SWFC and SYP CCTV footage shows that Gate A opened between 14:58:26 and 15:00:01. The CCTV footage shows that police officers formed a cordon on the inside of the gate and managed the entry of supporters into the ground. No other gate was open at the time Gate A was opened.
Officers close to Gate A made the decision to open it in response to the severity of the crushing outside. They were concerned that it was going to burst open and had stewards attempting to hold the top bolts in place.
By 14:55:02, a group of officers had assembled by the inside of Gate A and formed a cordon. They then requested authorisation to open the gate, which they received, though it is not clear from whom: possibly from Supt Marshall, or PS Goddard in the PCB.
Despite the reluctance of the gate steward, the police insisted that Gate A should be opened. The officers channelled incoming supporters away from the gate to the North Stand. When the pressure outside had reduced, Gate A was safely closed. It is not certain who coordinated this opening, but it stands in stark contrast to the more chaotic situation that was witnessed at both Gate C and Gate B.
SYP CCTV footage shows that Gate B was opened at 14:58:58 and closed almost immediately. Estimates for the number of supporters who entered via Gate B range from 70 to 500, demonstrating the confusion about what happened and how long it was open for. It is not clear where incoming supporters went, but it seems likely some would have headed to the central tunnel. While the opening of Gate B may therefore have helped reduce the crush outside, it is also possible that it contributed to the subsequent crush in the centre pens.
However, after Gate C was closed, Supt Marshall made further radio requests—potentially without realising Gate C had even been opened. The evidence of the police officers in the PCB about this has been consistent. Having heard the increasingly desperate requests from Supt Marshall to open the gate, Ch Supt Duckenfield deliberated on what to do and then gave an instruction to open the gates. It is not clear exactly when this instruction was issued.
At 2.52pm, Gate C was opened again, possibly shortly before the instruction from Ch Supt Duckenfield, and remained open for several minutes. Estimates vary as to how many supporters entered the ground through Gate C at this point, but the commonly accepted figure is more than 2,000.
Despite comprehensive analysis, Operation Resolve has not been able to establish whether Gate C was opened at 2.52pm as a result of Ch Supt Duckenfield’s instruction, as has largely been assumed, or whether it was opened for other reasons.
What is clear is that none of those directly involved in the opening of Gate C has at any point said they heard a radio message or received an instruction from the PCB to open it.
Further, Operation Resolve has found no evidence from the Racal recordings of communications from officers in the PCB, or from officers on duty elsewhere, that any further instruction was issued to officers inside the turnstiles, or inside the ground itself, that the gates were about to be opened, or even clarification of which gates were to be opened or by whom.
CCTV footage shows that Gate C was physically opened by steward Ian Marsh at 14:52:37. He was assisted by another steward. The recollections of both about exactly what happened have been inconsistent. Ian Marsh has accepted various possible explanations put to him, including that he opened the gate to allow a supporter out, and that he opened it in response to a request from a police officer outside.
Several supporters in the crush have described a police officer outside shouting to the stewards inside to open the gate. Others have described a police sergeant outside the ground directing them to Gate C, with the assurance that it would shortly be opened.
PS Morgan has confirmed that he did this, with the intention of allowing small groups of supporters in through Gate C in a controlled way to reduce the crush. However, he did not communicate this plan to other officers, with the possible exception of Insp Purdy.
Insp Purdy has also described an attempt to bring small numbers of supporters out of the crush and under the funnel bar, so that they could enter through Gate C in a controlled way when it was next opened. Mounted officers were being used to try to restrict the number of supporters waiting outside.
CCTV footage shows the situation outside Gate C twenty seconds before it opened.
In footage three seconds later, PS Morgan has been pinpointed close to the funnel bar, with Insp Purdy nearby. Figure 4P then shows PS Morgan and a group of supporters making their way along the service road towards Gate C at 14:52:26.
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Figure 4P: PS Morgan leading supporters on the service road, 14:52:26 (Source: SYP CCTV)
Ten seconds later, Gate C was opened.
At the Goldring Inquests, PS Morgan was shown this footage. He accepted it was him but insisted he had not requested the gate to be opened at the point it was. Instead, even though he had intended the gate should be opened, his evidence was that it came as a surprise. He accepted the possibility that Gate C was opened by stewards for another reason at this time.
Though there was an immediate surge through Gate C—in which PS Morgan was swept into the crowd—CCTV evidence indicates that at first the opening showed an element of controlled access. At 14:53:20, mounted officers had formed a line of horses across the service road outside Gate C and were guiding supporters through the open gate. Four of the outer perimeter gates were closed and two partially open, being monitored by a line of mounted police officers, which helped control the rate at which supporters were approaching Gate C.
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Figure 4Q: The area around Gate C at 14:53:20 (Source: SYP CCTV)
However, just after 2.54pm, one of the outer perimeter gates burst open, and supporters ran through the opening. Almost immediately, this was repeated at the other outer gates. A large number of supporters made their way onto the outer concourse, which had been cleared, and then through the open Gate C.
