In 2007, Norman Bettison was appointed Chief Constable of WYP and was still in this role when the HIP Report was published on 12 September 2012. His name appeared repeatedly in the HIP Report and there were some implied criticisms of what he did in the aftermath of the disaster.
On the day after the HIP Report was published, he issued a press statement through WYP's press office. He acknowledged the HIP Report had named him but said he had “absolutely nothing to hide.” He then summarised his “personal actions in respect of the Hillsborough tragedy”. Also within the statement was a comment that “Fans' behaviour, to the extent that it was relevant at all, made the job of the police, in the crush outside Leppings Lane turnstiles, harder than it needed to be.”
His statement was widely criticised, in particular for the comment on the behaviour of supporters. On 14 September 2012, he then issued a second statement, in which he apologised for the upset caused by the first statement and sought to clarify his comments.
On 24 October 2012, he resigned as Chief Constable of WYP with immediate effect. He stated he was resigning “not because of any allegations about the past, but because I share the view that this has become a distraction to policing in West Yorkshire now and in the future.”
The IOPC examined the accuracy of the two statements he made against the evidence it had gathered about his role in the aftermath of the disaster. It found several inaccuracies in these two statements, notably related to a comment he made that his involvement ended after the Taylor Inquiry and that he had no involvement with the Popper Inquests and later proceedings.
The statements were the subject of a conduct investigation, commenced by the IOPC. Having reviewed the evidence in the conduct report, the IOPC was of the view that a misconduct panel could conclude that Norman Bettison’s actions in issuing these statements were a deliberate attempt to mislead the public. On this basis, he would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, if he had still been serving.
The third instance the IOPC referred to was during a telephone conversation between Norman Bettison and the head of HMIC, David O’Dowd. This took place after the appointment was challenged; Mr O’Dowd was asked by the MPA to provide a press release about it, to reassure people that the process had been robust, and the appointment had been made properly. In it, Mr O’Dowd wrote: “Comments have been made about Mr Bettison ‘playing a key role in the post Hillsborough events’. This is factually incorrect and his role was peripheral.”
In a statement to the IOPC in October 2016, Mr O’Dowd said that before he wrote the press release, he spoke to Norman Bettison who “assured me that his role in the enquiry had been peripheral.”
On 28 June 2017, Norman Bettison was charged with four offences of misconduct in public office. One of these offences was related to “untruthfully describing his role in the response of the South Yorkshire Police Force to the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster to Sir David O'Dowd as ‘peripheral’.”
Following this announcement, Mr O’Dowd contacted the CPS to express his concern about the charge as he was not certain that Norman Bettison had used the word peripheral. He then gave a further statement to the IOPC, in which he explained: “My use of the word ‘peripheral’ has caused me concern, as I am not sure where it actually came from. It is not a word I would normally use. I can only assume that the word was used by either Dan Crompton when he briefed me about Mr Bettison, or Mr Bettison himself when I spoke to him on 23/10/98 on the telephone.”
There are no records of exactly what was said in the call on 23 October 1998, but in his statement to the MPA on 2 November, Norman Bettison described his association with the Hillsborough disaster as “a peripheral link more than a decade ago”.
In his first prepared statement to the IOPC, Norman Bettison commented that his link to the disaster was peripheral. However, he added: “I do not say, in any contemporaneous account, and have no recollection of ever saying, that my role in the aftermath was a peripheral one.”
The distinction between his peripheral role in the disaster itself, and his non-peripheral role in the aftermath, may not have been clear to all members of the MPA.
Nonetheless, Mr O’Dowd was clear that whether the exact word “peripheral” was used or not, he did not feel he had been misled.
On 21 August 2018, the CPS announced that, following a review of evidence, the prosecution would be discontinued. This decision was challenged under the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme. The evidence was reviewed by a different prosecutor, who upheld the decision to discontinue.
This announcement was almost immediately met with protests from some members of the families of those who died, which were covered extensively in Liverpool’s regional newspapers. These resulted in a series of press releases and statements from the MPA Appointments Committee and other parties, including HMIC, explaining the decision and the process that had been followed.
