accounts, but left unchanged in 13.
    
10. References to the failure of police control outside Leppings Lane were amended in 29 accounts but not amended in 45. A common theme among the amendments related to the decision not to delay the kick-off.
     
11. There were 63 accounts from which criticisms of senior officers and/or police command and control were removed or reworded, typically to remove comments that suggested a lack of leadership or direction. However, the IOPC also identified 49 accounts where criticisms of the senior officers or overall police command and control were not changed.
     
12. References to the police having contingency plans to close the tunnel to the centre pens of the West Terrace in the event of overcrowding, or having previously taken action to do so, were removed from all five accounts in which they appeared. 
     
13. Comments that indicated SYP had any responsibility for monitoring safety in the pens—including any actions to monitor the capacity of the pens at previous matches—were removed from all eight accounts where they appeared.
     
14. By reviewing the amendments in detail, the IOPC has established that there was a high degree of consistency between the amendments suggested by Mr Metcalf and those made by the SYP team. The evidence also indicates that particular care was taken to remove references to SYP being responsible for monitoring safety in the pens or taking steps to control access to the centre pens by closing the tunnel. These were potentially pivotal points; if SYP accepted any such responsibility or acknowledged it had previously taken action to close the tunnel, this could indicate that the force had failed to fulfil these responsibilities on the day of the disaster. As is examined in the next chapter, references to both topics were also removed from the written proof of evidence that SYP submitted to the Taylor Inquiry.
     
15. The amendments to the accounts and proof of evidence were made after these two topics were discussed in detail in meetings between SYP and its legal team—notably at the meeting on 26 April 1989 referred to in paragraphs 9.84–9.90.
     
16. In this meeting, the lawyers and DCC Hayes advocated a position that SYP was not responsible for safety in the pens or controlling access to the tunnel, arguing that no such responsibility was documented anywhere.
     
17. However, Ch Supt Mole stated that there was a known contingency among senior officers to close the tunnel when the pens were full—although he subsequently added that it was only a contingency and may never have been used. This appeared to align with the views expressed by CC Wright, in the meeting on 17 April, when he had commented: “you were well aware there were contingencies to deal with the filled stand, i.e. the shutting off of the tunnel.”
     
18. While this responsibility was not documented in the Operational Order, in a court case a few years previously, SYP had argued that it should be paid by football clubs for policing matches, because they were undertaking special police services beyond maintaining law and order: namely, taking responsibility for safety on the terraces. In evidence to the court, SYP officers had described how they did this. SYP won the case, known as Harris v Sheffield United. In meetings between SYP and its legal team, there were repeated references to the case; on 26 April, Mr Woodward even read from the case transcript at one point.
     
19. It is important to note that in the case, SYP was only seeking payment for policing the normal ‘home’ league and matches of clubs in the South Yorkshire area, not for matches when a stadium was being used as a neutral ground, such as FA Cup semi-finals. This was reflected in the meeting when DCC Hayes noted that the 1989 Semi-Final was not within the contract SYP had with SWFC.
     
20. However, when giving evidence in court, none of the officers who testified stated that the responsibility for safety on the terraces only applied to scheduled home games for clubs in South Yorkshire. Further, none of those present at the meeting on 26 April questioned the relevance of the case, or its applicability to the policing of Hillsborough Stadium on the day of the disaster. 
     
21. Amending accounts to remove references to monitoring safety on the terraces therefore appears a material change to the evidence that SYP officers had given. It meant that SYP presented a more consistent argument to the Taylor Inquiry, but an incomplete one. For example, the amendment to the account of Insp White involved the removal of a 200-word section describing his “practice over the years” to climb the steps of the PCB so that he could monitor the build-up in the pens. The same change removed Insp White’s explanation of some practical considerations around tunnel closure, which included the comment: “Although on rare occasions in the past I have used the gates nearest the concourses to control flow away from the tunnel around to the south pen.” 
     
22. Insp White was recognised by SYP colleagues as one of the officers with the most experience of policing the Leppings Lane end. This description of how he had monitored the pens and closed the tunnel in the past was simply removed from his account, so the information was not available to WMP or the Taylor Inquiry.