The evidence in this investigation, and indeed in other investigations conducted or overseen by the IOPC, demonstrates the impact on individual lives and confidence in the police service when the police do not act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations into their actions.
SYP’s persistent defensive approach to the various investigations and the fact that it did not put forward potentially relevant evidence are among the reasons why it has taken considerably longer than it should have done for the full circumstances of the disaster to be brought to light. Complaints made against officers at the time have had to be reinvestigated decades later. New inquests were required, and became the longest in English history, running for 308 days, spread over two years, and hearing evidence from more than 1,000 individuals. Having heard the evidence, the jury at the Goldring Inquests concluded that those who died in the disaster were unlawfully killed—a significant change from the conclusion of the Popper Inquests, which had been a verdict of accidental death in all cases.
The impact of this has been significant, on multiple fronts. While 15 April 1989 was the date of the disaster, the trauma and distress associated with it have been prolonged unnecessarily. The families of those who died have repeatedly been compelled to defend themselves and their loved ones against allegations that have never been proven and have had to wait years for the outcomes of their complaints and the investigations. Similarly, individuals under investigation and, in some cases, facing prosecution, have faced prolonged waits for decisions.
Collectively, these factors have damaged public confidence in the police and the justice system and cost the public purse substantial sums of money. These outcomes may have been avoided if SYP and its legal team had approached the initial investigations into the causes of the disaster with openness and transparency.
The Public Office (Accountability) Bill was introduced by the Government to address these kinds of issues. Reflecting the campaigns of Hillsborough families and others, it will impose a duty on all public authorities and public officials, including police officers, to act with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with inquiries and investigations. This will be reinforced by potential criminal sanctions for those who fail to do so.
If such a duty had existed in 1989, it may have helped bring the full facts of what occurred to light far sooner. The years and costs of multiple investigations could have been avoided, and the families of those who were unlawfully killed would have experienced a far less traumatic fight for answers about what happened to their loved ones at Hillsborough.
The IOPC was also tasked to investigate whether there was evidence that WMP sought to deflect blame for the disaster away from fellow police officers. As set out in chapters 14–17, the IOPC has identified a number of issues for which WMP’s investigations could be—and, in some cases, have been—criticised. None of these offer evidence that WMP deliberately attempted to deflect blame away from the police, nor that it was instructed to.
A large number of Liverpool supporters have made complaints about aspects of WMP’s evidence collection in Merseyside shortly after the disaster (see paragraphs 14.55–14.94). While such complaints paint a picture of an approach that lacked compassion, they do not suggest a deliberate attempt on the part of those officers to deflect blame from the police. In particular, the recording of large numbers of criticisms of SYP indicates a willingness on WMP’s part to accept there were flaws in the police operation at the 1989 Semi-Final.
However, WMP’s approach to its work may have made it easier for SYP to shape its case and control the story. In particular, WMP’s decisions not to take statements from SYP officers, and to allow SYP and its legal team to amend officer accounts, meant that some potentially relevant evidence from officers was not presented to the Taylor Inquiry (see paragraphs 14.95–14.124).
Though WMP knew that SYP officers’ accounts were not sufficient to be used as evidence for a criminal prosecution, it continued to refer to them throughout its criminal investigation and the file of evidence it submitted to the DPP for a charging decision. This was one of several flaws the IOPC has identified in WMP’s criminal investigation; others included the small number of investigative actions it undertook and the decision not to interview suspects under caution before submitting the file.
Though these were significant shortcomings in the investigation, they did not directly deflect blame for the disaster away from the police and the IOPC has not found evidence that this was WMP’s intention. However, there is evidence that the two officers leading WMP’s work—ACC Jones and, in particular, D Ch Supt Foster—did hold the view that the Taylor Inquiry underestimated the importance of the behaviour of supporters (see paragraphs 14.150–14.164).
This serves as a possible explanation for why WMP repeatedly referred to aspects of alleged supporter behaviour in the file of evidence it submitted to the DPP and, in its analysis, focused on how supporter behaviour may have affected police actions on the day.
