The summaries also included the blood alcohol level of each of those who died. This meant that at the start of each individual inquest, the person’s blood alcohol level was read out for the second time. The first time had been when the toxicologist who had conducted most of the blood alcohol testing, Dr Forrest, gave evidence. He was the third witness called and after describing the tests he had carried out, he read out a list of names of all of those who died, followed by their blood alcohol levels. It has been suggested this repetition of information about blood alcohol placed an inappropriate emphasis on the issue.
The IOPC has identified evidence that shows that the presentation of information about blood alcohol levels was discussed with a solicitor from the HSC at a pre-inquest review meeting. According to Dr Popper’s meeting note, the solicitor confirmed he was happy with the creation of summaries of evidence that included a reference to blood alcohol levels, but “wondered whether it would be possible to add something to the summary to indicate how many pints of beer equivalents that particular level was.” This information was subsequently included.
The IOPC has not found any documentary evidence to explain why Dr Popper decided to repeat this piece of information in each individual inquest. However, there is no indication that WMP had any involvement in the decisions about how or when information about blood alcohol levels were presented, or the decision to repeat the information.
It was agreed that, for the individual inquests, WMP would compile and present summaries of evidence about each of those who died. The HSC was made aware of this and agreed to share the draft summaries with the solicitors representing each of the families in advance of the hearings. The intention was that these could then also be passed to the families, if they wished to read them.
The summaries consisted of “factual and non-adversarial” evidence about each of those who died. Using eyewitness accounts, including those of close friends and family members, plus video material, the summaries traced their known movements on the day.
The draft summaries were sent to Dr Popper, who corrected various factual or typographic errors before they were sent on to the families’ solicitors. His corrections addressed various issues created by mistakes in documentation around the post-mortems, none of which were deliberate or resulted in anyone being misidentified.
The changes to the summaries were fully documented in memos that were retained in the individual coroner’s files for each of those who died. The IOPC has reviewed the files and examined the evolution of the individual summaries.
IOPC investigators did not find evidence of any errors which could be construed as an attempt to portray those who died, or Liverpool supporters in general, in a negative light. Similarly, the mistakes did not in any way result in SYP or individual officers being portrayed in a more positive light.
Despite this process, further errors in the summaries were identified while they were being presented. Though these were promptly corrected and do not indicate a deliberate attempt to mislead the jury, they were understandably deeply upsetting to the families of those who died. They may also have created, or reinforced, perceptions that the authorities were uncaring or insensitive.
Documents show that around this time, there was an initial discussion between Dr Popper and WMP about the possibility of splitting the inquests into two phases: an initial phase where the evidence heard would be strictly limited to avoid any conflict with possible prosecutions, followed by a broader examination once all criminal matters were dealt with. The rationale for doing so was simply that it had already been a long time since the disaster and that families had not yet received any “official explanation” of how their loved ones died. However, at this point, both Dr Popper and the WMP officers involved, including ACC Jones, agreed that it would be too difficult to control what evidence would be heard in the initial phase.
A few weeks later, the position changed. Dr Popper had received a letter from the secretary of the Hillsborough Steering Committee (HSC), a group of solicitors who represented most of the bereaved families and those injured in the Hillsborough disaster. The letter asked Dr Popper to progress as soon as possible, because the solicitors needed information about the movements of those who died, to assist in settling civil litigation claims.
With the full agreement of ACC Jones, Dr Popper wrote to the DPP to propose the resumption of the inquests in early spring on a limited basis. The DPP accepted the request and planning promptly began for what would become the individual inquests.
WMP was first appointed to support Dr Popper on 21 April 1989, after the inquests had been formally opened then adjourned to allow the Taylor Inquiry to take place. Over the following months, WMP provided a range of support for the coronial process, including taking statements from SYP officers who had been in contact with any of those who died, as an essential part of the body continuity process.
ACC Jones also kept Dr Popper informed about the evidence WMP had gathered, sending him copies of reports WMP had produced for the Taylor Inquiry and, from August 1989 onwards, for its criminal investigation. Evidence shows that ACC Jones and Dr Popper were in regular contact and discussed various matters, including the likelihood and potential scope of a criminal investigation. This was of direct relevance to the Popper Inquests’ timetable, as it was understood that—in line with normal practice—they could recommence once the criminal investigation was finished, so that inquest witnesses could give evidence without the prospect of it affecting any potential prosecutions.
In January 1990, WMP informed the DPP and Dr Popper of its intention to submit the file of evidence relating to its criminal investigation into the disaster by the end of March. This enabled Dr Popper to start considering when the inquest hearings could take place.
