Though the IOPC had access to thousands of archive documents relating to the investigations, there was comparatively little evidence within these documents about how WMP conducted its investigations. To address this, in September 2013, the IOPC launched a witness appeal, inviting people who had any contact with WMP during its initial investigation to contact the IOPC and share their accounts and experiences. This became the largest witness appeal the IOPC had ever conducted. In total, 1,713 individuals responded, of whom 1,325 said they had some dealings with WMP. Many of those who responded had never previously given an account to any inquiry or investigation.
Every respondent who had contact with WMP was asked if they believed the account they gave to WMP adequately reflected their experiences on the day of the disaster. While over 800 respondents said it did, 490 answered this question “no”. These individuals were then asked why: a range of reasons were given, with some giving more than one reason.
Those who said “no” were contacted again by IOPC investigators who asked for more information about the reasons for their dissatisfaction. Before contacting them, the IOPC investigators examined archived material and the WMP HOLMES databases to retrieve any statement or questionnaire registered by WMP in the respondent’s name. Investigators then sent the respondent a copy of these documents or, where the documents had already been published on the HIP website, directed them to the relevant pages.
In many cases, the dissatisfaction expressed specifically related to the fact that the respondent recalled being interviewed by WMP but had not been able to find any documentation related to them. One reason for this was that, in many cases, the HIP redacted the names of witnesses before publishing the documents. Once they had confirmed that there were documents that related to them, many of these witnesses informed the IOPC that they had no further issues.
However, over a quarter of those who had engaged with WMP expressed concerns about the behaviour and manner of the officers who interviewed them. Other common concerns raised by respondents were that WMP officers:
interviewed witnesses, but did not take a formal statement from them
did not record witnesses’ evidence accurately
appeared uninterested in what the witness had to say
focused excessively on alcohol consumption
interviewed witnesses under the age of 18 without an adult being present
Arising from these concerns, the IOPC received 66 formal complaints relating to these issues. This meant that WMP’s approach to collecting evidence from supporters for the Taylor Inquiry was the most common source of complaints related to the Hillsborough disaster.
The IOPC’s terms of reference included investigating: The conduct of officers involved in WMP’s investigations. This will include:
a) the involvement of WMP in the decisions taken about how to gather evidence/obtain witness accounts b) whether police officers involved in this investigation put inappropriate pressure on any witnesses to alter their accounts or influence the content of those accounts c) whether the summaries of evidence WMP presented at the individual inquests were accurate d) whether there is any evidence of bias in favour of SYP on the part of those involved in or leading the investigation e) whether any accounts provided were deliberately lost, inaccurately recorded, amended, or mishandled (including not following up on key witnesses) f) investigating other recorded complaints or conduct matters about the actions of WMP in the gathering or presenting of evidence
WMP’s work in relation to the Hillsborough disaster consisted of several different investigative strands: gathering evidence for the Taylor Inquiry, a criminal investigation, a police disciplinary investigation and supporting the Popper Inquests. WMP’s work had previously received little scrutiny but was subject to numerous complaints. The IOPC therefore conducted a substantial and wide-ranging investigation that considered each of these strands separately. This chapter focuses on the work WMP did for the Taylor Inquiry.
What was found?
• In the weeks after the disaster, WMP interviewed more than 3,800 supporters who had been at the match. This was an extremely challenging task, requiring relatively untrained officers to interview large numbers of severely traumatised witnesses over a short period of time.
• There were occasions where officers did not show sufficient compassion for witnesses—particularly those under the age of 18—which undoubtedly added to their already considerable distress. However, the evidence, including from supporters and respondents to the IOPC’s witness appeal, indicates that this occurred in a minority of cases only and that, for the most part, WMP officers undertook this work professionally.
• Some of the main criticisms of the WMP officers involved in this task were that they focused excessively on supporters’ alcohol consumption and that they did not record supporters’ accounts accurately. Though the evidence indicates that there were instances where aspects of accounts weren’t recorded accurately, the IOPC did not find evidence that this was a recurring or widespread issue.
• Many supporters interviewed by WMP recalled being questioned extensively about their alcohol consumption on the day, and about whether other supporters were drinking. However, the questionnaires WMP completed with supporters and statements it took included very few comments about alcohol consumption.
• Despite the absence of evidence from supporters about alcohol consumption, the officers leading the WMP investigation appear to have reached a view that alcohol was a key factor in the disaster, and that the Taylor Inquiry did not consider it sufficiently. This became apparent in a memo sent from the most senior detective involved, D Ch Supt Foster, to the officer in overall charge of WMP’s work, ACC Jones, after Counsel to the Taylor Inquiry had made his closing comments.