D Ch Supt Foster rejected this suggestion and denied that this—or any other failing identified by the IOPC—was a result of bias or part of an attempt to cover up SYP’s part in the disaster. This view was echoed by other WMP senior officers including CC Dear and ACC Jones, who stated to the IOPC that he completely refuted such allegations.
It has been suggested that one reason some senior officers persisted in these attempts to deflect blame was because they were Freemasons, and wished to protect a fellow Freemason, Ch Supt Duckenfield.
At some point after the disaster, it became public knowledge that Ch Supt Duckenfield was not only a Freemason but actually had been the head of a masonic lodge in Sheffield. This led to allegations that he was promoted above his capability and experience because he was a mason, and that fellow masons ‘closed ranks’ around him in the aftermath of the disaster.
To investigate these allegations, the IOPC sought to establish which other SYP officers were Freemasons; whether there was evidence to support the inference that membership of the masons improved career prospects within SYP; and, specifically, whether any of the officers who were masons were in a position to influence Ch Supt Duckenfield’s promotion or to protect him following the disaster.
When interviewing SYP and WMP officers, IOPC investigators routinely asked them whether they were or had ever been a member of the Freemasons. Very few stated they were, or had ever been, masons. However, some alleged that masons were in a position of influence in SYP at the time and that being a mason increased an officer’s likelihood of promotion. Others wholly dismissed this.
The IOPC approached UGLE, the governing body of Freemasonry in England, Wales and the Channel Islands to ask for its assistance. UGLE agreed and in May 2016, the IOPC provided UGLE with a list of 98 names that had featured in its investigation, to ask if they had been masons. These included senior officers from both SYP and WMP who featured repeatedly in the IOPC investigation.
Of the 98 names submitted, UGLE found 12 matches on its membership records. Nine of these were confirmed matches; there were also one possible and two probable matches. This indicated that membership among senior officers was not as widespread as had been rumoured.
ACC Anderson was one of the confirmed matches and some in the force believed he remained a high-ranking mason in 1989. This has led to the suggestion that he recommended the promotion of Ch Supt Duckenfield because both were masons. At the Goldring Inquests, ACC Anderson asserted he did not know Ch Supt Duckenfield was a mason; the IOPC has not found any evidence to support or challenge this.
Having reviewed details of his career, the IOPC has not found evidence to indicate that Ch Supt Duckenfield was promoted because he was a mason.
Nor has the IOPC found evidence that SYP’s actions in the aftermath of the disaster were motivated by a desire to protect fellow masons; there were multiple other potential motivations. Further, the IOPC has not found evidence to support claims of a broader masonic conspiracy or cover-up.
The allegation that there was a deliberate attempt to blame supporters for the disaster was repeatedly raised during the Goldring Inquests. Several former senior SYP officers were asked by barristers representing some of the families whether their actions in the aftermath of the disaster had been part of a cover-up. While some accepted that, in hindsight, certain actions were hard to justify, and in some cases even acknowledged that SYP had been on the defensive, all denied that they were involved in a deliberate cover-up of any form.
Ch Supt Duckenfield was asked if his lie was the start of a cover-up; he said no. Ch Insp Beal was directly accused of being a key figure in a police cover-up—an accusation he strongly rejected.
DCC Hayes was asked: “It is right, isn't it, that in preparing for the inquests in particular, officers under your command were trying to raise the profile of evidence which blamed the fans?” He replied: “Yes, I think that’s true.” He later reframed this as SYP trying to draw attention to evidence that involved supporters, rather than blamed them. He also rejected the suggestion this amounted to a cover-up.
Ch Supt Wain was asked about a memo he had written, in which he instructed DI Cleverly to “interrogate the system” to identify the officers who could give the best evidence about “Unruly behaviour by Liverpool fans” and high levels of alcohol consumption. He responded that he was “shocked” to see it and, when the barrister described it as “clear evidence of an attempt to denigrate the fans”, Ch Supt Wain replied: “I must agree with you.”
While the evidence points to SYP undertaking such a coordinated effort, there is an essential point to recognise: it was legally entitled to do so and to present its ‘best case’ to the Taylor Inquiry. There was no legal duty for the force, or individual officers, to obtain or put forward to the Taylor Inquiry any information which might present a different version of events to their preferred narrative. As long as officers did not put forward evidence that was false, misleading or inaccurate, they were not breaching the professional standards of the time.
