Once they were rescued from the crush on the West Terrace, injured supporters were taken to a range of locations including the gymnasium at the stadium, which was designated as both the place for medical treatment and the temporary mortuary on site, and to Sheffield’s two major hospitals, the Northern General and the Royal Hallamshire.
Within minutes, it was apparent that some of those being carried to the gymnasium had died. From about 3.15pm, the gymnasium became both a casualty clearing point and the temporary mortuary, with the injured being treated in a separate area of the main hall. Those who were pronounced dead by medical professionals on the pitch were also taken to the gymnasium. They remained there until they were identified.
At about 6.45pm, Dr Popper attended the gymnasium and agreed a formal identification process with Detective Chief Superintendent Terence Addis (D Ch Supt Addis), the head of CID at SYP. As part of this process, Dr Popper instructed that all those who had died in hospital must be transferred back to the gymnasium for identification.
By about 9.15pm, 93 of those who had died were at the gymnasium ready for the formal identifications to begin. This commenced about 9.30pm. Just after 10pm, the 94th of those who died on the day was brought to the gymnasium from the Northern General.
Under the agreed process, a photograph was taken of the face of each of those who had died. These photographs were taken using Polaroid cameras so that they could be printed instantly. They were then displayed on boards. In small groups, the family members and friends completing the identification were brought into the gymnasium to look at the boards and asked if they could see their loved one. When they recognised them, the photograph was removed from the board, and the corresponding body was brought by police officers into a small, curtained area for viewing; the family members and friends had to then confirm the identity of their loved one.
The family members and friends were then taken to a different area of the gymnasium where they gave police officers a formal identification statement. It was during this point that some have said they were asked about their or their loved one’s alcohol consumption.
Once a friend or family member had formally identified their loved one, the body was taken by ambulance to the MLC, which was the city mortuary in Sheffield, for a post-mortem examination. By early next morning, the majority of those who died had been identified and transferred to the MLC. A decision was made that anyone who had yet to be identified would also be taken to the MLC and identified there.
A police officer was assigned to stay with each of those who had died for the whole time, in line with a process known as ‘body continuity’. The officer could then confirm that it was the same individual the family had identified, and that there had been no unauthorised contact with them. At the MLC, the officer formally handed responsibility for that individual to the officers on duty there.
By 6.30am on 16 April 1989 the operation inside the gymnasium was closed down. Later that day, post-mortem examinations began at the MLC in line with Dr Popper’s instructions. They were concluded by 2pm on 17 April 1989.
Throughout this period, the situation was both distressing and extremely confusing for friends and family members. Some groups who had travelled to the match together did not have tickets for the same section of the ground, while many of those who did have tickets for the same area had become separated, whether during the crush at the turnstiles on entering the ground, during the crush on the West Terrace, or following their escape from the pens. While some were later reunited on the pitch or on their return to their pre-arranged meeting points, others were frantically searching for their companions and trying to obtain information. Mobile phones were not widely available at the time, so friends and family members had to rely on snippets of information they could get from others—including police officers on duty at the stadium—about where casualties may have been taken.
When this failed, the next course of action was to head to the nearest police station, Hammerton Road, to report their loved ones missing. Some then went to the hospitals, going from one to the other in the hope of finding information.
Many of those who had not been at the match attempted to contact SYP and Merseyside Police by phone, using dedicated Casualty Bureau numbers that were broadcast on TV and radio. However, the sheer number of calls meant that it was difficult to get through and speak to anyone; when calls were answered, the call handlers had little information to give. Many families then made the decision to travel to Sheffield, again trying hospitals but in many cases ending up anxiously waiting for information in various locations around the city that had been hurriedly transformed into reception centres. Those who had been at the game also gravitated to these same locations, typically deeply traumatised by their experiences that day. A large number of social workers, members of the church and other volunteers accompanied and supported the families and friends at those locations.
