The F Division Operational Order included an instruction to move any Liverpool supporters who had tickets for the Spion Kop to their own area of the ground. This was despite the fact that the match was sold out, so the West Terrace would already have been at maximum capacity.
Supt Greenwood has stated that he voiced concerns about this latter issue at the third SYP planning meeting on 10 April 1989. By this time, all the Operational Orders had been approved by ACC Jackson. The meeting was chaired by Ch Supt Duckenfield. Some of the officers in key roles on the day attended, along with representatives from D Division, Road Traffic Division and British Transport Police.
Supt Greenwood was one of the three SYP sector commanders for the match. He was in charge of sector 1, inside the stadium.
In a prepared statement given to WMP in June 1990, at the start of his interview under caution, Supt Greenwood explained that he raised the issue at the meeting “because I was concerned that the Leppings Lane end would become overcrowded if fans in such large numbers were transferred to that end.” He further explained that at the 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final, some supporters who were in the wrong end were transferred to the West Terrace, which resulted in overcrowding and crushing. He said: “When it was suggested at the second meeting that a transfer would again be necessary I raised an objection on the grounds of the 1981 incident.”
He also stated that he made Ch Supt Duckenfield, and everyone else at the meeting, aware of the importance of avoiding overcrowding and crushing on the West Terrace.
At the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Duckenfield said he had no recollection of a conversation with Supt Greenwood at the meeting on 10 April 1989 about the risk of overcrowding or crushing on the West Terrace. He was shown the instructions in the Operational Order and his attention was drawn to the fact that this would have resulted in the crowd on the West Terrace being over capacity. He responded that it was a defect in the Order that he had failed to see but reiterated that he had no recollection of the issue being raised at the meeting. Further, he said that at the time of the disaster he did not know about the incident of crushing at the 1981 match, or that SYP had raised concerns about the safety and capacity of the West Terrace following that incident. He said that had he been informed, he would have focused on that and taken the necessary action.
In a statement from 1990, Insp Sewell stated that he could not “…recall any comments being made regarding crushing at any previous Semi Finals or in fact at any match, or any of those present mentioning it.” He added that at no time did Supt Greenwood speak to him regarding difficulties at previous semi-finals.
PS Jones also attended the meeting and said that he recalled Supt Greenwood making a point regarding the movement of supporters within the ground, but he could not be more specific.
Supt Greenwood subsequently instructed the inspectors under his command not to transfer Liverpool supporters from the Spion Kop to the Leppings Lane end, even though he knew this was against the Operational Order.
Despite ACC Jackson’s confidence, Operation Resolve found there were in fact numerous gaps between the three Operational Orders, as well as important details that were not covered in them.
For example, all three Operational Orders included some instructions for managing the arrival of supporters by car, coach/minibus and by train. Between them, the Orders identified the police resources that were to escort supporters from the train stations to the stadium. However, none of the Orders included instructions about who these officers should report to when they arrived at the stadium and how they were to communicate the numbers and locations of arriving spectators to the PCB at the ground. Effective communication would have allowed the PCB to know the numbers and at what time supporters would arrive at the ground, so that resources could be deployed to effectively manage their dispersal there.
Similarly, there was no clarity about how any issues that emerged away from the stadium—whether in Sheffield city centre or on the main routes to the city—would be communicated to the PCB. In theory, this could have happened through the Force Control Room, which could have then alerted the PCB, but the instructions around this were inconsistent.
Both CC Johnson and Mr Hopkins also noted that SYP did not seek or use relevant police intelligence about the opposing sets of supporters to guide the planning. SYP did request information from the respective police forces—Merseyside Police and Nottinghamshire Constabulary—that regularly managed home games for the two clubs. SYP’s football intelligence team had an expectation, from previous experience, that Merseyside Police would provide little information. However, they did not make any additional or more specific requests to try to gain further insight.
Operation Resolve’s analysis of the F Division Operational Order against SYP’s Standing Instructions for the Policing of Football Matches identified some further gaps in its planning. These relate to issues that have been recognised in subsequent investigations as significant and that arguably should have been identified by the officer with overall responsibility for signing off the different Operational Orders (ACC Jackson).