Crucially, there had been no plan in place for what should happen once supporters entered through Gate C. There were no officers in place to direct the incoming supporters, who made their way across the inner concourse to the most obvious route to the terraces: the central tunnel under the West Stand, leading to Pen 3 and Pen 4.
At 14:57:01, large numbers of supporters were still entering the stadium through Gate C, which had been open for more than four minutes. As figure 4R shows, there was still no sign of police control on the inner concourse. However, a line of mounted officers can be seen positioned at the end of the service road, close to the side of the funnel bar.
Not only had the officers at Gate C not communicated with those on the inner concourse, but there is also no evidence to suggest that the opening of the gate was communicated to the PCB. Ch Supt Duckenfield therefore did not know about the intention of officers near Gate C to allow supporters into the ground in a controlled way when he issued his instruction to open the gates. It is also not clear what those in the PCB knew once Gate C had been opened.
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Figure 4R: The area around Gate C, 14:57:01 (Source: SYP CCTV)
At the Taylor Inquiry, Ch Supt Duckenfield confirmed that he had not given any specific instruction to police officers or stewards that the gate was going to be opened. He said that he had not thought to give instructions to the police officers on the inner concourse to try to direct the flow, because he had been busy watching what was happening.
He said that his instruction to open the gates was passed over the radio for all to hear at the ground; he hoped that the police officers on the inner concourse, who were trained to act on their initiative, would have done something around the central tunnel. He accepted that he had made a mistake by not giving an instruction for the central tunnel to be closed but said he hoped that others would have remedied that mistake.
At the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Duckenfield said he thought that the supporters would have gone onto the inner concourse and gathered themselves for a moment or two to recover. He said that he did not for a moment consider the possibility that they might go down the central tunnel.
Supt Murray and Supt Marshall have also both said, at separate times, that they did not think about where the incoming supporters would go. Crucially, Supt Greenwood was still not aware of the situation outside.
Strikingly, officers on duty on the inner concourse with experience of policing matches at Hillsborough Stadium immediately recognised the likely direction of supporters. Police Sergeant William Crawford told the Popper Inquests that if he had had prior knowledge that Gate C was going to be opened, he could have considered arranging for the central tunnel to be closed.
The cumulative result was a rapid influx of large numbers of supporters into the centre pens, which is examined further in the next chapter.
While it has not proven possible to establish on whose authority Gate C was opened, Operation Resolve’s investigation has reaffirmed that it was opened in response to the fact that the police had lost control of the situation outside the ground. Further, the evidence is clear that the police did not take control of the situation, either inside or outside the ground, when the gate was opened at 2.52pm. The person with overall responsibility for this was the match commander, Ch Supt Duckenfield.
As detailed in paragraphs 4.62–4.71, at 2.47pm, Supt Marshall contacted the PCB to ask for the exit gates to be opened, in an attempt to relieve the crush outside. However, he received no response.
In the meantime, Insp Purdy returned to Gate C with the intention of opening it. In his original account, Insp Purdy described what he did next: “I returned to the barrier on the side of the turnstile. I organised the horses to block off the gates at the perimeter [outer perimeter gates]. It seemed that we could deal with the numbers in there if we contained the people outside. When that was secure by all the horses, now five perhaps, and uniform PC's, I caused the gate [Gate C] to be opened down the side.”
He told the Taylor Inquiry that he had decided to open Gate C to create a space for people being brought under the funnel bar. He added that, because of its concealed location down the side, it seemed the best gate to open. In a 2015 statement to Operation Resolve, he also noted that there was no direct pressure on Gate C at the time.
Gate C, like the other exit gates, could only be opened from the inside. Operation Resolve established that stewards operating Gate C frequently opened it to let police officers and other authorised personnel in and out of the ground. Police officers also used the gate to eject supporters. Between 2.29pm and 2.48pm, Gate C opened 24 times for these purposes. No supporters entered the ground on these occasions.
SWFC CCTV footage shows that at 14:48:23, while Insp Purdy was heading towards Gate C with the intention of opening it, a police officer on the inside approached Gate C with a supporter who was being ejected. (Operation Resolve has been unable to identify the supporter ejected through Gate C, or the police officer with him.) PS Morgan was standing nearby among a group of officers.
This time, when the gate was opened by the steward, it remained open for over 30 seconds. There was a rapid influx of supporters; Insp Purdy was caught up in this and ended up on the inner concourse.
After the initial surprise, officers tried to close the gate. Figure 4M, taken from SYP CCTV footage timed at 14:48:55, shows a mounted officer positioning his horse across the open Gate C to stop the supporters from entering. A second mounted officer approached from the left.
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Figure 4M: Mounted officers positioning themselves in front of Gate C, 14:48:55 (Source: SYP CCTV)
Thirty seconds later, the picture looked very different (see figure 4N). Gate C was closed and mounted officers had cleared the area in front of the gate of supporters. Insp Purdy and PS Morgan have been identified inside Gate C.