The main reception centre was at Hillsborough Boys’ Club, a youth club close to Hammerton Road Police Station, which had limited facilities and offered little or no privacy. While there was some support available for the families and friends, the thing they wanted most—information on their loved ones—was in short supply. In some cases, when information did come through, it proved to be inaccurate.
Once the identification process had been determined, families were taken by bus to the gymnasium to identify their loved ones. For many, this involved a long wait outside the gymnasium before they were even allowed in, as the numbers of those inside were carefully controlled. Others simply had to wait in a state of increasing apprehension at the reception centres for the next bus.
This chapter includes witness accounts, images and descriptions of scenes that may be distressing.
What was investigated?
Under the terms of reference for the managed investigation, Operation Resolve investigated:
f) the actions of police officers in the gymnasium, in particular whether the treatment and questioning of relatives was appropriate. The actions of police officers at the Hillsborough Boys’ Club, and any other complaints about the treatment of friends or relatives on the day. The time parameters will be from 3.06pm on 15 April 1989 to the time when the last of the facilities shown below closed down—this will cover events between the match being stopped and the completion of arrangements to assist families at the following locations:
The gymnasium, Northern General Hospital, Royal Hallamshire Hospital, Ecclesfield Casualty Bureau, Merseyside Casualty Bureau, Hammerton Road Police Station, Hillsborough Boys’ Club, Forbes Road Church Hall, Meade House, Kelvin Centre, Burngreave Vestry, and the Medico-Legal Centre
What was found?
• Despite the efforts of many volunteers, medical professionals and individual police officers, the treatment of families and friends of those who died in the disaster lacked compassion. Procedure was adhered to in an unnecessarily rigid way, particularly in relation to the identification process, which added to the distress of families and friends.
• Families and friends repeatedly encountered a lack of information and coordination between sites. This resulted in situations such as parents being taken to see their son who had died in hospital, only to discover that he had been transported back to the gymnasium for the identification process.
• The identification process was largely determined by Dr Popper, the Coroner. He decided that all of those who died must be formally identified at the gymnasium. He also decided that as a first stage in the identification process, those coming to identify a loved one would look at photographs of each of those who had died rather than having to view multiple bodies. This process was adhered even when property found on someone who had died could potentially have spared friends and family that step of the process.
• Police officers had the right to suggest alternative approaches to Dr Popper, but there is no evidence that they did. Instead, they largely followed any directions from him to the letter, regardless of the impact this may have on families and friends.
• Viewing the photographs was a harrowing experience and little consideration was given to the way the photographs were presented to families and friends. For example, the photographs were not separated into age, gender or any other descriptive categories.
• Some families have said that officers they dealt with refused to allow them to touch their loved ones and on occasion told them they were the “property of the Coroner”. While this was not the experience for all families, there was no reason from a policing or coronial perspective why family members could not hold their loved ones.
• Many of those who gave an identification statement have said police officers asked them about their and their loved one’s consumption of alcohol and possession of match tickets. Such information was not needed for any procedural purpose. However, only a small number of the identification statements recorded included references to either issue. There is no record of any senior officer instructing colleagues to ask such questions.
• The Casualty Bureau set up by SYP should have been the single point of contact to help families and friends seeking their loved ones, and to help the police contact relatives, but it was overwhelmed by the volume of calls. It was only the second time SYP had set a Casualty Bureau up and it had never been properly tested; numerous practical issues occurred, limiting its effectiveness.
• One of these issues was that the telephone numbers supposed to be used for contact between the Casualty Bureau and hospitals and police sites were given to the public—meaning there were no dedicated lines. This disrupted information flow.
• The facilities made available for families and friends to wait in were chosen because they were convenient rather than because they were suited to the purpose. Though police officers were present, support for families and friends was largely organised by social services and volunteers.
• Throughout, there was no overarching coordination of the different activities underway. No police officer was in overall control. None of the SYP senior leadership team took any role or even showed any apparent interest in what was happening. This meant that support for families was disjointed, and the effectiveness of the efforts of the many volunteers, social care and medical professionals and individual police officers was limited.