• WMP did not interview SYP officers to take statements from them for the Taylor Inquiry. It is not clear that WMP ever committed to doing so, but nor is it clear that, as those leading the WMP investigation have claimed, they were instructed by the Taylor Inquiry to simply gather SYP officers’ accounts as evidence for the Inquiry.
• When WMP senior officers were alerted to the fact that SYP officers’ accounts were being amended—in some cases, significantly—before SYP submitted them, WMP did not take action to check the process or stop it.
Significant new evidence
In investigating the work of WMP, the IOPC had three significant sources of new evidence:
• The policy books of ACC Jones, who led WMP’s work around the disaster. This was a series of 14 physical notebooks into which were attached detailed, chronological records of ACC Jones’s correspondence, telephone calls and meeting notes throughout the investigations. Each entry was numbered, and they appeared to form a continuous record. Some of this material had been previously disclosed to the HIP, and there were other copies of some of the documents elsewhere in the archived material. However, there was also a large volume of material in the policy books that had not previously been considered.
• The responses to a major witness appeal, conducted by the IOPC in 2013, inviting people who had any contact with WMP during its initial investigation to contact the IOPC and share their accounts and experiences. This was the largest witness appeal ever conducted by the IOPC and was publicised across a range of channels, including national media and local media in Merseyside, South Yorkshire and the West Midlands. It was also publicised by Liverpool Football Club. Some 1,713 people responded, of whom 1,325 said they had some dealings with WMP.
• A set of 165 floppy disks—a digital storage technology used widely in the 1980s and 1990s—relating to the WMP investigation. These were in the South Yorkshire Police Archive, so had been available for review previously; however, they were not examined by the HIP, potentially because they were in a storage format that was no longer widely used. The IOPC employed a specialist company to recover all the material from these floppy disks into a format that could be read by today’s computers. Investigators then reviewed the material. While much of the material duplicated existing documents and records, the process did lead to the discovery of some new information, including correspondence between WMP officers that was not recorded elsewhere.
In addition, the IOPC took statements from more than 100 former WMP officers who had been involved in different aspects of the force’s work.
WMP was the police force responsible for investigating the Hillsborough disaster. Its involvement began on the day after the disaster and continued for almost two years. Its role and responsibilities evolved during this time, meaning WMP ultimately undertook four distinct, though overlapping, strands of work:
gathering evidence for the Taylor Inquiry from supporters who had been at the Semi-Final, the families of those who died in the disaster, police officers and a range of other witnesses
a criminal investigation
a police disciplinary investigation, overseen by the PCA, the national body that oversaw complaints against police officers at the time
supporting the Popper Inquests
Though some aspects of WMP’s work had previously been reviewed through the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny and the Goldring Inquests, the actions of WMP in relation to the disaster had not previously been the subject of a formal investigation. However, the HIP Report raised questions about the adequacy, integrity and professionalism of certain aspects of WMP’s investigations, including that, when interviewing Liverpool supporters in the aftermath of the disaster, officers focused disproportionately on alcohol consumption. Behind these questions was the underlying concern that WMP may have been biased in favour of SYP.
Recognising these questions and concerns, in 2012 WMP referred the actions of a small number of its officers to the IOPC for investigation. This referral led the IOPC to make the actions of officers involved in the WMP investigations one of the terms of reference for its independent investigation into the aftermath of the disaster. The IOPC subsequently received 118 complaints about the actions of WMP officers. A clear majority of these were related to the way WMP officers had collected evidence from Liverpool supporters. For example, 46 complaints focused on issues around how WMP recorded evidence and whether they had done so accurately. Fifteen were related to an alleged focus on supporters’ alcohol consumption. Seven covered WMP interviewing those under the age of 18 in an inappropriate way.
The IOPC upheld the complaint or found a case to answer in 41 instances.
It quickly became clear to the IOPC that examining WMP’s work as a single entity was neither helpful nor appropriate. The different strands of activity overlapped in terms of their timing but had separate aims and involved different officers. Separating the strands of work provided a degree of clarity in assessing the actions of the WMP officers involved against relevant standards. For instance, it made it easier to examine whether WMP conducted its disciplinary investigation to the professional standards that would have applied at the time, regardless of whether its work supporting Dr Popper was sufficient.