For example, there were no instructions or contingency plans as to what action officers should take in relation to supporters who did not have a ticket for the match. After the disaster, many officers raised the presence of supporters without tickets as a factor in the crush outside the Leppings Lane entrance, but they were not given any direction to check supporters had tickets or instructed how to manage those without tickets. In his 1989 account, Supt Murray suggested that he did have contingency plans to deal with “large numbers of supporters without tickets”, but this was not in the Order or any other written documentation, nor mentioned in any briefings.
Even though the Leppings Lane entrance was a known bottleneck and, as detailed in chapter 2, SYP had proposed changes to the entrance area to address this a few years previously, there was no clear instruction in the Order on how to manage the crowd outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles—such as using mounted officers to help create queues.
Despite previous crushing incidents on the West Terrace, there was no instruction anywhere about monitoring the capacity of the pens on the West Terrace and no officers were deployed there. Two units of officers (known as ‘serials’ and typically consisting of 10–12 PCs with a sergeant or inspector in charge) were assigned duties to “maintain order on the terraces” once the match had begun, but their deployment was to the tunnels rather than the terrace itself.
In fact, the arrangements for monitoring crowd numbers as a whole were poor, with no one being allocated responsibility for doing so. Even though the crushing in 1987 and 1988 did not result in as many injuries as had been the case at the 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final, there was a recurring issue at high-profile games that senior officers should have been aware of. It should also have been addressed in debriefs after the 1988 game, but Operation Resolve has not found evidence that it was.
ACC Jackson, Ch Supt Mole and Supt Greenwood have all stated that they were unaware of the crushing at the 1987 and 1988 FA Cup Semi-Finals because they had not been informed of it through the post-match debriefs. Supt Marshall has stated he was not aware of any crushing at the 1988 game but also commented that he did not attend any debrief following the 1988 Semi-Final. This raises questions about the rigour of the debriefs after these games and the information flow within the force.
Crucially, none of the debrief reports from 1988 referred to the closure of the central tunnel either. This was an action that SYP officers had taken at the 1988 Semi-Final to restrict access to Pens 3 and 4 once they were full. However, there were no instructions in either the 1988 or the 1989 Operational Order about closing the central tunnel, or when it might be necessary.
The SYP senior officers on duty at the 1989 Semi-Final have largely suggested in evidence that they had no knowledge of this as a police tactic and that any tunnel closure must have been instigated by officers on duty nearby. By contrast, several more junior officers who described closing the tunnel at previous matches have indicated it was a known contingency or operational tactic for league matches, where the West Terrace was not allocated wholly to supporters of the away team.
In his evidence to the Popper Inquests, Ch Supt Mole agreed that the tunnel could be closed at league games. He said the standard approach was for the crowd to be directed to the centre pens, Pen 3 and Pen 4, in the first instance, but if these were full the tunnel would be blocked, and supporters would be directed to the outer pens.
However, he said that at games where larger crowds were expected, such as semi-finals, the whole of the West Terrace was allocated to supporters from a visiting club. On such occasions, the gates between the pens were open and supporters were allowed to ‘find their own level’. This theoretically meant that supporters were free to go wherever they wished on the terraces and to distribute themselves in the way in which they felt comfortable. In practice, moving between pens was difficult because there was just one narrow gate in each radial fence, at the top of the terrace.
In evidence to the Goldring Inquests, Ch Insp Beal commented that ‘find their own level’ was a flawed concept for big crowds.
On 6 April 1989, Ch Supt Duckenfield signed off the F Division Operational Order. It was very similar in its wording, structure and content to that for the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final. It was circulated the same day to all officers of the rank of chief inspector and above involved in the operation.
In D Division, PS Jones drew up a draft Operational Order which he gave to Acting Superintendent Steven King. After some minor changes, it was approved and signed by Superintendent Leonard Bates on 10 April 1989, after which it was copied and circulated.
The Traffic Division Operational Order was written by Inspector George Scholey and reviewed by Ch Supt Nesbit, who was head of the Operations and Road Traffic Division, along with Superintendent John Brougham (Supt Brougham), who would be in charge on the day.
When interviewed under caution by WMP in 1990, ACC Jackson said that once the respective divisions had completed their planning for the match, he received copies of each Order for final approval. He said that he was satisfied with the arrangements made, and that if he had not been, he would have rejected them.
This meant each Order was approved without being assessed against the others for any potential contradictions or gaps.