Significant new evidence
The main sources of new evidence around the treatment of families and friends were additional statements, or testimony to the Goldring Inquests, from those involved. Some statements, such as those made as part of the investigation into a complaint about the way individuals were treated, specifically focused on the person’s experiences in the hours after the disaster.
Operation Resolve made further use of the Racal recordings of conversations with the Force Control Room. It also examined two SYP books known as ‘property other than found property registers’ that were used at the gymnasium and MLC to record the personal possessions of a number of those who died.
In the years since the Hillsborough disaster, many family members and friends of those who died have provided harrowing accounts of their experiences in the hours that followed. Within these deeply personal stories, there have been common themes: the difficulty in getting information about their loved ones, the chaotic scenes at the various locations to which they were directed, the traumatising nature of the process used for identifying those who died and the repeated unfeeling bureaucracy of some officials. Many have also recounted how they were questioned by police officers either about their own alcohol consumption, or that of their loved one.
Together, these accounts have painted a striking picture of an ongoing response to the disaster that failed on both a procedural and personal level; that added to the anguish of those first hours and caused enduring distress and trauma.
This chapter examines the way that the families and friends of those who died were treated by the police in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. It covers the period from just after the match was stopped to the point when the last of the facilities made available to the families and friends was closed. It includes extracts from some of the accounts provided by family members and friends but does not seek to represent the experiences of the families or to speak for them. Instead, its focus, in line with the terms of reference for Operation Resolve’s managed investigation, is on how SYP interacted with families and friends of those who died, and whether this followed the expected standards of the day.
Operation Resolve also investigated a number of complaints from families and friends about the way they were treated by the police. The complainants have been informed of the outcomes.
A further, more personal insight into the experiences of the families of those who died in the disaster can be found in Chapter 1 of the 2017 report by Bishop James Jones, the former Bishop of Liverpool and Chair of the HIP, ‘The Patronising Disposition of Unaccountable Power: A Report to Ensure the Pain and Suffering of the Hillsborough Families is not Repeated’.
Operation Resolve investigated a number of complaints and conduct matters relating to the emergency response and provided reports to the IOPC. Having reviewed the evidence detailed in these individual reports, the IOPC opinion was that ACC Jackson, Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray would have all had a case to answer for gross misconduct, if they had still been serving with the police. Supt Greenwood would also have had a case to answer for misconduct.
ACC Jackson would have had a case to answer for neglect of duty because he failed to take control of the situation. As the senior officer on call, he should have declared a major incident, rather than calling for Operation Support. Once he realised that Ch Supt Duckenfield was faltering, he should have assumed command of the rescue operation. While he did undertake some important actions, such as initiating the Casualty Bureau, he failed to provide overall coordination of the emergency services response, as according to the SYP Major Incident Manual the police should have done. Further, by taking Ch Supt Duckenfield from the PCB to meet SWFC officials, he left a more junior officer (Supt Murray) in sole command for a 12-minute period without guidance or instructions.
Ch Supt Duckenfield would have had a case to answer for neglect of duty on a number of grounds. Despite having an excellent viewpoint from the PCB, he failed to act when it became obvious that Pen 3 and Pen 4 were overfull and that people were in distress. He then was slow to coordinate a rescue operation and did not organise and direct the officers under his command to help save lives. He too could have declared a major incident, but did not, and then failed to take control of the police response as set out in the SYP Major Incident Manual—for example, by failing to communicate effectively with the other emergency services and to coordinate their efforts.
Several of these same issues applied to Supt Murray, who would also have had a case to answer for neglect of duty for failing to respond to the situation, being slow to coordinate a rescue operation and not organising and directing the officers under his command to help save lives. Despite going onto the pitch at a key time, he failed to identify the seriousness of the situation in Pens 3 and 4 and failed to respond to it quickly enough. He did not effectively advise Ch Supt Duckenfield regarding the dangerousness of the situation. He also did not liaise effectively with others to coordinate a response to the disaster.
