The IOPC investigation has not identified any single act, or found a document, that unequivocally demonstrates a clear intention to this effect. However, it has found evidence of patterns of behaviour by senior officers within SYP, over a substantial period of time, which together indicate a deliberate and sustained attempt to deflect or minimise blame.
Broadly, this evidence relates to the way that a group of senior officers within SYP, with the assistance of the legal team appointed by the force’s insurers (rather than the force’s in-house solicitors), sought to show that the disaster was not caused by failings on the part of SYP corporately, or on the part of individual officers. Instead, they advanced a case that the disaster was a result of unprecedented and unforeseeable events—meaning that SYP could not be blamed for failing to foresee, or prepare for, what happened.
The following examples of this can be identified from the initial period up to the publication of the Taylor Interim Report.
The core team of officers and legal representatives took steps to control the content of the accounts that were submitted to WMP and the Taylor Inquiry, in many cases leading to substantive amendments being made to officers’ accounts, as detailed in paragraphs 9.129–9.147. Notable amendments included removal of many comments that criticised the inaction of senior officers and of all comments related to previous actions to close the tunnel to the centre pens. When WMP alerted CC Wright to concerns raised by junior SYP officers about this review and amendment process, CC Wright did not seek to stop it (see paragraphs 9.125–9.128).
SYP actively sought evidence that purported to demonstrate supporters’ alcohol consumption, including through videos and photos that showed litter which potentially could have been left by supporters (see paragraphs 9.11–9.27), and by asking officers to include in their accounts comment on the mood of supporters (see paragraphs 9.85–9.88).
Senior officers, including the match commanders, were invited to meet and agree suitable answers to potential criticisms of them, and of the police operation in general, before they gave evidence to the Taylor Inquiry (see paragraphs 10.94–10.104). In some cases, the answers they then gave could not have been based on their personal experience.
In SYP’s written submissions and the oral evidence of officers, it was repeatedly asserted that there was very little difference between the police operation at the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final and the police operation at the 1988 Semi-Final (see paragraphs 3.9–3.10), and evidence to the contrary was minimised (see paragraph 10.39).
SYP maintained that previous police actions to close the tunnel to the centre pens were solely the result of junior officers acting on their own initiative and that SYP was not responsible for monitoring capacity on the Leppings Lane terraces. In line with the way that all references to past actions to close the tunnel were removed from SYP officers’ initial accounts (see paragraphs 9.145–9.146), several senior officers who had been on duty argued in their evidence to the Taylor Inquiry that SWFC stewards were responsible for monitoring capacity and safety in the pens. However, their accounts contradicted the evidence other SYP officers had given in the 1985 court case of Harris v Sheffield Utd (see paragraphs 9.151–9.153), as well as comments some of the same officers had made in meetings following the disaster (see paragraphs 9.148–9.150).
The IOPC has identified a range of evidence that appears to undermine the denials made by Ch Supt Duckenfield, Ch Supt Mole, Supt Greenwood, Supt Marshall and Supt Murray at the Taylor Inquiry and Popper Inquests of their prior knowledge of police tactics such as tunnel closure (see paragraphs 10.70–10.82).
These denials mirrored the approach taken in SYP’s written submissions to the Taylor Inquiry, where evidence that may have indicated police responsibility for monitoring the capacity of the pens and controlling access to them, via closing the tunnel, was removed from the final versions, despite having been in earlier drafts.
Further, SYP actively sought to gather and submit additional written evidence to the Taylor Inquiry to refute oral evidence, given by non-police witnesses, that SYP was responsible for monitoring the pens (see paragraphs 10.106–10.109).
As a whole, these actions meant that SYP’s evidence to the Taylor Inquiry painted a largely consistent picture of its officers being overcome by unforeseeable circumstances, including unprecedented levels of drunkenness among the supporters. Lord Justice Taylor summarised this evidence in his interim report as follows: “the police case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk, and to blame the Club for failing to monitor the pens.”
