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Development of the proof of evidence

  1. On 19 April 1989, in the first meeting between SYP and Hammond Suddards after the disaster, Mr Metcalf told those present, including DCC Hayes, ACC Anderson and Ch Supt Denton, that the force would be expected to submit a proof of evidence to the Taylor Inquiry. Though there was no official requirement to do this, it was what a (non-police) party represented by Mr Metcalf had done during a previous public inquiry.
     
  2. There was some discussion among the officers present about what should be covered in the proof of evidence. DCC Hayes concluded this topic by stating that SYP had little experience of public inquiries and asked Mr Metcalf for some guidance on what should be included. Mr Metcalf suggested some broad headings during the meeting, which he confirmed in a letter to DCC Hayes the following day. These were:

    "1. The South Yorkshire Police: history, geographical area, manning and organisation.
    2. The policing of sporting events: the statutory and common law background to Police involvement.
    3. The approach of the South Yorkshire Police to the policing of major sporting events: the history of such operations and the current standing operational orders.
    4. The specific background to Police involvement in the match to be played at Hillsborough on 15th April.
    5. Details of the manpower and organisation for the match.
    6. The events which occurred.”
     
  3. In the letter, Mr Metcalf also advised DCC Hayes: “In our view, it will be necessary to have statements from as many as possible of the Officers who were deployed at the ground on that day”.
     
  4. At some point between 19 and 24 April, DCC Hayes appointed Ch Supt Wain to take responsibility for production of the proof of evidence. Ch Supt Wain was, at the time, divisional commander of the Rotherham division of SYP. He was a highly experienced officer who had worked as a detective, led major investigations and run major incident rooms. He had also been match commander for a large number of football matches. At the Goldring Inquests, DCC Hayes confirmed he had specifically chosen to delegate the task of producing the report to Ch Supt Wain as he saw him as “an extremely good communicator, an extremely good administrator.”
     
  5. At a meeting in DCC Hayes’s office on 24 April 1989, this responsibility was confirmed. DCC Hayes instructed Ch Supt Wain and his team to have a draft report ready for a meeting with the legal team on 26 April.
     
  6. The minutes recorded that, by the time of the meeting, Ch Supt Mole had already produced initial drafts of content relating to headings 4 and 5 and Ch Insp Beal, who was not present at the meeting, had begun drafting the content for heading 3. The other headings were then allocated to different members of the team.
     
  7. At the meeting on 26 April, Ch Supt Wain gave the first draft of the proof of evidence to Mr Metcalf and Mr Woodward. He advised all present that the document had been “hastily pulled together” and pointed out: “We have not taken any evidence yet with which to back up the comments contained herein.” However, he said that they “should be able to validate it given time.”
     
  8. He added that “Parts IV and V in particular ought at this stage to be treated with care.” These were the sections relating to the background to the police operation for the 1989 Semi-Final and the events of the day; SYP had produced the document in five sections, rather than adhering to the six Mr Metcalf had recommended.
     
  9. The minutes recorded Mr Woodward describing the document as “magnificent”.
     
  10. There were two major topics of discussion during the meeting. Firstly, the lawyers asked whether the police were responsible for monitoring the capacity of the pens and closing the tunnel to the centre pens of the West Terrace if capacity was reached. This was with reference to the case of Harris v Sheffield United (see paragraphs 9.151–9.153). As detailed in chapter 9, Ch Supt Mole stated that there was a known contingency among senior officers to close the tunnel when the pens were full; both DCC Hayes and the legal team sought to confirm whether this was documented anywhere.
     
  11. The second major topic was that Mr Woodward asked the officers present what had changed between the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest at Hillsborough Stadium and the parallel game in 1989. After Ch Supt Mole detailed some specific changes that had been made to the Operational Order, DCC Hayes stated: “Now there were other changes and I think this is what Mr Woodward wants. People tell me for example, that they had never seen at other similar football matches to this one so many non-ticket holders arriving, so much alcohol brought to the football matches, and therefore having to be consumed or disposed of at the turnstiles.”
     