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Figure 4N: The situation at Gate C at 14:49:26 (Source: SYP CCTV)
Estimates suggest that between 130 and 180 supporters entered the ground through Gate C in this first opening. Once through the gate, they had free access to the stadium. Officers inside received no warning that spectators were entering in this way and had no influence over where these supporters went once inside.
As the evidence considered here shows, there remains a high degree of confusion and uncertainty about exactly who, if anyone, authorised the opening of Gate C at 2.48pm. Though it appears that officers outside—including Supt Marshall and Insp Purdy—wanted to open the gate to relieve the pressure on the turnstiles, there is no clear link between Supt Marshall’s radio request and the actual opening of the gate.
Officers in the PCB have recalled that, though they had heard the request, the 2.48pm opening of Gate C took them by surprise and led them to the view that it had burst open. In his original account, Ch Supt Duckenfield said that while he was considering Supt Marshall’s request, he saw on the CCTV monitor that the gate opened, supporters came in and then mounted officers managed to control the situation and shut the gate again.
The difference in fullness between the areas allocated to Nottingham Forest supporters and Liverpool supporters had been noted early on. However, as kick-off approached, there was a further visible disparity in fullness at the Leppings Lane end, between the centre pens—Pen 3 and 4—of the West Terrace and the side pens.
On the day, supporters with tickets for the West Terrace could choose which pen they went to and—at least in theory—could move between pens as part of SYP’s ‘find your own level’ approach to the distribution of spectators. The centre pens were accessed via the tunnel under the West Stand. The entrances to the side pens were at either end of the West Stand and not immediately visible or clearly signposted on entry.
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Figure 4K: Aerial photo of Leppings Lane end, with arrows showing spectator entry routes to the West Terrace and North West Terrace on the day of the disaster (Source: Operation Resolve, based on photograph taken by Michael Warburton Lee, SYP)
There was an expectation that the centre pens would fill first, as normal, and on the day of the disaster, this proved to be the case. As shown in figure 4C, as early as 2.15pm there was a visible difference in fullness between the centre pens and the side pens.
Officers nearby recalled there being a good atmosphere in the centre pens, with a beach ball being thrown around. Though there were some instances of supporters climbing over the fences between pens, and in one case climbing to the West Stand above, these were not as a result of supporters seeking to escape a crush.
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Figure 4L: View of Pen 3, 14:38:50 (Source: BBC)
At 14:38:50, Supt Greenwood was standing in front of the centre pens, talking to an officer on duty there. As figure 4L shows, there were no obvious signs of crushing or discomfort at this stage, but there was little room to move in the centre pens.
However, some supporters’ accounts indicate that by about 2.40pm, the situation in Pens 3 and 4 was becoming uncomfortable. One sought to leave Pen 3 but was unable to; others described using crush barriers for protection against crowd surges from behind.
Officers stationed on the perimeter track in front of the West Terrace have broadly shared the view that up to at least 2.40pm–2.45pm, there were no discernible problems in any of the pens.
While the officers on the track were not concerned, BBC football commentator John Motson had a different opinion. In a statement dated 4 May 1989, he said that from his position on the camera gantry on the roof of the South Stand, he had an excellent view of the inside of the ground. He said that at 2.45pm, he was rehearsing the sequence of camera shots and commentary, and that during one of the rehearsals he stopped speaking. He explained: “The reason I stopped was that part of my script talked about ‘an all ticket capacity crowd’ but I suddenly spotted that two end sections of the Leppings Lane terrace were only just over half full. There was plenty of room in these two wing sections which I have since gathered are numbered 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7.”
He said that, in contrast, the two centre sections were fully occupied and gave the usual impression of a solid, heaving mass of supporters who were chanting, singing and clapping. He recalled he was surprised that there was so much space in the wings of the terrace and thought that it looked as though two thousand ticket holders had not turned up.
Neither he, nor the officers on the track, were aware of what was happening outside the stadium at the same time. It is possible that, if those inside the stadium had known of the crush outside, they may have viewed the imbalance between the fullness of the pens differently.
As Operation Resolve’s analysis of the Operational Orders has made clear, none of the officers on duty at the Leppings Lane end had a documented responsibility to monitor the capacity and safety of the pens. While they could have seen the situation in front of them, they were not asked to evaluate it or consider it in context.
Senior officers, including Supt Greenwood and Ch Insp Creaser, have indicated in their accounts to different investigations that this duty was not documented because it was effectively a commonsense expectation for experienced officers. They have argued that, if fellow officers saw that any of the pens were becoming full, they could take action.
Ch Supt Duckenfield told the Taylor Inquiry and the Goldring Inquests that he believed responsibility for monitoring the pens lay with SWFC stewards. He said, correctly, that this was in line with the Green Guide, which recommended that stewards were responsible for the safe dispersal of spectators on the terraces and for preventing overcrowding. However, SWFC’s ‘Instructions to match day staff’ told stewards not to become involved in crowd control, as this was the responsibility of the police. At the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Duckenfield said he had never seen this document; Operation Resolve has, however, established that it was shared with the police planning team.
