Perhaps the most important question in relation to WMP’s complaints investigations is whether the fact that no proceedings ensued was due to any failure on WMP’s part. The evidence does not suggest there were fundamental failures, either intentional or accidental, to follow the required procedures. Instead, it appears that WMP largely fulfilled its basic legal responsibility to identify complaints and investigate them.
The evidence also does not support the suggestion that WMP attempted to minimise the number of complaints under investigation. It was within the scope of WMP’s role to review adverse comments and to reach a decision on whether to take them forward as complaint investigations. The IOPC’s examination found that in the majority of cases, appropriate reasons were recorded for not taking complaints forward. In some cases, there was no specific incident described that could form the basis of a complaint; in others, there was insufficient detail to identify which officer(s) may have been involved.
While there appear to have been some instances where potential complaints were not adequately addressed, and some witnesses who felt that WMP did not give them the opportunity to complain, this was not systematic. However, inadequacies in the criminal investigation also affected the quality of complaint investigations in relevant cases.
Having completed its investigation and reached provisional conclusions, WMP submitted reports to SYP, for SYP to determine what (if any) disciplinary action to take, once other legal processes had been completed. This was in line with normal practice for finishing complaint investigations.
At the end of the Popper Inquests in March 1991, ACC Anderson, who was responsible for complaints and discipline at SYP, wrote to the PCA stating that the force did not feel disciplinary action was appropriate in respect of any of the complaints. He included a rationale for each of the complaints, which largely followed the views WMP had set out in its reports. ACC Anderson added that, following the verdicts of the Popper Inquests, there was no additional evidence that would make it necessary to refer the matters back to WMP for further investigation.
The PCA accepted this in most cases. However, in the cases of Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray, it recommended that SYP start proceedings on the basis of the disciplinary offence of neglect of duty. The PCA argued that this was not the same as any criminal offence that had been considered by the DPP.
SYP did not do so. After a prolonged period of correspondence, the PCA sought to use its powers to direct (that is, force) SYP to begin disciplinary proceedings. However, various administrative and evidential issues meant that there was a further delay before a tribunal could begin. By this time, Ch Supt Duckenfield had been on sick leave for a sufficient period that he was permitted, under the Police Pension Regulations 1987, to apply for early retirement on medical grounds. He retired in October 1991.
Because at the time police disciplinary proceedings could only be taken against serving officers, this meant that no proceedings could be taken against him. Regarding Supt Murray, the PCA then determined that: “it would be unjust and inappropriate to pursue the charge against the Superintendent alone, in the absence of his superior officer.”
In a statement to the IOPC, Captain Noel Taylor, who had been the PCA representative overseeing WMP’s work in relation to the Hillsborough disaster, recalled this sequence of events. He said that when Ch Supt Duckenfield’s retirement was announced, both he and the Chair of the PCA at the time were angry “because the timing of the decision seemed very convenient for both Duckenfield and SYP”.
In the other complaint reports WMP submitted to the PCA and SYP, a common theme was that the matters under investigation as complaints were the same as those under criminal investigation. WMP therefore argued that if the DPP did not find sufficient evidence to charge the officer(s) with a criminal offence, they could not be deemed to have committed the police disciplinary offence either.
When the DPP announced there would be no criminal charges, SYP (who had the responsibility to decide on how to proceed in relation to the complaints) concluded that no disciplinary offences had been committed. This reflected the fact that, at the time, an officer could only be found guilty of a disciplinary offence if it was proven to the same standard as required for a criminal offence (that is, beyond reasonable doubt). This changed in 1999. Today, the standard of proof for police disciplinary investigations is the civil standard, on the balance of probabilities.
While this justified WMP’s argument, it meant that the same flaws in the criminal investigation—such as the poor quality of the suspect interviews—also affected the complaints investigations.
There were also some instances where the actions under investigation did not directly correspond to a criminal offence. For example, PC Illingworth was being investigated for the criminal offences of manslaughter and culpable malfeasance (also known as misconduct in public office). According to one of the disciplinary notices issued against him, PC Illingworth was also investigated for the disciplinary offence of abuse of authority. This was in relation to the allegation that he had mouthed abusive comments to supporters inside the pens. There was no parallel criminal offence to this, but the disciplinary investigation was discontinued.
All of the officers under criminal investigation were also under police disciplinary investigation. In addition, WMP investigated complaints about three officers who were not subject to criminal investigation. In each of these three cases—including the investigation of complaints about comments made to a journalist by CC Wright in February 1990, summarised in chapter 7—the evidence indicates the investigations were largely conducted in line with the guidance and legislation of the time.
