The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) oversees the police complaints system in England and Wales and sets and monitors the standards by which the police should handle complaints.
We investigate the most serious matters, including allegations of serious corruption, and cases where someone has died or been seriously injured following contact with the police. We also consider certain types of reviews from people who are dissatisfied with the way their complaint has been dealt with by a police force.
We play a vital role in improving police practice by ensuring the police are accountable for their actions and lessons are learnt. Working with our partners, service users and communities, we use evidence from our work to influence and drive changes in policing, particularly on issues that we know are affecting community and public confidence. Examples of this include our focus on race discrimination in policing and on the police response to violence against women and girls.
As part of our wider oversight work, we provide guidance to help the police handle complaints at a local level. We also monitor the performance of police force professional standards departments and we hold them to account for their performance in complaint handling.
Along with His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services and the College of Policing, we assess and respond to super-complaints. Super-complaints are made by a range of organisations about broad or systemic issues that could affect public confidence in policing. We also have powers in relation to a number of other organisations that are not police forces but have police-like powers, and we investigate criminal allegations against police and crime commissioners and their deputies.
Our mission is to improve policing by independent oversight of police complaints, holding police to account and ensuring learning effects change. We use learning from our work to influence changes in policing, so that everyone is able to have trust and confidence in the police. We make our decisions completely independent of, and separate from, the police and the Government.
Each year, we publish statistics about the complaints that forces have logged. Our complaints statistics reports include information about the number and type of complaints made. They also set out how these complaints were subsequently dealt with, and include demographic data about who complained and who the complaint was about.
All police officers and police staff must follow the official Standards of Professional Behaviour. The standards that applied in 1989 were set out in the Police Discipline Code 1985, which was published as a Schedule to the Police (Discipline) Regulations 1985. For the purposes of both the IOPC’s and Operation Resolve’s police misconduct investigations, the conduct of officers was assessed against this Code, which set out the professional standards that officers were expected to follow at the time when any breaches of those standards may have been committed.
SCHEDULE 1: DISCIPLINE CODE
1. Discreditable conduct, which offence is committed where a member of a police force acts in a disorderly manner or any manner prejudicial to discipline or reasonably likely to bring discredit on the reputation of the force or of the police service.
2. Misconduct towards a member of a police force, which offence is committed where-
(a) the conduct of a member of a police force towards another such member is oppressive or abusive, or (b) a member of a police force assaults another such member.
3. Disobedience to orders, which offence is committed where a member of a police force, without good and sufficient cause-
(a) disobeys or neglects to carry out any lawful order, written or otherwise; (b) fails to comply with any requirement of a code of practice for the time being in force under section 60 or 66 of the Act of 1984; or (c) contravenes any provision of the Police Regulations containing restrictions on the private lives of members of police forces, or requiring him to notify the chief officer of police that he, or a relation included in his family, has a business interest within the meaning of those Regulations.
4. Neglect of duty, which offence is committed where a member of a police force, without good and sufficient cause-
(a) neglects or omits to attend to or carry out with due promptitude and diligence anything which it is his duty as a member of a police force to attend to or carry out, or (b) fails to work his beat in accordance with orders, or leaves the place of duty to which he has been ordered, or having left his place of duty for an authorised purpose fails to return thereto without undue delay, or (c) is absent without leave from, or is late for, any duty, or (d) fails properly to account for, or to make a prompt and true return of, any money or property received by him in the course of his duty.
5. Falsehood or prevarication, which offence is committed where a member of a police force-
(a) knowingly or through neglect makes any false, misleading or inaccurate oral or written statement or entry in any record or document made, kept or required for police purposes, or (b) either wilfully and without proper authority or through lack of due care destroys or mutilates any record or document made, kept or required for police purposes, or (c) without good and sufficient cause alters or erases or adds to any entry in such a record or document, or (d) has knowingly or through neglect made any false, misleading or inaccurate statement in connection with his appointment to the police force.