As well as investigating each strand individually, the IOPC has separated the work into different chapters of this report. This one focuses on the work WMP did for the Taylor Inquiry, covering the period from the day after the disaster, up to the publication of the Taylor Interim Report in August 1989.
The HIP had found documents that indicated a PNC check had been conducted on a person who made a claim for compensation after the disaster. In its report, the HIP raised the concern that more such checks may have been conducted. The IOPC examined the circumstances around this and sought to establish if any similar checks had been made.
The disclosed documents showed that solicitors acting on behalf of SYP wrote to CC Wells on 2 March 1995 to request details of the criminal records of a Liverpool supporter who had claimed compensation for loss of earnings as a result of the disaster. The request was fulfilled by an inspector who was part of the SYP CRO on 15 March 1995 and appears to have resulted in a complaint from the solicitor representing the claimant. A subsequent SYP note indicated that the matter was resolved between the two sets of solicitors, and no further action was required.
In the circumstances, there is no evidence to suggest that this check was carried out inappropriately.
IOPC investigators carried out a comprehensive search of the archived material available to the investigations to establish whether any form of check was conducted on any other individual who made a claim for compensation. Only one was found.
This took place in April 1989, just days after the disaster. It followed the receipt on 18 April 1989 of a claim for compensation against SYP and SWFC for injuries sustained. A document showed that both a PNC check and a CRO check were conducted on the claimant. The document did not explain why these checks were carried out or why a printout of the record was added to the claim file.
While it is possible that further records have been legitimately destroyed in line with retention policies, there is no other evidence to suggest that there was a decision or intention to conduct PNC checks on survivors of the disaster.
On the main HOLMES database used by WMP, the records for 94 of those who died suggest that CRO checks were carried out. A CRO check is not the same as a PNC check. It does not provide the same level of detail and typically only includes any unspent convictions.
The IOPC has not found any specific explanation for why or when CRO checks were conducted, nor any evidence of who conducted them or who instructed that they should be conducted.
This still does not explain how the solicitor obtained the information. There is no record of any direct contact between WMP and the solicitor, and the documents in his possession were PNC printouts, not CRO checks.
Despite pursuing multiple routes, it has not been possible to ascertain how or why he had obtained this information. The IOPC has not found any legitimate reason for it to have been in his possession.
However, the IOPC did find evidence to show that SYP should have conducted PNC checks on all of those who died, shortly after the disaster. This is part of a standard process for updating the PNC and removing the records of those who have died from it. Though there is evidence to suggest that some checks were conducted, they were not done systematically and consistently, as they should have been.
This became apparent when, in June 2014 and with the consent of families, IOPC investigators conducted PNC checks on those who had died in, or as a direct result of, the disaster. If the process had been followed correctly, no records should have been found, as their details should have been removed from the PNC. However, investigators discovered that, as of June 2014, details of nine of those who died had not been removed from the PNC.
Following the IOPC’s discovery, the PNC has now been corrected and the relevant records removed. The IOPC wrote to the families of all those who died, explaining what had happened and offering to inform them if details of their family member had incorrectly remained on the PNC. Separately, the then National Policing Lead for Information Management apologised to the families for this oversight. In a letter, he explained that though he was not able to identify precisely where the process failed, the failure did not appear to have been a deliberate act.
The IOPC sought to establish who carried out the checks, why, and how the information had been given to the solicitor. Investigators made several attempts to interview the solicitor, who had indicated he wanted to speak to the IOPC. However, he was in poor health and unable to answer questions. Members of his family, who had worked with him, and other former colleagues spoke to the IOPC and confirmed they had no knowledge of how he had obtained this information. They allowed the IOPC to take further documents from the solicitor’s home to review, but these contained no further references to the PNC checks.
Supt Marshall stated he had no knowledge of, or involvement in, any PNC checks being carried out in relation to the Hillsborough disaster. Investigators did not find any information to suggest otherwise.
Investigators also compared handwriting on the documents to a sample of Supt Marshall’s handwriting. The visual dissimilarities between the two were so apparent to the naked eye that no further comparative analysis was deemed necessary. Investigators asked the solicitor’s family if they recognised the handwriting as his. They all agreed it was not.
The format of the printouts showed that they were from the original PNC rather than from PNC2, which became available to police forces in 1991. This narrowed the time window; however, it also meant that there were no records to show who had conducted the search or produced the printouts. Under PNC2 and current procedure, the name of the officer who conducts a check is automatically recorded and stored.
