The IOPC examined the evidence around each of the allegations about supporter behaviour that were reported in the media.
Again, the focus was to look at whether the allegations were based on comments made by police officers and if so, whether there was evidence to support the comments.
In most cases, even where the reports appeared to indicate that police officers may have been the source of the allegation, the evidence of disruptive supporter behaviour was—and still is—very limited.
For example, WMP sought to investigate the allegation about supporters coming to the ground without tickets by including a question on the standard questionnaire it used for Liverpool supporters about whether they had got an advance ticket for the game and whether they still had it.
On 12 June 1989, WMP sent an update on the issue to the Taylor Inquiry team, based on a review of 1,699 questionnaires WMP had completed with Liverpool supporters. Of these, 136 (8%) said they had travelled to Sheffield without a ticket for the Liverpool section. When questioned, 42 said they bought a ticket from a tout. A further 46 said they bought a ticket near the ground, without specifying from whom, while 36 entered the ground without a ticket. WMP applied these figures to the total number of tickets available for Liverpool supporters and suggested that alongside the 24,000 Liverpool supporters with tickets there would have been 2,088 without. This was at best a miscalculation: WMP found that just 36 of the 1,699 entered the ground without a ticket, equivalent to 2.1%, which if applied to the maximum attendance would have amounted to 212 supporters entering without tickets.
WMP did not provide any information about how this compared to other all-ticket games. Further, it would be logical that those who bought tickets from touts would not have then attempted to enter the ground without a ticket.
Detailed analysis by the HSE, carried out in preparation for the Popper Inquests in 1990, concluded that the total number of people on the Leppings Lane terraces on the day did not exceed the maximum allowed capacity of 10,100. It established that 7,494 supporters had entered the Leppings Lane terraces via the turnstiles; the HSE estimated a further 2,020–2,480 came through Gate C when it was opened at 2.48pm and 2.52pm. This indicates that fewer than 10,000 Liverpool supporters entered the terraces in total, undermining the suggestion that the crowd was swelled by people without tickets.
Similar gaps or uncertainties exist around other allegations reported in the first few days. For example, several newspaper reports claimed that police officers had been attacked by supporters as they attempted to rescue people from the crush. Though the IOPC found references in a number of officers’ original accounts to being struck in some way, by the time these officers gave accounts to Operation Resolve or the IOPC they were in general less definite that they had been attacked by supporters, as opposed to simply being jostled in the rescue effort. A comprehensive analysis of video footage and photos taken on the day found very little that depicted or even suggested supporters were attacking police officers.
WMP sent a list of 34 witnesses to the Taylor Inquiry who claimed they had seen officers being spat at. These included some supporters and other eyewitnesses as well as officers. In several cases, the alleged spitting took place outside the ground, or in other places away from the rescue effort. Three of the witnesses specifically noted that the spitting was by Nottingham Forest supporters rather than Liverpool supporters; one PC stated that he was spat at by supporters of both sides.
It is understood that it was not uncommon for football crowds at the time to spit at police officers. Further, it would not have been a cause of the disaster, nor would it have hampered any rescue efforts.
One of the stories in the White’s news feed focused on allegations of stealing. An anonymous officer was quoted as saying: “There was a lot of pilfering going on while the bid to save lives was taking place.” The story included the claim that Liverpool supporters were “picking the pockets of victims”, which was then repeated in The Sun.
At the Police Federation meeting on 19 April 1989, two officers were reported as saying that one of those who died in the disaster had “numerous wallets” in his possession. This was apparently accepted by the meeting as evidence of stealing among the Liverpool supporters. However, this allegation was comprehensively dismissed at the Goldring Inquests, by reference to a police log which listed the property of each of those who died. None had more than one wallet in their possession.
No police force or other investigation has ever received any complaint from a family member of someone who died in the disaster about theft from their loved one.
The central allegation about the behaviour of supporters was that a large number were under the influence of alcohol. Here there was, and remains, a clear divide in the evidence.
In broad terms, supporters have consistently stated that the overwhelming majority of fans did not drink to excess and that there was nothing unusual or remarkable about the level of drinking by supporters before the game. By contrast, a significant proportion of police officers have consistently stated that the level of alcohol consumption was much higher than normal for a football match.
There is insufficient evidence from any other source to say with certainty which of these perceptions was correct. However, perhaps the pivotal point of the media coverage was the inference that excessive drinking had been a factor in the disaster—if not as a direct cause, then at least aggravating the situation in some way and making the rescue effort harder.