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Figure 20A: Copy of front page of the Daily Post on 15 October 1998 (Source: Trinity Mirror Group)
Norman Bettison also issued a statement via the WYP press office in relation to his involvement in the disaster. In this, he briefly covered his actions on the day itself and then described his involvement in the aftermath. He said he was assigned to a unit “tasked with looking at what had happened on the day of the disaster, making recommendations about the policing of the remaining football matches at Hillsborough before the end of the season and reviewing policing arrangements for football at Hillsborough and other grounds in South Yorkshire the following season”. He also said that later on he “was given a specific role to monitor the public inquiry and the inquest and brief the Chief Constable on progress.”
On 19 October, the Appointments Committee met to discuss the appointment and the response to it. Part of this meeting was open to the media and members of the public. Meeting notes show that two members of the Appointments Committee—the two who stated they had not seen the HMIC assessment—questioned whether Norman Bettison had deliberately concealed information about his role in the disaster during the appointment process. Mr Crompton was at the meeting and responded that Norman Bettison had also recently applied for the post of Chief Constable with a different force, and that his application had been very similar and similarly focused on his senior command experience.
A further meeting was arranged for the whole of the MPA (not just the Appointments Committee) on 2 November. Norman Bettison attended; he read out an account he had prepared of his involvement in the disaster and then answered questions from MPA members. One of the Appointments Committee asked him why he had not raised the issue of his involvement in the disaster at any point. He replied that he had simply been responding to the questions asked and had not sought to set the agenda. He stated: “I did not go away from the interview thinking ‘Phew! Hillsborough wasn’t raised’.”
Having compared the statement he made and responses he gave in the meeting with the evidence set out throughout this report, the IOPC has identified that Norman Bettison did not at any point provide a full account of his involvement in SYP’s response.
While it could be reasonably claimed that covering every aspect of his involvement was not necessary for the purpose, and that it was possible that, ten years after the events, he had simply not recalled some of the tasks he did, the accounts he gave did not include some aspects of his role that could be deemed significant. For instance, he did not mention going to Parliament on behalf of the SYP Chief Constable to show MPs a video relating to the disaster (see paragraphs 8.45–8.52) or his role in SYP’s preparation for the Popper Inquests (see paragraphs 11.29–11.60). He also did not mention his attendance at almost every day of the Taylor Inquiry hearings, or the tasks he carried out as a result of this, such as taking statements from Supt Chapman and a retired SYP officer to refute evidence given by Mr Lock (see paragraphs 10.106–10.109).
Following the meeting, the MPA confirmed there were no grounds on which to overturn the appointment. Some members of the MPA have stated to the IOPC that Norman Bettison’s manner and responses during the meeting actually reassured them that he was a suitable person for the job. He served as Chief Constable of Merseyside Police until January 2005.
The two members of the Appointments Committee that felt he should have disclosed his link to the disaster during the application process both resigned immediately.
In statements to the IOPC and in evidence to the Goldring Inquests, Norman Bettison has consistently stated that he did not intentionally conceal his involvement in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster from the Appointments Committee. He explained that he did not feel that the work he had done in the aftermath of the disaster was relevant to his application and that he was not asked about it at any time before he was offered the post of Chief Constable.
Broadly, the evidence supports both of these points. However, after he was offered the post, the description he gave of his involvement in the aftermath of the disaster was neither accurate nor comprehensive. Having reviewed the evidence around this, the IOPC identified three occasions in October and November 1998 when what Norman Bettison said about his association with the disaster could be interpreted as misleading. These included the statement issued through WYP’s press office on 14 October, which underplayed the extent of his role, and the written account he gave to the MPA on 2 November.
The IOPC felt that a reasonable misconduct panel could conclude that he deliberately downplayed his role in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster, so would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, if he had still been serving with the police.