Complaints about Police Constable Roger Cuckson (PC Cuckson) related to his alleged actions on the perimeter track. Two supporters complained that they witnessed a police officer pulling a fellow supporter from the railings at the front of the terraces, and then not checking on the supporter’s wellbeing after he had fallen heavily.
At the start of its complaint report, WMP pointed out that PC Cuckson had acknowledged the incident in his initial account before any complaint was received—so had not sought to conceal what happened—and that that there was no evidence that the supporter had been seriously injured.
Overall, it appears that the complaint was investigated in line with the standards of the day. As part of its investigation, WMP approached the complainant, obtained statements from other witnesses and examined video footage.
The PCA subsequently determined that the complaint was unsubstantiated.
WMP investigated the complaints about PC Scott together and took some relevant steps in doing so. For example, WMP:
used video footage to confirm the identity of the officer complained about
attempted to identify the victim of the assault
sought relevant witnesses
asked the head of WMP’s Mounted Section for his assessment of the incident
Further, the investigation outcome was that PC Scott should receive advice about his future actions. This could be deemed appropriate for the type of incident, insofar as he slapped or swiped at supporters, rather than punching, to prevent injury to the horse and minimise the risk of injury to bystanders.
However, the evidence also suggests that aspects of the investigation did not have a sufficiently broad scope. In particular, WMP did not take sufficient steps to investigate PC Scott’s explanation for why he struck out at supporters. Witness accounts disputed the suggestion that anyone was threatening his horse with a cigarette, and other mounted officers did not recall a horse being burned. It seems reasonable to suggest that in investigating the complaint, WMP could have taken further steps to verify whether there were any official reports of injuries to a police horse, such as veterinary records. The evidence appears to suggest that WMP does not seem to have considered this possibility, focusing instead on confirming PC Scott’s identity, which was not in dispute.
However, the disparity between the number of adverse comments made about the police and the number of complaints recorded led to the concern that WMP may have deliberately sought to minimise how many complaints it had to investigate.
One key allegation was that WMP did not follow up on some adverse comments, or recontact some witnesses, even though their records suggested they had done. Over the course of its investigation, the IOPC received three complaints from individuals who—according to WMP records —had been contacted by phone in relation to an adverse comment they had made. All three told the IOPC that they had no recollection of being contacted.
In three of the four cases, records on the WMP HOLMES database showed that the individual was recontacted by WMP by telephone in relation to an adverse comment they had made. According to these records, the individual advised WMP that they did not wish to make a complaint. There was no statement taken to this effect, so the records were simply in the form of brief messages to the MIR from the officer involved. In each case, the officer was D Supt Beechey.
Each of these three complainants told the IOPC that they had no recollection of this further contact from D Supt Beechey. All three also stated to the IOPC that they would not have said they did not wish to make a complaint.
The IOPC examined all available evidence about what WMP did in these three instances. Though documents do not prove that WMP did recontact all witnesses, the specific detail of notes made by D Supt Beechey indicate that he did at least make efforts to contact each of them. This does not therefore support the view that WMP was deliberately seeking to minimise the number of complaints under investigation.
The IOPC also identified some instances where initial evidence indicated that WMP may not have managed a complaint—or potential complaint—in the correct way. During the course of WMP’s investigation, various actions were raised for D Ch Supt Foster to review witness accounts that included adverse comments, to determine how they should be handled. In a small number of these instances, D Ch Supt Foster instructed that the individual should be recontacted as a potential witness for an existing complaint about a PC on duty, rather than as a complainant in their own right. On a couple of further occasions, he specifically advised that individuals should be recontacted to see whether they wished to complain. If they did not, he advised they should be treated as witnesses for existing complaints.
However, when IOPC investigators reviewed the questionnaires and statements that include these adverse comments, they found details in some of the accounts that made it unlikely that the witness was describing the actions of the officers already under investigation.
For example, in one of the cases where D Ch Supt Foster advised that the individual should be treated as a witness for the allegations against PC Scott, the witness referred to a mounted officer allegedly using his stick (a police officer’s baton) against supporters. However, the recorded complaints against PC Scott were in relation to him striking a supporter with his hand—an act that had been shown on TV footage in the days after the disaster—rather than a baton. This was more than a simple inaccuracy on D Ch Supt Foster’s part; the use of a baton against supporters was a serious allegation that merited investigating in its own right.
Two allegations about the actions of officers on the perimeter track in front of the West Terrace included references to officers punching or kicking supporters who were trying to escape the pens. These were stronger allegations than those that had already been recorded against PC Smith or PC Illingworth, who were under investigation for pushing supporters back.