The IOPC’s terms of reference included investigating: The conduct of officers involved in WMP’s investigations. This will include:
a) the involvement of WMP in the decisions taken about how to gather evidence/obtain witness accounts b) whether police officers involved in this investigation put inappropriate pressure on any witnesses to alter their accounts or influence the content of those accounts c) whether the summaries of evidence WMP presented at the individual inquests were accurate d) whether there is any evidence of bias in favour of SYP on the part of those involved in or leading the investigation e) whether any accounts provided were deliberately lost, inaccurately recorded, amended, or mishandled (including not following up on key witnesses) f) investigating other recorded complaints or conduct matters about the actions of WMP in the gathering or presenting of evidence
This chapter focuses on the work WMP did in support of the Popper Inquests.
What was found?
• The evidence does not suggest WMP had any improper involvement in key decisions about the scope and structure of the Popper Inquests, such as the 3.15pm cut-off. While there is evidence that officers—particularly ACC Jones —were consulted by Dr Popper, this was within the expected parameters of discussion between a coroner and the police team.
• There is also no evidence to suggest WMP had any role in deciding how information about the blood alcohol levels of those who died was presented. Solicitors representing the families were consulted on this matter and did not object to the approach.
• Though WMP did make some errors in compiling the summaries of evidence about each of those who died for the individual inquests, these were not intentional or systematic. They were corrected as soon as they were discovered and none of the errors resulted in misidentification or anything that could be perceived as detrimental to those who died.
• The IOPC’s investigation did not find evidence to support the allegations that WMP officers had acted inappropriately in the way they took the additional statements from two witnesses—Police Constable Derek Bruder (PC Bruder) and Special Constable Debra Martin (SC Martin)—for the inquest into the death of Kevin Williams.
• WMP did assist Dr Popper in preparation for the generic hearing and offered advice when requested on a range of matters. This is normal when coroners prepare for an inquest of any size. The evidence available to the IOPC does not indicate that WMP overstepped the mark in the work it undertook, or in providing views where they were asked for.
• ACC Jones gave SYP information about the witnesses Dr Popper intended to call. He did not give this information to any other party.
Significant new evidence
The main new sources of evidence available regarding the Popper Inquests were ACC Jones’s policy books and a detailed statement from Dr Popper.
This chapter examines WMP’s role in supporting the Popper Inquests and whether WMP performed the expected duties of a police force in such a role in a professional manner. In particular, it considers the allegations that WMP may have inappropriately influenced Dr Popper in some of his decisions about the format and scope of the inquests. It also looks at:
the allegations that some WMP officers pressured witnesses into changing their evidence
issues relating to the accuracy of the summaries of evidence about each of those who died, that were presented to the individual inquests
As is detailed in chapter 1 of this report, the Popper Inquests followed an unusual structure. Almost a year after the disaster, individual inquests were held for each of the (then) 95 who had died. These focused on confirming the time and place of death, plus the medical cause of death, for each person. WMP officers read out a summary of evidence relating to the movements of each of those who died.
Then, in November 1990, there was a generic hearing that focused on examining the wider causes of death. This ran for almost six months and heard evidence from 230 witnesses. On 28 March 1991, the jury returned majority verdicts of accidental death in all 95 cases.
The decision to split the Popper Inquests into these two phases is one of several sources of controversy around them. Others include:
Dr Popper’s ruling that he would not consider evidence relating to events after 3.15pm. This ruling was made on the view that all those who died would have suffered such severe injuries before 3.15pm that any treatment provided (or not provided) after this point would not have affected the outcome.
Some allegations, first aired at the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny in 1997, that WMP officers pressured two other police officers into changing their evidence in relation to one young man who died in the disaster. This latter issue was one of the matters WMP referred to the IOPC to investigate.
Perhaps the most important question in relation to WMP’s complaints investigations is whether the fact that no proceedings ensued was due to any failure on WMP’s part. The evidence does not suggest there were fundamental failures, either intentional or accidental, to follow the required procedures. Instead, it appears that WMP largely fulfilled its basic legal responsibility to identify complaints and investigate them.
The evidence also does not support the suggestion that WMP attempted to minimise the number of complaints under investigation. It was within the scope of WMP’s role to review adverse comments and to reach a decision on whether to take them forward as complaint investigations. The IOPC’s examination found that in the majority of cases, appropriate reasons were recorded for not taking complaints forward. In some cases, there was no specific incident described that could form the basis of a complaint; in others, there was insufficient detail to identify which officer(s) may have been involved.