This claim was rejected as early as the Taylor Interim Report in August 1989, which suggested that officers had overstated the impact of alcohol as a way of explaining the loss of police control. Further investigations, including most recently the Goldring Inquests, did not find evidence to suggest that alcohol consumption was a factor. The jury at the Goldring Inquests concluded that there was no behaviour on the part of football supporters which caused or contributed to the dangerous situation at the Leppings Lane turnstiles. Similarly, the IOPC has not found any evidence to suggest that the behaviour of supporters caused or contributed to the disaster.
As set out in paragraph 7.45, the first media reports that raised allegations of supporter misbehaviour were published on 17 April. However, it was on 18 April that the allegations escalated, with both the Sheffield Star and White’s producing stories with similar details.
The IOPC sought to establish which of the two outlets had been the initial source of these stories.
Assuming the Sheffield Star followed its normal publication times—and no evidence has been found to suggest it did not do so on 18 April 1989—its article ‘Fans in drunken attacks on police’ would have been available from early afternoon, or possibly even late morning.
For White’s, sending news feeds to the nationals was (and remains) a central part of its business. However, it did also sell stories to the Sheffield Star. Therefore, it is possible that the story in the Sheffield Star could have been based on a White’s news feed. However, the evidence examined by the IOPC suggests this is unlikely.
Firstly, the White’s news feed was built up over the course of the day. The initial feed, consisting of just one story, was issued on the morning of 18 April. According to White’s, the second and third parts were then produced in the afternoon. These would, therefore, have been added after the Sheffield Star’s first edition—which included the article—was printed.
Secondly, in their statements to the IOPC, the White’s journalists indicated that they had not done much investigative work around the disaster in the immediate aftermath. The reason was that the majority of their clients—the national media—had sent their own reporters to Sheffield and so did not need the services of a press agency.
By contrast, one of the journalists whose name appeared on the Sheffield Star article ‘Fans in drunken attacks on police’ recalled producing the article. He told IOPC investigators that it took some time to research and develop. Rumours had been circulating about supporter behaviour, so he and a colleague were instructed to interview local residents and workers near the ground. They sought to substantiate claims before the paper was willing to print the article.
The White’s journalists who gave statements to the IOPC did not have any recollection of speaking to local residents. However, it does appear that White’s did have some contact with police officers in this period.
On 12 June 1989, White’s sent a memo to the news editor of the Evening Standard regarding the news feed it had sent out on 18 April 1989. The Evening Standard had been one of the first papers to print the allegations made in the feed.
In the memo, White’s provided an explanation of how the agency came about the information contained in the feed: “all the allegations in the stories we filed were made, unsolicited, by ranking officers in the South Yorkshire force to three different experienced senior journalists who are partners in this agency.”
The memo further explained that the first claims were received on the night of the disaster, when an officer told one of the journalists about being punched and urinated on. The following day, another of its journalists met by chance with a different officer who said they had witnessed bad behaviour by supporters. At that stage, White’s felt there was not enough confirmation to send a story making such serious claims.
However, when a third officer reiterated the allegations, White’s felt it was appropriate to send the story out.
There were five journalists at White’s at the time who fitted this description of ‘experienced senior journalists’. Two had died before the IOPC investigation began. The IOPC interviewed the other three. None recalled the memo, and none said they were one of the journalists to whom unsolicited allegations were made.
However, all three stated that if they did know the names of any officers who had spoken to the media, they would have been more than willing to disclose them to the IOPC. They commented that the story had damaged the reputation of White’s, and they also all felt that any right the sources may have had to anonymity had been lost by the fact that the stories had been false.
This raises the possibility that officers spoke to both the Sheffield Star and White’s. As noted, the IOPC was not able to identify the officers quoted anonymously. No officer admitted being the source of these quotes. However, it strongly appears that some officers spoke to the media and commented on the behaviour of supporters. A crucial part of the IOPC investigation was therefore to consider whether any of these comments were inappropriate or inaccurate.
There is a range of evidence to indicate that police officers spoke to the media about the disaster.
On Sunday 16 April, the SYP press log recorded an enquiry from Bob Westerdale, a journalist at the Sheffield Star, who said that he had “info from an unnamed officer who said the trouble was caused by 4000 drunken Liverpool supporters.” According to the press log, the SYP press office did not comment.
On Monday 17 April, among the extensive media coverage of the disaster, several newspapers published quotes from police officers—none of whom were named. For example, in The Independent, an officer was reported as saying: “I know my back will be covered in bruises. It’s been kicked all afternoon by Liverpool supporters while I’ve been trying to tend the injured.”