The IOPC reviewed how WMP followed up on the instructions to treat these individuals as additional witnesses.
In most cases, there is documentary evidence to suggest that the individuals were recontacted. Some were recorded as stating they did not wish to complain. Others who were reinterviewed several months after the disaster were unable to recall further details to help identify the officers who may have been involved.
Some of those who had made adverse comments about a mounted officer were subsequently shown the footage of PC Scott appearing to strike a supporter. They were asked if this was the same incident they had witnessed or indeed involved the same officer. None of those shown the footage recognised PC Scott as the officer involved in the incident they had witnessed.
Failing to revisit some individual cases could be seen as omissions, particularly the serious allegation that a mounted officer used a baton against supporters. However, this occurred in a very small proportion of the potential complaints. This does not suggest that WMP systematically sought to prevent further complaints being made.
Once the complaints were recorded, the available evidence indicates that WMP largely investigated them in line with the legislation and guidance of the time. The IOPC identified that, in total, WMP raised 220 actions related to the complaint investigations—more than it raised in its criminal investigation. Complainants and some witnesses (including some of those who had made an adverse comment) were contacted and asked to provide a further statement. Where WMP had identified relevant video footage, this was shown to witnesses. In some cases, officers who had been close to the alleged incident were contacted and also provided statements.
These tasks were the sort of things that would normally be expected when investigating complaints and, for the most part, the evidence indicates that the tasks were completed in accordance with legislation and guidance. The work completed was mostly documented, through statements taken and written updates to the actions.
The majority of the members of the public contacted by WMP in relation to investigating the complaints had no issues with what WMP did.
WMP’s responsibilities changed from 9 August 1989, when it was invited to undertake both the criminal and complaint investigations, which both SYP and WMP recognised were related. However, this necessitated WMP taking over the ongoing investigation of complaints about Ch Supt Duckenfield, which had been started by Northamptonshire Police.
As with the criminal investigation, WMP’s involvement was then delayed by discussions around the financing of its work. These were eventually resolved by late September 1989, but the investigation by Northamptonshire Police had essentially been on hold up to that point.
WMP formally began its complaints investigation on 27 September 1989. At this stage, SYP had informed WMP of complaints against six of its officers. On 28 September, ACC Jones contacted Northamptonshire Police to arrange the collection of all documentation it had gathered in relation to the complaints.
One of the first steps WMP took was to review the evidence it already had from supporters to identify whether there were any other complaints. The officer tasked with leading this review was D Supt Beechey.
D Supt Beechey’s involvement in WMP’s Hillsborough investigation has been subject to online criticism and speculation. Much of this relates to the fact he was associated with WMP’s SCS, which was disbanded in 1989 after numerous allegations were made of serious misconduct by officers working for it. Several convictions secured by the SCS were subsequently overturned.
In light of the online comments about him, and some complaints the IOPC received about his work, the IOPC examined D Supt Beechey’s role and professional experience. It established that D Supt Beechey’s association with the SCS lasted just two months and was in an oversight role rather than an operational one. His work in relation to the SCS was not under investigation and the allegations about misconduct within the SCS pre-dated D Supt Beechey joining.
The process D Supt Beechey devised for reviewing existing evidence involved re-examining any questionnaires and statements WMP had taken from supporters which had been identified on initial review as including an “adverse comment” about the police. Under the review process, the 3,000+ questionnaires and statements in this category were reassessed.
Many were immediately marked “NFA”, meaning that WMP would take no further action. These included cases where the adverse comment was a general observation about police failings that could not be attributed to particular officers, so could not readily be investigated as complaints.
Where the adverse comment was about a potentially identifiable officer, witnesses were recontacted by WMP to ask for further details. This process led to complaints being recorded against three further SYP officers, including PC Scott (the mounted officer who claimed his horse was burned by supporters’ cigarettes, as examined at paragraphs 10.54–10.64 of this report), about whom four complaints were recorded.
Though the process did lead to further complaints being recorded at the time, out of more than 3,000 adverse comments, there were in total only 18 recorded complaints. Some of these were based on multiple adverse comments about the same officer for the same incident. Nonetheless, the total number of recorded complaints was a small proportion of the total number of adverse comments.
In the months following the disaster, SYP received a small number of complaints about the actions of its officers on the day. These included complaints about the actions of some PCs who had been on duty at the Leppings Lane end of the stadium (inside and outside the ground) and a complaint that an officer had taken money to allow supporters into the ground. It had also received a complaint about Ch Supt Duckenfield’s comments to the FA and SWFC officials, shortly after the match had been stopped, that gave the impression that the disaster had been caused by supporters forcing a gate open. As detailed in chapter 7, Ch Supt Duckenfield has since acknowledged this was a lie.