6. Improper disclosure of information, which offence is committed where a member of a police force-
(a) without proper authority communicates to any person, any information which he has in his possession as a member of a police force, or (b) makes any anonymous communication to any police authority, or any member of a police force, or (c) without proper authority, makes representations to the police authority or the council of any county or district comprised in the police area with regard to any matter concerning the force, or (d) canvasses any member of that authority or of such a council with regard to any such matter.
For the purposes of this paragraph the Isles of Scilly shall be treated as if they were a county.
7. Corrupt or improper practice, which offence is committed where a member of a police force-
(a) in his capacity as a member of the force and without the consent of the chief officer of police or the police authority, directly or indirectly solicits or accepts any gratuity, present or subscription, or (b) places himself under a pecuniary obligation to any person in such a manner as might affect his properly carrying out his duties as a member of the force, or (c) improperly uses, or attempts so to use, his position as a member of the force for his private advantage, or (d) in his capacity as a member of the force and without the consent of the chief officer of police, writes, signs or gives a testimonial of character or other recommendation with the object of obtaining employment for any person or of supporting an application for the grant of a licence of any kind.
8. Abuse of authority, which offence is committed where a member of a police force treats any person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution of his duty in an oppressive manner and, without prejudice to the foregoing, in particular where he-
(a) without good and sufficient cause conducts a search, or requires a person to submit to any test or procedure, or makes an arrest; or (b) uses any unnecessary violence towards any prisoner or any other person with whom he may be brought into contact in the execution of his duty, or improperly threatens any such person with violence; or (c) is abusive or uncivil to any member of the public.
9. Racially discriminatory behaviour, which offence is committed (without prejudice to the commission of any other offence) where a member of a police force-
(a) while on duty, on the grounds of another person's colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins, acts towards that other person in any such way as is mentioned in paragraph 8 (abuse of authority); or (b) in any other way, on any of those grounds, treats improperly a person with whom he may be brought into contact while on duty.
10. Neglect of health, which offence is committed where a member of a police force, without good and sufficient cause, neglects to carry out any instructions of a medical officer appointed by the police authority or, while absent from duty on account of sickness, commits any act or adopts any conduct calculated to retard his return to duty.
11. Improper dress or untidiness, which offence is committed where without good and sufficient cause a member of a police force while on duty, or while off duty but wearing uniform in a public place, is improperly dressed or is untidy in his appearance.
12. Damage to police property, which offence is committed where a member of a police force-
(a) wilfully or through lack of due care causes any waste, loss or damage to any police property, or (b) fails to report as soon as is reasonably practicable any loss of or damage to any such property issued to, or used by him, or entrusted to his care.
13. Drunkenness, which offence is committed where a member of a police force renders himself unfit through drink for duties which he is or will be required to perform or which he may reasonably foresee having to perform.
14. Drinking on duty or soliciting drink, which offence is committed where a member of a police force, while on duty-
(a) without proper authority, drinks, or receives from any other person, any intoxicating liquor, or (b) demands, or endeavours to persuade any other person to give him, or to purchase or obtain for him, any intoxicating liquor.
15. Entering licensed premises, which offence is committed where a member of a police force-
(a) while on duty, or (b) while off duty but wearing uniform, without good and sufficient cause, enters any premises in respect of which a licence or permit has been granted in pursuance of the law relating to liquor licensing or betting and gaming or regulating places of entertainment.
16. Criminal conduct, which offence is committed where a member of a police force has been found guilty by a court of law of a criminal offence.
17. Being an accessory to a disciplinary offence, which offence is committed where a member of a police force incites, connives at or is knowingly an accessory to any offence against discipline.
Appropriate Authority In police complaints, the Appropriate Authority is the police chief officer or policing body (such as PCC) that is responsible for recording the complaint and making the final decision on it.
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) A forum for chief police officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It was replaced in 2015 by the National Police Chiefs’ Council.
Body continuity The formal process by which police officers and others ensure that as the body of a person who has died is moved, identified and where necessary examined, all those involved are dealing with the same body. The process should be fully documented so that there is no unauthorised contact with the body.