  12. ACC Anderson and Ch Supt Wain then gave examples of stories they had heard from officers about Liverpool supporters’ consumption of alcohol. None of these three officers—DCC Hayes, ACC Anderson or Ch Supt Wain—had been on duty at the game, so all were relying on information they had received from those who had been present, which they all acknowledged during the meeting.
     
  13. Following this meeting, the draft proof of evidence was updated substantially to become the document known as the Wain report. Both the topics discussed at the meeting on 26 April were covered in detail, but in a way that did not replicate the full breadth of the discussions.
     
  14. For example, on the subject of closing the tunnel, the Wain report overlooked Ch Supt Mole’s comments at the meeting and only included references that indicated it was not a safe or appropriate tactic. It also included several references to the roles and responsibilities of SWFC stewards, including a comment that “over the years, the clubs [sic] attention has been drawn to the fact that stewards were not performing their duties to the full.”
     
  15. Some 15 paragraphs were allocated to a discussion of the case of Harris v Sheffield United. Towards the end of the section, the Wain report made clear that the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final was not covered by the contractual agreement that had been in place with clubs following the conclusion of the case. 
     
  16. In part 4 of the Wain report, relating to police planning for the 1989 Semi-Final, there were multiple negative references to the behaviour of football supporters generally, plus some specific references to previous matches involving Liverpool. 
     
  17. There were also multiple points of comparison between the 1988 game and the 1989 one—including comprehensive details of changes in the number of officers on duty at the two games.
     
  18. In the very first draft of the proof of evidence, part 5 consisted of a chronological summary of the events of 15 April 1989, from 2pm to 3.33pm. In the Wain report, part 5 was over 100 pages long and quoted extensively from 81 officer accounts. Full versions of these accounts were also included in an appendix.
     
  19. In a section with the subheading “Events to 2.30pm”, numerous quotes were included from officers about supporters drinking large amounts of alcohol and/or attempting to enter the ground without tickets. Some of these were potentially misleading. For example, in an extended quote from Supt Marshall describing supporters “drinking openly”, he commented: “all of the fans I encountered were Liverpool supporters”. This arguably gave the impression that only Liverpool supporters were drinking. However, as he was on duty at the Liverpool end, it was in fact no surprise that he only encountered Liverpool supporters.
     
  20. The subsection on the emergency response also included several accounts where officers referred to their efforts being hampered in some way by the actions of supporters under the influence of alcohol.
     
  21. At the Goldring Inquests on 20 April 2015, Ch Supt Wain was directly asked about the reasons behind the inclusion of this material, and whether it stemmed from discussions at the meeting with the legal team on 26 April 1989. He confirmed that was the case and that he had picked up “a concern among senior officers to ensure that any evidence about changes in fan behaviour was highlighted”.
     
  22. At the Goldring Inquests, the barrister representing Ch Supt Wain pointed out that of the 81 accounts appended to version B of the proof of evidence, 31 officers stated they had witnessed the consumption of alcohol and a further 29 either referred to the effects of alcohol on supporters or made other observations about the involvement of alcohol. This therefore appeared to support Ch Supt Wain’s assertion—both at the Goldring Inquests and in his prepared statement to the IOPC—that the focus on alcohol consumption in the proof of evidence reflected the evidence of the SYP officers.
     
  23. However, it overlooked the fact that SYP had control over which accounts it chose to include. According to dates on SYP’s HOLMES account, up to and including 8 May 1989, some 429 officer accounts (including seven statements) had been registered. There is no clear explanation of how the 81 accounts used were chosen. 
     
  24. Having reviewed all these accounts, the IOPC has established that 44% of them included a reference to Liverpool supporters behaving in a way that could be seen as negative. By comparison, 72% of the accounts referred to in part 5 of the Wain report referred to negative supporter behaviour. This indicates that the accounts SYP selected for inclusion over-represented these issues.
     