Given the considerable differences between this narrative and the evidence of other parties—notably the evidence provided by supporters—Lord Justice Taylor described the SYP case as an “unrealistic approach” and concluded that the main cause of the disaster was a failure of police control.
Whether there is evidence to suggest that there may have been a general attempt by officers within SYP and/or WMP to deflect or minimise blame for the disaster from the police service, including by focusing on the behaviour or alleged behaviour of supporters.
What was found
• SYP did attempt to deflect blame for the disaster away from the police. Senior officers, working with the legal team, sought to advance a case that the disaster was caused by unprecedented and unforeseeable events, including the failings and actions of others, rather than as a result of any failings on the part of SYP corporately or of individual officers.
• The IOPC has reached this view based on the consistent patterns in SYP’s actions following the disaster and in response to the various investigations into it—such as presenting a case that SYP had never been responsible for monitoring safety in the pens and then removing any references to that from officers’ accounts.
• SYP consistently tried to find and/or promote evidence of drunken behaviour by supporters. Even though this was largely dismissed by the Taylor Inquiry, SYP continued to promote such evidence in meetings with MPs and during the Popper Inquests.
• This was an ongoing process, starting with the evidence presented to the Taylor Inquiry and continuing through the civil litigation and Popper Inquests. At different times, different senior officers were aware that at least some of these actions were taking place.
• SYP was legally entitled to present the force’s best case to the Taylor Inquiry. Because they did not give evidence under oath, and police officers did not have a duty of candour at the time, as long as they did not put forward evidence that was false, misleading or inaccurate, they were not breaching professional standards.
• However, as detailed throughout this report, SYP consistently and intentionally presented unsubstantiated evidence. It also altered the evidence of officers before it was submitted, by amending their accounts. Even if such actions were legally permissible in relation to the Taylor Inquiry, they were not in keeping with the Inquiry’s aim to gain a full understanding of the disaster and to prevent such an incident from happening again.
• There is no evidence that the attempt to deflect blame was related to Freemasonry, or that officers’ actions were undertaken to protect a fellow Freemason.
• The IOPC has not found evidence that WMP was instructed, or deliberately attempted, to deflect blame for the disaster away from the police in general and SYP in particular. However, WMP’s approach to its work for the Taylor Inquiry made it easier for SYP to present the case it wanted. Further, there is evidence to suggest that the officers leading WMP’s flawed and narrow criminal investigation had a fixed view of the evidence before they started.
Significant new evidence
The majority of the evidence the IOPC considered in addressing this term of reference was reviewed or gathered and analysed in relation to the other terms of reference for the investigation. This is shown by the number of cross-references in this chapter to evidence set out earlier.
However, the IOPC did gather new evidence about membership of the Freemasons among SYP officers, including from official records held by the United Grand Lodge of England (UGLE). This enabled investigators to assess the influence of Freemasonry within SYP at the time.
The IOPC investigation focused on a range of allegations about the police response to the disaster, as examined over preceding chapters. However, looking at each of these allegations in isolation only tells part of the story. It has long been claimed that these individual aspects were part of something bigger: an orchestrated attempt by the police to shift the blame for the disaster from them on to supporters.
The first suggestion that there was some form of police ‘cover-up’ was reported in the media in the days after the disaster. Over the years, similar comments have been made by a wide range of people: not only by the families of those who died and Liverpool supporters, but also by some journalists, public figures and campaigners as well as other football supporters. In short, many believe that there was a cover-up, and the IOPC received several complaints to that effect.
These complaints related to the actions of different officers over a long period of time. A range of police actions has been identified as allegedly forming part of this cover-up, and there have also been suggestions of involvement from the wider ‘establishment’.
This issue was therefore included in the IOPC’s terms of reference. In response, the IOPC sought to assess whether there was evidence, from across the whole of its investigation, of an organised or consistent attempt to minimise potential blame against police officers, and of organised or consistent attempts to draw attention to the behaviour of supporters.
The evidence, already set out across the chapters of this report, strongly indicates that SYP did deliberately and consistently try to deflect the blame for the disaster away from the police.
