Similarly, SYP’s approach to the Popper Inquests was consistent with aspects of its approach to the Taylor Inquiry.
With the costs of compensation apparently contained by early October 1990 and the DPP having announced in August 1990 that no officers would be prosecuted in connection with the disaster, two major risks to SYP and its officers were, to a degree addressed. In this context, SYP now appeared willing to take a more confrontational approach at the forthcoming generic hearing (which was to look at the broader causes of death rather than just the medical causes) than it had done in previous legal proceedings.
At 2pm on 30 October 1990, a ‘pre-inquest’ meeting took place between DCC Hayes, Ch Insp Bettison, Mr Metcalf, Mr Payne and Patrick Limb (junior counsel working with Mr Payne).
According to a meeting note, Mr Payne suggested that in his view “unlawful killing is the most likely [inquest] verdict.” This was instead of other potential verdicts such as accidental death, natural causes or an open verdict. However, he set out four points that would need to be accepted by the jury to reach that verdict, and indicated he felt that this was not a foregone conclusion.
He explained that SYP would not be permitted to make a speech or put forward a case to the inquests, so the only available “weapon” was cross-examination of witnesses. He suggested focusing on aspects of the ground layout and provision for spectators; in other words, drawing attention to apparent failings of SWFC.
Despite this, Mr Payne stated that he “saw no point in attempting to pass blame on any other parties”. The note recorded that he then quoted from the judgment in the Harris v SUFC case, where he said that “police officers had firmly accepted their role as being one of crowd management.”
Mr Payne was reported as stating that he did not “see the relevance of advancing an argument that it was drunken, disorderly Liverpool supporters who first created the problem for the Police outside the ground.”
Later that same day, a further meeting was documented, at SYP HQ, where the police officers “under threat” attended along with their legal representatives. The term “under threat” referred to Ch Supt Duckenfield, Supt Murray, Supt Greenwood and Supt Marshall, all of whom were at this stage still potentially under threat of prosecution and police disciplinary proceedings and had appointed their own barristers to represent them at the generic hearing.
According to the meeting notes, Mr Payne again argued against attempting to “shovel blame” onto other parties and said that “the behaviour of the fans outside the ground may not be relevant.”
The officers disagreed. According to the meeting notes, “There was a strong feeling from most parties that this evidence should be gotten-in. It was agreed that Hammond Suddards would be provided with details of those people known to the South Yorkshire Police who might give evidence in this regard”.
The notes of these two meetings indicate a difference of opinion between Mr Payne and the police officers about the overall approach that should be taken. This is significant, insofar as several SYP officers have consistently suggested that they were acting in line with legal advice; the evidence shows that on this subject, SYP rejected the advice of Mr Payne.
Following the meeting, SYP carried out a series of actions that were related to promoting evidence about the behaviour of supporters. DCC Hayes approached ACC Jones to ask him whether Dr Popper intended to call some of the witnesses SYP had suggested; ACC Jones responded that this was Dr Popper’s decision.
Separately, Ch Insp Bettison attempted to search the HOLMES database for statements from witnesses that included certain “buzz words” related to supporter behaviour and alcohol consumption—though this proved a fruitless task (and one Ch Insp Bettison later described as a “fool’s errand”).
On 6 November 1990, Mr Metcalf wrote to DCC Hayes to advise him that Hammond Suddards had looked through the statements and transcripts in accordance with the “various categories of misbehaviour”. Mr Metcalf listed 79 SYP officers whose accounts were deemed most relevant to the categories. He invited DCC Hayes to remove any names from the list before submitting it to Dr Popper. Mr Metcalf’s letter concluded: “I remain of the opinion that ground inadequacy was the real cause of this disaster and that the events outside, however abominable, should not be the main focus of our attention. Having made that point, if we can get in some solid evidence about drunkenness and drunken behaviour and this is fairly reported in the press, then this may do something to alleviate the perception of unfairness which clearly persists with a substantial number of Officers.” [Emphasis in original.]