Case to answer In police complaints and conduct matters, an officer has a case to answer when there is enough evidence that a reasonable misconduct meeting or disciplinary hearing panel, could find misconduct or gross misconduct proven on the balance of probabilities.
Civil litigation A term used to describe for non-criminal legal disputes.
CJA statements Statements are made in the majority of criminal investigations by police officers and other witnesses. They are made under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1967 and include a signed declaration of truth. They are sometimes referred to as CJA statements.
Complaint The IOPC defines a complaint as any expression of dissatisfaction with a police force expressed by or on behalf of a member of the public.
Conduct matter Any matter which is not and has not been the subject of a complaint, where there is an indication (whether from the circumstances or otherwise) that a person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner which would justify disciplinary proceedings.
Conspiracy to pervert the course of justice Where two or more people agree to commit an act, or series of acts, intended to pervert the course of justice. To prove the offence, there must be evidence of both the agreement and the intent of that agreement.
Covert activity Surveillance activities carried out in a calculated way to ensure that people who are under surveillance are unaware that it is taking place.
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) The CPS prosecutes criminal cases that have been investigated by the police and other investigative organisations in England and Wales. The CPS makes decisions independently of the police and Government.
Decision maker The IOPC decision maker is responsible for setting out their opinion about what action should be taken regarding a complaint or conduct investigation. The decisions and opinions that the IOPC decision maker can make are set out in law.
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) The head of the CPS.
Disclosure Providing interested parties with copies of, or access to, all material for a court procedure. In this report, it may relate either to disclosure before criminal trials or disclosure in relation to the Goldring Inquests.
Discreditable conduct Under paragraph 1 of the 1985 Code of Conduct, discreditable conduct was committed where a member of a police force acted in a disorderly manner or in a manner prejudicial to discipline or reasonably likely to bring discredit on the reputation of the force or the police service.
Floppy disk A computer storage medium used in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s.
GEN 18 form A form used by SYP for recording details of all sudden deaths, whether suspicious or not.
Generic hearing The second phase of the Popper Inquests, which examined the circumstances leading up to the deaths during the disaster. The generic hearing is sometimes referred to as the “resumed inquests”.
Goldring Inquests The inquests into the disaster that were opened in 2013, after the Lord Chief Justice quashed the verdict of the original inquests. The new inquests were led by Lord Justice Goldring.
Green Guide (Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds) The Green Guide was the official Government publication ‘The Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds’. First published in 1973, it was recognised as the core guidance for all football grounds to follow.
Gross misconduct A breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour so serious that dismissal would be justified.
Ground commander The senior police officer who was responsible for overseeing the events inside the football ground and the officers deployed there. The ground commander was part of the senior command team managed by the match commander.
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Britain’s national regulator for workplace health and safety.
Hillsborough Independent Panel (HIP) The HIP was set up in 2009 to oversee maximum public disclosure of all documents relevant to the disaster held by central government, local government and other statutory bodies. The HIP was also tasked with producing a report that explained “how the information disclosed [added] to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath”.
Hillsborough Steering Committee The Hillsborough Steering Committee was set up on 16 April 1989 to act as a focal point for the large number of solicitors’ firms instructed to represent the bereaved families and/or those injured in the Hillsborough disaster.
HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Enquiry System) An IT system designed to support large police investigations and follows the processes used in major incident rooms. It provides a standard and controlled means of storing, categorising and linking the information gathered by police—letters, emails, transcripts, statements, reports etc.—as well as the actions investigators took. A new account is typically created for each investigation. Both the IOPC and Operation Resolve used HOLMES in their investigations; SYP and WMP did the same.
Inquest Inquests are legal inquiries into the cause and circumstances of a death. Their parameters are clearly defined in law.
