The post-mortem examinations of 94 of those who died in the Hillsborough disaster began at around 9am on Sunday 16 April 1989. They were completed the following day.
Dr Popper had made initial arrangements for the post-mortems on the Saturday evening. At some point before they began, he determined that full forensic post-mortems should be conducted in all cases. That included the testing of blood alcohol in all cases, including on those aged under 18.
In the preliminary proceedings to the individual inquests on 18 April 1990, Dr Popper explained that this testing had been done at his direction. He acknowledged that blood alcohol testing was not conducted as a part of every inquest, but commented it is part of “a great number of cases”.
He said he made the decision to authorise the testing because alcohol levels may have been relevant to understanding how people died. He added that he made the decision without knowing the ages of all those who had died and determined that it should be a standard part of all of the post-mortems.
Nothing he said in the preliminary proceedings indicated that any police officer—or indeed any other individual—influenced the decision.
The IOPC sought to re-examine the decision process, reviewing documentation and taking statements from Dr Popper, six of the pathologists who conducted the post-mortems (the other four had died) and various other members of Dr Popper’s team.
Dr Popper reiterated to the IOPC that the decision had been his, and that no police officer had influenced it. He suggested that the question of whether to test blood alcohol had probably been discussed in his initial meetings with pathologists and the deputy coroner, but he couldn’t specifically recall this. He said: “It might have been that one of the pathologists said that we ought to do blood alcohol tests, or I may have spontaneously thought of it myself.”
None of those interviewed by the IOPC who were present in these initial meetings recalled there being any discussion regarding blood alcohol testing—nor of supporter behaviour or alcohol consumption.
Dr Popper also acknowledged that he was aware, from an early stage, of the suggestion that alcohol could have been a factor in the disaster but could not remember how he knew this or whether anyone said anything to him. He also stated that he thought what he had heard about alcohol was “unlikely not to have had an influence” on his decision.
Though he knew that some families were upset by it, he felt it had been the right decision, as doing it meant they had been able to answer the question as to whether alcohol had been a factor in the deaths; the testing provided evidence that it had not been.
In his statement, Dr Popper described the overall sequence of events between when he received the initial call from the police to advise him of the disaster and the start of the post-mortems. This provided an insight into where he went and who he might have spoken to.
He remembered speaking in depth to only one police officer before the post-mortems began. This was D Ch Supt Addis, with whom he discussed the formal identification process and arrangements for transporting those who had died from hospitals to the gymnasium, then on to the MLC.
At least four SYP officers mentioned seeing Dr Popper in the gymnasium. However, none of these officers has at any time mentioned speaking to him at this point.
Dr Popper stated to the IOPC that he had “no recollection of any pressure from the police” in relation to the question of whether blood alcohol testing should be conducted. He added: “I’m as confident as I can be at the present time that I was not put under any pressure to do it.”
No one else interviewed by the IOPC suggested there had been any discussion with police officers about blood alcohol testing. The deputy coroner recalled being present when Dr Popper spoke to some police officers, including CC Wright, but said there was no discussion whatsoever about alcohol or the behaviour of supporters.
Regardless of how the decision was reached, Dr Popper stated to the IOPC: “I do not recall anybody questioned or disagreed with the decision to do the blood alcohol tests.”
This was supported by the statements from the pathologists who, with one exception, felt it had been an appropriate decision in the circumstances. Several of them suggested they would have been more surprised if they had not been instructed to test blood alcohol levels.
The only pathologist who disagreed said that left to his own devices, he would not have tested blood alcohol levels as he didn’t smell any alcohol in the post-mortems that he did. He arrived during the afternoon of 16 April, when the post-mortems were underway, and understood it was a definite instruction.
He also addressed the question of taking blood alcohol levels from those under the age of 18, commenting: “There was no separate discussion about the decision to take blood alcohol levels from those under the age of 18. One of the patients I examined was 14 years old and I didn’t think it was all that appropriate really, I felt slightly uncomfortable doing it.”
Again, this was a different view from the others, who agreed that having decided to test blood alcohol levels of all those who died, there was no need for a separate policy for under 18s.
While there was a difference of opinion on the appropriateness of testing, there was total agreement on the key issue for the IOPC’s investigation: all of the pathologists who provided statements were unaware of any police influence on the decision to test blood alcohol.
D Ch Supt Addis was asked what he recalled of his contact with Dr Popper. He said: “I did not have any conversation with him regarding post-mortems and I had nothing to do with post-mortems whatsoever.” He added: “I had no knowledge of why blood samples was [sic] taken from the deceased and checks on alcohol levels, I wasn’t privy to any discussions regarding this.”
Professor Jack Crane was an experienced pathologist who served as an advisor to the Goldring Inquests on pathological issues. After these ended, the IOPC asked him for an expert opinion on the decision to test blood alcohol levels. He provided a written report, in which he said that “In the circumstances of Hillsborough it seems quite reasonable for BAA [blood alcohol analysis] to be carried out on the majority of victims since there was at least a theoretical possibility that alcohol intoxication could have played a part in the incident.”
He echoed Dr Popper’s view that blood alcohol testing had ultimately proved valuable as it meant “the rumour that drunken fans contributed to the disaster could be, and indeed was, able to be refuted”. However, he said that conducting blood alcohol testing on the children who had died was “disproportionate and inappropriate”.
The checking of blood alcohol levels of those who died and survivors, and what influence, if any, any police officer may have had on the Coroner’s/any other person’s decision to do this.
What was found?
• The IOPC found no evidence to indicate that the decision to test blood alcohol levels as part of the post-mortems following the disaster was influenced by the police. Dr Popper consistently stated that it was his decision and believed it was the correct one. Most of the pathologists who conducted the post-mortems said they agreed with the decision.
• Evidence gathered by the IOPC indicates that blood alcohol testing was not, as the HIP Report suggested, an “unusual” or “exceptional” decision. Official coronial statistics indicate that toxicology testing takes place in around 1 in 5 post-mortems today: by no means a majority, but not rare enough to be deemed exceptional. Blood alcohol was tested in other disasters involving multiple deaths in the era, such as the Herald of Free Enterprise sinking in 1987.