The Times included the comment: “Fellow officers were punched and kicked as they carried a dead girl, about nine years old, from the ground.” As the youngest person who died in the disaster was a boy aged 10, and the youngest woman who died was 15, it is not clear who this officer was referring to.
The SYP press log that day recorded queries from journalists at the Sheffield Star and The Sun asking for police comment on various allegations of misbehaviour by supporters; both reportedly asked about the allegation that officers had been urinated on. The press office did not comment on the allegations.
In its City Late edition (published mid-afternoon), the Sheffield Star named Supt Marshall as the police officer who had opened a gate at the stadium. The front-page article stated that he had made the decision “fearing a wall was seconds away from collapsing on hundreds of fans” outside. The article quoted an unnamed “high-ranking” colleague and an “officer at the scene”, both of whom offered support for Supt Marshall. Neither was quoted as commenting on the behaviour of supporters. However, the article did include references to some fans being “the worse for drink” and arriving late.
The comments in support of Supt Marshall were repeated in the Daily Mail on 18 April. The paper also included quotations from PC Middup, who was the SYP Police Federation representative. He strongly criticised the behaviour of supporters, stating that “they were arriving tanked up on drink”, and that: “Even as our lads were giving the kiss-of-life to victims they were being spat upon and pelted with coins.” The same article also quoted an unnamed chief inspector, who stated: “I have no doubt that a major contributory factor in the disaster was excessive drinking.”
In its first edition of the day, published around lunchtime, the Sheffield Star included an article headlined: ‘Fans in drunken attacks on police’. The article claimed: “Emergency workers were attacked and even urinated on by drunken fans”. One “high-ranking officer” was quoted as saying: “Some were like animals: drunk and violent”. The same quotation concluded: “People were picking coins off the floor as victims lay needing help.”
The same day, White’s News Agency issued a news feed consisting of three stories, all of which included allegations about supporter behaviour. Such feeds were made available to newspapers and other media outlets to reuse for a fee. The first article in the feed quoted three unnamed officers. In the second piece, an unnamed officer stated: “People were picking up coins which had fallen from victim's pockets as they lay on the floor”, and one “high-ranking officer” was quoted as saying: “Some of them were like animals, they were drunk and violent.” These words were almost identical to one of the quotations in the Sheffield Star; however, the White’s feed split the quotation between two officers. The second story also quoted PC Middup, using quotes very similar to those featured in the Daily Mail that morning.
The third story in the news feed was an extended quote from Irvine Patnick, Conservative MP for Sheffield Hallam.
In its West End Final edition that evening, the London Evening Standard published the material from White’s, largely verbatim.
At 6.30pm, the SYP press office received the first of a series of queries from journalists regarding a report they had received from an agency about supporters attacking the police. According to the press log, each caller was referred to WMP, which had by this time been given responsibility for investigating the disaster.
At 9pm that evening, both PC Middup and Mr Patnick featured in a BBC News broadcast. Both made comments about the behaviour of supporters that were similar to the quotes that had already been attributed to them in newspaper coverage.
At 10pm, Mr Patnick was featured in an ‘ITN News’ broadcast, again repeating the allegations. He stated that he had spoken to officers who had been attacked.
On Wednesday 19 April, several national newspapers published articles that appear to have been strongly based on the White’s news feed of the previous day. These included The Times, the Daily Express, the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror.
The paper that gave the stories the greatest prominence was The Sun, in a now notorious article headlined ‘The Truth’. The key difference between The Sun’s coverage and that of other papers was that, rather than couching the stories in the language of allegations, The Sun published them as facts—emphasised by its headline. It also added two aspects that were not in the White’s feed: a further allegation and a quote from PC Middup, suggesting that The Sun had requested a comment from him.
Though media coverage of the disaster continued, the intensity reduced after this. It is clear that these initial stories were the most influential in terms of public opinion and caused the greatest distress.
The IOPC sought to identify the sources of the stories and in particular the quotes. Aside from official statements made in press conferences by CC Wright, the only police officer who was named as commenting on the behaviour of supporters was PC Middup. He was first quoted on the subject in the national papers on the morning of Tuesday 18 April. Other quotes were attributed variously to “officers who had been on duty”, “senior officers” and “experienced officers”.
There were two similar comments, both attributed to unnamed chief inspectors. In the Daily Mail on 18 April, a chief inspector was quoted as saying: “I have no doubt that a major contributory factor in the disaster was excessive drinking.” Then in an article from a different paper—which appears to be the Sheffield Star—an unnamed chief inspector was quoted as stating: “I am convinced excessing drinking was a major contributory factor.”