Interested person (IP) In the IOPC’s work, an IP is someone who has a legitimate reason to be kept informed about another person’s complaint or conduct matter. In the Hillsborough investigations, the families of those who died in the disaster were offered IP status for a number of complaints and conduct matters that investigators identified as being of probable interest and relevance to them.
Interview under caution A police interview with an individual suspected of a criminal or police disciplinary offence, where at the start of the interview, the interviewee is cautioned about their rights. The caution can be for a criminal offence or police misconduct.
Major Incident Room (MIR) The purpose of an MIR is to serve as the hub for the collection of evidence related to a major incident. MIRs operate to a standard administrative process (MIRSAP), which helps bring order to the information gathered and the use of investigative resources.
Manslaughter by gross negligence Where a death is a result of a grossly negligent (though otherwise lawful) act or omission on the part of the defendant.
Match commander The officer in charge of the police operation at a football match.
Medico-Legal Centre (MLC) A purpose-built centre in Sheffield designed to provide the facilities and services required for the investigation of a sudden or unexpected death. It comprises the offices of HM Coroner for South Yorkshire (West) District and the public mortuary. It opened in 1978.
Misconduct Misconduct is defined in the Police Reform Act 2002 as “a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour”. However, where a matter is being dealt with under the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, the following definition applies: “a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action”.
Misconduct in public office (MIPO) A criminal offence that can only be conducted by public office holders while they are carrying out the duties of that office. It is committed when the office holder “wilfully neglects to perform his duty and/or wilfully misconducts himself to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder, without reasonable excuse or justification.”
Negligence A civil wrong or tort that defines any conduct or failure to act that breaches an established duty of care.
Operational order A document that links information regarding an event or incident with the structure of the police response and the operational resource requirement.
Pen An area of a terrace that was completely fenced in so that access in and out was controlled. There were seven pens on the West Terrace in 1989.
Perverting the course of justice A serious offence which is committed when a person intentionally carries out an act which could interfere with ongoing or anticipated judicial proceedings, whether it has that effect or not.
Popper Inquests The original inquests into the Hillsborough disaster. They were led by the then Coroner for South Yorkshire (West District) Dr Stefan Popper.
Prepared statement Section 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 gives anyone interviewed as a suspect the right to be silent when being interviewed. However, at the start of the interview suspects are cautioned that an adverse inference may be drawn if they choose not to answer questions and so do not provide evidence that they later rely on in court. If the suspect reads out a prepared statement (or their lawyer does so on their behalf) then no adverse inferences can be drawn in respect of matters dealt with in the statement.
Professional standards The Standards of Professional Behaviour that apply to all police officers in England and Wales.
Referral A submission from an appropriate authority about an incident that is serious enough to be sent to the IOPC. It can be in the form of a complaint or conduct matter, or it could involve death or serious injury after contact with the police.
Regulation 16 Notice This is a notice of the alleged breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, served under Regulation 16 of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 (for people no longer serving with the police).
Safety Certificate The Safety of Sports Ground Act 1975 introduced a requirement for larger stadia to obtain a 'Safety Certificate' from the local authority and comply with the terms and conditions of that Certificate.
Salmon letter A letter sent to a person or organisation who may be subject to criticism when a public report is published. The purpose of the letter is to give the person or organisation the opportunity to prepare a response.
Stuart-Smith Scrutiny An independent judicial scrutiny of evidence related to the disaster which was not made available to previous investigations. It began in 1997 and was led by Lord Justice Murray Stuart-Smith.
Telex A method of sending simple written messages over the telephone network. Messages were printed out on specialist printers. It was discontinued in 2008.
Terms of reference Terms of reference set out the scope and objectives of the IOPC and Operation Resolve’s investigations.
The Taylor Inquiry An independent inquiry led by Lord Justice Peter Taylor into the Hillsborough disaster. It was a non-statutory departmental inquiry, not a statutory public inquiry.
Treasury Solicitor's Department A government department that provided legal services to central government and other public bodies. It changed its name to the Government Legal Department in 2015.
