On 13 July, Counsel to the Inquiry Mr Collins gave his final observations. These began with some highly complimentary remarks on WMP’s “immense effort in interviewing witnesses and collecting the necessary evidence and in producing for us, often at very short notice, exceedingly helpful reports and summaries of their enquiries.”
Mr Collins then provided a summary of the evidence heard, expressing views on issues such as failings around stadium safety and the fact that Ch Supt Duckenfield did not foresee the consequences of his order to open the gates.
Mr Collins also set out his view of the evidence that had been heard relating to the behaviour of supporters. While he stated that there was “a considerable amount of boorish and loutish behaviour”, he said he believed “it was a minority of fans who were guilty of it.” Crucially, he added that such behaviour “did not cause the trouble.”
D Ch Supt Foster sent ACC Jones a memo in response to Mr Collins’s closing observations. The IOPC found this on one of the floppy disks obtained from the Sheffield Archives. It has not previously been published and was not examined by the HIP.
In the memo, which according to its title was written at ACC Jones’s request, D Ch Supt Foster listed a number of areas where he disagreed with Mr Collins’s conclusions.
For example, D Ch Supt Foster challenged Mr Collins’s assertion that the crush on the terraces was an “inevitable result” of not blocking the tunnel to the centre pens once the gates were opened. D Ch Supt Foster wrote: “I find it difficult therefore to have expected and planned for the majority to have gone down the tunnel to Pen 3 and Pen 4” and later added: “Mr Duckenfield could not have anticipated it.” D Ch Supt Foster offered the view that “If anyone should [have anticipated it] then it is my contention the experience of Mr Marshall, Mr Murray places that responsibility firmly with them.”
However, perhaps the most notable feature of the memo was the number of references D Ch Supt Foster made to alcohol consumption and supporter behaviour.
The first of these was on the first page of the memo, where D Ch Supt Foster wrote: “I would suggest many Liverpool supporters left it late, deliberately having no tickets or consuming alcohol to a greater degree then [than] emphasised at the Public Inquiry.” The IOPC has not found compelling evidence in the wider body of questionnaires or statements taken by WMP to support any of these three suggestions.
D Ch Supt Foster then commented: “I question the use of the word minority in relation to Alcohol etc outside [sic] who forced open the Leppings Lane perimeter gates. I suggest (and the statements confirm) that the final crowd build up were in the majority those who had been drinking.” [Emphasis in original.] It is not clear which statements he was referring to here. Some officer accounts did refer to large numbers of supporters consuming alcohol or appearing drunk; however, there were also plenty of officers who did not suggest this was the case. The overwhelming majority of actual statements WMP had taken, from supporters and other witnesses, certainly did not support D Ch Supt Foster’s assertion.
Next, in a section of the memo subtitled “Alcohol”, D Ch Supt Foster wrote: “I really do believe this is more of a problem than identified. I have to say that the evidence suggests the majority of the latecomers were those who had been detained drinking. There is no other explanation based upon the times of arrival of the coaches, private cars etc. Add to this the evidence of the local residents, licensees, supermarket outlets, Police on duty and the picture is clear.”
The evidence WMP had gathered from local residents and licensed premises absolutely did not support this assertion.
D Ch Supt Foster stated at the end of the memo that his comments were made “straight off the hip with no real preparation time”. It was an internal memo, not intended for external audiences. Nonetheless, the memo appears to set out a very different view of the available evidence to that articulated by Mr Collins.
IOPC investigators asked D Ch Supt Foster about this memo when interviewing him under caution. D Ch Supt Foster stated: “I’ve written that based on the evidence that was before me at that particular time.”
In a response to the summary of proposed criticisms of D Ch Supt Foster sent by the IOPC in 2024, his solicitors wrote that he did not accept that this memo indicated he disagreed with Mr Collins’s conclusions. They emphasised that the memo was an initial reaction to the closing observations and highlighted that the memo also included a number of points where he directly agreed with Mr Collins.
The content of this memo appears to illustrate that D Ch Supt Foster had formed a closed view of the available evidence. While this was arguably of limited impact on the Taylor Inquiry, the consequences of such a closed view became more apparent in the criminal investigation that followed.
Though the IOPC has identified some issues with WMP’s work for the Taylor Inquiry—particularly in relation to its collection of evidence from police witnesses—it remains clear that WMP was working at this stage on behalf of the Taylor Inquiry team. Supporting a public inquiry was an unusual role for a police force; the need to gather so much evidence at speed meant that decisions had to be made about priorities. The IOPC’s concerns should therefore be balanced against the consistent view of the Taylor Inquiry team that WMP performed a complex task very well.