Supt Greenwood would have had a case to answer for misconduct for a range of allegations about his organisation of the rescue effort. While he did take a number of actions in response to the unfolding disaster, there were other steps he could have taken to better coordinate the police response. He focused his efforts on Pen 3 and was highly involved in the rescue effort: however, as the senior officer in that location, he could have directed others to do this and taken an overview of the situation, coordinated medical triaging and deployed police resources more effectively.
Yet even while both were in the PCB, the police control of the incident remained poor. Though the PCB was in ongoing communication with the Force Control Room, at no point did it provide a clear explanation of what had happened. The Force Control Room operators therefore had to make assumptions in their communication with SYMAS and SYCFS counterparts.
Requests were made for Operation Support and for all officers at the stadium to head to the Leppings Lane end, but with no explanation given. Those responding did not know what they were responding to. As was the case earlier in the afternoon, those outside the stadium did not know what was happening inside and vice versa. When SYMAS and SYCFS teams turned up, the police officers at the entrances did not know why they were there and could provide no useful direction.
Throughout, radio communications were problematic, but there were other means of communication available. Despite the proximity of the PCB to the unfolding situation, Ch Supt Duckenfield did not at any point go on the pitch to make his own assessment. He has subsequently acknowledged that he froze. Supt Murray did go on the pitch but appears to have done little to assist; he did not provide any instructions beyond the reported words to PS Morgan to do whatever they could.
In short, though the senior officers in the PCB had the means to coordinate a response, and a view of the situation unfolding, they failed to manage the police resources and the other emergency services effectively.
Even by the time they left the PCB, they had still not provided the Force Control Room or other locations with clear information about what had actually happened. This inevitably hampered the efforts of those involved with attempting to assist traumatised supporters and the families and friends of those who were injured, missing or who had already died. This is the focus of chapter 6.
Operation Resolve identified a series of recurring issues that restricted the effectiveness of the emergency response. The first of these was a lack of coordination, command and control. This was mentioned in many of the accounts of SYCFS officers who came to the stadium, but also by SYMAS and a significant number of SYP officers. The most visible police leadership came from Ch Supt Nesbit, in organising officers at the gates. Others—from each emergency service and some of the off-duty medical professionals—also took the initiative to provide some coordination, albeit of small groups, which made the response more effective.
Throughout, the processes that formed part of the Major Incident Plan and Manual were not followed. Key omissions included the failure to declare a major incident, and the failure to have a visible site commander in overall control of the emergency response.
Both Ch Supt Duckenfield as match commander and ACC Jackson as the on-call chief officer could have performed this role. Even after both have given evidence on multiple occasions, it is still not clear which of them was the site commander or who was in charge of the emergency response.
At the Taylor Inquiry, ACC Jackson told Counsel to the Inquiry that he did not at any point tell Ch Supt Duckenfield that he was no longer in charge. ACC Jackson said that as the senior officer there, he was at Ch Supt Duckenfield's side, assisting and making sure that everything was done that possibly could have been done. However, ACC Jackson agreed with Lord Justice Taylor that, by the time Ch Supt Mole arrived at the PCB, he had taken over control from Ch Supt Duckenfield.
At other times, ACC Jackson has insisted that Ch Supt Duckenfield had remained in control and assumed the role of site commander in the major incident response. Then at the Goldring Inquests, he said he couldn’t remember whether Ch Supt Duckenfield had performed that role.
At the Goldring Inquests on 18 March 2015, Ch Supt Duckenfield told his own Counsel that ACC Jackson had not offered to take over command, had not overruled any of his decisions and had not given him advice. Two independent expert witnesses—both highly experienced match commanders—said they would have expected ACC Jackson, as the more senior officer, to have assumed command in this situation.
Aside from this lack of clarity about command, from 3.35pm to 3.48pm, both ACC Jackson and Ch Supt Duckenfield were away from the PCB in the boardroom, updating FA and SWFC officials about what had happened and their proposed approach. In the boardroom, Ch Supt Duckenfield repeated the lie that the disaster had been caused by supporters forcing their way into the stadium.