The evidence in this investigation, and indeed in other investigations conducted or overseen by the IOPC, demonstrates the impact on individual lives and confidence in the police service when the police do not act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations into their actions.
SYP’s persistent defensive approach to the various investigations and the fact that it did not put forward potentially relevant evidence are among the reasons why it has taken considerably longer than it should have done for the full circumstances of the disaster to be brought to light. Complaints made against officers at the time have had to be reinvestigated decades later. New inquests were required, and became the longest in English history, running for 308 days, spread over two years, and hearing evidence from more than 1,000 individuals. Having heard the evidence, the jury at the Goldring Inquests concluded that those who died in the disaster were unlawfully killed—a significant change from the conclusion of the Popper Inquests, which had been a verdict of accidental death in all cases.
The impact of this has been significant, on multiple fronts. While 15 April 1989 was the date of the disaster, the trauma and distress associated with it have been prolonged unnecessarily. The families of those who died have repeatedly been compelled to defend themselves and their loved ones against allegations that have never been proven and have had to wait years for the outcomes of their complaints and the investigations. Similarly, individuals under investigation and, in some cases, facing prosecution, have faced prolonged waits for decisions.
Collectively, these factors have damaged public confidence in the police and the justice system and cost the public purse substantial sums of money. These outcomes may have been avoided if SYP and its legal team had approached the initial investigations into the causes of the disaster with openness and transparency.
The Public Office (Accountability) Bill was introduced by the Government to address these kinds of issues. Reflecting the campaigns of Hillsborough families and others, it will impose a duty on all public authorities and public officials, including police officers, to act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations. This will be reinforced by potential criminal sanctions for those who fail to do so.
If such a duty had existed in 1989, it may have helped bring the full facts of what occurred to light far sooner. The years and costs of multiple investigations could have been avoided, and the families of those who were unlawfully killed would have experienced a far less traumatic fight for answers about what happened to their loved ones at Hillsborough.
The IOPC was also tasked to investigate whether there was evidence that WMP sought to deflect blame for the disaster away from fellow police officers. As set out in chapters 14–17, the IOPC has identified a number of issues for which WMP’s investigations could be—and, in some cases, have been—criticised. None of these offer evidence that WMP deliberately attempted to deflect blame away from the police, nor that it was instructed to.
A large number of Liverpool supporters have made complaints about aspects of WMP’s evidence collection in Merseyside shortly after the disaster (see paragraphs 14.55–14.94). While such complaints paint a picture of an approach that lacked compassion, they do not suggest a deliberate attempt on the part of those officers to deflect blame from the police. In particular, the recording of large numbers of criticisms of SYP indicates a willingness on WMP’s part to accept there were flaws in the police operation at the 1989 Semi-Final.
However, WMP’s approach to its work may have made it easier for SYP to shape its case and control the story. In particular, WMP’s decisions not to take statements from SYP officers, and to allow SYP and its legal team to amend officer accounts, meant that some potentially relevant evidence from officers was not presented to the Taylor Inquiry (see paragraphs 14.95–14.124).
Though WMP knew that SYP officers’ accounts were not sufficient to be used as evidence for a criminal prosecution, it continued to refer to them throughout its criminal investigation and the file of evidence it submitted to the DPP for a charging decision. This was one of several flaws the IOPC has identified in WMP’s criminal investigation; others included the small number of investigative actions it undertook and the decision not to interview suspects under caution before submitting the file.
Though these were significant shortcomings in the investigation, they did not directly deflect blame for the disaster away from the police and the IOPC has not found evidence that this was WMP’s intention. However, there is evidence that the two officers leading WMP’s work—ACC Jones and, in particular, D Ch Supt Foster—did hold the view that the Taylor Inquiry underestimated the importance of the behaviour of supporters (see paragraphs 14.150–14.164).
This serves as a possible explanation for why WMP repeatedly referred to aspects of alleged supporter behaviour in the file of evidence it submitted to the DPP and, in its analysis, focused on how supporter behaviour may have affected police actions on the day.