In his evidence to the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Duckenfield noted that officers from Serial 1, on the perimeter track, and Serial 13, in the West Stand above the West Terrace, had a role to play in monitoring capacity.
Inspector David Bullas (Insp Bullas) was in charge of Serial 13. He was asked at the Taylor Inquiry if his officers had been instructed to keep a particular eye on the size of the crowd in the terrace below. He replied: “There is no particular instruction, but it is common sense that one does look down, looking down at the crowd all the time if you are stood at the front, and obviously you will be monitoring the people in the stand with regard to exits and emergency exits, etc.”
Police Sergeant Paul Burman was the Serial 13 sergeant. In a statement to Operation Resolve in 2013, he explained that he and members of his serial regularly worked in the West Stand and listed their duties. Monitoring the crowd was not included in the list he gave. However, at the Goldring Inquests, he said that he would expect the officers under his command to do that, and to bring any matters of concern to his attention.
Insp Darling was in charge of Serial 1. He told the Taylor Inquiry: “It is a general duty of ours to monitor the crowd and had anything happened or any sort of circumstances occurred within the crowd which needed our attention, then we would have taken the necessary action.”
Police Constable Peter Smith (PC Smith) was regularly stationed in front of Pen 3. In his original account and evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, he said that monitoring the behaviour of supporters was part of his duties. He was asked by Counsel to the Inquiry if that extended to monitoring overcrowding. He replied: “That is something that is permanently monitored, sir. You would be looking for people in difficulty.”
Inspector Harry White (Insp White) was in charge of Serials 14 and 15, whose duties included maintaining order on the West Terrace. He had considerable experience policing matches at Hillsborough Stadium. Following the disaster, he was asked to provide a report covering, among other things, “what instructions I have received in the past about, and what my understanding is as to whose responsibility it is to check and monitor the capacity each pen holds at any time before and during the match and their rate of fill.”
He wrote that he had “never received any specific instructions as to monitoring content and rate of fill of the pens or stands”. He commented that due to the location of the PCB he had “always exercised the common sense approach that the ground commander in the control box could assess best from this vantage point capacity and rate of fill.” He added that if he thought the terraces were full, he would have alerted the PCB.
The consistent impression from their own accounts and other evidence is that officers on duty at the Leppings Lane end would keep an eye out for overcrowding, but had neither any specific instruction to do so, nor any clear understanding of what they might do if the pens became overcrowded.
At the Taylor Inquiry, Ch Supt Duckenfield stated that, at around 2.30pm, he had noticed the uneven distribution of supporters in the pens and asked for a public address message to be relayed for supporters to move forward and spread along the West Terrace. Counsel to the Inquiry asked him whether he had considered sending officers to encourage supporters to move. He said this did not cross his mind but indicated that officers could have taken this action of their own volition. Counsel pointed out the problem with this assumption: the officers with responsibility for maintaining order on the West Terrace—Serials 14 and 15—were deployed on the inner concourse at this stage, so would not have been aware of the situation in the pens, unless they were specifically informed.
The evidence indicates that Ch Supt Duckenfield also did not consider the implications of the uneven distribution: that it meant there were many more Liverpool supporters still to arrive.
At this stage, officers inside the stadium had some knowledge of the situation in the pens—or at least, could see that the centre pens were approaching being full—but those outside had no idea that there were still gaps. By contrast, those outside were responding to an escalating crush that those inside the stadium had no knowledge of. The officers who could see both situations were those in the PCB, but they did not communicate this to either group of officers.
Exit gates, as the name suggests, are primarily used as a means of exit from the stadium at the end of the game or in the event of an emergency. They are wide gates designed to allow people to go through unimpeded (in contrast to turnstiles at the entrance, which control access to the ground). They are not normally used to allow people into the ground.
As shown in figure 4A, there were three exit gates at the Leppings Lane end.
Gate A was closest to the turnstiles allocated to supporters with tickets to the North Stand.
Gate B was the middle gate of three exit gates at the Leppings Lane end of the ground. It was to the left of the area that gave access to turnstiles A to G. This exit gate was used to allow supporters from the West Terrace and the West Stand to exit the stadium.
Gate C was at the far southern end, close to the river. It opened onto the service road at the side of the stadium and was slightly hidden from view behind the turnstiles allocated for supporters with standing tickets (see figure 4I).
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Figure 4I: Photo of Gate C and surrounding area at the Leppings Lane end (Source: Provided by Yorkshire Ambulance Service, Sheffield Archives)
From the earliest stages after the disaster, the opening of Gate C was identified as a pivotal moment. When it was opened, large numbers of supporters came through it at the same time, in an uncontrolled flow. Evidence shows that the majority headed towards the central tunnel, which was the most obvious route to the terraces. The word above it reads “STANDING”. The only other sign to an alternative route to the terraces was not readily visible.
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Figure 4J: Photo of the inner concourse of the Leppings Lane end, as viewed from Gate C, in 1989 (Source: WMP)
The central tunnel led directly into Pens 3 and 4 of the West Terrace, which is where the fatal crushing occurred, following the arrival of a large number of people into those pens at the same time. These pens were already full, or near full, but no action was taken to stop more supporters going into them. In the Taylor Interim Report, the fact that no action was taken to cut off access to the centre pens following the opening of Gate C was described as “a blunder of the first magnitude”.