During this period, Supt Murray was left in charge, having recently returned to the PCB from the pitch. Operation Resolve found no evidence to suggest that Supt Murray was given any formal handover of control before ACC Jackson and Ch Supt Duckenfield left the PCB to go to the meeting in the boardroom. It was during this time that SO Fletcher visited the PCB to speak to the senior police officer but received no useful information.
Ch Supt Duckenfield told the Goldring Inquests that he was annoyed at being taken away from the PCB to brief the officials and suggested ACC Jackson should have done this alone.
The efforts of those involved at the front of the pens and in taking casualties away had an impact. By 3.30pm, the front of Pen 3 had been cleared of casualties. This was 25 minutes after Supt Greenwood had caused the match to be stopped.
Tragically, this was already too late for many. At 3.29pm, an entry on the Force Control Room extended incident log recorded that the PCB requested that the Sheffield city mortuary, located at the Medico-Legal Centre (MLC), should be warned “to expect several bodies.”
There was still a major medical effort, including at the back of the West Stand, to try to resuscitate some and treat others.
There were also still large numbers of supporters on the pitch, and some police officers were concerned that there was a risk of confrontation between opposing supporters, with some Nottingham Forest supporters in the Spion Kop area chanting and whistling. This led to the police forming further cordons, to prevent Liverpool supporters on the pitch from reaching the areas allocated to Nottingham Forest. By 15:38:30, police officers had formed a cordon in front of the Spion Kop, near the edge of the penalty box.
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Figure 5N: A police cordon in front of the Spion Kop, 15:38:30 (Source: SYP)
The cordon then moved up the pitch guiding supporters back towards the Leppings Lane end. There were no confrontations between rival supporters.
Shortly before the cordon was formed, at 3.37pm, two police officers on the pitch close to the Spion Kop had their truncheons drawn. This took place at a time when some Liverpool supporters were making their way towards the Nottingham Forest end of the ground. The footage shows that the truncheons were not used to strike anyone and were put away within moments of them being drawn.
Operation Resolve conducted a comprehensive review of all available video footage, in response to allegations that police officers used truncheons, sticks, canes or batons to prevent supporters seeking to escape from the West Terrace. This was the only instance found of police officers drawing their truncheons during the whole day. Operation Resolve did not identify any footage that supports the allegations. It should be noted that the footage, though extensive, is not continuous.
Further, Operation Resolve did not identify anyone who said they were struck by a police officer with a truncheon or something similar while climbing on or over the perimeter fence of the West Terrace.
SWFC CCTV footage shows that supporters and police officers continued to carry casualties through Gate C to ambulances that were still arriving. In total, SWFC CCTV filmed the arrival of 20 ambulances. The last casualty was carried out of the ground by supporters and police officers at 3.51pm.
At 3.56pm, Liverpool manager Kenny Dalglish gave a message over the stadium PA to ask supporters to remain calm and cooperate with the police. At 4.17pm, a further message was broadcast to inform supporters that the match had been abandoned. By around 4.40pm, Ch Supt Mole arrived at the stadium and went to the PCB, where he assumed command of the remaining operations, allowing Ch Supt Duckenfield and ACC Jackson to return to SYP HQ to brief the Chief Constable.
The focus shifted from the situation on the pitch to the gymnasium and the hospitals, which are examined in chapter 6.
As well as the emergency services, supporters played a pivotal role in the rescue effort. Many tried to help those being crushed in the pens. Others, including some who had escaped from the pens themselves, sought to assist the injured. This included helping carry casualties to the gymnasium on advertising hoardings, which were used as makeshift stretchers.
Several off-duty medical professionals who were at the match as spectators also assisted, as did off-duty police officers. Like the other emergency services, they were hindered by a lack of information; there was no instruction for them to help, so they did whatever they could in response to the situation in front of them. When they tried to get information, police officers initially did not know where to send them and there was no specific organisation. Several assisted with resuscitation efforts on the pitch; others helped in the gymnasium or at the back of the West Stand. They were also hampered by a lack of medical equipment, both on the pitch and elsewhere.