The IOPC also investigated some wider allegations that Norman Bettison told fellow students on an MBA course that SYP was trying to concoct a story and blame Liverpool supporters for the disaster. This was further explored at the Goldring Inquests, with two former students giving evidence about what he had said (separately) to them.
While there are strong consistencies between the accounts of these two individuals, there were also some differences, including around the date it occurred. The IOPC also spoke to several other students from the same group. Though all remembered Norman Bettison taking time off from the course to assist with SYP’s response to the disaster, they did not recall him suggesting anything improper.
In short, the balance of evidence did not support the allegation.
In 2007, Norman Bettison was appointed Chief Constable of WYP and was still in this role when the HIP Report was published on 12 September 2012. His name appeared repeatedly in the HIP Report and there were some implied criticisms of what he did in the aftermath of the disaster.
On the day after the HIP Report was published, he issued a press statement through WYP's press office. He acknowledged the HIP Report had named him but said he had “absolutely nothing to hide.” He then summarised his “personal actions in respect of the Hillsborough tragedy”. Also within the statement was a comment that “Fans' behaviour, to the extent that it was relevant at all, made the job of the police, in the crush outside Leppings Lane turnstiles, harder than it needed to be.”
His statement was widely criticised, in particular for the comment on the behaviour of supporters. On 14 September 2012, he then issued a second statement, in which he apologised for the upset caused by the first statement and sought to clarify his comments.
On 24 October 2012, he resigned as Chief Constable of WYP with immediate effect. He stated he was resigning “not because of any allegations about the past, but because I share the view that this has become a distraction to policing in West Yorkshire now and in the future.”
The IOPC examined the accuracy of the two statements he made against the evidence it had gathered about his role in the aftermath of the disaster. It found several inaccuracies in these two statements, notably related to a comment he made that his involvement ended after the Taylor Inquiry and that he had no involvement with the Popper Inquests and later proceedings.
The statements were the subject of a conduct investigation, commenced by the IOPC. Having reviewed the evidence in the conduct report, the IOPC was of the view that a misconduct panel could conclude that Norman Bettison’s actions in issuing these statements were a deliberate attempt to mislead the public. On this basis, he would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, if he had still been serving.
The third instance the IOPC referred to was during a telephone conversation between Norman Bettison and the head of HMIC, David O’Dowd. This took place after the appointment was challenged; Mr O’Dowd was asked by the MPA to provide a press release about it, to reassure people that the process had been robust, and the appointment had been made properly. In it, Mr O’Dowd wrote: “Comments have been made about Mr Bettison ‘playing a key role in the post Hillsborough events’. This is factually incorrect and his role was peripheral.”
In a statement to the IOPC in October 2016, Mr O’Dowd said that before he wrote the press release, he spoke to Norman Bettison who “assured me that his role in the enquiry had been peripheral.”
On 28 June 2017, Norman Bettison was charged with four offences of misconduct in public office. One of these offences was related to “untruthfully describing his role in the response of the South Yorkshire Police Force to the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster to Sir David O'Dowd as ‘peripheral’.”
Following this announcement, Mr O’Dowd contacted the CPS to express his concern about the charge as he was not certain that Norman Bettison had used the word peripheral. He then gave a further statement to the IOPC, in which he explained: “My use of the word ‘peripheral’ has caused me concern, as I am not sure where it actually came from. It is not a word I would normally use. I can only assume that the word was used by either Dan Crompton when he briefed me about Mr Bettison, or Mr Bettison himself when I spoke to him on 23/10/98 on the telephone.”
There are no records of exactly what was said in the call on 23 October 1998, but in his statement to the MPA on 2 November, Norman Bettison described his association with the Hillsborough disaster as “a peripheral link more than a decade ago”.
In his first prepared statement to the IOPC, Norman Bettison commented that his link to the disaster was peripheral. However, he added: “I do not say, in any contemporaneous account, and have no recollection of ever saying, that my role in the aftermath was a peripheral one.”