Since the disaster, it has been established that there were three different openings of Gate C which led to supporters coming into the ground. Gates A and B were also opened to allow supporters in. Each of these openings is considered in the following sections.
Having decided not to delay the kick-off, Ch Supt Duckenfield did not then consider whether there were other tactics that could be used to alleviate the situation at the turnstiles. Evidence from supporters and police officers suggests that in the period immediately after 2.30pm, the crowd outside the Leppings Lane entrance began to increase rapidly.
Supporters’ accounts of this period describe being unable to move freely and being crushed against walls and turnstiles. Many have stated it was the worst crowd situation they had ever experienced, with some feeling faint or unable to breathe, and others recalling people screaming in pain. They also commented on police officers in the crowd, including mounted police officers, becoming overwhelmed.
Officers closed the outer perimeter gates, to reduce some of the pressure on the bottleneck at the turnstiles. However, the pressure outside was so intense that one of the gates sprung back open a couple of minutes later. It was later established that the bottom bolt holding it closed had buckled. Several mounted officers have described how their horses were being lifted off the ground by the sheer pressure of the crowd.
Chief Inspector Robert Creaser (Ch Insp Creaser) was one of the most experienced officers on duty outside the stadium at the Leppings Lane end. In his original account, he recalled that at about 2.30pm he could see that difficulties were being experienced at the turnstiles and commented that the build-up of supporters was later and larger than was usually the case.
Figure 4F, taken from CCTV footage at 14:33:35, demonstrates the density of the crowd outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles at this time.
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Figure 4F: View of the crowd build-up outside the Leppings Lane entrance, 14:33:35 (Source: SYP CCTV)
With increased pressure on the turnstiles, some supporters climbed onto the walls and over the turnstiles to escape the crush. Turnstile operators recalled the state of supporters as they finally entered the ground, with many distressed, red-faced and out of breath. Another turnstile operator said that after 2.30pm, the crush was so intense that “some supporters were unable to take tickets from their pockets.”
Figure 4G shows the situation at 14:37:03 from the opposite angle, looking towards the stadium from Leppings Lane. Supt Marshall has been identified between the turnstiles and the outer perimeter gates, surrounded by supporters. Police horses can be seen between the outer perimeter gates and the turnstiles, also surrounded by the crowd. Some supporters can be seen on the walls above the turnstiles.
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Figure 4G: The crowd outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles at 14:37:03 (Source: BBC)
Inspector Robert Purdy (Insp Purdy) was part of sector 1, officially under Supt Greenwood. He was on duty on the outer concourse, by the turnstiles. In evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, he explained that around this time he felt the officers outside the turnstiles were no longer effective because they themselves were in danger, so he decided to redeploy them.
Other officers described their efforts to try to help particular individuals out of the crush, unable to control the crowd as a whole. Many mentioned supporters pleading with them to do something to relieve the crush.
Supt Marshall told the Taylor Inquiry that the situation was worsening by the minute with more supporters arriving. He had attempted to get a better vantage point away from the crush, by heading to a bridge outside the stadium, but from there he saw what he described as “A vast and progressively more unruly crowd” that officers were struggling to control.
Insp Purdy was also seeking a better vantage point by standing on the funnel bar, a railing that separated the turnstiles from the service road. He had initially attempted to direct supporters from there, but at 14:39:41 was handed an injured child from the crowd.
In a statement to Operation Resolve, he recalled: “I thought at first he was dead. He was limp in my hands.” However, the child was taken by another officer to a first aid point and recovered.
By the point at which the injured child had to be lifted out of the crowd, it should have been apparent to officers outside the ground that this was now a very serious crush, and that urgent action was required.
At around this time, Insp Purdy had a conversation with D Supt McKay, who was close by; D Supt McKay suggested that the gates would have to be opened.
Officers on the inner concourse were equally concerned. In a statement made in 2013, Inspector John Bennett (Insp Bennett) recalled sending a radio request for more officers to be deployed to the Leppings Lane end of the ground, based on both his own observations and the comments of supporters entering through turnstiles A–G that someone could be killed. He did not recall receiving an acknowledgement.
The PCB had received an earlier request for additional officers to be sent to the Leppings Lane end. In response, PS Goddard had radioed a Mounted Section sergeant to deploy all available mounted officers to the area, and Supt Murray also deployed reserve Serial 20 from the gymnasium. Insp Bennett said this serial arrived close to him at Gate A shortly after his request. Gate A was an exit gate closest to the North Stand. A few minutes later, another serial joined them there.
At about this time, Supt Marshall attempted to contact the PCB by radio to request that an announcement be made over the Tannoy system to urge supporters to queue in an orderly fashion. He also asked for Police Constable Michael Buxton (PC Buxton), who was driving a Land Rover equipped with a public address system, to make his way to Leppings Lane.