• The IOPC found no obvious clinical reason why ten of those who received hospital treatment after the disaster had their blood alcohol tested. The consultant who authorised blood alcohol testing of survivors stated strongly that he had not been asked by police officers to do this.
• The IOPC has found no evidence that blood alcohol testing was carried out on any other injured patients beyond these ten.
Significant new evidence
New evidence gathered in investigating this term of reference consisted primarily of statements from Dr Popper and his deputy, six of the ten pathologists who conducted the post-mortems and the toxicologists who conducted the tests. In addition, investigators sought to gain the expert view of other coroners and pathologists on the decision to test blood alcohol levels.
On 16 April 1989, the day after the Hillsborough disaster, post-mortem examinations began on all of those who had died. These were carried out at the direction of Dr Popper, to assist in the inquests into the deaths. As part of the post-mortems, blood alcohol levels were tested in all cases—regardless of the age of the individual who died. In the context of allegations from the police and others that a large number of Liverpool supporters had been drinking heavily before the match, this testing has become a source of considerable controversy.
The HIP Report commented that Dr Popper’s decision to conduct the testing was “an unusual direction” and stated: “The bereaved and survivors considered allegations of drunkenness had been compounded by the decision to take and publish blood alcohol levels, impugning the reputation of those who died.”
The reference to publishing the blood alcohol levels reflected the fact that each individual’s blood alcohol level was read out at two separate points during the individual inquests. The first time was at the overall start of proceedings, where the names and blood alcohol levels of all those who died were read out together. The second time was at the start of the specific inquest into each individual’s death.
The HIP Report also showed, for the first time, that the blood alcohol levels of a small number of injured patients had also been tested. It asked why this had been done.
In light of the questions posed by the HIP Report, SYP referred the issue of blood alcohol testing to the IOPC to investigate. The focus of the investigation was to establish whether there was evidence to indicate that the decision to test the blood alcohol in all the post-mortems was influenced by the police.
Similarly, SYP’s approach to the Popper Inquests was consistent with aspects of its approach to the Taylor Inquiry.
With the costs of compensation apparently contained by early October 1990 and the DPP having announced in August 1990 that no officers would be prosecuted in connection with the disaster, two major risks to SYP and its officers were, to a degree addressed. In this context, SYP now appeared willing to take a more confrontational approach at the forthcoming generic hearing (which was to look at the broader causes of death rather than just the medical causes) than it had done in previous legal proceedings.
At 2pm on 30 October 1990, a ‘pre-inquest’ meeting took place between DCC Hayes, Ch Insp Bettison, Mr Metcalf, Mr Payne and Patrick Limb (junior counsel working with Mr Payne).
According to a meeting note, Mr Payne suggested that in his view “unlawful killing is the most likely [inquest] verdict.” This was instead of other potential verdicts such as accidental death, natural causes or an open verdict. However, he set out four points that would need to be accepted by the jury to reach that verdict, and indicated he felt that this was not a foregone conclusion.
He explained that SYP would not be permitted to make a speech or put forward a case to the inquests, so the only available “weapon” was cross-examination of witnesses. He suggested focusing on aspects of the ground layout and provision for spectators; in other words, drawing attention to apparent failings of SWFC.
Despite this, Mr Payne stated that he “saw no point in attempting to pass blame on any other parties”. The note recorded that he then quoted from the judgment in the Harris v SUFC case, where he said that “police officers had firmly accepted their role as being one of crowd management.”
Mr Payne was reported as stating that he did not “see the relevance of advancing an argument that it was drunken, disorderly Liverpool supporters who first created the problem for the Police outside the ground.”
Later that same day, a further meeting was documented, at SYP HQ, where the police officers “under threat” attended along with their legal representatives. The term “under threat” referred to Ch Supt Duckenfield, Supt Murray, Supt Greenwood and Supt Marshall, all of whom were at this stage still potentially under threat of prosecution and police disciplinary proceedings and had appointed their own barristers to represent them at the generic hearing.
According to the meeting notes, Mr Payne again argued against attempting to “shovel blame” onto other parties and said that “the behaviour of the fans outside the ground may not be relevant.”
The officers disagreed. According to the meeting notes, “There was a strong feeling from most parties that this evidence should be gotten-in. It was agreed that Hammond Suddards would be provided with details of those people known to the South Yorkshire Police who might give evidence in this regard”.
The notes of these two meetings indicate a difference of opinion between Mr Payne and the police officers about the overall approach that should be taken. This is significant, insofar as several SYP officers have consistently suggested that they were acting in line with legal advice; the evidence shows that on this subject, SYP rejected the advice of Mr Payne.
Following the meeting, SYP carried out a series of actions that were related to promoting evidence about the behaviour of supporters. DCC Hayes approached ACC Jones to ask him whether Dr Popper intended to call some of the witnesses SYP had suggested; ACC Jones responded that this was Dr Popper’s decision.
Separately, Ch Insp Bettison attempted to search the HOLMES database for statements from witnesses that included certain “buzz words” related to supporter behaviour and alcohol consumption—though this proved a fruitless task (and one Ch Insp Bettison later described as a “fool’s errand”).
On 6 November 1990, Mr Metcalf wrote to DCC Hayes to advise him that Hammond Suddards had looked through the statements and transcripts in accordance with the “various categories of misbehaviour”. Mr Metcalf listed 79 SYP officers whose accounts were deemed most relevant to the categories. He invited DCC Hayes to remove any names from the list before submitting it to Dr Popper. Mr Metcalf’s letter concluded: “I remain of the opinion that ground inadequacy was the real cause of this disaster and that the events outside, however abominable, should not be the main focus of our attention. Having made that point, if we can get in some solid evidence about drunkenness and drunken behaviour and this is fairly reported in the press, then this may do something to alleviate the perception of unfairness which clearly persists with a substantial number of Officers.” [Emphasis in original.]
Of the 79 SYP officers listed by Mr Metcalf, nine were initially selected to give evidence at the Popper Inquests. Eight of these gave evidence, along with two others who had been on Mr Metcalf’s list but were not initially selected by Dr Popper.