While there appear to have been some instances where potential complaints were not adequately addressed, and some witnesses who felt that WMP did not give them the opportunity to complain, this was not systematic. However, inadequacies in the criminal investigation also affected the quality of complaint investigations in relevant cases.
Having completed its investigation and reached provisional conclusions, WMP submitted reports to SYP, for SYP to determine what (if any) disciplinary action to take, once other legal processes had been completed. This was in line with normal practice for finishing complaint investigations.
At the end of the Popper Inquests in March 1991, ACC Anderson, who was responsible for complaints and discipline at SYP, wrote to the PCA stating that the force did not feel disciplinary action was appropriate in respect of any of the complaints. He included a rationale for each of the complaints, which largely followed the views WMP had set out in its reports. ACC Anderson added that, following the verdicts of the Popper Inquests, there was no additional evidence that would make it necessary to refer the matters back to WMP for further investigation.
The PCA accepted this in most cases. However, in the cases of Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray, it recommended that SYP start proceedings on the basis of the disciplinary offence of neglect of duty. The PCA argued that this was not the same as any criminal offence that had been considered by the DPP.
SYP did not do so. After a prolonged period of correspondence, the PCA sought to use its powers to direct (that is, force) SYP to begin disciplinary proceedings. However, various administrative and evidential issues meant that there was a further delay before a tribunal could begin. By this time, Ch Supt Duckenfield had been on sick leave for a sufficient period that he was permitted, under the Police Pension Regulations 1987, to apply for early retirement on medical grounds. He retired in October 1991.
Because at the time police disciplinary proceedings could only be taken against serving officers, this meant that no proceedings could be taken against him. Regarding Supt Murray, the PCA then determined that: “it would be unjust and inappropriate to pursue the charge against the Superintendent alone, in the absence of his superior officer.”
In a statement to the IOPC, Captain Noel Taylor, who had been the PCA representative overseeing WMP’s work in relation to the Hillsborough disaster, recalled this sequence of events. He said that when Ch Supt Duckenfield’s retirement was announced, both he and the Chair of the PCA at the time were angry “because the timing of the decision seemed very convenient for both Duckenfield and SYP”.
In the other complaint reports WMP submitted to the PCA and SYP, a common theme was that the matters under investigation as complaints were the same as those under criminal investigation. WMP therefore argued that if the DPP did not find sufficient evidence to charge the officer(s) with a criminal offence, they could not be deemed to have committed the police disciplinary offence either.
When the DPP announced there would be no criminal charges, SYP (who had the responsibility to decide on how to proceed in relation to the complaints) concluded that no disciplinary offences had been committed. This reflected the fact that, at the time, an officer could only be found guilty of a disciplinary offence if it was proven to the same standard as required for a criminal offence (that is, beyond reasonable doubt). This changed in 1999. Today, the standard of proof for police disciplinary investigations is the civil standard, on the balance of probabilities.
While this justified WMP’s argument, it meant that the same flaws in the criminal investigation—such as the poor quality of the suspect interviews—also affected the complaints investigations.
There were also some instances where the actions under investigation did not directly correspond to a criminal offence. For example, PC Illingworth was being investigated for the criminal offences of manslaughter and culpable malfeasance (also known as misconduct in public office). According to one of the disciplinary notices issued against him, PC Illingworth was also investigated for the disciplinary offence of abuse of authority. This was in relation to the allegation that he had mouthed abusive comments to supporters inside the pens. There was no parallel criminal offence to this, but the disciplinary investigation was discontinued.
All of the officers under criminal investigation were also under police disciplinary investigation. In addition, WMP investigated complaints about three officers who were not subject to criminal investigation. In each of these three cases—including the investigation of complaints about comments made to a journalist by CC Wright in February 1990, summarised in chapter 7—the evidence indicates the investigations were largely conducted in line with the guidance and legislation of the time.
Complaints about Police Constable Roger Cuckson (PC Cuckson) related to his alleged actions on the perimeter track. Two supporters complained that they witnessed a police officer pulling a fellow supporter from the railings at the front of the terraces, and then not checking on the supporter’s wellbeing after he had fallen heavily.
At the start of its complaint report, WMP pointed out that PC Cuckson had acknowledged the incident in his initial account before any complaint was received—so had not sought to conceal what happened—and that that there was no evidence that the supporter had been seriously injured.
Overall, it appears that the complaint was investigated in line with the standards of the day. As part of its investigation, WMP approached the complainant, obtained statements from other witnesses and examined video footage.
The PCA subsequently determined that the complaint was unsubstantiated.