Though there was no reply from the PCB, PC Buxton himself confirmed by radio that he was on his way. He arrived a few minutes later. However, he could not be heard over the noise of the crowd. Believing that his messages were not getting through to the PCB, Supt Marshall radioed the Force Control Room at SYP HQ, to ask officers there to contact the PCB regarding a Tannoy announcement. This was one of several examples Operation Resolve has identified where problems with radio communications appear to have hampered the police response. More generally, officers have commented on the fact that radio communications were inaudible, or unclear; many simply did not have access to a radio.
By this stage, the crowds on Leppings Lane had extended beyond the funnel bar and were between the outer perimeter gates and Gate C. Figure 4H, taken from SYP CCTV footage, shows the situation at 14:44:51.
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Figure 4H: The crowd outside the Leppings Lane entrance, 14:44:51 (Source: SYP CCTV)
At 2.47pm, Supt Marshall radioed the PCB again. This time, he requested that the exit gates at the Leppings Lane end should be opened, to allow supporters to escape the crush outside.
He did this after speaking to Insp Purdy near the outer perimeter gates. Insp Purdy commented that because he was unable to contact Supt Marshall, he had to force his way through the crowd to speak to him. Though this was a distance of only approximately 30 yards, Insp Purdy said it took minutes, rather than seconds to reach him.
In his 1989 account, Supt Marshall said that once he arrived at the outer perimeter gates, “Inspector Purdy told me that people at the front of the crowd by turnstiles A-G were being crushed and asked me to open gates.” Supt Marshall further explained: “He was not specific as to which gates he thought should be opened but his anxiety was apparent.”
Supt Marshall said he was reluctant to do so, as it would result in uncontrolled access to the stadium. However, because an officer with the experience of Insp Purdy seemed extremely concerned about the situation, he agreed to ask the PCB to authorise the opening of the gates.
Again, there was no acknowledgement, so he borrowed a radio of a different type from another officer and tried to send the message a second time. Still there was no acknowledgement. He made a third attempt, suggesting that if the gates weren’t opened, people would be killed.
Supt Marshall has repeatedly stated that he requested the PCB’s authority before opening the gates, and various officers have said that they heard his increasingly frantic radio requests.
However, Insp Purdy has consistently recalled that Supt Marshall gave him the authority to open the gates when they spoke. Specifically, he believed he had authority to open Gate C.
By 2.30pm, the contrast in fullness between the Spion Kop and Leppings Lane ends was increasingly pronounced. The screens in the PCB showed a large crowd outside the Leppings Lane entrance, with supporters tightly packed in front of the turnstile block.
Police Constable Trevor Bichard (PC Bichard), the officer responsible for monitoring the CCTV cameras in the PCB, estimated that there were over 3,000 supporters waiting to get in. Police Sergeant Michael Goddard (PS Goddard), who operated the personal radio network in the PCB, recalled PC Bichard making a comment about the size of the crowd, and so he looked at the screens. He told Operation Resolve he estimated that there were about 3,000 to 4,000 supporters there and commented: “Only once before have I seen such numbers and that was when Sheffield Wednesday played Coventry City in an FA Cup 6th Round match in 1987 when the Coventry fans came to Sheffield in their thousands.”
Operation Resolve has established that some supporters at that game experienced severe crushing.
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Figure 4E: View of the Leppings Lane entrance from the West Stand, 14:30:16 (Source: SYP CCTV)
At around 2.30pm, Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray discussed whether to delay the kick-off, so supporters could get in safely. In advance, they had agreed on a very small set of reasons which would necessitate delaying the kick-off. These essentially amounted to the late arrival of a large number of supporters due to circumstances beyond their control, such as poor weather or a major traffic problem en route.
They had received no information about any such delays, and Supt Murray assured Ch Supt Duckenfield that there should be sufficient time to get the waiting supporters into the ground by the scheduled kick-off time. They agreed that the kick-off should not be delayed.
In agreeing this, neither suggested consulting with other officers, such as Supt Greenwood inside the stadium or Supt Marshall outside, nor did they check the turnstile count data, which could have given them more information about how many supporters were still to arrive. Instead, they relied on their own visual assessment of how full the Leppings Lane end was.
Yet even this basic visual assessment should have been a cause for concern. Officers in the PCB have indicated that at 2.30pm they thought the North Stand was only about half full. Given its official safe capacity was 9,702, this would indicate that just under 5,000 supporters were still to enter. There were ten turnstiles available for the North Stand, so to fill it by 3pm, each of those turnstiles would have to admit more than 450 supporters over the next half hour. As detailed in chapter 2, the Green Guide advised that the maximum number of supporters that could enter through a single turnstile each hour was unlikely to exceed 750—so 375 per half hour. Later analysis by the HSE concluded that, based on the number of people in the stadium at 2.30pm, it would have taken until around 3.40pm for all supporters to have entered safely through the turnstiles.
Subsequently, it was also established that there had been various traffic problems affecting several of the routes Liverpool supporters would have used if travelling from Merseyside. This information was not shared with officers in the PCB.