In addition to resuscitation efforts, some were involved in the triage of casualties, to prioritise who should be taken to hospital and to provide direction to SJA volunteers and police officers. The arrangements for assessment and triage of casualties on the pitch were largely driven by the individual response of the medical personnel. Operation Resolve has found no evidence that a systematic approach was put in place or facilitated by those in the PCB, or senior police officers on the scene.
The third primary role undertaken by off-duty doctors was to certify the deaths of supporters. Some were directed to the gymnasium to assist with this. The situation in the gymnasium is examined in chapter 6.
With a hole already made in the fence, there was no longer a need for the cutting equipment brought by the fire service. Several SYCFS officers have said that when they arrived and asked where they were required, the initial response from the police was to suggest they weren’t needed. Other police officers could offer no direction or information. The SYCFS officers decided to go into the stadium anyway; when they saw the situation, they recognised the most useful way they could assist was with resuscitation and first aid.
Station Officer Brian Fletcher (SO Fletcher) was the day shift station officer at Sheffield Central Fire Station, from where three SYCFS vehicles had been dispatched. In a statement made in 2013, he said that due to the large number of casualties, he decided to go to the PCB to find out who was in charge and to see if there was a designated area for casualties. When he got there, he was told that Ch Supt Duckenfield (who he knew) was in charge, but away at that time. They were unable to provide him with any information, so he “decided to return back to the pitch area to set up my own casualty handling area.”
It appears this was at the time Ch Supt Duckenfield was visiting the SWFC boardroom, as discussed at paragraph 5.171.
In his 1989 account, SO Fletcher said that he instructed the SYCFS drivers to set up a casualty handling area behind the South Stand, as he knew there was access to that area, and to organise the ambulances when they arrived. He also arranged for his officers to provide first aid wherever necessary. He estimated that about 20–30 people were taken to the SYCFS casualty handling area on makeshift stretchers.
Station Officer Robert Horner, from a different fire station, described how he and his crew went straight onto the pitch when they arrived, bringing resuscitation equipment. He said that he and his crew spread out among the casualties to provide treatment and resuscitation where necessary. He recalled asking “two senior police officers if those spectators not injured in any way could be moved out of the congestion to enable those endeavouring to give assistance more room to work, the reply was 'we have already tried to do this'.” He commented: “Police co-ordination and control seemed to be non-existent on the playing area.”
The on-call SYCFS Divisional Officer David Lockwood arrived at the stadium at 3.24pm and assumed command of the fire service response. He too was unable to find a senior police officer, so went to the PCB and introduced himself. He said: “I didn't receive any direction from anyone in the police box as to what they wanted me to do.”
The evidence of the SYCFS personnel who arrived at Hillsborough Stadium is highly consistent. All highlighted a lack of direction or instruction when they arrived, with police officers apparently surprised at the arrival of the fire service and having no idea why SYCFS had been called. This reinforces the lack of communication between the PCB—which had requested the fire service attend with cutting equipment—and the rest of the police officers on duty. When SYCFS officers sought to identify and speak to the SYP officers in command of the situation, they were unable to do so.
Some SYCFS officers have described similar difficulties in engaging with SYMAS teams on site.
In the absence of any direction from the other emergency services, the SYCFS officers sought to assist as best they could, predominantly by providing first aid, making use of their resuscitation equipment and organising aspects of the triage and casualty clearance response. They took numerous practical steps from clearing the pitch to aiding the movement of ambulances and providing advice to supporters. The one thing they had been specifically called to provide—cutting equipment—proved not to be needed.
By 3.10pm, a huge number of police officers were involved in the rescue effort. Figure 5J shows the situation at 15:11:30. Numerous officers had climbed on the perimeter fence; some were in Pen 2, to the left of the photo. Many more were on the pitch. Some supporters were also on the fence; others were being helped into the West Stand above and still more were climbing the radial fences between pens.