Due to the seriousness of the allegations, SYP had initially invited two different police forces to investigate. Northamptonshire Police was asked to investigate the complaint about Ch Supt Duckenfield and GMP was asked to investigate the complaint about an officer taking money. SYP asked the PCA to supervise both investigations, which was standard practice at the time for more serious complaints. Unlike the IOPC, the PCA could not carry out investigations itself; it could only supervise them.
In these first months, WMP had no authority to investigate complaints, even though its officers were working for the Taylor Inquiry and the Popper Inquests. Instead, its responsibility was to alert SYP to any complaints it received.
On 20 April 1989—within the first few days of WMP’s involvement—ACC Jones recorded a policy decision that: “Where allegations of discipline offences appear these will be referred to the Senior Investigating Officer and a decision will be made on the merits of each as to the further action that needs to be taken. Once again the necessity to conserve evidence must be followed.”
A few days later, it was noted that any complaints or allegations against SYP should be “actioned and referred to office manager or Detective Chief Superintendent Foster.” D Ch Supt Foster was the most senior detective involved in the WMP investigation. He had also previously worked as a detective superintendent in WMP’s Complaints and Discipline department, giving him experience of managing complaints about police officers.
When interviewed under caution by the IOPC, D Ch Supt Foster pointed out that, at the point ACC Jones set this policy (26 April 1989), WMP did not have jurisdiction to investigate complaints. He suggested that any complaints received by WMP should have been simply forwarded to SYP to consider. This would have been the correct protocol under the police complaints framework in place at the time.
The IOPC has identified one occasion on which this protocol appears to have been followed. On 5 June 1989, Supt Thursfield—the WMP officer in charge of the force’s temporary operation in Merseyside—forwarded written statements from two Liverpool supporters for the attention of Ch Supt Denton of SYP. The statements contained allegations that officers on duty at the game had offered to let spectators without tickets into the ground, for money. This was the complaint that SYP asked GMP to investigate. The IOPC has found no reason to explain why GMP was invited to do this, but there is nothing to indicate it was an inappropriate decision. After taking statements from the complainant and other witnesses, GMP was unable to identify who the officer(s) may have been and recommended no further action.
In addition, on one occasion, a prospective complainant was advised to make their complaint to SYP rather than to WMP.
The IOPC has also identified two occasions where WMP did not follow this basic principle of passing matters back to SYP. One of these related to a letter sent by a Liverpool supporter, which was shared with WMP by Liverpool Football Club. In the letter, the supporter said he saw a police officer punch three supporters. WMP registered the letter on its HOLMES database, but no actions were raised. The apparent complaint—which, as it amounted to possible assault by a police officer, was a serious matter—was not referred back to SYP to be recorded.
The letter writer later complained to the IOPC that WMP had failed to recognise his letter as a complaint. The IOPC upheld this complaint.
In this initial period of evidence gathering, WMP developed a means of identifying potential complaints about the police as it processed questionnaires and statements gathered for the Taylor Inquiry. When the team in WMP’s MIR read a statement or questionnaire, they were required to tick relevant boxes on a standard ‘category template’ form to indicate the categories that the statement or questionnaire should be linked to. One of the categories set up was “Recognition”; this covered positive and negative comment about the police. It included sub-categories for “Adverse comments” and “Complaints”.
The IOPC has reviewed completed category templates against the contents of the questionnaires and statements. It appears the “complaints” box was only used where the witness was specifically recorded as stating that they wanted to complain. However, in total, around 3,000 witness accounts (questionnaires and/or statements) on WMP’s HOLMES database were marked as being in the category of adverse comments.
The IOPC’s terms of reference included investigating: The conduct of officers involved in WMP’s investigations. This will include:
a) the involvement of WMP in the decisions taken about how to gather evidence/obtain witness accounts b) whether police officers involved in this investigation put inappropriate pressure on any witnesses to alter their accounts or influence the content of those accounts c) whether the summaries of evidence WMP presented at the individual inquests were accurate d) whether there is any evidence of bias in favour of SYP on the part of those involved in or leading the investigation e) whether any accounts provided were deliberately lost, inaccurately recorded, amended, or mishandled (including not following up on key witnesses) f) investigating other recorded complaints or conduct matters about the actions of WMP in the gathering or presenting of evidence
This chapter focuses on the police disciplinary investigation WMP carried out in relation to the Hillsborough disaster.
What was found?