The distinction between his peripheral role in the disaster itself, and his non-peripheral role in the aftermath, may not have been clear to all members of the MPA.
Nonetheless, Mr O’Dowd was clear that whether the exact word “peripheral” was used or not, he did not feel he had been misled.
On 21 August 2018, the CPS announced that, following a review of evidence, the prosecution would be discontinued. This decision was challenged under the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme. The evidence was reviewed by a different prosecutor, who upheld the decision to discontinue.
This announcement was almost immediately met with protests from some members of the families of those who died, which were covered extensively in Liverpool’s regional newspapers. These resulted in a series of press releases and statements from the MPA Appointments Committee and other parties, including HMIC, explaining the decision and the process that had been followed.
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Figure 20A: Copy of front page of the Daily Post on 15 October 1998 (Source: Trinity Mirror Group)
Norman Bettison also issued a statement via the WYP press office in relation to his involvement in the disaster. In this, he briefly covered his actions on the day itself and then described his involvement in the aftermath. He said he was assigned to a unit “tasked with looking at what had happened on the day of the disaster, making recommendations about the policing of the remaining football matches at Hillsborough before the end of the season and reviewing policing arrangements for football at Hillsborough and other grounds in South Yorkshire the following season”. He also said that later on he “was given a specific role to monitor the public inquiry and the inquest and brief the Chief Constable on progress.”
On 19 October, the Appointments Committee met to discuss the appointment and the response to it. Part of this meeting was open to the media and members of the public. Meeting notes show that two members of the Appointments Committee—the two who stated they had not seen the HMIC assessment—questioned whether Norman Bettison had deliberately concealed information about his role in the disaster during the appointment process. Mr Crompton was at the meeting and responded that Norman Bettison had also recently applied for the post of Chief Constable with a different force, and that his application had been very similar and similarly focused on his senior command experience.
A further meeting was arranged for the whole of the MPA (not just the Appointments Committee) on 2 November. Norman Bettison attended; he read out an account he had prepared of his involvement in the disaster and then answered questions from MPA members. One of the Appointments Committee asked him why he had not raised the issue of his involvement in the disaster at any point. He replied that he had simply been responding to the questions asked and had not sought to set the agenda. He stated: “I did not go away from the interview thinking ‘Phew! Hillsborough wasn’t raised’.”
Having compared the statement he made and responses he gave in the meeting with the evidence set out throughout this report, the IOPC has identified that Norman Bettison did not at any point provide a full account of his involvement in SYP’s response.
While it could be reasonably claimed that covering every aspect of his involvement was not necessary for the purpose, and that it was possible that, ten years after the events, he had simply not recalled some of the tasks he did, the accounts he gave did not include some aspects of his role that could be deemed significant. For instance, he did not mention going to Parliament on behalf of the SYP Chief Constable to show MPs a video relating to the disaster (see paragraphs 8.45–8.52) or his role in SYP’s preparation for the Popper Inquests (see paragraphs 11.29–11.60). He also did not mention his attendance at almost every day of the Taylor Inquiry hearings, or the tasks he carried out as a result of this, such as taking statements from Supt Chapman and a retired SYP officer to refute evidence given by Mr Lock (see paragraphs 10.106–10.109).
Following the meeting, the MPA confirmed there were no grounds on which to overturn the appointment. Some members of the MPA have stated to the IOPC that Norman Bettison’s manner and responses during the meeting actually reassured them that he was a suitable person for the job. He served as Chief Constable of Merseyside Police until January 2005.
The two members of the Appointments Committee that felt he should have disclosed his link to the disaster during the application process both resigned immediately.
In statements to the IOPC and in evidence to the Goldring Inquests, Norman Bettison has consistently stated that he did not intentionally conceal his involvement in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster from the Appointments Committee. He explained that he did not feel that the work he had done in the aftermath of the disaster was relevant to his application and that he was not asked about it at any time before he was offered the post of Chief Constable.