WMP investigated the complaints about PC Scott together and took some relevant steps in doing so. For example, WMP:
used video footage to confirm the identity of the officer complained about
attempted to identify the victim of the assault
sought relevant witnesses
asked the head of WMP’s Mounted Section for his assessment of the incident
Further, the investigation outcome was that PC Scott should receive advice about his future actions. This could be deemed appropriate for the type of incident, insofar as he slapped or swiped at supporters, rather than punching, to prevent injury to the horse and minimise the risk of injury to bystanders.
However, the evidence also suggests that aspects of the investigation did not have a sufficiently broad scope. In particular, WMP did not take sufficient steps to investigate PC Scott’s explanation for why he struck out at supporters. Witness accounts disputed the suggestion that anyone was threatening his horse with a cigarette, and other mounted officers did not recall a horse being burned. It seems reasonable to suggest that in investigating the complaint, WMP could have taken further steps to verify whether there were any official reports of injuries to a police horse, such as veterinary records. The evidence appears to suggest that WMP does not seem to have considered this possibility, focusing instead on confirming PC Scott’s identity, which was not in dispute.
However, the disparity between the number of adverse comments made about the police and the number of complaints recorded led to the concern that WMP may have deliberately sought to minimise how many complaints it had to investigate.
One key allegation was that WMP did not follow up on some adverse comments, or recontact some witnesses, even though their records suggested they had done. Over the course of its investigation, the IOPC received three complaints from individuals who—according to WMP records —had been contacted by phone in relation to an adverse comment they had made. All three told the IOPC that they had no recollection of being contacted.
In three of the four cases, records on the WMP HOLMES database showed that the individual was recontacted by WMP by telephone in relation to an adverse comment they had made. According to these records, the individual advised WMP that they did not wish to make a complaint. There was no statement taken to this effect, so the records were simply in the form of brief messages to the MIR from the officer involved. In each case, the officer was D Supt Beechey.
Each of these three complainants told the IOPC that they had no recollection of this further contact from D Supt Beechey. All three also stated to the IOPC that they would not have said they did not wish to make a complaint.
The IOPC examined all available evidence about what WMP did in these three instances. Though documents do not prove that WMP did recontact all witnesses, the specific detail of notes made by D Supt Beechey indicate that he did at least make efforts to contact each of them. This does not therefore support the view that WMP was deliberately seeking to minimise the number of complaints under investigation.
The IOPC also identified some instances where initial evidence indicated that WMP may not have managed a complaint—or potential complaint—in the correct way. During the course of WMP’s investigation, various actions were raised for D Ch Supt Foster to review witness accounts that included adverse comments, to determine how they should be handled. In a small number of these instances, D Ch Supt Foster instructed that the individual should be recontacted as a potential witness for an existing complaint about a PC on duty, rather than as a complainant in their own right. On a couple of further occasions, he specifically advised that individuals should be recontacted to see whether they wished to complain. If they did not, he advised they should be treated as witnesses for existing complaints.
However, when IOPC investigators reviewed the questionnaires and statements that include these adverse comments, they found details in some of the accounts that made it unlikely that the witness was describing the actions of the officers already under investigation.
For example, in one of the cases where D Ch Supt Foster advised that the individual should be treated as a witness for the allegations against PC Scott, the witness referred to a mounted officer allegedly using his stick (a police officer’s baton) against supporters. However, the recorded complaints against PC Scott were in relation to him striking a supporter with his hand—an act that had been shown on TV footage in the days after the disaster—rather than a baton. This was more than a simple inaccuracy on D Ch Supt Foster’s part; the use of a baton against supporters was a serious allegation that merited investigating in its own right.
Two allegations about the actions of officers on the perimeter track in front of the West Terrace included references to officers punching or kicking supporters who were trying to escape the pens. These were stronger allegations than those that had already been recorded against PC Smith or PC Illingworth, who were under investigation for pushing supporters back.
The IOPC reviewed how WMP followed up on the instructions to treat these individuals as additional witnesses.
In most cases, there is documentary evidence to suggest that the individuals were recontacted. Some were recorded as stating they did not wish to complain. Others who were reinterviewed several months after the disaster were unable to recall further details to help identify the officers who may have been involved.
Some of those who had made adverse comments about a mounted officer were subsequently shown the footage of PC Scott appearing to strike a supporter. They were asked if this was the same incident they had witnessed or indeed involved the same officer. None of those shown the footage recognised PC Scott as the officer involved in the incident they had witnessed.
Failing to revisit some individual cases could be seen as omissions, particularly the serious allegation that a mounted officer used a baton against supporters. However, this occurred in a very small proportion of the potential complaints. This does not suggest that WMP systematically sought to prevent further complaints being made.