In this second article, the chief inspector was described as having “emerged from the temporary mortuary.” There were two chief inspectors known to have been in the temporary mortuary. Based on the strong similarity between these comments and words he has used in other accounts, the IOPC has identified that Ch Insp Sumner was the most likely source of these comments. This clear similarity led to a complaint about Ch Insp Sumner speaking to the media in this way so soon after the disaster. The IOPC has upheld this complaint, as in speaking to the media in this way Ch Insp Sumner did not deliver the level of service the public would expect.
Despite asking dozens of officers, as well as over 100 journalists, IOPC investigators have not been able to identify any other officers who spoke to journalists. No officer has admitted being an unnamed source. Even those officers who have given accounts, as recently as the Goldring Inquests, describing high levels of alcohol consumption among supporters, have flatly denied speaking to the media in the immediate aftermath of the disaster.
None of the Sheffield Star journalists interviewed by the IOPC said they knew where the original allegations regarding supporters’ behaviour came from. Several journalists from other media outlets referred to stories and rumours about supporter behaviour beginning to circulate after the disaster. However, none of journalists interviewed by IOPC investigators were willing or able to identify a police source. Apart from calling the SYP press office, very few even recalled speaking to a police officer.
A common view among the journalists interviewed was that, at the time, they trusted police officers to tell them the truth and did not question what officers had told them. However, most would seek corroboration from at least one other source—potentially, though not necessarily, another officer—before proceeding with a story. This was certainly the view of journalists at both White’s and the Sheffield Star. Once a quote was published by another news outlet, others would feel able to reuse it without seeking corroboration themselves.
Two individuals have acknowledged their role in sharing stories with the media: PC Middup and Mr Patnick.
In a statement to the IOPC, PC Middup confirmed that he had made all the comments attributed to him. He explained that, in engaging with the media in relation to the disaster, he simply repeated what officers had told him. He added that he had not checked whether their accounts were true before sharing them. In fact, the IOPC has found evidence that he did seek to get some of the details confirmed at a Police Federation meeting on 18 April, where according to the minutes, he specifically “asked for the names of people who were abused because the Inquiry will want to know them.” This was after he had first spoken to the media.
Mr Patnick’s own notes from the time show that on the evening of the disaster, he went to the Niagara Police Sports and Social Club, which had been opened as an informal meeting point for officers. While he was there, Mr Patnick spoke to a group of SYP officers who made various allegations about the behaviour of Liverpool supporters. These included reports of officers being assaulted and urinated on by supporters. At the end of the conversation, Mr Patnick was asked by the officers to speak up for them and to tell Parliament what had happened.
Mr Patnick’s notes state that he “was advised by senior officers to take what had been said ‘with a pinch of salt.’” However, Mr Patnick subsequently repeated several of these stories to the media.
Further, on 20 April 1989, Mr Patnick wrote to Lord Justice Taylor, whose inquiry had been announced. He explained that he had deliberately spoken to the media about the behaviour of Liverpool supporters: “Eventually after being sickened by the ‘myths’ that had sprung up about the disaster I repeated the story in part to the media in order to correct the rumours circulating the police officers had related to me.” He added: “I am not aware of names ranks or numbers of the officers but do believe they were telling me the truth.”
Following the publication of the HIP Report, Mr Patnick issued a statement, acknowledging that he had repeated to the media information that he had been given by officers. He apologised for not questioning the accuracy of that information. Mr Patnick died shortly after the IOPC investigation began and investigators did not have an opportunity to interview him.
There is some evidence to indicate that Mr Patnick did seek to check the accuracy of what he had said. On 12 July 1989, Peter Moxon of White’s sent a letter to Mr Patnick including extracts from “sworn statements” made by witnesses. The IOPC has established that these were in fact not signed and sworn statements, but accounts written on plain paper from a small number of police and ambulance officers, apparently sent in response to a request from Mr Patnick. The extracts included references to officers being attacked, spat at and urinated on by supporters. One officer also alleged that he had seen supporters stealing.
Mr Patnick responded on 27 July 1989 thanking Mr Moxon for the accounts. He noted they “actually confirm everything you stated”. It is not clear whether Mr Patnick was referring to what was stated in the content of the news feed or what may have been stated in separate conversations.