Broadly, the evidence supports both of these points. However, after he was offered the post, the description he gave of his involvement in the aftermath of the disaster was neither accurate nor comprehensive. Having reviewed the evidence around this, the IOPC identified three occasions in October and November 1998 when what Norman Bettison said about his association with the disaster could be interpreted as misleading. These included the statement issued through WYP’s press office on 14 October, which underplayed the extent of his role, and the written account he gave to the MPA on 2 November.
The IOPC felt that a reasonable misconduct panel could conclude that he deliberately downplayed his role in the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster, so would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, if he had still been serving with the police.
To examine the appointment process, IOPC investigators reviewed all available documentation about it—including a comprehensive 1999 report from the Clerk of the MPA, who was at the heart of the appointment process. They then took statements from surviving members of the Appointments Committee, including one of the two who had stepped down, as well as others involved in the selection process or the fallout from it. These included two members of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), which routinely provided an assessment of each candidate for chief officer roles to the selection panels. Investigators also received several prepared statements from Norman Bettison.
The evidence indicates that, during the initial application process, there was no point at which he was asked about his involvement in SYP’s response to the disaster, and so there was no point during this phase at which he should have declared his involvement.
On the application form, candidates were asked to demonstrate their suitability for the role of Chief Constable with reference to actions in senior roles. These were understood to be roles of superintendent or above. Norman Bettison was a chief inspector at the time of the disaster and did not refer to any of the work he did in relation to the disaster in his responses on the form. The first role he mentioned was as superintendent in the SYP Traffic Division—a role he began in October 1989. There was no specific question asking for details of experience in more junior roles.
When the Appointments Committee met to review the applications, they were provided with a brief written assessment from HMIC of each candidate. The assessment of Norman Bettison mentioned that when he was at SYP, he had been a “member of a small enquiry team reporting to the Chief Constable on the Hillsborough incident”. The HMIC assessor who wrote this, Dan Crompton, told the IOPC that he had included it because he “was conscious that anything relating to Hillsborough was an extremely sensitive issue in Merseyside.” Some members of the Appointments Committee chose not to read the HMIC assessment, and two others stated they did not recall seeing it.
Seven candidates, including Norman Bettison, were invited for a two-day interview process. This included an evening gathering, where members of the Appointments Committee could meet the candidates in an informal setting. Though the interviews were structured to ask similar questions to each candidate, this gathering would have provided an opportunity for members of the Appointments Committee to ask about his association with the disaster. No such questions were asked.
At the end of the interview process, Norman Bettison was announced as the unanimous choice of the Appointments Committee.
The IOPC’s terms of reference included investigating: The following specific complaints/conduct matters relating solely to Sir Norman Bettison and not already covered elsewhere in the terms of reference:
a) whether Sir Norman Bettison was deliberately dishonest in relation to his involvement in the Hillsborough investigation during the application and appointment process for the post of Chief Constable of Merseyside Police in 1998 b) the nature and extent of various statements made by Sir Norman Bettison to the press and any other actions after publication of the Hillsborough Independent Panel Report, based on allegations that this was part of a continued effort to deflect blame away from SYP towards others, particularly Liverpool supporters
What was found?
• During the initial application process, there was no point at which Norman Bettison was asked about his involvement in SYP’s response to the disaster. This meant there was no point during this phase when he should have declared this involvement.
• Most of the Appointments Committee who decided to appoint Norman Bettison as Chief Constable of Merseyside Police have confirmed they were aware he had been involved in SYP’s response to the disaster. Two stated that when they appointed him, they were not aware of his involvement.
• After protests against the appointment, Norman Bettison issued a statement in which he confirmed he had been involved in SYP’s response to the disaster. However, the description he gave of his role was not accurate and omitted some significant activities he performed.
• There were also inaccuracies in the description he gave to the Merseyside Police Authority (MPA) of his involvement in the disaster. Together, these give the impression that he deliberately downplayed the extent of his involvement in SYP’s response.
• Similar criticisms can be made of the public statements he gave after the HIP Report was published.
• The evidence is inconclusive about whether Norman Bettison told his MBA classmates that SYP intended to blame supporters for the disaster. Only two of the 14 interviewed by the IOPC recall him saying this.