As the start of the generic hearing approached, Mr Metcalf set out a “strategy” he proposed to take. He explained this in a meeting with the new Chief Constable of SYP, Richard Wells, on 15 November 1990 and again in a telephone call with Mr Payne on 16 November. In speaking to Mr Payne, Mr Metcalf described a “relatively low key approach without too many attacks, but to bring out the issue of drink related hooliganism so far as possible.” Once the generic hearing was underway, Mr Metcalf wrote to SYP’s insurers, again describing the strategy in similar terms.
At the Goldring Inquests, DCC Hayes was asked questions about SYP’s preparation for the generic hearing of the Popper Inquests. Under examination by Pete Weatherby QC, who was representing 22 of the bereaved families, DCC Hayes was specifically asked whether “in preparing for the inquests in particular, officers under your command were trying to raise the profile of evidence which blamed the fans”. He replied: “Yes, I think that's true.”
Of the 230 witnesses listed to give evidence at the generic hearing, 62 were serving SYP officers and three were retired. In the event, fewer SYP officers were called than had initially been planned: just 49, plus two retired officers. While several of them made comments about supporter behaviour, these were in line with their original written accounts. Though video and photographic evidence has not substantiated officer accounts, it is not possible to verify or wholly disprove their claims. When interviewing officers who gave evidence to the Popper Inquests, the IOPC asked if they stood by what they had said; none suggested they did not.
Despite the conclusions of the Taylor Inquiry, officers were still asked questions about alcohol consumption and given the opportunity to comment on the behaviour of supporters. Mr Payne asked the majority of these witnesses some questions about alcohol consumption, but so did other barristers.
Ch Insp Creaser and PS Crawford both gave evidence to the Popper Inquests and reiterated their accounts of police involvement in closing the tunnel at previous matches. PS Higgins was also called to give evidence and said tunnel closure was a standard practice. He could not recall who had given the order at the 1988 Semi-Final.
The senior officers on duty were all asked about tunnel closure. Ch Supt Duckenfield denied any knowledge of previous tunnel closures. He further suggested that it was not solely a police responsibility to close the tunnel and ensure supporters did not enter the centre pens. He asked: “Don't the fans have a role in this situation when they come through that gate?”
At the generic hearing, Supt Greenwood was asked: “Did you know at the end of the 1988 match or before the 1989 match began that the tunnel leading to the centre pens may have been or was closed off in 1988?” He replied, “no”.
Supt Murray specifically stated in his evidence to the Popper Inquests that he only learned the tunnel had been closed in 1988 after the 1989 Semi-Final and added that was “the first I knew that the tunnel had ever been closed.” Pressed on this, he said: “I had no knowledge of the tunnel ever being closed. No one had ever told me it had been closed; no one had ever told me it had been used as any sort of measure to prevent people going down.”
Ch Supt Mole gave evidence to the Popper Inquests over several days. He was asked early on about tunnel closure and replied: “I have never had occasion to seal the tunnel and I have no knowledge of it being sealed in my operational experience.”
The Popper Inquests ended on 28 March 1991, when the jury reached the verdict of accidental death. Though the Taylor Inquiry had found that “the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control”, at the Popper Inquests there was no adverse finding against SYP. This suggests that the evidence presented, selected or produced by SYP officers may have had a material impact on the process and the outcomes.
What can be said with certainty is that the fact that supporter behaviour and alcohol consumption again came under the spotlight had a devastating impact on the families of those who died and on many of the supporters who had been at the game but survived.
The evidence examined by the IOPC demonstrates that many officers in SYP felt that the Taylor Inquiry had not considered the impact of supporter behaviour sufficiently and wished to raise it again at the generic hearing. Mr Payne, the barrister appointed to represent SYP at the generic hearing, initially advised senior officers that he did not see this as relevant. However, it was made clear that the match commanders, and others, felt strongly that the topic should be covered. It appears Mr Payne accepted this and adapted his approach to include a greater focus on supporter behaviour and alcohol consumption—again, in contrast to the arguments made by SYP officers that they followed legal advice. Evidence shows that once this approach was agreed, SYP and Mr Payne took a range of steps to encourage Dr Popper to call witnesses who might provide further details of drunken behaviour.
While there are questions about the appropriateness of this approach, questions about the accuracy and completeness of the evidence presented by SYP and by individual officers at the Popper Inquests relate primarily to other matters.
Again, SYP senior officers denied knowledge of past actions to close the tunnel, inferring they could not be held responsible for failing to instruct any officers to close the tunnel at the 1989 Semi-Final. They also rejected the suggestion that SYP was responsible for monitoring safety in the pens. There is clear evidence that these officers attended meetings after the disaster where tunnel closure was discussed. However, it is not possible to establish what knowledge they had at the time of the disaster.
IOPC conduct reports considered whether any of the officers had given inaccurate or misleading evidence. Having reviewed these, the IOPC was of the view that none had a case to answer. It was not clear that any of them had answered the specific questions they were asked in a misleading way, and because there was no duty of candour, they were not obliged to volunteer any further details.
The evidence in this chapter has shown that DCC Hayes was adamant that SYP should not accept that it was responsible for monitoring safety in the pens, and that when SYP began to prepare for the contribution proceedings, Mr Metcalf identified this issue as one that the force should challenge.
At Mr Metcalf’s suggestion, a range of actions were coordinated to try to gather evidence that would enable SYP to challenge the Taylor Inquiry’s finding. Officers that had given evidence about previous actions to close the tunnel or police responsibility for monitoring the pens—either in their original accounts or at the Taylor Inquiry itself—were approached and asked whether they stood by that evidence. This action was undertaken by DI Cleverley, but with the knowledge and endorsement of DCC Hayes, Ch Supt Wain and Ch Insp Bettison.
The IOPC investigated the conduct of DCC Hayes and Ch Supt Wain in relation to the contribution proceedings. Having assessed the evidence, the IOPC noted it was legitimate and acceptable for SYP to defend its position and present its best case, to minimise financial liability following the disaster. If doing so would require the force to gather additional evidence, it was legally entitled to.