The IOPC has not been able to establish how White’s received the accounts. Mr Moxon could not recall it. However, it is unlikely that White’s had received the accounts by the time it sent out the news feed that included allegations around supporter behaviour. The feed was sent on 18 April 1989; most officers had not completed their accounts by that date.
No one who provided a statement to the IOPC—from SYP, WMP and SYMAS officers, to solicitors working for any of these organisations—has indicated in any way that they passed the accounts to White’s or even that they were aware that it was done.
The evidence available to the IOPC gives the strong impression that both Mr Patnick and PC Middup simply repeated stories they had been told, without checking them.
The first reports of an incident came shortly after the match had been stopped. Gerald Sinstadt, working at the ground for the BBC, told viewers of the TV show ‘Grandstand’ that some Liverpool supporters were on the pitch because there had been “too many spectators” at the Leppings Lane end. He noted that some supporters were receiving treatment from SJA.
At 3.25pm, also on ‘Grandstand’, commentator John Motson said: “I have to say that this what [was] not caused by as far as we know by misbehaviour, except the reason it happened was because one of the outside gates here was broken and non ticket holders forced their way in and overcrowded the section at the Leppings Lane end occupied by the genuine authentic ticket holders.”
In a later statement, he said that this was based on information he had been given by the BBC producer, who he believed had been told this by the police. The producer had no recollection of this.
At 3.40pm, in a live broadcast, BBC radio commentator Alan Green stated that there were unconfirmed reports that a door had been broken down at the Liverpool end of the stadium.
This was followed at 4.15pm by an initial media statement from SYP: “About five minutes after game started there was a serge [sic] of fans at the Leppings Lane end of the ground which was occupied by the Liverpool supporters. There was a spillage onto the ground and a number of people were injured.”
At 4.30pm, Mr Green reported on BBC radio that there had been a surge at the Leppings Lane end, “composed of about 500 Liverpool fans and the police say that a gate was forced and that led to a crush in the terracing area.”
At 4.49pm, FA Chief Executive Graham Kelly gave an interview to the BBC and stated that there were “two versions of what went wrong. The first is that a door or doors were forced down the second is that a door or doors was or were opened by someone in authority.”
Cumulatively, this amounted to a series of reports via a national broadcaster that indicated the disaster had been a result of supporters forcing their way into the stadium.
At 7.15pm, CC Wright addressed a press conference at SYP HQ. He informed journalists that 93 people had been confirmed dead (which was correct at the time he gave the information) and at least 200 had been injured. He also stated that a gate had been opened at the request of the police to relieve the crush outside the stadium, but said he was “not aware of any connection between the opening of the gate and the surge on the terrace.” As he left the press conference, he shouted words to the effect that his officers would be vindicated.
Though CC Wright was quite clear that a gate had not been forced, the damage had been done. The next day, some newspapers reported that the gate had been forced by supporters. This, and the initial broadcast media reports, were hugely influential in the growth of an enduring and widespread public perception that the supporters’ actions had caused the disaster.
A range of evidence supports that the most likely source of this story was Ch Supt Duckenfield—albeit indirectly. At 3.15pm, he spoke to Mr Kelly and the FA’s Head of External Affairs Glen Kirton and led them to understand that a gate had been forced by Liverpool supporters. Then at 3.35pm, he gave a similar impression to SWFC directors and others in the boardroom at the stadium.
The IOPC has not found any evidence to indicate that Ch Supt Duckenfield spoke directly to TV or radio broadcasters on the day of the disaster, or to any media in the days that followed. Despite this, the comments he made were widely reported in the media. Lord Justice Taylor confirmed this in his Interim Report, writing that Ch Supt Duckenfield “gave Mr Kelly and others to think that there had been an inrush due to Liverpool fans forcing open a gate. This was not only untruthful. It set off a widely reported allegation against the supporters which caused grave offence and distress.”
A transcript has been found of an interview Mr Green conducted with Mr Kelly, but the exact time is not confirmed on it. In this, Mr Kelly stated that he had “been in the Police Control Box and they tell me that a gate or gates was opened or broken and fans came in.” When Mr Green responded that they had heard reports that a gate was opened under police orders, Mr Kelly replied: “I’ve only spoken very briefly to the Police commander and that wasn’t the impression that I got.”
In his evidence to the Goldring Inquests in 2015, Ch Supt Duckenfield accepted that he had told Mr Kelly and others a lie and said he apologised unreservedly to the families of those who died for doing so.
He stated that immediately after speaking to Mr Kelly and Mr Kirton in the PCB, he realised the partial explanation he had given—that supporters had come through a gate—would be open to misinterpretation as he had not clarified that the gate had been opened on police authority.