The D Division Operational Order contained an instruction that the Force Control Room at SYP HQ was to be informed of any traffic issues. However, Operation Resolve’s review of the Operational Orders showed that there was no instruction in any of them for officers engaged on the road traffic operation or in the Force Control Room to inform the PCB of problems with the routes into Sheffield.
There were also no plans in place to liaise with neighbouring forces, to understand if there were issues in their areas that could affect the arrival of supporters into Sheffield. Major delays were reported in Greater Manchester and Derbyshire; it appears the SYP Force Control Room was not made aware of these, nor did it check. Certainly, no information about these was passed to the PCB, but neither did anyone in the PCB ask whether there were any problems on the roads.
By about 2.15pm, officers in the PCB were discussing the disparity between how full the areas allocated to Nottingham Forest supporters were, and the comparative emptiness of the areas allocated to Liverpool supporters. This can be seen in figure 4C, which offered a similar view to that which would have been available through the PCB window.
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Figure 4C: View of the West Stand, West Terrace and North West Terrace, 14:15:32 (Source: BBC)
While the centre pens of the West Terrace (shown in the foreground) appear quite full, the pen beyond the goal is comparatively empty, as is the West Stand above. A lot of space is also visible in the North West Terrace in the corner of the stadium.
By this time, the crowd outside was building, as can be clearly seen in the CCTV image at figure 4D, from 14:17:10.
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Figure 4D: View of the area outside the outer perimeter gates, as seen from the West Stand, 14:17:10 (Source: SYP CCTV)
Various factors had contributed to this build-up, including the arrival of a special train at Wadsley Bridge station just after 2pm, from which mounted police escorted between 350 and 500 supporters to the stadium. Photographs of the supporters being escorted from the train show them walking calmly and there are no signs of supporters with alcohol.
In addition, at 2.10pm, PS Miller decided to close the Horse and Jockey pub and direct supporters towards the stadium. He suggested there were about 400 supporters there and alerted the PCB to his actions. As with the supporters on the special train, there were no reports of anyone causing problems.
Together with supporters arriving from other locations, this meant that up to 1,000 more people converged on the entrance area at around the same time.
Accounts vary as to what the situation was like at the turnstiles around this time. Some officers and spectators have said that up to 2.15pm, there were neat queues, with supporters laughing and joking. Others recall that from 2pm there was some pushing and shoving at the turnstiles; one supporter said that when he arrived at 2.10pm “There was just a sea of people at the turnstiles” and another commented that by 2.15pm there were no distinct queues and police officers could no longer organise the crowd.
In his 1989 account, Detective Superintendent Graham McKay (D Supt McKay), who was the senior detective on duty at the stadium at that stage, recalled that at about 2.15pm, he went to the service road to the side of the Leppings Lane turnstiles. He saw that officers were having great difficulty controlling the crowd and it was apparent that the turnstiles were not coping efficiently with the increasing number of supporters.
Supt Marshall was outside the stadium, on Leppings Lane. In an account from 1989, he said that by 2.15pm, Leppings Lane was full of supporters moving in both directions. He estimated there were between 6,000 and 8,000 supporters in the area. He said they were spilling off the footpaths onto the road and disrupting traffic flow. At 2.17pm, he radioed the PCB asking for Leppings Lane to be closed to traffic. A serial of officers was deployed to do this at one end, but the PCB was unable to contact the serial at the other end of the street. The road was not closed immediately and at about 2.22pm, Supt Marshall sent a further message reporting that there was still traffic coming along the road and asking again for it to be closed.
Both Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray commented in their 1989 accounts that, having seen the CCTV footage, they did not think closing the road looked necessary.
In describing the situation at around 2.20pm, the accounts of supporters are largely consistent. With just a few exceptions, they paint a picture of no discernible queues and a mass of people at the entrance. Those closer to the turnstiles referred to pressure building from behind and being unable to turn around or get out of the crowd. This pressure then increased further.
In their original statements, and again in statements to Operation Resolve, some supporters compared the situation at the 1989 Semi-Final with their experiences the previous year, where they recalled that the police operation seemed more organised, with officers checking whether supporters had tickets before they got close to the entrance area. There had been no such crowd pressure at that game.
Up to at least 1pm, the number of supporters in the vicinity of the stadium was quite small, despite advance efforts by SYP to encourage people to enter the ground early. These included messages in match programmes at preceding home games of both teams and a promise of pre-match entertainment in the stadium (which did not take place).
The first cars and minibuses carrying Liverpool supporters began to arrive shortly after 11am, and the first coaches arrived in designated coach parks at around 11.45am.
After the disaster, a persistent theme in police officers’ accounts was that supporters travelled to Sheffield early and then went to pubs or bought alcohol from shops. Evidence from a range of sources strongly indicates that there was nothing out of the ordinary about this. The licensee of a pub a short distance from the stadium—The Horse and Jockey—confirmed he was expecting to be busy with football supporters.