Of the 79 SYP officers listed by Mr Metcalf, nine were initially selected to give evidence at the Popper Inquests. Eight of these gave evidence, along with two others who had been on Mr Metcalf’s list but were not initially selected by Dr Popper.
As the start of the generic hearing approached, Mr Metcalf set out a “strategy” he proposed to take. He explained this in a meeting with the new Chief Constable of SYP, Richard Wells, on 15 November 1990 and again in a telephone call with Mr Payne on 16 November. In speaking to Mr Payne, Mr Metcalf described a “relatively low key approach without too many attacks, but to bring out the issue of drink related hooliganism so far as possible.” Once the generic hearing was underway, Mr Metcalf wrote to SYP’s insurers, again describing the strategy in similar terms.
At the Goldring Inquests, DCC Hayes was asked questions about SYP’s preparation for the generic hearing of the Popper Inquests. Under examination by Pete Weatherby QC, who was representing 22 of the bereaved families, DCC Hayes was specifically asked whether “in preparing for the inquests in particular, officers under your command were trying to raise the profile of evidence which blamed the fans”. He replied: “Yes, I think that's true.”
Of the 230 witnesses listed to give evidence at the generic hearing, 62 were serving SYP officers and three were retired. In the event, fewer SYP officers were called than had initially been planned: just 49, plus two retired officers. While several of them made comments about supporter behaviour, these were in line with their original written accounts. Though video and photographic evidence has not substantiated officer accounts, it is not possible to verify or wholly disprove their claims. When interviewing officers who gave evidence to the Popper Inquests, the IOPC asked if they stood by what they had said; none suggested they did not.
Despite the conclusions of the Taylor Inquiry, officers were still asked questions about alcohol consumption and given the opportunity to comment on the behaviour of supporters. Mr Payne asked the majority of these witnesses some questions about alcohol consumption, but so did other barristers.
Ch Insp Creaser and PS Crawford both gave evidence to the Popper Inquests and reiterated their accounts of police involvement in closing the tunnel at previous matches. PS Higgins was also called to give evidence and said tunnel closure was a standard practice. He could not recall who had given the order at the 1988 Semi-Final.
The senior officers on duty were all asked about tunnel closure. Ch Supt Duckenfield denied any knowledge of previous tunnel closures. He further suggested that it was not solely a police responsibility to close the tunnel and ensure supporters did not enter the centre pens. He asked: “Don't the fans have a role in this situation when they come through that gate?”
At the generic hearing, Supt Greenwood was asked: “Did you know at the end of the 1988 match or before the 1989 match began that the tunnel leading to the centre pens may have been or was closed off in 1988?” He replied, “no”.
Supt Murray specifically stated in his evidence to the Popper Inquests that he only learned the tunnel had been closed in 1988 after the 1989 Semi-Final and added that was “the first I knew that the tunnel had ever been closed.” Pressed on this, he said: “I had no knowledge of the tunnel ever being closed. No one had ever told me it had been closed; no one had ever told me it had been used as any sort of measure to prevent people going down.”
Ch Supt Mole gave evidence to the Popper Inquests over several days. He was asked early on about tunnel closure and replied: “I have never had occasion to seal the tunnel and I have no knowledge of it being sealed in my operational experience.”
The Popper Inquests ended on 28 March 1991, when the jury reached the verdict of accidental death. Though the Taylor Inquiry had found that “the main reason for the disaster was the failure of police control”, at the Popper Inquests there was no adverse finding against SYP. This suggests that the evidence presented, selected or produced by SYP officers may have had a material impact on the process and the outcomes.
What can be said with certainty is that the fact that supporter behaviour and alcohol consumption again came under the spotlight had a devastating impact on the families of those who died and on many of the supporters who had been at the game but survived.
The evidence examined by the IOPC demonstrates that many officers in SYP felt that the Taylor Inquiry had not considered the impact of supporter behaviour sufficiently and wished to raise it again at the generic hearing. Mr Payne, the barrister appointed to represent SYP at the generic hearing, initially advised senior officers that he did not see this as relevant. However, it was made clear that the match commanders, and others, felt strongly that the topic should be covered. It appears Mr Payne accepted this and adapted his approach to include a greater focus on supporter behaviour and alcohol consumption—again, in contrast to the arguments made by SYP officers that they followed legal advice. Evidence shows that once this approach was agreed, SYP and Mr Payne took a range of steps to encourage Dr Popper to call witnesses who might provide further details of drunken behaviour.