If indeed he did realise this, it is notable that he did not seek to correct the impression he had given to Mr Kelly and Mr Kirton. Instead, he offered a very similar explanation shortly after in the SWFC boardroom.
This was a different account to the one he gave to the Taylor Inquiry. There, he accepted that he may have misled Mr Kelly and Mr Kirton, but suggested it was because he was in shock. He added under further cross-examination at the Inquiry that he had acted “in good faith”. He then claimed that he had not told them the police had opened the gate because he “was concerned about the crowd situation, and I didn't want the public at large, via the media or by casual conversation, to become aware… of the opening of the gates by police officers, and the disaster.”
In 2019, Ch Supt Duckenfield faced a retrial for manslaughter relating to the disaster. His barrister said that his client’s admission at the Goldring Inquests that he had lied had been taken out of context and had been made with the benefit of hindsight.
On 22 November 1989, WMP recorded a complaint that Ch Supt Duckenfield “was deceitful and intentionally misled senior police officers and members of the public regarding his command and control of police officers on the day.” Part of this related to the explanation he gave to the FA and SWFC officials.
WMP investigated the complaint and concluded “That Chief Superintendent Duckenfield misled Jackson, Kelly and Kirton seems clear, that he did it deliberately or deceitfully is not supported by the evidence available.”
The PCA, which was the national body that oversaw complaints against police officers at the time, disagreed with this opinion and recommended that SYP should bring disciplinary proceedings against Ch Supt Duckenfield for the lie. These proceedings never took place, as Ch Supt Duckenfield retired early from police duty due to ill health.
When the IOPC began its investigation in 2012, the complaint was reopened, using new powers that the IOPC had requested to allow it to reinvestigate matters that had been dealt with by its predecessors. Having reviewed the evidence, the IOPC found that Ch Supt Duckenfield would have faced a case to answer for gross misconduct, if he had still been serving. This was on the basis that he knowingly made false, misleading or inaccurate oral statements in the PCB and the SWFC boardroom by suggesting that Gate C had been forced open by supporters, when he knew that he gave the order for the gate to be opened.
The focus of the IOPC investigation was not on the accuracy or appropriateness of the coverage itself—the IOPC has no authority to investigate the media—but on the roles played by police officers in the media reporting. The IOPC also looked into the interactions of SYP officers with journalists.
Following the publication of the HIP Report, SYP referred a range of allegations to the IOPC for investigation. This referral identified various potential criminal offences, including attempting to pervert the course of justice by misleading the press, and perverting the course of justice by providing copies of officers’ accounts to White’s News Agency.
WMP also referred some matters to the IOPC, including the leaking of SYP accounts to the media, because evidence suggested that this happened after WMP had collected officer accounts from SYP.
The IOPC also received a number of complaints relating to police interaction with the media.
Some related to Ch Supt Duckenfield’s comments to officials from SWFC and the FA that the disaster had been caused by supporters forcing a gate, which the officials then passed on to the media.
Others referred to an interview with CC Wright, which was published in the Sheffield Star on 5 February 1990. In it, he was quoted as making critical comments about the Taylor Inquiry and suggesting “a different picture” would emerge at the forthcoming inquests. The complainants alleged he deliberately misled the journalist and could potentially have prejudiced jurors at the forthcoming inquests.
To investigate these allegations, IOPC investigators reviewed hundreds of newspaper articles related to the disaster, from national and local publications. This was supported by a review of existing statements and documents held in the archived material, including the SYP press log, which was intended to provide a record of all contact between the SYP press office and the media. Through this approach, the IOPC was able to build a detailed timeline of the evolving media coverage.
When taking statements from (former) SYP officers, investigators routinely asked them if they had any contact with the media in the aftermath of the disaster. The majority said they did not; some recalled being contacted by journalists but said they had not provided them with any information. The IOPC also took statements from SYP officers or civilian staff who were known to have interacted with journalists, including those who worked in the SYP press office at the time.
IOPC investigators traced and, where appropriate, took witness statements from newspaper journalists whose names appeared on the articles, as well as others who were known to have been in the press box at the stadium on the day of the Semi-Final. Almost 200 journalists were contacted and asked about their recollections of the disaster and its aftermath; based on their responses to investigators’ preliminary questions, 44 were asked to provide statements to the IOPC. Of these, 24 worked on local or regional newspapers, six were national media journalists who were in the press box on the day of the disaster, and 14 were national journalists who appeared to have used material from the White’s news feed.