Significant new evidence
The major new evidence in relation to this part of the investigation came in the form of statements from MPA members and various witnesses, plus the prepared statements of Norman Bettison. The IOPC also reviewed other applications he made for senior roles around this time.
At the time of the disaster, Norman Bettison was a chief inspector at SYP. He was at the stadium as a spectator on the day of the disaster and responded to the emerging situation by helping organise an information point for those trying to find a missing friend or family member. As has been detailed throughout this report, he was then involved in various aspects of SYP’s response to the disaster, including the production of the proof of evidence, and compiling a video, which he presented to MPs.
By October 1989, he had been promoted to superintendent. In 1992, he successfully applied to become an assistant chief constable at West Yorkshire Police (WYP). In 1998, he then applied to become Chief Constable of Merseyside Police: the force which serves the Liverpool area.
Following an application process which was based on best practice guidelines at the time, he was appointed Chief Constable of Merseyside Police in October 1998. However, his appointment was met with protests by family members of those who had died, due to his association with the disaster. It was suggested that he had deliberately avoided telling the Appointments Committee of the MPA (which was responsible for appointing the Chief Constable) about his involvement in SYP’s response to the disaster. Having discovered the extent of Norman Bettison’s role in SYP’s response, two members of the Appointments Committee stepped down in protest at his appointment.
The IOPC investigated the appointment of Norman Bettison as Chief Constable of Merseyside and in particular the allegation that he in some way lied to or misled the Appointments Committee during the application process. It also looked at a separate allegation against him related to the contents of two public statements he made in 2012, following the publication of the HIP Report. The core of this second allegation was that in those statements, he did not fully or accurately describe his role in SYP’s response to the disaster.
Given the sensitivity of the subject and the sense of intrusion on individual lives, the IOPC provided the affected families with a comprehensive presentation of the evidence found in relation to alleged surveillance early in its investigation.
While the IOPC was unable to reach a finding on the complaints related purely to telephone surveillance, five of the complaints around surveillance were upheld.
The IOPC also investigated each of the incidents where families suggested that police contact occurred as a result of the police listening to their telephone conversations. Investigators were able to provide family members with a plausible alternative explanation for what had occurred. These explanations were welcomed by the families, even where it could not be confirmed that this was what had happened. The IOPC identified that in some cases the manner of the police when they then contacted the families was not appropriate. In particular, in one incident where WMP officers were sent to retrieve a document that should not have been in the public domain, the evidence indicates the officers behaved in an unnecessarily intimidating way towards the family. This complaint was upheld.
The allegations of individuals being followed were in many cases too vague in terms of dates and locations to enable further investigation. However, the IOPC did look in detail into one specific allegation, where a family member was conspicuously followed by police officers for almost a week—and on at least one occasion, spoke to the officers directly. This complaint was upheld.
To investigate the burglaries, the IOPC instructed Merseyside Police to retrieve all material relating to them, from initial incident logs through to subsequent investigations, and to provide names and ranks of all officers who attended. The initial response was disappointingly slow, and the IOPC had to escalate the issue to senior officers, including the Head of Professional Standards at Merseyside Police, before receiving the material. Having looked into the matter, the Head of Professional Standards apologised to the IOPC for the poor initial response from the force and ensured more comprehensive information was provided.
This information indicated poor practice in the crime recording process, with key information relating to the crimes being recorded either inadequately or inaccurately.
Two separate burglaries—the first burglary at the Hillsborough Centre and the first burglary at the HJC shop—were recorded as one incident.
No information at all—not even a crime reference number—was found in relation to either of the break-ins at the home of the individual involved in the campaign and support group.
Despite this, the information that was available did not support the allegation that the police were in any way involved in the burglaries. Some of the recollections that only material related to the disaster was stolen proved incorrect and in one case, witness accounts described those involved in the incident as youths, indicating they could not have been police officers. This does not, however, prove the campaigner or the campaign and support groups were not under police surveillance.