To examine the appointment process, IOPC investigators reviewed all available documentation about it—including a comprehensive 1999 report from the Clerk of the MPA, who was at the heart of the appointment process. They then took statements from surviving members of the Appointments Committee, including one of the two who had stepped down, as well as others involved in the selection process or the fallout from it. These included two members of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), which routinely provided an assessment of each candidate for chief officer roles to the selection panels. Investigators also received several prepared statements from Norman Bettison.
The evidence indicates that, during the initial application process, there was no point at which he was asked about his involvement in SYP’s response to the disaster, and so there was no point during this phase at which he should have declared his involvement.
On the application form, candidates were asked to demonstrate their suitability for the role of Chief Constable with reference to actions in senior roles. These were understood to be roles of superintendent or above. Norman Bettison was a chief inspector at the time of the disaster and did not refer to any of the work he did in relation to the disaster in his responses on the form. The first role he mentioned was as superintendent in the SYP Traffic Division—a role he began in October 1989. There was no specific question asking for details of experience in more junior roles.
When the Appointments Committee met to review the applications, they were provided with a brief written assessment from HMIC of each candidate. The assessment of Norman Bettison mentioned that when he was at SYP, he had been a “member of a small enquiry team reporting to the Chief Constable on the Hillsborough incident”. The HMIC assessor who wrote this, Dan Crompton, told the IOPC that he had included it because he “was conscious that anything relating to Hillsborough was an extremely sensitive issue in Merseyside.” Some members of the Appointments Committee chose not to read the HMIC assessment, and two others stated they did not recall seeing it.
Seven candidates, including Norman Bettison, were invited for a two-day interview process. This included an evening gathering, where members of the Appointments Committee could meet the candidates in an informal setting. Though the interviews were structured to ask similar questions to each candidate, this gathering would have provided an opportunity for members of the Appointments Committee to ask about his association with the disaster. No such questions were asked.
At the end of the interview process, Norman Bettison was announced as the unanimous choice of the Appointments Committee.
The IOPC’s terms of reference included investigating: The following specific complaints/conduct matters relating solely to Sir Norman Bettison and not already covered elsewhere in the terms of reference:
a) whether Sir Norman Bettison was deliberately dishonest in relation to his involvement in the Hillsborough investigation during the application and appointment process for the post of Chief Constable of Merseyside Police in 1998 b) the nature and extent of various statements made by Sir Norman Bettison to the press and any other actions after publication of the Hillsborough Independent Panel Report, based on allegations that this was part of a continued effort to deflect blame away from SYP towards others, particularly Liverpool supporters
What was found?
• During the initial application process, there was no point at which Norman Bettison was asked about his involvement in SYP’s response to the disaster. This meant there was no point during this phase when he should have declared this involvement.
• Most of the Appointments Committee who decided to appoint Norman Bettison as Chief Constable of Merseyside Police have confirmed they were aware he had been involved in SYP’s response to the disaster. Two stated that when they appointed him, they were not aware of his involvement.
• After protests against the appointment, Norman Bettison issued a statement in which he confirmed he had been involved in SYP’s response to the disaster. However, the description he gave of his role was not accurate and omitted some significant activities he performed.
• There were also inaccuracies in the description he gave to the Merseyside Police Authority (MPA) of his involvement in the disaster. Together, these give the impression that he deliberately downplayed the extent of his involvement in SYP’s response.
• Similar criticisms can be made of the public statements he gave after the HIP Report was published.
• The evidence is inconclusive about whether Norman Bettison told his MBA classmates that SYP intended to blame supporters for the disaster. Only two of the 14 interviewed by the IOPC recall him saying this.
Significant new evidence
The major new evidence in relation to this part of the investigation came in the form of statements from MPA members and various witnesses, plus the prepared statements of Norman Bettison. The IOPC also reviewed other applications he made for senior roles around this time.
At the time of the disaster, Norman Bettison was a chief inspector at SYP. He was at the stadium as a spectator on the day of the disaster and responded to the emerging situation by helping organise an information point for those trying to find a missing friend or family member. As has been detailed throughout this report, he was then involved in various aspects of SYP’s response to the disaster, including the production of the proof of evidence, and compiling a video, which he presented to MPs.