Journalists were also asked about any interactions they had with police officers. Many said they did not speak directly to police officers; a small number recalled they had done but could not remember the officers’ names or any identifying details. Some specifically told the IOPC that if they could remember the officers’ names, they would have willingly disclosed them, as they felt any right the sources may have had to anonymity had been lost by the fact that the stories had been false.
From the afternoon of the disaster onwards, media outlets turned to police forces and individual officers for information about what had happened. The first TV and radio reports from the BBC (which was broadcasting at the game) included suggestions that the disaster had occurred after supporters forced open a gate to gain entry to the stadium. This same explanation had been given by Ch Supt Duckenfield, in his first conversations with senior officials from the FA and SWFC who were at the game.
These suggestions were corrected by CC Wright on the evening of the disaster. In a press conference, he confirmed that the gate had been opened by the police. Nonetheless, the next day some newspapers included the suggestion that supporters had forced a gate.
During the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Duckenfield admitted that his account to FA and SWFC officials had been a lie and apologised for it.
In the days that followed the disaster, reports in the national and regional media described Liverpool supporters at the game as drunk, and repeated allegations that supporters had forced entry into the stadium. While this was by no means the tone of all the media coverage, the focus on the behaviour of Liverpool supporters intensified. On Tuesday 18 and Wednesday 19 April, numerous newspapers published articles which alleged that some supporters had attacked police officers and stolen from those who had died. One of these reports was an article in The Sun, headlined ‘The Truth’.
Many of these reports quoted unnamed police sources, making comments that were highly critical of the behaviour of Liverpool supporters. Some of these police sources were described as “senior officers”; The Sun attributed comments to “a high-ranking officer at the ground”.
The HIP Report cited a range of documents and other material that raised questions about the accuracy of the information given to the media by police sources in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. It found no documentary evidence to support many of the stories that had been repeated in media coverage over the years.
It also raised a more serious allegation: that SYP, in an organised and deliberate way, may have sought to use the media as a means of deflecting the blame for the disaster away from the police, on to Liverpool supporters.
Under a term of reference covering SYP’s engagement with the media and MPs in the aftermath of the disaster, the IOPC investigated: The interactions of police officers with the press and politicians, in particular:
a) whether any police officer was involved in the passing of inappropriate or inaccurate information to a journalist, including whether any police officer was involved in passing written accounts to the press b) whether any police officers passed inappropriate or inaccurate information to any Member of Parliament—whether individually or at meetings. This will include investigation of the actions of Chief Inspector Norman Bettison in visiting Parliament and the evidence he presented, its content and subsequent use by others c) whether the briefing which was given to the Home Secretary and Prime Minister on the day after the disaster contained any inaccurate or inappropriate information d) whether the evidence demonstrates that such interactions were directed or encouraged by SYP
This chapter focuses on part a and some interactions with MPs, in relation to what they then said to the media (part b). Chapter 8 covers parts b and c.
What was found?
• The IOPC has not found any evidence to suggest that the behaviour of supporters caused or in any way contributed to the disaster. There was little or no evidence to support the main allegations reported in the media about the behaviour of supporters on the day of the disaster.
• In relation to supporters’ alcohol consumption, there was a clear divide between the evidence of many police officers, who broadly suggested that there was an unprecedented level of alcohol consumption, and the evidence of most supporters, who indicated that there was nothing out of the ordinary. The majority of third-party accounts, images and video do not support the suggestion that drinking was at unprecedented levels.
• The allegation that supporters burned a police horse with cigarettes is not supported by evidence. In fact, the evidence gathered by the IOPC shows that this claim was not only improbable, but implausible.
• Though it has long been assumed that The Sun was the first newspaper to print stories which painted the supporters in a negative light, the IOPC confirmed that similar allegations had been reported by local news outlets the Sheffield Star and White’s News Agency the day before they were published in The Sun.
• The available evidence suggested that a key source of information for the White’s news feed—and possibly the Sheffield Star article—was Irvine Patnick, the then Conservative MP for Sheffield Hallam. Mr Patnick’s own notes from the time show that he spoke to several police officers on the evening after the disaster; they told him various stories about supporters, which he then repeated to the media.
• No officer admitted being the source of the anonymous comments published in The Sun or any of the other media coverage. With just one exception—the probable identification of a chief inspector quoted in one article—the IOPC was not able to identify the officers who spoke to journalists.