  25. These topics were then reintroduced in a section under the subheading “Observations”, which was written in a different style to the rest of part 5. As the subheading suggested, it was mostly comment; however, it did not accurately reflect the evidence of the preceding sections. More significantly, the section as a whole squarely pointed the finger at supporters, with a series of observations that had not been substantiated in the evidence included as part of the Wain report, or since. Examples of this were:
     
    • “Saturday 15 April 1989 was a warm and sunny Spring day, which should have provided the perfect atmosphere for a major sporting attraction. Instead, however, it would appear that many visiting spectators used this as an opportunity to find local public houses and off licences where they could purchase and consume alcohol, to the extent that in so doing their arrival at the stadium was seriously delayed.”
    • “The situation was exacerbated by the obvious influx of a large number of Liverpool supporters who did not have a ticket.”
    • “Despite substantial police resources which had been allocated for the event, senior officers found themselves suddenly and unexpectedly overwhelmed by several thousand spectators who had converged on the Leppings Lane entrance within a few minutes of the designated time for kickoff, many of whom being the worse for drink embarked upon a determined course of action, the aim of which was to enter Hillsborough Football Stadium at all cost; irrespective of any danger to property or, more importantly, the lives and safety of others.”
       
  26. Strikingly, the Observations section was introduced with the comment: “the Chief Constable is content to make a number of observations which he feels may be pertinent to the Committee of Enquiry”. This firmly placed the responsibility for these observations on CC Wright.
     
  27. On 9 May, the 288-page Wain report was given to the legal team. In a phone call before the legal team received it, ACC Anderson told Mr Metcalf that the draft was two inches thick. Mr Metcalf replied that “this was not too bad and that if we could cut it down to 1 inch thick with just a few crucial documents included as appendices to the report itself, then I would be really quite satisfied.” Having seen the draft, Mr Metcalf spoke to ACC Anderson again later that day and informed him that they intended to edit part 5, which would “be limited to factual comment up to about 2.00pm” on the day of the disaster.
     
  28. The legal team edited the document extensively. The submitted version included no officer accounts. Clear points of comparison between the 1988 and 1989 Semi-Finals, such as differences in officer numbers, were mostly removed, as was the section on Harris v Sheffield United. The references to supporter behaviour on the day were cut, but some earlier references to previous matches involving Liverpool supporters were retained. Most notably, the section on the events of the day was cut from over 100 pages to just seven, and ended at 12 noon, when the turnstiles opened. The submitted version included the following explanation: “With a view to avoiding comment prejudicial to the Enquiry this background material does not seek to cover the tragic events which followed thereafter.”
     

  29. The majority of the observations were removed from the version submitted to the Taylor Inquiry, leaving only a section of three paragraphs, with a very different tone: 
     

    “The South Yorkshire Police has been deeply involved with the tragic events which occurred on Saturday 15 April 1989. Police officers and civilian personnel involved in the operation have been deeply grieved by the death and suffering which they witnessed on an occasion which should have been an enjoyable sporting event. Many have had to seek professional counselling.
     

    “For those most directly involved, memories and a deep sense of sorrow will remain with them for the rest of their lives, particularly those officers who tried so desperately to save the lives of men, women and children.
     

    “The Force extends it sincere condolences to the relatives and loved ones of those who died.”
     

  30. By the time the Wain report was handed to the legal team, there had been some significant developments in terms of the evidence that the Taylor Inquiry had requested from SYP. Notably, the accounts of the SYP officers on duty now had to be submitted to the Taylor Inquiry—a decision that led to the review and amendment process described in the previous chapter. This may explain why the legal team removed references to officers’ accounts from the proof of evidence.
     
  31. At the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Wain acknowledged he was responsible for the proof of evidence, regardless of its authorship. Under cross-examination, he also accepted that the document he had overseen was potentially misleading.