IOPC investigators spoke to two former PNC operators at SYP to understand how the PNC was used by the force in 1989 and up to the launch of PNC2. The operators explained that PNC checks were typically conducted by trained staff at a dedicated terminal. As far as they could remember, in 1989 SYP had two PNC terminals in the CRO and an additional two in the Force Control Room. To request a check, officers in the field would call in via radio or telephone. They would have to give their name and collar number, plus the name and date of birth of the subject of the check. The information they requested was recorded on paper logs, along with the date and time the check was requested. The paper logs were kept for 12 months before they were destroyed. In line with this policy, the IOPC has not found any paper logs from the time.
The IOPC asked SYP officers interviewed if they had any recollection of PNC checks being carried out after the disaster. The only officers who referred to anything of this sort were some of those who had been involved at either the gymnasium or at the MLC in documenting the details of each of those who died in the disaster. They noted that the forms they completed included a tick-box referring to PNC checks. This was not ticked on any of the forms, supporting the accounts of the officers that they had not had access to the PNC when they were conducting this task.
The IOPC checked all the HOLMES databases used by SYP and WMP in relation to the disaster. There was no record in any of them of an instruction to conduct PNC checks.
This meant that the IOPC had no further avenues available to establish who conducted the checks or why, or who had provided the solicitor with the information.
The carrying out of Police National Computer checks on those who died and others to establish, if possible, which police force or police officer was responsible for this, the reasons why it was done, and whether it was justified.
What was found?
• The Police National Computer (PNC) checks carried out after the disaster were done using the original PNC, which was replaced by PNC2 in 1991. This meant that, unlike PNC2, there would have been no records in the system to show who had conducted the search or produced the printouts.
• The IOPC has not been able to establish who carried out the PNC checks or wrote the accompanying summary. However, it has established that the handwriting on the summary did not belong to the solicitor who originally provided these documents to the HIP, or to his client, Supt Marshall.
• SYP standing orders from the time indicate that carrying out PNC checks on those who died would have been in line with procedure, so that records could be updated. However, in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster, it appears that the process followed was not in line with SYP guidance.
• This was confirmed when in 2014 the IOPC conducted PNC checks on those who died in the disaster and found that records relating to nine of those who died had not been removed, as they should have been. This has since been rectified, and the National Policing Lead for Information Management apologised to the families of those who died for the oversight.
• WMP conducted Criminal Records Office (CRO) checks on 94 of those who died. The IOPC has not found any specific explanation for why or when this was done, nor any evidence of who conducted them.
• In response to the concern that PNC checks had been carried out on someone who claimed compensation after the disaster, the IOPC conducted a comprehensive search of the archived material to establish whether any form of check was conducted on any other individual. Only one more check was found.
Significant new evidence
In June 2016, during a search of SYP premises conducted at the IOPC’s request, a book of SYP standing orders from late 1989/early 1990 was found. This contained the standing orders around use of the PNC referred to in this section.
The IOPC also contacted former PNC operators at SYP to understand how the PNC was used in 1989 and up to the launch of PNC2.
The PNC is a national database of information available to all UK police forces and law enforcement agencies. It holds a range of information relevant to policing, such as records of people who have previous convictions, cautions and formal warnings. It also holds information about all UK drivers and the vehicles they own.
The PNC is used by police officers and some police staff routinely in their daily work, for a range of reasons, but there are strict rules on how it should be used. Looking up whether a person has a criminal record on the PNC is known as conducting a PNC check.
Documents disclosed to the HIP showed that PNC checks were conducted on some of those who died in the Hillsborough disaster. This information had not previously been public knowledge. The documents, which consisted of printouts from the PNC and a handwritten list of personal data about some of those who had died, had been in the possession of the solicitor who had represented Supt Marshall during the original criminal investigation into the disaster and at the Popper Inquests.
The documents gave rise to the concern that, in this instance, PNC checks may have been carried out inappropriately or even unlawfully. One reason for this concern was that the checks appeared to have been carried out systematically on a targeted group: those who died in the disaster and who had blood alcohol levels over zero. Another reason was that the information had been in the possession of a third party (the solicitor) who, under normal police procedure, would not have had access to PNC data.
The HIP Report suggested that the checks were carried out in an attempt to impugn the reputations of those who died. In addition, the HIP Report stated that, in response to claims for compensation for injuries sustained at Hillsborough Stadium, “South Yorkshire Police (SYP) undertook criminal records checks on the claimants.” In fact, the documents available to the HIP provided evidence that this had happened in one case.
