As examined in chapter 9, WMP did not take statements from SYP officers. Instead, it requested that SYP send officers’ own accounts for the Taylor Inquiry team to review. This was a significant decision because there are important differences between a statement, made under CJA rules, and a written account.
Firstly, a statement includes a declaration of truth that the maker must sign, acknowledging that they are aware that it is a criminal offence to include anything they know to be untrue. Secondly, the process of producing a statement typically involves an interview, where the witness can be asked to explain gaps or inconsistencies in their statement; their evidence can be probed and challenged before the statement is signed.
The available evidence indicates that, at first, WMP did intend to take statements from SYP officers, and that SYP expected this. The initial instructions sent to SYP officers included that their accounts should be an aide-memoire for when WMP interviewed them. When DCC Hayes told ACC Jones, on 25 April 1989, that SYP wished to obtain accounts from its officers, ACC Jones confirmed that he had no objection but hoped that “these could be made available at a later time when my officer’s interview yours.”
Then, on 29 April 1989, WMP received an instruction from Lord Justice Taylor that six senior SYP officers who had been on duty should provide written recollections. ACC Jones wrote to CC Wright at SYP to ask for these accounts, adding that “Lord Justice Taylor has indicated some urgency on this particular action.” He further confirmed that WMP would not interview the senior officers (at least at this stage). The first of the senior officers’ accounts was received by WMP on 3 May 1989 with more following on 4 May.
At a meeting on 3 May involving WMP senior officers and representatives from the Taylor Inquiry team, there was further discussion of how accounts would be obtained. Chief Superintendent David Baker of WMP was reported as noting that “South Yorkshire Police are calling their key police officers in and taking statements from them.” ACC Jones responded: “I don’t want to get into interviewing I just want a written submission.”
ACC Jones compiled a list of policy directives from the meeting. One of these was that “officers who were posted to the Leppings Lane area are to be identified, and actions raised to invite written recollections of their account of the day from 2.30 pm onwards.” This indicates that a decision had been made at, or as a direct result of, the meeting to extend the request for written accounts to a wider group of officers. There was no indication in the meeting notes that any member of the Taylor Inquiry team requested this.
Though the policy decision was made on 3 May, it was not communicated to SYP until 7 May (just over a week before the Taylor Inquiry hearings were due to start). In a letter to CC Wright, ACC Jones wrote: “I have now been asked by Counsel appointed by Lord Justice Taylor to request from a selected number of your officers their recollections in writing, of what happened at Hillsborough on 15th April 1989.”
The wording of the letter appeared to suggest ACC Jones was simply following Counsel’s instructions. However, the IOPC has not found any other documentary evidence of such an instruction. D Ch Supt Foster suggested it was agreed in a conversation between ACC Jones and Mr Collins, at which he was not present.
The letter then listed 122 officers from whom accounts were requested. Most of these had been on duty at the Leppings Lane end of the stadium.
Over the following weeks, WMP issued SYP further requests for accounts from other groups of officers.
The request on 7 May was the catalyst for SYP to start its review and amendment process, which resulted in it sending accounts to WMP only after they had been reviewed by either Hammond Suddards or (later) SYP’s in-house team. As detailed in chapter 9, around 1 in 4 SYP accounts were amended before WMP received them.
The IOPC sought to understand why WMP had chosen to use the accounts written by SYP officers, rather than taking statements. ACC Jones stated to IOPC investigators that the possibility of WMP taking statements from SYP officers “never came on the agenda.” The meeting notes detailed here, taken from his policy books, indicated differently.
In evidence to the Goldring Inquests, he explained that the decision was made on a purely practical basis: there would not have been the time for WMP to interview all the SYP officers concerned.
This was echoed by D Ch Supt Foster, who suggested to the IOPC that allowing SYP officers to write their accounts was the only way to get sufficient evidence from them in advance of the Taylor Inquiry hearings, which were scheduled to start on 15 May. He added it was not “practically possible” for WMP officers to interview all the SYP officers required in the time available.
There was a reasonable argument that by 7 May—the date of the letter to CC Wright—it would not have been possible to take statements from 122 officers before the Taylor Inquiry hearings were due to start on 15 May. However, 7 May was some two weeks after WMP had begun its investigation and four days after the policy had been agreed. By this time, the WMP team in Liverpool had interviewed hundreds of witnesses and the WMP team in Sheffield had conducted extensive house-to-house enquiries and interviewed SWFC stewards and turnstile operators. It seems reasonable to suggest that, if WMP had taken a different approach from the start, or prioritised activity differently, they would have been able to take statements from at least some of these officers.
D Ch Supt Foster also indicated he was not concerned about the accuracy of the accounts, as there was a basic expectation that police officers would tell the truth. Another WMP officer, DCI Ross, was of a similar view. He stated to the IOPC that it was “standard practice for police officers to write and provide their own statements.”
Both D Ch Supt Foster and DCI Ross pointed out that using officer accounts at this stage did not remove the possibility of taking statements later, for example, in the event of a criminal investigation where statements made under CJA rules would be necessary for a prosecution. However, as is detailed in chapter 15, when WMP did begin a criminal investigation, they did not attempt to convert the accounts into CJA statements. To add further confusion, WMP recorded the officers’ accounts as statements on the HOLMES system.