The likelihood of supporters drinking featured in numerous police briefings and instructions. For example, Serial 48 under Police Sergeant Derek Miller (PS Miller) had instructions to pay particular attention to licensed premises in the Wadsley and Middlewood areas. In a statement to Operation Resolve, PS Miller confirmed that they started patrol at 11.30am and visited several pubs which were busy with Liverpool supporters. He described them as being in “high spirits” but presenting no problems.
Though there were instructions to “pay attention”, there was no direction within the Operational Order about how to deal with supporters drinking: a clear oversight given its likelihood.
Some 52 coaches of Liverpool supporters arrived between 12.30pm and 1.45pm. Some of those who travelled by coach went directly to the stadium; others felt it was too early, so chose to go for a drink. As the available pubs were mostly full, some bought drinks from shops instead.
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Figure 4B: View of Leppings Lane and the entrance at 13:59:53 (Source: SYP CCTV)
From around 1pm, the numbers of supporters at the ground steadily increased. Figure 4B shows the scene at the Leppings Lane entrance at 13:59:53. It is taken from SYP CCTV footage, which would have been visible to those in the PCB.
While the situation at the entrance presented no issues, various witnesses have commented on how empty some of the areas of the stadium allocated to Liverpool supporters were at this time. Inspector Peter Darling (Insp Darling), on duty in the South Stand, visited the SWFC control room around this time. He told the Taylor Inquiry that someone in the control room had noted there were only 12,000 people inside the ground at that stage, compared to 20,000 at the same time at the previous year’s Semi-Final. This information would have been based on turnstile count data, which was displayed on a screen in the control room. However, Insp Darling did not mention this to the PCB and there is no evidence to indicate that anyone in the PCB actively requested this potentially invaluable data.
Some officers have since acknowledged that, if they had known how few supporters were in the stadium at 2pm, they would have been concerned.
The turnstiles were scheduled to open at midday ahead of the 3pm kick-off. Officers on duty at or around the stadium attended a 10am briefing in the North Stand, led by Ch Supt Duckenfield. He used exactly the same briefing notes as he had for his briefing of senior officers the previous day.
The evidence of officers present suggests there was nothing particularly remarkable about Ch Supt Duckenfield’s briefing. Following it, there was a series of sector and serial briefings, with more detailed instructions about the duties of individual officers. The majority of these were as officers expected, but a small number of discussions appear to have been significant.
Supt Greenwood, as ground commander inside the stadium, briefed officers on duty at the Spion Kop (the terrace allocated to Nottingham Forest supporters) about how they should deal with any Liverpool supporters that had bought tickets for that area. He instructed officers that any Liverpool supporters there should remain in a segregated area on the Spion Kop and not be transferred to the Leppings Lane end of the ground. This instruction was different from what was set out in the F Division Operational Order, in which officers were told to transfer Liverpool supporters found in the wrong area to their own designated area. Supt Greenwood did not want to do this, because he was concerned that it could result in overcrowding on the West Terrace, as had occurred at the 1981 Semi-Final.
Despite this concern and other instances of overcrowding on the West Terrace, no officer appears to have given, or received, a direct instruction during a briefing to monitor capacity in the pens there. As no instructions to this effect were included in the F Division Operational Order either, no officers anywhere in the stadium were told that they had a responsibility for monitoring the pens. Ch Supt Duckenfield and other senior officers have all stated in evidence that they understood officers in certain areas of the ground had that responsibility.
There were separate briefings for D Division, who had commenced duty earlier in the city centre, and for the Dog and Mounted Sections, both of which were briefed at the Niagara Sports and Social Club, where they were based, a short distance from the stadium.
Ch Supt Duckenfield arrived at the Niagara Club before the Mounted Section had left, at around 11.30am. He spoke briefly to the mounted officers to wish them well.
This is one of few clear details about how Ch Supt Duckenfield spent the time between the end of the 10am briefing and his arrival in the PCB at around 1.50pm. Ch Supt Duckenfield’s own accounts are vague on what he did in this period. Operation Resolve has used multiple sources of information to re-examine this issue, drawing together the accounts of different officers, witnesses at different venues and locations, and some AV material.
Some evidence indicates that Ch Supt Duckenfield toured the area in a police car with Insp Sewell and then went around the stadium—though there are few witnesses to this latter part. It appears they then went for lunch in the gymnasium at around 1.30pm.
Partly because his accounts are so vague, questions have been asked about what Ch Supt Duckenfield did during this period, and it has been alleged that he could have drunk alcohol during this time. Operation Resolve has found no evidence to indicate he (or any other officer on duty at the match) did so.
Nonetheless, the evidence gathered by Operation Resolve demonstrates that Ch Supt Duckenfield’s activities and movements in this period lacked the focus and purpose that would be expected of a match commander. He did not use the time after the pre-match briefing to familiarise himself with the important areas of the stadium, to talk to officers on duty in different areas about their knowledge of previous issues and risks, or to gather their observations on the arrival of supporters.
Ch Supt Duckenfield subsequently acknowledged that he was not sufficiently aware of the structures of the stadium or the facilities available to him to be able to understand how to manage any foreseeable events.
