After the oral hearings of the Taylor Inquiry were complete, all parties were invited to produce a final written submission. Mr Woodward wrote the closing submissions on behalf of SYP and on 29 June 1989, SYP sent him some documents that they believed he may find helpful. These included the Observations that formed section 5.18 of the Wain report, and a memo sent by Ch Supt Wain to CC Wright on 16 June 1989, including suggestions for what should be in SYP’s closing submissions, based on a review of the Inquiry transcripts.
On 6 July, the legal team made a 31-page submission on behalf of SYP. It was accompanied by an additional statement from Superintendent David Chapman (Supt Chapman), which Ch Insp Bettison helped obtain.
Supt Chapman’s statement specifically addressed evidence given on 29 June (the last day of the oral hearings) by Douglas Lock, the head of security at SWFC.
Mr Lock had stated to the Inquiry that SYP and SWFC had an agreement that the police were responsible for crowd control and safety on the West Terrace at Hillsborough Stadium. He asserted that this agreement had been in place since 1982, when Mr Lock was a superintendent with SYP. According to Mr Lock, the agreement was a result of a discussion involving himself, Ch Supt Herold (who was then the SYP match commander for high-profile games at Hillsborough Stadium), Supt Chapman and the then SWFC Secretary, Mr England. Mr Lock said he then adopted this same approach when he was in charge of policing the ground, adding he had “rubber-stamped” an agreement that had been made by his predecessor, Supt Chapman. He further stated that this same agreement “was subsequently carried on by Mr. Freeman and also Mr. Murray.”
The additional statement from Supt Chapman that was included as part of SYP’s closing submissions wholly refuted this. It denied not only the existence of any agreement with SWFC but also that Supt Chapman had been present at any meeting that matched that described by Mr Lock.
The first page of SYP’s main closing submission included an apparent criticism of the way the Inquiry had been conducted: “At the Inquiry no rules of evidence prevailed, no sworn testimony was given (and once the Advocates had become accustomed to such licence), leading questions became the order of the day, hearsay upon hearsay was invited and opinion and speculation was canvassed.”
It suggested that, due to the speed at which the Inquiry had taken place and the fact that WMP’s investigations were ongoing, “it may be unsafe, even if were considered possible, to come to what might strictly be described as findings of fact.”
However, the closing submissions then presented information as facts which had either yet to be proven or had been proven wrong. For example, under the subheading “Non ticket holders”, SYP’s closing submissions claimed that there was a “significant and substantial element of non-ticket holders” at the game. This did not align with analysis conducted by the HSE for the Taylor Inquiry, which found that the total number of supporters who had entered the ground through turnstiles A to G and Gate C was at the very most just 14 more than the number of tickets available; the more likely figure was actually lower than the 10,100 capacity. Evidence has not emerged through any subsequent investigation to prove there were large numbers of supporters at the game without tickets.
The closing submissions also repeated the suggestion, rejected by the Taylor Inquiry, that there had been “concerted action” among some supporters to try to gain entry to the ground, and commented: “the very notion that something was planned or organised to defeat the Police and embarrass them into having to open the gates was, in the early stages of this Inquiry, dealt with perhaps somewhat dismissively and treated as fanciful by Counsel for the Inquiry. Clearly it is not a matter upon which it might be expected evidence would be readily, if ever, available. However, belatedly it has to some degree emerged and it is submitted that the notion of a plan by some to foment difficulty and disorder cannot be airily dismissed.”
The IOPC has established that there were no similarities between the memo from Ch Supt Wain to CC Wright, which was then shared with the legal team, and a memo sent from Ch Supt Duckenfield to Ch Supt Wain on 13 June 1989.
Ch Supt Duckenfield’s memo had included a series of recommendations to prevent or manage future crowd crushes at Hillsborough Stadium. Though not specifically analysing the causes of the disaster, his recommendations addressed some factors which have since been identified as contributing to the disaster. These included:
the unequal allocation of turnstiles to the respective sets of supporters
the physical layout of the Leppings Lane end
improved signage, including a suggestion of a “large electronic indicator, similar to an electronic score-board, equipped with flashing lights so that fans queuing can be given, visually, up to date information regarding delays or police messages and, whatever the noise, this can be seen clearly by all queuing or waiting in Leppings Lane.”
greater use of loudhailers and Tannoys
Ch Supt Wain’s memo similarly included recommendations around reviewing signage, turnstile allocation and the use of Tannoys and loudhailers.
When reviewing the memo, IOPC investigators noted that its tone is highly lucid, and the recommendations appear to show some insight into the causes of the disaster. This makes a notable contrast to the more hesitant answers Ch Supt Duckenfield gave in his evidence to the Taylor Inquiry.
Evidence examined by the IOPC indicates that the closing submissions were written by the legal team—primarily Mr Woodward—and that SYP did not even see it before it was sent to the Taylor Inquiry on 6 July, despite a request from CC Wright to Mr Metcalf to view it. On 12 July 1989, Mr Metcalf and Mr Woodward met CC Wright and DCC Hayes. An attendance note of the meeting, written by Mr Metcalf, recorded that the officers were very pleased with the closing submissions.