Significant new evidence
To investigate police interactions with the media, the IOPC contacted almost 200 journalists who had been at the ground on the day, or whose name appeared on any of the articles published in the days that followed the disaster, asking them about the sources of their stories and whether they had spoken to any police officers.
Media coverage of the Hillsborough disaster has been a source of enduring controversy, primarily due to the way that Liverpool supporters were portrayed.
From the earliest reports, there were suggestions in the media that the disaster had been caused by the actions of supporters. A central allegation was that large numbers of supporters had been drunk. Further coverage then insinuated that supporters had hindered rescue efforts and, in the most notorious article published by The Sun, even claimed that some supporters had acted disrespectfully towards those who had died.
This led to a lasting public perception that the behaviour of supporters was, at best, uncaring and unsavoury; at worst, that it directly contributed to the disaster.
This coverage has been repeatedly discredited, not least following the conclusion of the Goldring Inquests, where the jury found the behaviour of the supporters did not cause or contribute to the dangerous situation at the Leppings Lane turnstiles.
The tone and content of the media coverage has caused enormous distress to many Liverpool supporters and residents, to those who were at the game and to those who lost family members or friends. The IOPC investigation focused on the role of the police in the coverage, looking at what officers may have said to journalists and whether there was any evidence of a coordinated effort to influence media coverage.
A recurring theme across all the locations used in the aftermath of the disaster was an adherence to process rather than a focus on compassion and care. With a lack of overall command and coordination by police, individuals defaulted to procedure and were often overwhelmed by what they were dealing with. While the evidence shows officers taking control of specific aspects of the process—for example, D Ch Supt Addis taking control in the gymnasium and, later in the night, Supt Sleath seeking to coordinate reception facilities for the families—Operation Resolve has found no evidence of any senior leader within SYP taking strategic command of the response.
This was the same overarching issue that affected the emergency response at the ground.
Many individuals at each site tried hard to perform essential tasks such as recording missing persons, providing family reception and ensuring accurate identification. There were large numbers of volunteers from local authorities, support groups and churches of different denominations, who offered practical and emotional support, as did some local residents. Many police officers involved in the disaster response did their best to establish information, organise processes and conduct essential tasks with compassion and sensitivity. However, they were hampered in these efforts by the lack of overall coordination.
It would have been challenging for any organisation to respond to a disaster of this scale, and the initial response to any substantial disaster is always chaotic. Nonetheless, as the evening and night progressed, the lack of leadership and poor coordination became increasingly apparent and had several consequences.
The demands and perceived requirements of the Coroner became the key element in the disaster response. The impact on families and people affected by the disaster often took second place to following procedures. Dr Popper’s instructions were not questioned or challenged, even where a more flexible approach around issues such as viewing the photographs or using earlier identification statements could have reduced distress for the families.
Different functions and sites operated in silos. There was no effective coordination of the different agencies, especially social services and support agencies. These services provided invaluable practical, emotional and spiritual support, but the lack of wider police coordination meant they were not used as effectively as they might have been.
The lack of clear guidance meant individual officers used their own discretion, sometimes appropriately, sometimes not.
The evidence examined by Operation Resolve clearly shows that the lack of control and coordination contributed to and exacerbated a chaotic response that on too many occasions made an already devastating experience worse for families, friends and those affected by the Hillsborough disaster.
By around 5am on 16 April, the majority of those who died had been identified and transferred to the MLC. A decision was made that the remaining individuals, who had yet to be identified, would also be taken to the MLC and identified there. Operation Resolve has established that 17 of those who died were yet to be identified at that stage.
The same process was followed for identifications made at the MLC, but the layout of the building meant that the physical identification had to be done by looking through a window into a viewing area. Because the viewing area was only accessible through the mortuary and examination room, families were not permitted to go through it.
However, some families were not told this before the physical identification, so they were not expecting to be looking through a window and unable to touch or hold their loved one. Others did receive an explanation of the arrangements.
There were family members who went to the MLC simply to see their loved one, who had already been identified by a friend or another member of the family. Many of them were also not informed about what to expect and remembered it as extremely upsetting.
Other issues also recurred at the MLC, including families being questioned about alcohol consumption and officers treating them in an offhand or insensitive manner.
After the conclusion of the original Inquests, Dr Popper sent a letter dated 27 September 1991 to the Secretary of the Coroners' Society. In this, he summarised some of the issues that had been raised by relatives of those who died in relation to their experiences. While many of these related to the wider identification process, Dr Popper did highlight that the viewing arrangements at the MLC, which required families to stay behind the glass partition, had been unsuitable.