The evidence is inconclusive as to whether this approach worked. The out-of-court settlement of the contribution proceedings on 8 October 1990 meant that other parties agreed to contribute £4 million to the costs of paying compensation. SWFC and Eastwood & Partners paid £1.5 million each and Sheffield City Council paid £1 million. In a letter to DCC Hayes on 19 February 1992, Mr Metcalf stated that the total liability was “now estimated at £12 million”, noting that “if the estimate is correct then the South Yorkshire Police have taken two thirds of the liability.” This proportion was higher than the 55% share anticipated by Mr Payne. Further, it continued to rise: by 1999, it is understood that approximately £19.8 million had been paid in compensation, with no further contributions from other parties. This meant SYP had covered almost 80% of the total sum paid.
The amounts paid to families varied, with many receiving comparatively small sums that were insufficient to cover funeral costs.
In June 2021, SYP and WMP announced additional compensation to 601 individuals following a group litigation claim for misfeasance in public office relating to the actions of the two forces following the disaster. The claims had been started in 2015, and compensation was awarded for the trauma and psychological harm as a result of the actions of the police in the aftermath of the disaster, including the investigations that followed. Acting Chief Constable Lauren Poultney of SYP stated that the force offered “an unreserved apology” to those affected by the Hillsborough disaster and its aftermath and acknowledged that “serious errors and mistakes were made by South Yorkshire Police, both on 15 April 1989 and during the subsequent investigations.” She added that “The force's subsequent failings also caused huge distress, suffering and pain, both to the victims and their families.”
WMP Deputy Chief Constable Vanessa Jardine also issued a statement, saying: “We deeply regret the harm and distress caused to those affected by the tragedy and although I know it cannot make up for their suffering, working with South Yorkshire Police, we have agreed a scheme to compensate those affected.”
Following the announcement in August 1989 of a criminal investigation into the disaster, on 11 September 1989, Hammond Suddards sent instructions to Mr Payne, who had taken over the role of Counsel for SYP from Mr Woodward, who had represented SYP during the Taylor Inquiry.
The instructions related to the various claims for damages received by SYP. Hammond Suddards requested advice on the likely liability for paying the claims, including how this might be split between the four parties against whom claims had been made: SYP, SWFC, Eastwood & Partners and SCC. Hammond Suddards also asked what further evidence might be needed to increase the share carried by the other parties. Mr Payne was asked for his view on the idea of settling the claims (in other words, paying compensation without going to court).
Mr Payne responded on 15 September 1989. He advised that, based on the findings of the Taylor Interim Report and the press statement of CC Wright in response to it (in which he said that he and SYP accepted those findings), the likely apportionment of damages in the civil case was about 55% against SYP and 15% against each of the other three parties.
On 2 October 1989, further instructions were sent to Mr Payne by Hammond Suddards to request advice on the evidence available around responsibility for public safety and the level of liability based on this evidence. In particular, advice was requested in respect of the Taylor Interim Report finding that SYP had “de-facto accepted responsibility for the packing and monitoring of the West terraces”.
On 11 October 1989, there was a meeting at the barristers’ chambers where both Mr Woodward and Mr Payne were based. Both attended, as did DCC Hayes and Mr Metcalf. DCC Hayes was recorded as making a point very early in the meeting that while CC Wright had publicly stated his acceptance of Lord Justice Taylor’s report, this did not mean SYP accepted everything in the report. He added that “as far as the police were concerned liability remained to be determined in civil proceedings.” Further into the discussion, he was documented to be “much concerned” that an admission of de facto (in practice) responsibility would amount to de jure (by law) acceptance for the future.
Mr Payne pointed out that “to defend the matter at a trial would be difficult in view of the Harris-v-Sheffield United case where SYP asked for money and were awarded money for crowd control.” [Emphasis in the original meeting notes.] He also pointed out that this case had been concluded just a few years before the disaster.
The topic moved to a discussion of SYP’s potential admission of liability. DCC Hayes was recorded as accepting that there “was some liability on SYP” and that it would be “nonsensical” to dispute it. He added that the legal team “had given the same advice on this point and he [DCC Hayes] accepted it”. However, he said the “amount of liability” was still to be decided. Three broad options for SYP were discussed:
to continue to openly defend themselves against the claims
to formally admit liability and allow judgment to be entered “with damages to be assessed”
to come to an agreement with the other parties as to the proportion of blame each party would take, which would remove the need for a court hearing
It was agreed that at the forthcoming pre-trial review SYP would not offer any admission of liability. However, it was further agreed that if it became clear that a negotiated settlement was not going to be reached, SYP may need to reconsider.
Following this, on 18 October 1989, DCC Hayes, ACC Anderson, Ch Supt Denton and Ch Insp Bettison attended a meeting with Mr Metcalf, who advised them that Mr Payne had recommended admission of liability at an early stage. This was on the basis that SYP “would, perhaps attract 25% or more of liability in any civil case”. He said Mr Payne had further argued that SYP should “admit those aspects of the claims to which we have no defence on the basis that doing otherwise might be seen as weak, indecisive, and flying in the face of Taylor.”
Mr Metcalf was reported as saying that he did not believe “it would be as bad” as Mr Payne had suggested. He argued that non-admission of liability at this stage would provide time to negotiate a settlement with the other parties. The officers also raised the impact that admitting liability would have on force morale.
At the pre-trial hearing on 26 October 1989, the High Court rejected SYP’s application that a civil case should not be allowed to proceed until after the criminal investigation and any trials had finished. A provisional date for hearing the first claims was set for 11 June 1990.
This led to SYP’s announcement in November 1989 that it would settle claims out of court, though the announcement made clear this was not an admission of liability. A large number of payments were made, although as the HIP Report identified, “In cases that concerned the death of children, their parents received no more than the statutory bereavement allowance of £3,500 and funeral expenses.” Some families of those who died did not make a claim.
In the announcement made on 30 November 1989, SYP stated that it had asked the other parties if they would join the force in settling these claims; however, it noted that all had refused to do so.