D Ch Supt Foster rejected this suggestion and denied that this—or any other failing identified by the IOPC—was a result of bias or part of an attempt to cover up SYP’s part in the disaster. This view was echoed by other WMP senior officers including CC Dear and ACC Jones, who stated to the IOPC that he completely refuted such allegations.
It has been suggested that one reason some senior officers persisted in these attempts to deflect blame was because they were Freemasons, and wished to protect a fellow Freemason, Ch Supt Duckenfield.
At some point after the disaster, it became public knowledge that Ch Supt Duckenfield was not only a Freemason but actually had been the head of a masonic lodge in Sheffield. This led to allegations that he was promoted above his capability and experience because he was a mason, and that fellow masons ‘closed ranks’ around him in the aftermath of the disaster.
To investigate these allegations, the IOPC sought to establish which other SYP officers were Freemasons; whether there was evidence to support the inference that membership of the masons improved career prospects within SYP; and, specifically, whether any of the officers who were masons were in a position to influence Ch Supt Duckenfield’s promotion or to protect him following the disaster.
When interviewing SYP and WMP officers, IOPC investigators routinely asked them whether they were or had ever been a member of the Freemasons. Very few stated they were, or had ever been, masons. However, some alleged that masons were in a position of influence in SYP at the time and that being a mason increased an officer’s likelihood of promotion. Others wholly dismissed this.
The IOPC approached UGLE, the governing body of Freemasonry in England, Wales and the Channel Islands to ask for its assistance. UGLE agreed and in May 2016, the IOPC provided UGLE with a list of 98 names that had featured in its investigation, to ask if they had been masons. These included senior officers from both SYP and WMP who featured repeatedly in the IOPC investigation.
Of the 98 names submitted, UGLE found 12 matches on its membership records. Nine of these were confirmed matches; there were also one possible and two probable matches. This indicated that membership among senior officers was not as widespread as had been rumoured.
ACC Anderson was one of the confirmed matches and some in the force believed he remained a high-ranking mason in 1989. This has led to the suggestion that he recommended the promotion of Ch Supt Duckenfield because both were masons. At the Goldring Inquests, ACC Anderson asserted he did not know Ch Supt Duckenfield was a mason; the IOPC has not found any evidence to support or challenge this.
Having reviewed details of his career, the IOPC has not found evidence to indicate that Ch Supt Duckenfield was promoted because he was a mason.
Nor has the IOPC found evidence that SYP’s actions in the aftermath of the disaster were motivated by a desire to protect fellow masons; there were multiple other potential motivations. Further, the IOPC has not found evidence to support claims of a broader masonic conspiracy or cover-up.
The allegation that there was a deliberate attempt to blame supporters for the disaster was repeatedly raised during the Goldring Inquests. Several former senior SYP officers were asked by barristers representing some of the families whether their actions in the aftermath of the disaster had been part of a cover-up. While some accepted that, in hindsight, certain actions were hard to justify, and in some cases even acknowledged that SYP had been on the defensive, all denied that they were involved in a deliberate cover-up of any form.
Ch Supt Duckenfield was asked if his lie was the start of a cover-up; he said no. Ch Insp Beal was directly accused of being a key figure in a police cover-up—an accusation he strongly rejected.
DCC Hayes was asked: “It is right, isn't it, that in preparing for the inquests in particular, officers under your command were trying to raise the profile of evidence which blamed the fans?” He replied: “Yes, I think that’s true.” He later reframed this as SYP trying to draw attention to evidence that involved supporters, rather than blamed them. He also rejected the suggestion this amounted to a cover-up.
Ch Supt Wain was asked about a memo he had written, in which he instructed DI Cleverly to “interrogate the system” to identify the officers who could give the best evidence about “Unruly behaviour by Liverpool fans” and high levels of alcohol consumption. He responded that he was “shocked” to see it and, when the barrister described it as “clear evidence of an attempt to denigrate the fans”, Ch Supt Wain replied: “I must agree with you.”