By October 1989, he had been promoted to superintendent. In 1992, he successfully applied to become an assistant chief constable at West Yorkshire Police (WYP). In 1998, he then applied to become Chief Constable of Merseyside Police: the force which serves the Liverpool area.
Following an application process which was based on best practice guidelines at the time, he was appointed Chief Constable of Merseyside Police in October 1998. However, his appointment was met with protests by family members of those who had died, due to his association with the disaster. It was suggested that he had deliberately avoided telling the Appointments Committee of the MPA (which was responsible for appointing the Chief Constable) about his involvement in SYP’s response to the disaster. Having discovered the extent of Norman Bettison’s role in SYP’s response, two members of the Appointments Committee stepped down in protest at his appointment.
The IOPC investigated the appointment of Norman Bettison as Chief Constable of Merseyside and in particular the allegation that he in some way lied to or misled the Appointments Committee during the application process. It also looked at a separate allegation against him related to the contents of two public statements he made in 2012, following the publication of the HIP Report. The core of this second allegation was that in those statements, he did not fully or accurately describe his role in SYP’s response to the disaster.
Given the sensitivity of the subject and the sense of intrusion on individual lives, the IOPC provided the affected families with a comprehensive presentation of the evidence found in relation to alleged surveillance early in its investigation.
While the IOPC was unable to reach a finding on the complaints related purely to telephone surveillance, five of the complaints around surveillance were upheld.
The IOPC also investigated each of the incidents where families suggested that police contact occurred as a result of the police listening to their telephone conversations. Investigators were able to provide family members with a plausible alternative explanation for what had occurred. These explanations were welcomed by the families, even where it could not be confirmed that this was what had happened. The IOPC identified that in some cases the manner of the police when they then contacted the families was not appropriate. In particular, in one incident where WMP officers were sent to retrieve a document that should not have been in the public domain, the evidence indicates the officers behaved in an unnecessarily intimidating way towards the family. This complaint was upheld.
The allegations of individuals being followed were in many cases too vague in terms of dates and locations to enable further investigation. However, the IOPC did look in detail into one specific allegation, where a family member was conspicuously followed by police officers for almost a week—and on at least one occasion, spoke to the officers directly. This complaint was upheld.
To investigate the burglaries, the IOPC instructed Merseyside Police to retrieve all material relating to them, from initial incident logs through to subsequent investigations, and to provide names and ranks of all officers who attended. The initial response was disappointingly slow, and the IOPC had to escalate the issue to senior officers, including the Head of Professional Standards at Merseyside Police, before receiving the material. Having looked into the matter, the Head of Professional Standards apologised to the IOPC for the poor initial response from the force and ensured more comprehensive information was provided.
This information indicated poor practice in the crime recording process, with key information relating to the crimes being recorded either inadequately or inaccurately.
Two separate burglaries—the first burglary at the Hillsborough Centre and the first burglary at the HJC shop—were recorded as one incident.
No information at all—not even a crime reference number—was found in relation to either of the break-ins at the home of the individual involved in the campaign and support group.
Despite this, the information that was available did not support the allegation that the police were in any way involved in the burglaries. Some of the recollections that only material related to the disaster was stolen proved incorrect and in one case, witness accounts described those involved in the incident as youths, indicating they could not have been police officers. This does not, however, prove the campaigner or the campaign and support groups were not under police surveillance.
The IOPC sought to examine potential explanations for the noises that people heard on their telephone lines, other than that they were a result of police surveillance. Investigators contacted three telephone engineers who had experience of supporting official surveillance during the 1990s and 2000s. They all indicated that if there had been authorised surveillance of telephone lines, the users would not have heard anything. This was because of the way such surveillance was conducted. They also suggested that in this period, crossed lines—that is, hearing a different conversation—sometimes occurred as a result of either a fault or water ingress on the line.
