In the summer of 1985, Eastwood & Partners installed two additional radial fences on the West Terrace. One radial fence extended from the mouth of the central tunnel to the perimeter fence, dividing the existing centre pen into what became Pen 3 and Pen 4. The second fence was installed parallel to an existing one, to create a 2m-wide corridor, referred to as Pen 5. This was for police use.
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Figure 2E: Digital reconstruction of the West Terrace layout in 1985, following the installation of two further radial fences (Source: R2S)
The evidence tends to suggest that Eastwood & Partners installed these as part of a general review of the layout of the Leppings Lane end and arrangements for segregation of supporters, initiated at the request of SYP.
In his report, Mr Cutlack made clear that, following the installation of these additional fences, the capacity of the West Terrace should have been recalculated based on the revised capacity of the individual pens, rather than considered as a whole. He calculated that the changes that created Pen 5 reduced the combined capacity of Pen 3 and Pen 4 by approximately 26.5m2, meaning that capacity should therefore have been reduced by a further 143.
He also highlighted that the installation of the radial fences should have resulted in a requirement for amendments to be made to the existing Safety Certificate.
On 11 April 1981, Hillsborough Stadium hosted the FA Cup Semi-Final between Tottenham Hotspur and Wolverhampton Wanderers. The game was attended by over 50,000 spectators.
Just after kick-off, a crushing incident took place on the West Terrace near the PCB. SWFC received reports that 38 people sustained injuries. SJA treated 30 supporters on site for minor injuries. Eight people were taken to hospital; three had broken limbs and two required stitches.
Following the match, SYP held an internal debrief, where senior SYP officers expressed concerns about the layout of the Leppings Lane terraces (the West Terrace and North West Terrace). Assistant Chief Constable Robert Goslin felt that, to assist with crowd control, the terraces required more divisions into separate pens, so that the supporters were not in such a solid mass. He also suggested that the permitted capacity of 10,100 for the two terraces was too high.
SYP followed this up with SWFC. Chief Superintendent Robin Herold (Ch Supt Herold), who had been the match commander for the 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final, had a meeting with Eric England, the Secretary of SWFC at the time. He explained SYP's concerns and the proposal that the terrace should be divided into pens. According to Ch Supt Herold’s notes, Mr England disagreed with the view that the capacity was too high and suggested that, instead of fixed fences, portable barriers could be used to assist with crowd control.
SYP persisted, and the then Chief Constable wrote to the SWFC Chairman, reiterating SYP’s concerns and recommending that the issues should be discussed with the local authority.
The OWP visited Hillsborough Stadium on 8 June 1981. Meeting minutes recorded that SWFC, together with SYP, were considering revising arrangements on the West Terrace. By early September, Dr Eastwood had been instructed by SWFC to arrange the installation of two fences on the West Terrace, to divide it into three approximately equal sections, each with its own entrance. This would allow parts of the terrace to be used by supporters of SWFC at home league games, with a smaller area allocated to away supporters, separated by the fences.
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Figure 2C: 3D model of the West Terrace layout in 1981, following the installation of two radial fences (Source: Operation Resolve, based on image produced by Return 2 Scene LTD (R2S))
There was to be a gate at the top of each fence, which could be either locked shut or secured against the back wall, allowing people to move between pens. The latter option would only be considered if the whole terrace was allocated to supporters of the same team.
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Figure 2D: Example of gates in radial fence (Source: Dennis Bond, SYP)
According to Dr Eastwood and an SYCFS officer who regularly attended the OWP, if the gates were open, this would be under police control. SYP officers have disputed this and said they had no responsibility for managing the gates.
The plan was approved by the local authority on 14 September 1981, and the fences were installed in October and November that year. Subsequent documents indicate that SYP was largely happy with the new arrangements.
Following a change to the terrace such as this, the capacity should have been formally reassessed. There is no evidence that it was.
SYP had been instrumental in getting Hillsborough Stadium designated, so that it required a Safety Certificate. SYP was then part of the Officer Working Party (OWP), a multi-agency group responsible for advising the local authority on safety matters related to the stadium. SYCFS and later the Area Health Authority were also part of this group.
In this role, various SYP officers attended regular OWP meetings to discuss safety issues. At one of these meetings, on 15 August 1979, it was agreed that the Safety Certificate should be issued to SWFC, subject to identified ground alterations; SYP was involved in the decision-making process.
The OWP also conducted stadium inspections twice a year. SYP officers attended these too. In 1987, the OWP changed its name to become the Safety of Sports Grounds Advisory Group (SSGAG); SYP remained a member.