Both Chief Constable Brian Johnson (CC Johnson) of Lancashire Police—the policing assessor for the Taylor Inquiry—and Mr Hopkins suggested that SYP would have been better served by producing a single forcewide Operational Order covering all three divisions. CC Johnson described the F Division Operational Order as “less than adequate and, in some cases, imprecise in much of the information it contained.” He reported that the complementary Orders produced for the day, dealing with traffic and the deployment of officers in other divisions, were “confusing and unco-ordinated.”
In his 1989 account, ACC Jackson explained that for the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final, SYP had decided to have three separate Operational Orders, so that the divisional commander responsible for Hillsborough Stadium did not have to be responsible for the logistics of directing traffic and escorting supporters to the ground. He suggested that this approach offered flexibility, as police officers concerned in those duties remained available for redeployment in the gymnasium at the ground after they had completed their allocated tasks. It was therefore repeated for the 1989 Semi-Final.
When giving evidence at the Popper Inquests on 5 March 1991, ACC Jackson explained that the Operational Orders were developed following liaison between him, the relevant division and Ch Supt Nesbit. He said this meant it was “inevitable” that when the plan was complete, it would be right. He said that if someone identified a problem during the planning process, they would contact him and discuss the issues.
The next planning meeting took place on 29 March. By this time, Ch Supt Mole had moved to become divisional commander of B Division, based in Barnsley. He stated that, after the first planning meeting, he had no further involvement in the planning for the 1989 Semi-Final.
Instead, the meeting was chaired by Ch Supt Duckenfield and involved the three members of the F Division planning team. The purpose of the meeting was to review the F Division Operational Order. Ch Supt Duckenfield has repeatedly said they went through it page by page; he asked a few questions and suggested some minor amendments but was largely content to approve it.
At the Goldring Inquests, he was asked if he had raised any questions about any incidents in the stadium’s history that he should have been made aware of. He replied that, as a new commander, he would have asked questions, but 26 years on he could no longer recall the specifics. He said he was not told anything about the history of the ground that caused him any concern.
He also stated that he was not alerted to any particular issues that had occurred at the 1988 Semi-Final.
On 20 March 1989, the FA announced that Hillsborough Stadium had been selected as the venue for the FA Cup Semi-Final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest on 15 April. This was a repeat of the previous year’s semi-final.
SYP officers have repeatedly stated that the planning of the police operation for the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final was based on the plans for the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final, which was viewed within SYP, SWFC and the FA as having been a success. The grounds for this are not wholly clear, but they appear to have been that there was no serious disorder and that the match had adhered to its intended schedule.
However, the HIP Report identified that at the 1988 match “at least 62 people experienced crushing in the central pens, some sustaining injuries such as bruised ribs.” There had also been a small pitch invasion at the end of the game.
It is not clear whether the overcrowding at the 1988 Semi-Final or the resulting injuries were recognised by any authorities before Hillsborough Stadium was selected to host the 1989 Semi-Final. It appears that the fact that supporters had been injured was not covered during debriefs following the 1988 Semi-Final and the evidence indicates that the police planning team was unaware that there had been crush injuries. The pitch invasion, however, was known.
The planning process for the 1989 game largely followed the approach used in 1988. This consisted of some planning meetings involving representatives from most of the different organisations who would be part of the match day operation, and the development of Operational Orders.
There were three planning meetings in total, on 22 March, 29 March and 10 April. However, in a change from the process used in 1988, there was no meeting between SYP and SWFC in 1989. It is not clear why such a meeting was not arranged, when it would have provided an opportunity for all the relevant parties to discuss issues and review plans.
There were also three Operational Orders, each prepared by a different division of SYP.
F Division was responsible for policing the area where Hillsborough Stadium was located. The F Division Operational Order was the main one for the match and involved the most officers.
D Division was responsible for policing Sheffield city centre, including the main railway station. The D Division Operational Order covered operations beginning the night before the match.
Road Traffic Division was responsible for road safety and traffic flow on roads in South Yorkshire. It had no responsibility for roads in other forces’ jurisdictions, which covered the main part of the journey from either Liverpool or Nottingham to Sheffield.
For F Division, Ch Supt Mole appointed a planning team of three officers: Supt Murray, who was his regular deputy match commander at league matches, Chief Inspector David Beal (Ch Insp Beal) and Inspector Steven Sewell (Insp Sewell). The latter two both had considerable experience in planning police operations for matches at the stadium.