SYP subsequently issued contribution claims against all three organisations, asking them to contribute towards the sums it had paid out. They all declined, so again the matter proceeded to court. On 15 December 1989, the High Court determined that contribution proceedings would be held in October 1990.
The actual court date was confirmed in May 1990, and SYP began to prepare. On 25 May 1990, Mr Metcalf wrote to DCC Hayes to inform him that a date had been set for the contribution proceedings. Mr Metcalf explained that, on the instruction of the Court, “each party is to mark up copies of the interim and final Taylor reports by underlining those aspects of the report which they do not [Emphasis in original.] admit for the purposes of trial.” Mr Metcalf also wrote that “a small team of Officers would be of great assistance” in preparing for the contribution proceedings.
On 30 May 1990, Mr Metcalf met DCC Hayes to discuss this further. DCC Hayes agreed to provide a team of officers under Ch Supt Wain to assist and made a list of tasks for the team. The first of these was to review the copy of the Taylor Interim Report that had already been examined and marked up by Mr Metcalf to identify whether there were any further aspects of it which they believed SYP should not accept.
There was a specific request to review the issue of tunnel closure and in particular the evidence of PS Higgins that at the 1988 Semi-Final he had received orders to close the tunnel. Further notes on this topic read: “Who was on duty at that end of the ground in 1988? What do any of these officers remember of the tunnel closure and alleged verbal order to do that? It may be that the instruction to close the gate came from the Club. If it can be shown that many stewards were involved then the Club through their agents (stewards) should have known of this and their arrangements subsequently, ie 1989, seemed to have failed to take account of the 1988 experience which increases their liability.”
Though Ch Supt Wain and Ch Insp Bettison were both appointed to the team, the majority of tasks appear to have been performed by Detective Inspector John Cleverley (DI Cleverley).
In a report to Ch Supt Wain on 2 July 1990, DI Cleverley dealt with the question of if and why the tunnel to the centre pens had been closed by the police at the 1988 Semi-Final. DI Cleverley reported that he had reinterviewed the officers who closed the gates to the tunnel. He wrote that they had indicated that “the instructions to do so came from police sources, not the club so far as they knew.” None of the officers he had interviewed were able to identify who these police sources were. He commented: “the operation seems to have been simple and low key, with not much more than three officers involved.”
The evidence identified by DI Cleverley appeared to reduce the possibility of SWFC accepting a greater share of liability in relation to tunnel control, as Mr Metcalf had hoped.
On 12 July 1990, Ch Insp Bettison provided a written update to DCC Hayes that confirmed the nine tasks had been completed. He also mentioned that on 11 July, he and DI Cleverley had met with Mr Metcalf and identified some further required actions. This correspondence indicates that DCC Hayes and Ch Insp Bettison were both fully aware of the actions being undertaken in preparation for the contribution proceedings.
Also on 12 July 1990, Ch Supt Wain instructed DI Cleverley to “interrogate the system” to identify the officers who could give the best evidence about issues such as “Unruly behaviour by Liverpool fans”, supporters attending without valid tickets and alcohol consumption. This was noted as being in preparation for the inquests, rather than for the contribution hearings.
When he gave evidence to the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Wain was questioned about this request. He stated he had no recollection of it and that he was “shocked” to see it. He said he could only think that it “was a request from the legal team.” When Mark George QC, representing some of the families of those who died, described it as “clear evidence of an attempt to denigrate the fans”, Ch Supt Wain replied: “I must agree with you.”
On 19 July 1990, Mr Metcalf wrote to DCC Hayes outlining his intention to challenge Lord Justice Taylor’s finding that SYP had accepted responsibility for monitoring the capacity of the pens. He noted that while several officers had said “they believed the duty extended only to keeping an eye on the crowd and reacting to any signs of distress…”, some officers had gone further. He identified Ch Insp Creaser and three other inspectors, all of whom had stated that they were aware of the police tactic to close the tunnel when the pens were full, or that they had been involved in police action to do so.
Mr Metcalf proposed that the officers should be asked to review the transcript of their evidence to see whether it gave “the true flavour of what they meant to say.” If not, he suggested that they could provide a further statement to clarify. He provided a draft statement that could be used as the basis for this, which began with the clarification that the officer “did not expect any police officer to be making a deliberate numerical or overall visual assessment of the numbers of fans entering each of the individual pens.”
DI Cleverley approached the four officers as requested. All confirmed they were happy with the evidence they had given, and none made a further statement.
Having received the responses, on 16 August 1990, Mr Metcalf wrote to Ch Supt Wain stating that it remained his intention not to accept SYP was responsible for monitoring the numbers in the pens, but “realistically, we must face the likelihood of this issue going against us, as it did at the inquiry.”
The approach used by Mr Metcalf, including the pre-drafting of a template statement for officers to complete, led to one of the charges of perverting the course of justice against him. This was considered in the trial of Mr Metcalf, Ch Supt Denton and DCI Foster in 2021.
On 26 May 2021, the judge, Mr Justice William Davis, ruled that there was no case to answer. He ruled that, in drafting statements for witnesses to sign, Mr Metcalf was acting in accordance with accepted practice, as long as the witness confirmed the information submitted in their name was accurate.
On 12 September 1990, DCC Hayes had a discussion with Mr Metcalf about the contribution proceedings, the generic hearing and the disciplinary investigations. In his file note, DCC Hayes said that Mr Metcalf “made specific reference to the lack of certified crowd capacity numbers for the individual Leppings Lane pens; the ineffective escape routes; the radial fences; the ineffective barriers; incompetent signing; the failure to close the tunnel; non-ticket holders; the recognition of overcrowding; and, other matters.”
As can be seen, many of these issues cited by Mr Metcalf related to the ground layout—for which SWFC, rather than SYP, had primary responsibility. One related to supporters: the presence of non-ticket holders. Only two could be deemed to relate directly to the police operation: the failure to close the tunnel and the recognition of overcrowding, both of which SYP had already sought to demonstrate were not its responsibility.