As there appeared to be a clear breach of accepted practice around the use of the PNC, both SYP and WMP referred the matter to the IOPC to investigate.
While the testing of blood alcohol levels of those who died in the disaster had been a contentious subject since the Popper Inquests, the testing of blood alcohol levels of survivors only became public knowledge through two documents disclosed to the HIP.
The first was a note from Dr Forrest, the same toxicologist who carried out the blood alcohol testing on the majority of those who died in the disaster, to Mr Alan Crosby, A&E Consultant at the Royal Hallamshire Hospital, on the afternoon of the disaster. The document listed 11 names and/or hospital identification numbers of survivors, a date and time, and their blood alcohol levels. For 9 of the 11 individuals listed, no alcohol was detected.
The second was a document which, under the heading “Alcohol”, recorded the number of those who died that had blood alcohol levels over 80mg/100ml (the legal alcohol limit for driving in England, Wales and Northern Ireland) then included the note: “few of those admitted had appreciable levels”.
The IOPC used these documents as the basis to investigate why blood alcohol had been tested in these cases, and to establish if any other injured patients had been tested.
One of the first things the IOPC established in relation to the first document was that although there were 11 names or identification numbers on the list, it referred to only ten individuals: one was listed twice.
There was no record of this blood alcohol testing in the medical notes of eight of the ten survivors. The reasons for treatment did not suggest any correlation between those who were tested and the injuries they had or treatment they required: the list of those tested included individuals who had only minor injuries as well as some with more serious injuries.
IOPC investigators sought to contact each of the ten individuals listed on the note, or their families, to find out whether they knew anything about the testing. Where individuals gave consent, investigators reviewed the respective medical records to ascertain whether there was any common pattern or clinical reason (such as common pre-existing medical conditions) behind their blood alcohol level being tested.
None was found. Of the ten individuals, four were conscious on arrival; five were unconscious and one semi-conscious. Seven were admitted to intensive care.
Five of the patients agreed to talk to the IOPC. None of those interviewed recalled having their blood taken while in hospital. None thought that having a blood sample taken was an unreasonable step in their treatment, nor did they think they would have objected to it or questioned it at the time. However, none remembered being asked whether they were willing to have their blood taken for alcohol testing or being told that their blood alcohol level would be tested.
The IOPC followed a range of routes to establish whether blood alcohol testing had been carried out on any other injured patients. No evidence was found to suggest it had been.
IOPC investigators interviewed Dr Forrest and Mr Crosby to ask what they remembered of the testing and whether there had been any police influence on the decision to carry out tests.
Dr Forrest said he was aware, when he did it, that he “was carrying out the tests on people who had been injured at Hillsborough.” He said that the tests were authorised by a consultant, and he had no reservations about doing them. He suggested that the consultant may have been intending to write a report or scientific paper on the disaster.
Mr Crosby, who authorised the tests told the IOPC he couldn’t remember asking for them but agreed that the request had come from him. He also accepted Dr Forrest’s suggestion that it was possible he was considering writing a paper. However, he stated: “there would have been an initial clinical reason” for taking blood samples.
Crucially for the IOPC investigation, Mr Crosby stated strongly that he had not been asked by police officers to conduct blood alcohol testing and that “A suggestion like that from a police officer would not have gone down too well.”
The allegation that the decision to test blood alcohol was part of an attempt to discredit Liverpool supporters was reinforced for some by the way the information about blood alcohol was presented at the Popper Inquests. As explained earlier, the blood alcohol levels of all those who died were read out together in the evidence of the toxicologist, Dr Bob Forrest. Each individual’s blood alcohol level was then read out again as part of the factual summary given in relation to that individual.
IOPC investigators asked Dr Popper why blood alcohol levels had been read out twice in this way. Dr Popper could not specifically recall this and suggested “it was merely a matter of convenience”.
Documentary evidence shows that the approach was discussed at a pre-inquest review meeting, attended by some of the solicitors representing the families of those who had died in the disaster. There was no suggestion that any of them voiced any concern about it.
WMP was supporting Dr Popper in his work. The IOPC therefore examined records of WMP’s investigation, such as the policy books of ACC Jones, who led WMP’s work for the Popper Inquests. No reference of any sort was found to when blood alcohol levels should or would be read out.
While presenting the information twice in this way may have been distressing to families, the IOPC found no evidence to suggest it was done in an attempt to discredit those who died, or Liverpool supporters more generally.