In his 1989 account, Supt Murray recalled meeting with Ch Supt Mole on 20 March to start the process. He said that “as this was a repeat of the same fixture the previous year, which had passed without serious incident we decided to base the order on the previous year's event.”
However, Supt Murray also said he was “asked by Chief Superintendent Mole to aim for a manpower reduction on 1988 of 10% in the interest of most effective and efficient utilisation of resources as it was to my knowledge that the previous year, some officers had been under employed.”
In the same account, Supt Murray said that following the 1988 game, he had identified a number of areas where he considered arrangements could be improved. None of these referred to overcrowding. Supt Murray did, however, refer to reinforcing security on the perimeter track at the end of the game to prevent a pitch invasion as occurred in 1988, and instructing officers in the West Stand to be particularly vigilant about preventing spectators from climbing into that stand from the terraces below.
A planning meeting was arranged for 22 March 1989 at Hammerton Road Police Station. The meeting was chaired by Ch Supt Mole and attended by the core planning team plus representatives of other organisations involved in the match, such as British Rail, local public transport providers and the Highways Authority of the County Council. Representatives of SYP’s D Division and Road Traffic Division also attended the meeting. No one from SWFC was present.
Supt Greenwood and Supt Marshall were both there; both had been sector commanders at the 1988 game and were selected by Ch Supt Mole to serve as sector commanders again for the 1989 Semi-Final. Ch Supt Duckenfield also attended, having been appointed as chief superintendent of F Division, taking effect from 27 March 1989. This meant he would be in post for the 1989 Semi-Final and would serve as match commander. According to his own accounts, and those of others present, he did not contribute to the meeting.
No minutes or other notes have been found for this meeting. Notes were first sought in 1989, shortly after the disaster, by SYP colleagues and then by WMP, but could not be located. Operation Resolve has also examined all available documentation but has not found anything relevant. The details of the planning meeting are therefore taken from the accounts of those present.
The overarching impression is that the meeting largely confirmed the intention to repeat arrangements from the previous year, with just a few changes, such as around traffic operations.
Police Sergeant Kenneth Jones (PS Jones) was one of the officers responsible for producing the D Division Operational Order. He commented that “The tone of the meeting from memory was that the F order and the D order would be based on the previous year.” However, he said that he and his colleague wrote the D Division Operational Order from scratch.
PS Jones also said that at the meeting on 22 March 1989, he arranged for further meetings with South Yorkshire Transport (SYT), British Transport Police (BTP), British Rail and the SYP Road Traffic Division. These meetings did not include the F Division planning team, but he did liaise with Insp Sewell in respect of the unloading points for the SYT buses.
Under the terms of reference for the managed investigation, Operation Resolve investigated: Planning and preparation for the match by the police, including organisational and individual decision making in relation to:
a) the resourcing of the event b) any role played by the police in allocation of areas within the ground to the visiting teams’ supporters c) the arrangements for the policing of the match, including arrangements for the arrival of supporters and their management outside the stadium d) the arrangements (or lack of) for precise monitoring of the crowd numbers and their safety within the pens at the Leppings Lane end
What was found?
• Though SYP officers have repeatedly insisted that their planning for the 1989 Semi-Final was broadly the same as for the 1988 Semi-Final involving the same teams, there were several important differences, including changes in key personnel. No allowances were made for these changes.
• For the 1989 Semi-Final, there was a 14% reduction in the number of officers on duty compared to the previous year. In the area where Liverpool supporters would arrive, there were 21% fewer officers on duty. SYP had intended to reduce the number of officers on duty by just 10%.
• A significant change made by SWFC to entrance arrangements for the terraces at the Leppings Lane end meant that all 10,100 Liverpool supporters who had standing tickets had to enter through just seven turnstiles. For these spectators to get in on time, each of the turnstiles would have had to operate continuously at maximum speed for almost two hours. It is not clear whether any SYP senior officers understood the potential consequences of this change.
• There were various gaps and inconsistencies in the key planning documents developed by SYP, known as Operational Orders. A major gap was a total absence of contingency plans with clear tactics to address known risks that had occurred at previous matches, including crushing on the West Terrace. Another was around responsibility for monitoring capacity on the West Terrace to prevent such crushing occurring.
• The three SYP divisions involved in the police operation all developed their own Operational Order without working together. They were approved by senior officers in each division, without looking at the other Orders. This resulted in a lack of coordination. Some accounts suggest that the Force Control Room was supposed to provide a coordinating role, but this was not documented anywhere. Beyond that, SYP relied solely on briefing meetings led by the match commander to bring the different divisions’ activities together.