On 21 September 1990, DCC Hayes attended a five-hour meeting with Mr Payne, Mr Metcalf and claims officers from SYP’s insurers, Mutual Municipal Insurance. In notes he made following this meeting, DCC Hayes stated that Mr Metcalf had already met with the judge who would preside over the contribution proceedings. According to Mr Metcalf, the judge had “made it clear that on his reading of the evidence available to him at this time, he was of the view that the police were clearly negligent, especially in view of the very clear view they had over the terraces and he was surprised an out of court settlement had not been arrived at yet.”
In his note, DCC Hayes also wrote: “I reacted very strongly against any acceptance that the police had, even de facto, accepted responsibility for monitoring the relevant pens if this was assumed to mean counting in, checking for overcrowding, taking remedial action if this was likely or seen to have occurred, as this would have been impossible.” This echoed the stance DCC Hayes had taken from the earliest meetings in preparation for the contribution hearings.
As the case was settled out of court, these arguments did not need to be made. However, the IOPC identified that they showed a consistent approach from SYP, building from the Taylor Inquiry onwards, in rejecting the suggestion that officers had responsibility for monitoring safety in the pens.
In the aftermath of the disaster, claims for compensation were made by some of those who had been injured or bereaved. These included claims from some police officers who had been on duty. They were not only against SYP but also other parties. By mid-August 1989, hundreds of claims had been made.
No party accepted liability, so it was expected that the claims would proceed to court. However, this meant that civil proceedings might take place before any criminal trials. If any SYP officers were facing prosecution, they could have refused to give evidence at a civil hearing.
To avoid this problem arising, on 30 November 1989, SYP announced that it intended to settle any “bona fide claims” for compensation out of court—but that it did not accept any liability. A large number of payments were made, at different levels depending on the nature of the claim. These included payments to 16 police officers.
SYP invited the other parties against whom claims had been made to join the out-of-court settlements. All declined, so SYP issued contribution claims against them, with the aim of requiring them to contribute towards the sums it had paid out.
The High Court determined that court hearings into the matter should take place in October 1990. The hearings commenced on 2 October 1990. On 5 October, SYP’s Counsel requested an adjournment. On 8 October, it was announced that the parties had reached an agreement.
Though aspects of the civil litigation and contribution proceedings were referred to in the HIP Report, SYP’s preparation for them has not previously been examined in depth. During the early stages of its investigation, the IOPC identified from documentary evidence that there was a strong link between the way SYP prepared for the contribution proceedings and the way it prepared for the generic hearing of the Popper Inquests. This led the IOPC to include the contribution proceedings within this term of reference for its investigation, even though the brief hearings meant the amount of evidence presented by any party in court was minimal.
On 18 April 1989, inquests into the deaths at Hillsborough Stadium were opened, and immediately adjourned by Dr Popper. The adjournment was because there was a possibility of criminal proceedings in relation to the disaster. In such situations, it is accepted practice to defer an inquest.
A criminal investigation began in September 1989, after the publication of the Taylor Interim Report. By March 1990, with the criminal investigation work largely complete, Dr Popper sought the agreement of the DPP to restart the inquests as soon as possible.
Because the evidence was still under review by the DPP, there were limits as to what could be discussed in front of a jury at that stage. Dr Popper proposed holding the inquests in phases. There would be a series of individual inquests (these have sometimes been referred to as ‘mini inquests’) to confirm the identity of each of those who died, along with the medical cause of death, and where and when they died. Once the DPP reached his decision about whether anyone should be prosecuted, and potentially after any trials that followed, there would then be a generic hearing examining the circumstances leading up to the deaths. This proposal was accepted by all parties, including solicitors representing the families.
The individual inquests took place between 18 April 1990 and 4 May 1990. SYP officers were not required to present any evidence at the hearings.
On 30 August 1990, the DPP announced that no one would be charged with a criminal offence in relation to the disaster, meaning the generic hearing could freely take place. It began on 19 November 1990 and ended on 28 March 1991. It heard evidence from 230 witnesses, including 62 serving SYP officers and three witnesses described as retired SYP officers. The jury returned majority verdicts of accidental death in all 95 cases. Anthony (Tony) Bland died in hospital on 3 March 1993. His death was therefore not considered in the Popper Inquests, nor was that of Andrew Devine, who died in 2021.
A significant proportion of the officers who gave evidence commented on the behaviour of supporters and in particular about their alleged levels of alcohol consumption. This was despite the findings of the Taylor Interim Report that the great majority of supporters at the game were not drunk, nor even the worse for drink.
When the Lord Chief Justice announced in 2012 that the verdicts of the Popper Inquests were to be quashed and new inquests opened, one of the reasons he gave was the prominence given to alcohol levels among the Liverpool supporters. Another was the tendency by SYP to blame the supporters, which the Lord Chief Justice described as “disappointingly tenacious”.
The IOPC investigated: The evidence that was put forward on behalf of SYP, or by individual officers, to the WMP investigations, Lord Justice Taylor’s Inquiry, the contribution proceedings, and the inquests, or in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, considering:
a) whether any police officer gave or produced evidence that was inaccurate, false or deliberately misleading (or was involved in attempts to do so) b) whether such evidence contained inaccurate, misleading or irrelevant criticism of supporters’ behaviour c) whether the ‘Wain Report’ was an accurate and complete picture of the evidence d) whether any police officer was party to, or directed the production or selection of, evidence that was inaccurate or misleading, including irrelevant criticism of supporters’ behaviour and evidence regarding operational police tactics/actions to control supporters
This chapter focuses on the evidence presented to the Popper Inquests and contribution proceedings, and how SYP prepared for both.
What was found?
• After SYP had agreed to pay compensation to those seeking damages in relation to the disaster, it took court action to seek financial contributions from SWFC, Eastwood & Partners and SCC towards the payment. This approach was advocated by both DCC Hayes and Mr Metcalf, even after newly appointed Counsel Richard Payne QC had suggested SYP was likely to be liable for the majority of compensation payments.
• In preparation for the contribution proceedings, a team of officers under Ch Supt Wain was tasked with carrying out a series of actions requested by the lawyers. These included reviewing the Taylor Interim Report to see if there was anything the force should challenge and re-examining evidence around the 1988 tunnel closure.
