2. The safety of Hillsborough Stadium

What was investigated?

Under the terms of reference for the managed investigation, Operation Resolve investigated:
Issues relating to the stadium, including any role played by the police in:

a) suitability and choice of the stadium to host the event
b) the planning and decision making in relation to the ground’s design, alterations and final layout, including the siting and condition of barriers, fences, and gates within the fences
c) the design and layout of the pens
 

What was found?

• The Safety Certificate issued to Hillsborough Stadium in 1979 was based on incorrect calculations about the safe capacity of each area of the stadium. This meant that more people were permitted in some areas of the ground than should have been. On the West Terrace, the permitted capacity was 7,200 but the engineering expert appointed to the Goldring Inquests calculated that, applying a strict interpretation of the guidance at the time, it should have been no more than 4,518 when first set in 1979—and possibly as low as 3,089. 

• When changes were made which further reduced the amount of space for spectators on the West Terrace, no steps were taken to reassess the safe capacity of the terrace, either by SWFC or SCC which issued the Safety Certificate for Hillsborough Stadium. Nor was capacity formally reviewed in response to changes in safety requirements for sports grounds during the 1980s.

• Following crushing incidents at previous FA Cup semi-finals at Hillsborough Stadium in the early 1980s, SYP officers proposed changes should be made to the layout of the West Terrace. These were implemented, splitting it into separate pens, which would also allow home and away supporters to share the terrace at relevant SWFC matches.

• SYP officers subsequently proposed significant changes to the Leppings Lane entrance to the stadium, to help segregate rival supporters at that end. The proposed changes were rejected as too expensive; though some changes were eventually made to this area of the stadium as an indirect result, these were very different from what SYP had suggested. This demonstrates an awareness among the police and other organisations that some aspects of the stadium layout presented potential risks to supporters.

• Despite this awareness, recognised risks were not managed with due care. For example, SYP officers requested that a crush barrier near the main entrance of the centre pens of the West Terrace should be removed, so that supporters did not congregate there. Engineering experts raised concerns that this could affect barriers lower down the terrace, but the barrier was removed, on the condition that SYP would keep the area near the entrance clear of spectators. However, there was no mention of this in police planning for the 1988 or 1989 Semi-Finals. 
 

Significant new evidence

The most significant new evidence in relation to stadium safety was the three reports produced by Mr Cutlack, who was instructed as an independent civil engineering expert to the Goldring Inquests. 

These showed, among other matters, that the capacity calculations used when SWFC first applied for a Safety Certificate wee too high. They also included detailed analysis of key issues such as the causes of a crush barrier breaking on the day of the disaster.

The third report was commissioned by Operation Resolve to address issues that had arisen during its investigation and had not been considered in Mr Cutlack’s first two reports.