• The replacement of the highly experienced match commander Ch Supt Mole was poorly timed. It was a direct result of the decision to move Ch Supt Mole from the role of divisional commander for F Division and to replace him with the newly promoted Ch Supt Duckenfield. There was an unwritten policy that the divisional commander would be match commander at Hillsborough Stadium.
• There is no definitive explanation for the decision and no evidence that Ch Supt Duckenfield’s appointment as divisional commander was inappropriate or conducted improperly. However, it meant that someone who had never previously commanded a match at Hillsborough Stadium was given responsibility for a major game, with just a few weeks’ notice.
Significant new evidence
The Operational Orders and police planning for the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final have been examined by a range of previous investigations and inquiries. In this investigation, Operation Resolve was able to draw on the views of Douglas Hopkins, a former Metropolitan Police chief superintendent with a wealth of experience commanding football matches in the 1980s and 1990s. Mr Hopkins was appointed by the Goldring Inquests as an expert witness on the policing standards of the day. He also gave evidence at the criminal trials of Ch Supt Duckenfield and Mr Mackrell.
SYP was the primary driving force behind SWFC's initial application for a Safety Certificate under the SSGA 1975. It was then involved, as part of the OWP (and later the SSGAG), in discussions around the requirements of the Safety Certificate before it was issued.
The evidence shows that SYP officers continued to be involved in discussions around safety and stadium design. Following a crushing incident at the 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final, SYP expressed to SWFC the view that the capacity at the Leppings Lane end was too high. It also proposed the introduction of radial fences to divide the terrace into separate pens to assist with crowd control. The fences were introduced, but the capacity was not reviewed.
SYP was also instrumental in the installation of further fences in 1985 and the removal of parts of barrier 144, in 1986.
While these changes were proposed by SYP, they were then planned by SWFC and particularly Eastwood & Partners. The plans were considered by the OWP—of which SYP was a member—and agreed. The involvement of SYP within this process appears to have been appropriate and in keeping with expectations of the time.
Mr Cutlack observed that the removal of barrier 144 had a detrimental effect on safety. However, he commented that this should have been raised by the engineers and did not criticise SYP for suggesting it.
Both Eastwood & Partners and the SYCC principal surveyor have said that SYP offered to monitor the entrance to the pens from the central tunnel, as part of securing agreement for the changes to barrier 144. SYP officers have said they did not agree to any such duties, and police planning documents make no reference to any officers being allocated to this task.
SYP was also closely involved in a further proposal to redesign the Leppings Lane turnstile area. Mr Cutlack identified that the resulting plans, if implemented, could have averted the disaster or at least reduced its severity. However, the plans were deemed too expensive, and a less extensive change was made, which did not increase turnstile numbers and resulted in fewer turnstiles being available for entrance to the West Terrace.
Considered as a whole, the evidence gives the impression that SYP had an interest in the stadium layout, insofar as it affected the force’s ability to police matches effectively.
This also appears to have been the primary factor in SYP’s insistence that it would only agree to Hillsborough Stadium hosting the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final if the same arrangements were used as in the previous year—despite the request from Liverpool Football Club to change the allocation of ends.
Questions about the safety of the stadium are crucial not only to understanding the causes of the disaster, but also to investigating the actions of the police and other organisations. In simple terms, if the stadium was not safe, this could indicate other parties—notably SWFC—were also at fault. Set against that, the police were responsible for managing the safety of spectators attending football matches at a stadium. This meant that if officers felt any aspect of the ground was unsafe, the police had a responsibility to raise concerns to the club and other partners, and to mitigate any perceived risks to supporters.
Evidence shows that the licensing authorities—first SYCC, then SCC—did not insist on a review of the Safety Certificate in response to changes to the stadium layout or incidents of crushing.
However, the core responsibility for ensuring the Safety Certificate was up to date rested with SWFC. Over the decade after the Certificate was issued, SWFC authorised a series of significant changes to the design and layout of the stadium and in July 1986, asked Eastwood & Partners to review the current Safety Certificate and advise the club of any alterations to the terms and conditions it considered appropriate. Despite this, the Safety Certificate was not updated, and the capacities of the different areas were not reviewed, except in the case of the Spion Kop, where capacity was increased after an application from Eastwood & Partners and SWFC.