• In their evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, four officers had indicated they were aware of previous police actions to close the tunnel to the centre pens. The team under Ch Supt Wain was instructed to ask these officers to review the transcripts of the evidence they had given to the Taylor Inquiry and, if they felt it had given the wrong impression, provide a statement correcting it. All four refused.
• In preparation for the generic hearing of the Popper Inquests, Ch Supt Wain issued an instruction to identify the officers who could provide the best evidence about various aspects of alleged misbehaviour by supporters.
• Mr Metcalf described on three occasions the “strategy” he proposed to follow at the Popper Inquests on behalf of his client, which involved a “low key approach avoiding too much individual criticism” but highlighting “drink induced hooligan behaviour”.
• In their evidence to the Popper Inquests, senior officers again sought to play down the force’s responsibility for safety in the pens or at the stadium and to avoid the suggestion that senior officers on duty on the day had failed to take relevant action, such as to close the tunnel.
Significant new evidence
There were two main sources of new evidence around the Popper Inquests and contribution proceedings. These were:
• the attendance notes and other documentation held by Hammond Suddards. This information had been disclosed to the HIP, but only at the very end of its work, so had not been assessed in depth
• the policy books of ACC Jones of WMP, who had worked closely with Dr Popper in preparation for the generic hearing of the inquests. These had not previously been available
As the evidence summarised has shown, significant questions remain about the accuracy and completeness of the evidence presented by SYP and by individual officers to the Taylor Inquiry. These questions are not predominantly concerned with the evidence individual SYP officers gave about supporters’ behaviour. Given the evidence now available, and the gaps in that evidence, it is neither possible to verify nor wholly disprove officers’ accounts and testimony about issues such as supporters’ alcohol consumption.
The question of whether the evidence presented by officers about supporter behaviour was relevant is a complex one to answer. The material considered in this and other chapters strongly indicates that many SYP officers believed supporters’ behaviour—and in particular the amount of alcohol consumed—was relevant to an understanding of the disaster. This stance was reiterated at the Goldring Inquests, where officers such as Supt Marshall and Insp Sykes stated that, while accepting there were flaws in police action and indeed their own actions, they still feel the role of the supporters in the disaster should be taken into account.
It is acceptable for a police force to present the evidence of its officers to an inquiry or external investigation and for that inquiry or investigation to consider it. Logically, the evidence the force presents will be whatever it considers relevant. However, as detailed in the previous chapter, IOPC analysis indicates that SYP sought to amplify the evidence about supporter behaviour.
This was the case with the claim that a police horse was deliberately and repeatedly burned with a cigarette. This was accepted as fact by Lord Justice Taylor. However, evidence gathered by the IOPC strongly indicates it did not happen and that the officer involved, PC Scott, exaggerated the incident to justify him striking out a supporter. This led the IOPC to the view that the officer would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct.
While some officers made comments about supporter behaviour when they gave oral evidence, information about supporter behaviour was deleted almost wholesale from SYP’s proof of evidence before it was submitted to the Taylor Inquiry. The deletion was made by the legal team and was part of a comprehensive edit made before submission.
This took place at around the time when SYP was first advised that WMP would not be taking statements from its officers; instead, the recollections of SYP officers would be submitted to the Taylor Inquiry. In such a context, it could be argued that there was therefore no need to include a narrative summary of the recollections in the SYP proof of evidence; instead, the Taylor Inquiry team could simply read the recollections in full.
The result of the legal team’s editing of the SYP proof of evidence was that the submitted version contained no details about events of the day after 12 noon (though these were covered in the officers’ accounts). To answer part of the IOPC’s terms of reference, this submitted version was not, and cannot have been, a complete picture of all the evidence available to SYP.
The IOPC’s analysis of the different versions has also highlighted that several areas of information that would have been relevant to the Taylor Inquiry were removed from the proof of evidence before submission. Details of the number of officers on duty at the 1988 Semi-Final were cut, making it hard to compare the police preparation for the two games. Also, all references to the possibility of SYP closing the tunnel and having responsibility for monitoring capacity in the pens were deleted.
When senior officers gave oral evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, they denied that the police were responsible for monitoring capacity in the pens—suggesting instead it was the responsibility of SWFC stewards. In addition, they denied knowledge of past actions to close the tunnel. The IOPC view is that these denials appear to have been coordinated or formed part of an agreed stance.
In the face of substantial evidence from junior officers, some spectators and SWFC officials that the tunnel was not only closed at the 1988 Semi-Final but also that it was a relatively common practice to do so at league games, SYP and its legal team were forced to accept that the tunnel had been closed at the 1988 Semi-Final. However, they then claimed this was as a result of junior officers acting on their own initiative. Lord Justice Taylor accepted this.
Overall, the IOPC has found a range of evidence to suggest that SYP did seek to control the story it presented to the Taylor Inquiry, about certain topics. There is a consistency between the amendments made to officer accounts, the material in the proof of evidence and oral evidence given by senior officers. This consistency was not focused on the behaviour of supporters, but rather on the extent of police responsibility.
However, as set out in other chapters, there was no duty of candour to the Taylor Inquiry, as long as evidence was not misleading. Officers and the force as a whole were entitled to present their best case and not put forward material that could undermine the overall argument SYP and its legal team was seeking to make.
However, acting in this way was not in keeping with the aims of the Taylor Inquiry, to prevent such events recurring. SYP adopted a highly defensive approach and was selective in what it put forward as evidence, particularly in relation to tunnel closure and monitoring the pens. Though evidence around this came out during the oral hearings, the Taylor Inquiry still could not make safety recommendations based on a full understanding of how the police managed matches at Hillsborough Stadium.
The written submissions to the Taylor Inquiry were made in CC Wright’s name. He was reportedly pleased with the closing submissions sent, which included unsubstantiated claims about the behaviour of supporters.
CC Wright had the authority to set the direction for the force’s approach. He was directly aware of evidence pointing towards police culpability for the disaster. Instead of acknowledging this and seeking to assure the public that SYP would act to prevent any future reoccurrence, CC Wright appears to have sanctioned an approach that sought to deflect blame onto others.