The IOPC also appointed an expert witness on surveillance, who had been part of the surveillance team at the Metropolitan Police Flying Squad. He was asked to comment on various matters, including the noises that complainants had heard on their telephone lines. He said that, as far as he was aware, authorised interception of communications took place in a sterile environment where “it would be impossible to hear intruding voices.” He also observed that if voices could be overheard during an interception operation, it “would completely jeopardise and compromise the process.” He could not offer an explanation for the clicking noises heard.
Together, these responses indicated that the noises were unlikely to be a result of official police surveillance.
To investigate the allegations, the IOPC began by taking statements from family members and others about what they had experienced and why they thought this could be a result of police surveillance. The issues most commonly cited related to problems with telephone lines.
Twenty-one of the complainants who wrote to the IOPC reported hearing noises, such as clicks on the line, when they made or received telephone calls at home. Some also said they often experienced a delay at the start of a call. All suspected these noises and interruptions were the result of telephone interception carried out by, or at the instruction of, the police.
In some cases, the noises continued even after the individuals had moved home or changed telephone provider.
One complainant said that, in one property he lived in, he only heard these noises when speaking to another individual who wrote to the IOPC.
One woman only heard noises when she called her mother, who was a prominent member of one of the campaign and support groups related to the disaster. Her concern was not about her own telephone line being intercepted, but rather her mother’s.
Four people referred to a specific crossed-line incident, which meant two individuals overheard, during a call between them, the separate telephone conversation of a third complainant. All already knew each other as a consequence of the disaster.
Eight further individuals referred to hearing other voices on the line. Three of these (including two who referred to calls made from a public phone box near SYP HQ) specifically mentioned hearing sounds that were like police radio or other police conversations.
In some cases, family members had some form of contact with the police, which they believed occurred as a result of the police hearing something they had said in a phone conversation.
Understandably, those reporting the issues were often not able to state which police force, or forces, could have been involved. There was also no information on surveillance in the archives, or in the material disclosed to the HIP.
Five complaints referred to burglaries in Merseyside, as well as the interception of communications. Two of these incidents were at the Hillsborough Centre—set up to provide support to families and supporters who had been at the match—and two at the Hillsborough Justice Campaign (HJC) shop. A further two incidents, covered by the same complaint, took place at the home of a member of the HJC. Because in each case material that was stolen or damaged involved information relating to the disaster and the work of campaign and/or support groups, the complainants raised the possibility that the police were involved in the burglaries. This was on the basis that they felt only the police would have found the information of value.
The IOPC secured the support of the Home Secretary to ask all police forces to search for any records of surveillance related to family members of those who died, or to members of campaign and support groups related to the disaster, and to provide those records to the IOPC. No records were found. Again with the support of the Home Secretary, the IOPC then asked forces for all information they held related to the disaster, as a means of checking that nothing had been overlooked. Still no relevant information was provided.
While this could indicate that there had been no authorised police surveillance of the individuals, it could also mean that the records had been (correctly) destroyed after they had been held for the permitted period.
In relation to telephone surveillance, the legal framework meant that, at the time the IOPC made this request, records should have existed of every lawful police interception of telephone communications since 2000, and of every time a police force applied to the Home Secretary to intercept telephone communications. However, the longstanding government policy is that the Home Secretary will neither confirm nor deny whether any individual is the subject of telephone interception.
Instead, families were directed to contact the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), an independent public body which oversees complaints about the use of intrusive powers such as phone-tapping by intelligence services, law enforcement agencies and public authorities. It has the authority to view the details held by the Home Office of all authorisations granted to intercept telephone communications and to award damages to complainants.
Police surveillance powers in the UK are subject to a range of regulations. These regulations evolved over the period covered by the allegations, reflecting changes in lifestyle and technology. They have changed further since the start of the IOPC investigation.
However, there are some key principles that have remained at the core of the regulatory environment throughout. These include that all police surveillance has to be authorised, typically by senior officers, and that intercepting telephone calls is a particularly intrusive form of surveillance, which can only be authorised in strict circumstances by the Home Secretary.