Operation Resolve investigated both SWFC and Eastwood & Partners in relation to their responsibilities under the HSWA 1974 and the SSGA 1975. However, because neither organisation exists as the same legal entity it was at the time of the disaster, it was not possible to launch meaningful legal proceedings against either. In the case of SWFC, the company was still in existence but had no registered directors; Operation Resolve ensured it was kept active for sufficient time to explore these issues.
Although proceedings could not be considered in respect of any organisation, they could in respect of individuals. Over the course of its investigation, Operation Resolve identified a range of evidence that indicated Mr Mackrell may have failed to fulfil his duties as SWFC’s ‘responsible officer’ under the SSGA 1975 and as safety officer as defined in the Green Guide.
Following the investigation by Operation Resolve, and consideration by the CPS, Mr Mackrell was charged with two offences under the SSGA 1975. These charges related to breaches of the Safety Certificate for Hillsborough Stadium alleged to have been committed by SWFC while he was the responsible officer. These charges were in addition to a separate charge against him under the HSWA 1974, which is examined in chapter 3.
During the trial of Ch Supt Duckenfield and Mr Mackrell, jurors were directed by the judge that it was not appropriate to proceed with the charges under the SSGA 1975 due to insufficient evidence.
The evidence clearly indicates that the choice of the stadium to host the 1989 Semi-Final was made by the FA. The choice was based on geographical location and the perceived suitability of the stadium. Hillsborough Stadium had been used to host an FA Cup Semi-Final in both the previous two years, and these were viewed as having been successful by the FA, SWFC and SYP.
When the FA selected Hillsborough Stadium as the venue for the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final, none of the authorities raised any objections or concerns.
SYP did have some input into the decision. When Hillsborough Stadium was proposed by the FA as a possible venue for a Semi-Final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, Mr Mackrell contacted Ch Supt Mole to ask if SYP would be willing to police the match. Ch Supt Mole made it clear that SYP would only agree if the same fundamental arrangements for the allocation of areas of the stadium were applied as had been used at the 1988 Semi-Final between the same teams. This was to facilitate the segregation of opposing supporters.
This meant that the Liverpool supporters would be allocated the West Terrace, North West Terrace, West Stand and North Stand, reflecting their likely routes to the ground. However, it also meant that Liverpool would receive fewer tickets overall than Nottingham Forest, despite having higher average crowds, and that all Liverpool supporters would be required to enter the ground through the turnstiles at the Leppings Lane end.
The then Secretary of Liverpool Football Club, Peter Robinson, asked the FA if it could change this allocation of ends so that more tickets would be available to Liverpool supporters. SYP refused and would not agree to policing the game if the arrangement was changed. This was accepted by the FA. Nottingham Forest supporters were allocated 27,754 tickets for the match, including 21,000 for the Spion Kop terrace. Liverpool supporters were allocated 23,542 tickets, including 10,100 for standing areas (7,200 on the West Terrace and 2,900 on the North West Terrace).
The number of standing tickets allocated to Liverpool supporters matched that on the Safety Certificate, but as has been made clear, the permitted capacity of the West Terrace was based on flawed calculations. It should have been reassessed and potentially reduced once the additional fences were installed.
Although Hillsborough Stadium possessed a Safety Certificate, it was identified as early as the Taylor Inquiry, and has since been confirmed in Mr Cutlack's reports, that there were various ways in which the ground in 1989 did not adhere to the recommended standards of the Green Guide 1986. For example:
there were not enough turnstiles at the Leppings Lane end for the number of spectators
the fact that Pens 3 and 4 had a shared entrance and exit
there were some areas of Pens 3 and 4 where the distance to the nearest crush barrier was more than recommended
some of the barriers were the wrong height—including one of the barriers higher up the terrace than the barrier that collapsed, which meant during the crush in the pens the collapsed barrier was subjected to a pressure greater than it had been designed to withstand
the emergency exits from Pens 3 and 4 were not suitable—the central tunnel was too steep and the gates in the perimeter fence at the front were too narrow
the permitted capacity for Pens 3 and 4 was far higher than it should have been
Despite these factors, and the fact that there had been previous crushes on the West Terrace, Operation Resolve has found no evidence that any party felt that Hillsborough Stadium was unsafe when it was considered as a venue for the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final.