• Overall, WMP’s investigation of complaints against SYP officers was broadly in keeping with the professional standards of the time. WMP took relevant investigative actions—more overall than were undertaken for the criminal investigation—and the majority of members of the public contacted by WMP in relation to complaints had no issues with what WMP did.
• Though WMP recorded more than 3,000 adverse comments about SYP, only 18 complaints were investigated. However, the IOPC has not found evidence to suggest that WMP deliberately sought to minimise the number of complaints it was investigating.
• The allegation that Detective Superintendent Stanley Beechey (D Supt Beechey) was involved in the miscarriages of justice perpetuated by the notorious WMP Serious Crime Squad (SCS) is not correct. His involvement with the SCS was brief and not in an operational role.
• Some witnesses complained to the IOPC that WMP did not allow them to complain about SYP at the time or incorrectly recorded that they did not want to complain. The available evidence around this was inconclusive, but did not suggest it was a recurring or deliberate issue.
• WMP’s reports into complaints about Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray offered contradictory assessments of their respective responsibilities, despite suggesting that they should be considered together.
• Though the IOPC has identified some shortcomings in WMP’s complaints investigations, the evidence does not suggest these were the result of bias. Further, it should be emphasised that WMP’s investigation did lead to the PCA recommending that Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray should face disciplinary proceedings. No such proceedings took place, because Ch Supt Duckenfield retired on medical grounds.
Significant new evidence
For this strand of the investigation, the IOPC was able to draw on the information contained in ACC Jones’s policy books, which had not previously been considered, and the evidence of CC Sharp of Cumbria Constabulary, who was involved in WMP’s disciplinary investigation. In addition, the IOPC gathered information about the policing career of D Supt Beechey of WMP.
In August 1989, at the same time that it took on the criminal investigation, WMP was also asked to undertake a police disciplinary investigation into complaints that had been made against SYP officers, related to the Hillsborough disaster. As part of this task, WMP was also required to investigate any further complaints that were received relating to the disaster.
Over a period of around 12 months, WMP investigated 18 complaints about SYP officers. As well as complaints that had already been made to SYP, WMP investigated some complaints it identified after reviewing supporters’ questionnaires and statements. WMP was also involved in investigating three complaints about comments made by CC Wright to a newspaper in February 1990.
The fact that no SYP officer was ever disciplined in relation to the disaster has led some to the view that the complaints and conduct investigations were biased, or part of a police cover-up.
Furthermore, some respondents to the IOPC’s 2013 witness appeal told the IOPC that in 1989 they had sought to complain to WMP about SYP. However, they felt either that their complaints had not been investigated properly, or that they had in some way been prevented or deterred from complaining. The IOPC received eight complaints to this effect.
This chapter addresses these two issues. It examines whether WMP conducted its complaints investigation in line with the standards in place at the time and whether there was any evidence of bias in the handling of complaints.
The series of failings the IOPC identified in WMP’s criminal investigation were sufficient to indicate a criminal offence may have been committed, which is the basis on which the IOPC is required to refer material to the CPS for its consideration. In January 2017, the IOPC therefore referred ACC Jones and D Ch Supt Foster to the CPS for a decision on whether both should be charged with the criminal offences of misconduct in public office and perverting the course of justice, in relation to the WMP criminal investigation.
In March 2018, the CPS announced that no charges would be brought as the evidential threshold for prosecution had not been met. The CPS stated that “whilst there was found to be some cause for concern in the actions of both suspects, there is insufficient [evidence] to reach the high threshold required to prove a criminal offence.” In particular, the CPS noted that while there was evidence that some aspects of the investigation were not carried out to a high standard, “there is a lack of evidence showing any deliberate plan or action by the suspects to hinder it.”
The CPS decision not to charge either former officer was challenged under the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme. The evidence was reviewed by a different prosecutor, who upheld the original decision.
The IOPC nonetheless reached the view that both ACC Jones and D Ch Supt Foster would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, for failing to investigate SYP effectively. In addition, both would have had a case to answer for not intervening in SYP’s account amendment process.
Further, D Ch Supt Foster would have had a case to answer for not submitting all relevant evidence to the DPP and for failing to investigate the competence of SYP’s match commander.
In each case, the disciplinary offence would have been neglect of duty.
Further, the IOPC was of the view that the fixed mindset with which both ACC Jones and D Ch Supt Foster approached the criminal investigation meant that consciously or unconsciously, they failed to conduct a rigorous investigation because they were biased towards the force and against the supporters. On this basis, the IOPC view was that both officers would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, for the disciplinary offence of discreditable conduct.