SWFC was not in Division 1 at the time. However, because Hillsborough Stadium was used regularly for matches like FA Cup semi-finals, which attracted crowds of over 30,000, the then Chief Constable of SYP believed the stadium should be required to have a Safety Certificate. He wrote to the Home Office to request that Hillsborough Stadium should be designated. In 1978, it was, so SWFC had to obtain a Safety Certificate.
The application form was submitted in September 1978; the capacity of the stadium was given as 54,950.
SWFC had by this time appointed local engineering firm Eastwood & Partners as structural advisers and to help the club meet its duties under the SSGA 1975.
The director of Eastwood & Partners, Dr Wilfred Eastwood, reviewed the layout of the stadium and assessed the capacity against the standards in the Green Guide 1976. In early 1979, he calculated, under a strict interpretation of the Green Guide, the capacity of 54,950 was too high. In a letter to SWFC, he explained that if the club made certain improvements, like upgrading some crush barriers, the capacity could stay above 50,000. He calculated maximum permitted capacities for each area of the stadium, based on his interpretation of the Green Guide; for the West Terrace, the maximum permitted was 7,200.
After work was done to upgrade the crush barriers as Dr Eastwood had recommended, Hillsborough Stadium was granted a Safety Certificate in December 1979. On the Certificate, the total stadium capacity was set at 50,174 and the maximum permitted capacity of the West Terrace at 7,200.
As part of his work for the Goldring Inquests, engineering expert Mr Cutlack made his own calculations of the maximum permitted capacities for each area of the stadium as it was in 1980, following the Green Guide 1976. He concluded that most of Dr Eastwood’s figures were too high and that the maximum capacity of the West Terrace at that time should have been 4,518.
In this calculation, Mr Cutlack included the gates in the perimeter fence at the front of the terrace as part of the emergency exit provision. However, he also noted that it was not wholly clear whether those gates would be deemed suitable as emergency exits under the Green Guide 1976. They were narrow and had been designed primarily to allow police officers into the terrace rather than to allow supporters out. If these gates were not included, he calculated that the permitted capacity should have been 3,089.
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Figure 2B: View of perimeter gate and perimeter fence from Pen 3 (Source: SYP)
In short, this meant that from 1979 onwards, there were many more supporters allowed on the West Terrace than should have been, according to the safety guidelines of the day.
In 1989, stadium safety was based on the SSGA 1975 and the Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, an official government publication widely known as the ‘Green Guide’ due to its green cover. Both had been introduced following the 1971 disaster at Ibrox Park, the stadium of Glasgow Rangers, in which 66 spectators were killed. The report into the disaster recommended a new process of certifying and inspecting football grounds. It also set out some proposed standards for clubs and licensing authorities to follow.
The Green Guide was first published in 1973. It provided detailed guidance on numerous aspects of stadium design and layout, such as how many exits were needed for each area, the use of crush barriers, particularly on terraces, and the construction of stairways. It also explained how to calculate the safe capacity of each area of the ground. It was, and remains, guidance and there is no legal requirement to adhere to it.
In 1976, and again in 1986, the Green Guide was updated, to include additional guidance and clarification. The 1986 version was produced soon after the publication of ‘The Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds 1985’. This inquiry had been set up following two incidents at football matches on the same day, 11 May 1985: a fatal fire at Bradford City’s stadium, in which 56 people died, and a riot at a match between Birmingham City and Leeds United, in which a 15-year-old boy died. Following the two incidents, Justice Oliver Popplewell, a senior judge, was appointed by the then Home Secretary to undertake an inquiry into the operation of the SSGA 1975 and make recommendations to improve both crowd safety and crowd control. The Final Report is often referred to as the Popplewell Report.
Drawing on recommendations in the Popplewell Report, the Green Guide 1986 included some significant changes, such as:
a requirement for football clubs to have a designated safety officer “of sufficient status and authority effectively to take responsibility for safety at the ground”
additional guidance on the use of turnstiles for spectators entering a ground, including an observation that the maximum number of supporters that could enter through a single turnstile each hour was unlikely to exceed 750
a new chapter on crowd control, which had a specific reference to the need for clubs to work with the police to counter potential disorder
The Green Guide 1986 was the version in force at the time of the disaster.
The SSGA 1975 introduced a requirement for designated professional sports grounds to obtain a Safety Certificate. These were granted by local authorities, who were required to set terms and conditions to “secure reasonable safety” at the stadium. Local authorities were then responsible for checking whether the terms and conditions of the Safety Certificate were being met, and for deciding whether any condition of the Safety Certificate needed to be amended in response to changes at the ground.
Any stadium with capacity over 10,000 could be designated as needing a Safety Certificate, but in practice the requirement was initially just applied to the grounds used for Football League Division 1 (the equivalent of the modern-day Premier League) and those regarded as international football stadiums.