It was clearly in the public interest that such information should have formed part of the Taylor Inquiry’s considerations and not providing it was potentially detrimental to the Inquiry. The IOPC was therefore of the view that, CC Wright could be deemed to have breached the Police Disciplinary Code for the offence of discreditable conduct. This was because he permitted and even appears to have endorsed the approach SYP took: one of defensiveness and deflection, rather than transparency. SYP senior officers were aware from an early stage that there was evidence suggesting that the actions of the police had caused, or contributed to, the disaster.
By contrast, as the Inquiry progressed, it was clear there was limited or no evidence of supporter behaviour being a causative factor. Despite this, SYP persisted in putting forward the case that it was, particularly in its closing submissions; hence Lord Justice Taylor’s criticism of the police case as unrealistic. CC Wright had the authority to insist SYP adopted a different position, which was less defensive and did not seek to blame supporters; he made no efforts to do so. If he was still serving, his actions would have resulted in a case to answer for gross misconduct.
After the oral hearings of the Taylor Inquiry were complete, all parties were invited to produce a final written submission. Mr Woodward wrote the closing submissions on behalf of SYP and on 29 June 1989, SYP sent him some documents that they believed he may find helpful. These included the Observations that formed section 5.18 of the Wain report, and a memo sent by Ch Supt Wain to CC Wright on 16 June 1989, including suggestions for what should be in SYP’s closing submissions, based on a review of the Inquiry transcripts.
On 6 July, the legal team made a 31-page submission on behalf of SYP. It was accompanied by an additional statement from Superintendent David Chapman (Supt Chapman), which Ch Insp Bettison helped obtain.
Supt Chapman’s statement specifically addressed evidence given on 29 June (the last day of the oral hearings) by Douglas Lock, the head of security at SWFC.
Mr Lock had stated to the Inquiry that SYP and SWFC had an agreement that the police were responsible for crowd control and safety on the West Terrace at Hillsborough Stadium. He asserted that this agreement had been in place since 1982, when Mr Lock was a superintendent with SYP. According to Mr Lock, the agreement was a result of a discussion involving himself, Ch Supt Herold (who was then the SYP match commander for high-profile games at Hillsborough Stadium), Supt Chapman and the then SWFC Secretary, Mr England. Mr Lock said he then adopted this same approach when he was in charge of policing the ground, adding he had “rubber-stamped” an agreement that had been made by his predecessor, Supt Chapman. He further stated that this same agreement “was subsequently carried on by Mr. Freeman and also Mr. Murray.”
The additional statement from Supt Chapman that was included as part of SYP’s closing submissions wholly refuted this. It denied not only the existence of any agreement with SWFC but also that Supt Chapman had been present at any meeting that matched that described by Mr Lock.
The first page of SYP’s main closing submission included an apparent criticism of the way the Inquiry had been conducted: “At the Inquiry no rules of evidence prevailed, no sworn testimony was given (and once the Advocates had become accustomed to such licence), leading questions became the order of the day, hearsay upon hearsay was invited and opinion and speculation was canvassed.”
It suggested that, due to the speed at which the Inquiry had taken place and the fact that WMP’s investigations were ongoing, “it may be unsafe, even if were considered possible, to come to what might strictly be described as findings of fact.”
However, the closing submissions then presented information as facts which had either yet to be proven or had been proven wrong. For example, under the subheading “Non ticket holders”, SYP’s closing submissions claimed that there was a “significant and substantial element of non-ticket holders” at the game. This did not align with analysis conducted by the HSE for the Taylor Inquiry, which found that the total number of supporters who had entered the ground through turnstiles A to G and Gate C was at the very most just 14 more than the number of tickets available; the more likely figure was actually lower than the 10,100 capacity. Evidence has not emerged through any subsequent investigation to prove there were large numbers of supporters at the game without tickets.
The closing submissions also repeated the suggestion, rejected by the Taylor Inquiry, that there had been “concerted action” among some supporters to try to gain entry to the ground, and commented: “the very notion that something was planned or organised to defeat the Police and embarrass them into having to open the gates was, in the early stages of this Inquiry, dealt with perhaps somewhat dismissively and treated as fanciful by Counsel for the Inquiry. Clearly it is not a matter upon which it might be expected evidence would be readily, if ever, available. However, belatedly it has to some degree emerged and it is submitted that the notion of a plan by some to foment difficulty and disorder cannot be airily dismissed.”
The IOPC has established that there were no similarities between the memo from Ch Supt Wain to CC Wright, which was then shared with the legal team, and a memo sent from Ch Supt Duckenfield to Ch Supt Wain on 13 June 1989.
Ch Supt Duckenfield’s memo had included a series of recommendations to prevent or manage future crowd crushes at Hillsborough Stadium. Though not specifically analysing the causes of the disaster, his recommendations addressed some factors which have since been identified as contributing to the disaster. These included:
the unequal allocation of turnstiles to the respective sets of supporters
the physical layout of the Leppings Lane end
improved signage, including a suggestion of a “large electronic indicator, similar to an electronic score-board, equipped with flashing lights so that fans queuing can be given, visually, up to date information regarding delays or police messages and, whatever the noise, this can be seen clearly by all queuing or waiting in Leppings Lane.”
greater use of loudhailers and Tannoys
Ch Supt Wain’s memo similarly included recommendations around reviewing signage, turnstile allocation and the use of Tannoys and loudhailers.
When reviewing the memo, IOPC investigators noted that its tone is highly lucid, and the recommendations appear to show some insight into the causes of the disaster. This makes a notable contrast to the more hesitant answers Ch Supt Duckenfield gave in his evidence to the Taylor Inquiry.
Evidence examined by the IOPC indicates that the closing submissions were written by the legal team—primarily Mr Woodward—and that SYP did not even see it before it was sent to the Taylor Inquiry on 6 July, despite a request from CC Wright to Mr Metcalf to view it. On 12 July 1989, Mr Metcalf and Mr Woodward met CC Wright and DCC Hayes. An attendance note of the meeting, written by Mr Metcalf, recorded that the officers were very pleased with the closing submissions.