While there are questions about the appropriateness of this approach, questions about the accuracy and completeness of the evidence presented by SYP and by individual officers at the Popper Inquests relate primarily to other matters.
Again, SYP senior officers denied knowledge of past actions to close the tunnel, inferring they could not be held responsible for failing to instruct any officers to close the tunnel at the 1989 Semi-Final. They also rejected the suggestion that SYP was responsible for monitoring safety in the pens. There is clear evidence that these officers attended meetings after the disaster where tunnel closure was discussed. However, it is not possible to establish what knowledge they had at the time of the disaster.
IOPC conduct reports considered whether any of the officers had given inaccurate or misleading evidence. Having reviewed these, the IOPC was of the view that none had a case to answer. It was not clear that any of them had answered the specific questions they were asked in a misleading way, and because there was no duty of candour, they were not obliged to volunteer any further details.
The evidence in this chapter has shown that DCC Hayes was adamant that SYP should not accept that it was responsible for monitoring safety in the pens, and that when SYP began to prepare for the contribution proceedings, Mr Metcalf identified this issue as one that the force should challenge.
At Mr Metcalf’s suggestion, a range of actions were coordinated to try to gather evidence that would enable SYP to challenge the Taylor Inquiry’s finding. Officers that had given evidence about previous actions to close the tunnel or police responsibility for monitoring the pens—either in their original accounts or at the Taylor Inquiry itself—were approached and asked whether they stood by that evidence. This action was undertaken by DI Cleverley, but with the knowledge and endorsement of DCC Hayes, Ch Supt Wain and Ch Insp Bettison.
The IOPC investigated the conduct of DCC Hayes and Ch Supt Wain in relation to the contribution proceedings. Having assessed the evidence, the IOPC noted it was legitimate and acceptable for SYP to defend its position and present its best case, to minimise financial liability following the disaster. If doing so would require the force to gather additional evidence, it was legally entitled to.
The evidence is inconclusive as to whether this approach worked. The out-of-court settlement of the contribution proceedings on 8 October 1990 meant that other parties agreed to contribute £4 million to the costs of paying compensation. SWFC and Eastwood & Partners paid £1.5 million each and Sheffield City Council paid £1 million. In a letter to DCC Hayes on 19 February 1992, Mr Metcalf stated that the total liability was “now estimated at £12 million”, noting that “if the estimate is correct then the South Yorkshire Police have taken two thirds of the liability.” This proportion was higher than the 55% share anticipated by Mr Payne. Further, it continued to rise: by 1999, it is understood that approximately £19.8 million had been paid in compensation, with no further contributions from other parties. This meant SYP had covered almost 80% of the total sum paid.
The amounts paid to families varied, with many receiving comparatively small sums that were insufficient to cover funeral costs.
In June 2021, SYP and WMP announced additional compensation to 601 individuals following a group litigation claim for misfeasance in public office relating to the actions of the two forces following the disaster. The claims had been started in 2015, and compensation was awarded for the trauma and psychological harm as a result of the actions of the police in the aftermath of the disaster, including the investigations that followed. Acting Chief Constable Lauren Poultney of SYP stated that the force offered “an unreserved apology” to those affected by the Hillsborough disaster and its aftermath and acknowledged that “serious errors and mistakes were made by South Yorkshire Police, both on 15 April 1989 and during the subsequent investigations.” She added that “The force's subsequent failings also caused huge distress, suffering and pain, both to the victims and their families.”
WMP Deputy Chief Constable Vanessa Jardine also issued a statement, saying: “We deeply regret the harm and distress caused to those affected by the tragedy and although I know it cannot make up for their suffering, working with South Yorkshire Police, we have agreed a scheme to compensate those affected.”