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Figure 5J: View of the West Terrace, 15:11:30 (Source: BBC)
Figure 5K, taken at 3.11pm, shows the chaotic nature of the response from a different angle. While some officers were predominantly engaged at the exit gates, others were standing further back from the fence, appearing unsure how to help. Some may have been part of a cordon. The photograph offers no sign of a coordinated rescue effort.
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Figure 5K: The front of the West Terrace, 3.11pm (Source: SYP)
It was around this time that Ch Supt Nesbit arrived at the Leppings Lane end. Ch Supt Nesbit was the head of the SYP Traffic Division. In an account from 1989, he explained that he had been on patrol in Sheffield city centre and arrived at Hillsborough Stadium shortly after the referee had stopped the match. His arrival was not in response to the call for Operation Support. When he got to the gymnasium, Insp Sewell told him they were evacuating the West Terrace and that supporters had been injured.
Ch Supt Nesbit went onto the pitch at the Spion Kop end and saw what he first thought to be a pitch invasion. However, he then spotted that some of the supporters climbing over the perimeter fence were being assisted by police officers. In his 1989 account, he said that as he approached the goal area, he saw that the perimeter track was filled with police officers and supporters, and that a number of casualties were being attended to by SJA personnel and uniformed police officers.
He said that when he reached the front of Pen 3, “to my horror I could see bodies piled on top of each other with other spectators being pressed against the fencing.” He said that Gate 3 was open but blocked by two supporters who were unable to move; he assumed they had died. He instructed officers to try to move them, to free the gateway.
He quickly realised that “Police Officers and spectators in their endeavours to help, were getting in each others way.” He instructed officers to form a chain onto the pitch, so that casualties could be pulled out and carried away from the pens.
This approach began to create some order in the rescue effort. Figure 5L shows the scene at 15:20:24. By this time, Supt Greenwood was standing on what appears to be a stepladder with a loud hailer in his hand. Ch Supt Nesbit was in the open gateway, attempting to pull people out of Pen 3. There were fewer supporters at the gate, with the police taking control of the rescue operation.
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Figure 5L: The front of Pen 3, as viewed from the West Stand, 15:20:24 (Source: BBC)
The more organised response at the gates was assisted by having increased access to the pens. In a statement from 2014, Inspector Richard Dews recalled that shortly after Ch Supt Nesbit arrived at Gate 3, he saw police officers and supporters kicking and pulling the wire of the perimeter fence back to create another escape route. He said that he radioed the PCB and asked for bolt cutters to assist in cutting the mesh.
At 15:13:09, the Racal system recorded a radio transmission from the PCB to the Force Control Room, requesting that SYCFS be contacted to attend the stadium with cutting equipment. The Force Control Room promptly contacted their counterparts at SYCFS and requested this, but they were still unable to provide SYCFS with details of what had happened. However, the Force Control Room operator did refer to there having been a “major accident” and later in the conversation “a major incident inside the ground”, even though one had not been formally declared, and they did not have the knowledge or authority to do so. In accordance with the SYCFS Major Incident Contingency Procedures, SYCFS dispatched six standard fire engines, a control unit and an emergency tender (a vehicle designed to carry extra water supplies) to Hillsborough Stadium.
The first of these did not reach Hillsborough Stadium until 3.22pm. By this time, supporters and police officers had managed to bend back a small section of the perimeter fence at the front of Pen 3, adjacent to the radial fence with Pen 4. This created an additional escape route from the pens, through which officers and supporters worked to free more people. The impact of this is shown in figure 5M, taken from BBC footage a few minutes later at 15:26:28. By this time, large numbers of officers were inside Pen 3, both at Gate 3 to the right-hand side of the ambulance and at the newly created break in the perimeter fencing, at the bottom left of the image.
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Figure 5M: The rescue effort aided by the hole in the perimeter fence, 15:26.28 (Source: BBC)