In the aftermath of the disaster, SYP was, rightly, under intense scrutiny. Its reputation was under threat, damaging public confidence in the force. It faced the prospect of officers being prosecuted and the force having to pay large sums in compensation to those affected. As a publicly funded body, the force had a right to defend itself and to seek to fairly apportion blame, if it believed other individuals and organisations were to some degree responsible.
This appears particularly applicable to SYP’s persistent argument that officers were not responsible for safety on the terraces, and that this was the role of SWFC stewards, as the Green Guide would indicate.
In such circumstances, a police force is—like any other party—allowed to defend itself against allegations and put forward its best case. However, this did not give SYP total freedom to consistently and intentionally:
present unbalanced and unsubstantiated evidence, placing a disproportionate emphasis on supporter behaviour even where it could not prove certain allegations (for example, that large numbers of supporters attended without tickets and/or arrived late, deliberately)
alter the underlying evidence of officers before it was submitted, by amending accounts to fit the narrative it wished to present
minimise the evidence that was given in relation to previous police actions to close the tunnel and monitor capacity in the pens, and in relation to the extent to which the police had previously managed the arrival of supporters at the Leppings Lane end
While such actions may have been legally permissible in relation to the Taylor Inquiry, where there was no duty of candour, they were very clearly not in keeping with the Inquiry’s aim to gain a full understanding of the disaster and prevent such an incident from happening again.
There has been speculation that one reason SYP adopted this unusual approach to collecting evidence was because of its experiences in the aftermath of events at Orgreave coking plant, during the 1984/85 miners’ strike.
On 18 June 1984, Orgreave was the scene of violent confrontations between police officers and striking miners. The plant was in the SYP area, near Sheffield, so a substantial proportion of these officers were from SYP; however, officers were also drawn from other forces around the country. Following the events, 55 protesters were charged with riot. All charges were eventually withdrawn, amid questions over the validity of some of the arresting officers’ statements. It transpired that, among other issues with the statements, when officers from other forces were making statements, SYP officers gave them a standard introduction to use, which set out key locations that the visiting officers would not have known.
Between 2012 and 2015, the IPCC received two voluntary referrals from SYP in relation to allegations of police misconduct relating to Orgreave. In 2015, having reviewed the available information, the IPCC announced its decision not to investigate these allegations nor to reopen complaints about police conduct relating to Orgreave.
After this decision was announced, the IOPC Hillsborough investigation team requested access to the material that had been considered in making it. This was because of the possibility that there could be parallels between SYP’s approach to evidence gathering in both cases.
The Hillsborough investigation team appointed independent counsel to conduct a comprehensive review of the Orgreave material, to assess its relevance to the Hillsborough investigation. The review found there was no material related to Orgreave that was relevant to the Hillsborough criminal investigations or the complaint and conduct investigations being undertaken by the IOPC and Operation Resolve.
While the examples listed here appear to demonstrate a wide-ranging and consistent attempt to deflect the blame away from the police, not all of SYP’s actions in the aftermath of the disaster—or those of its officers—form part of this pattern.
For example, chapters 12 and 13 of this report summarise the IOPC’s investigation into the allegations that blood alcohol testing and PNC checks were carried out on those who died to besmirch their reputations: the IOPC has not found evidence that this was the intent. Nor is there evidence that SYP was behind, or even involved in, the disappearance of two video tapes from the SWFC control room.
There is no doubt that Ch Supt Duckenfield’s lie that the disaster was caused when supporters broke through a gate has had a lasting impact. Similarly, the media coverage after the disaster that focused on the behaviour of supporters led to an enduring public perception that they had somehow been to blame, even though the Taylor Interim Report wholly rejected that view. The HIP Report again called this perception into question and the Goldring Inquests reaffirmed that the actions of supporters in no way caused or contributed to the disaster.
Yet despite the immense damage and hurt that the lie and the media coverage caused, it is not clear that either was the result of a coordinated corporate attempt to deflect blame from the police. The lie was told so quickly, there was no chance for SYP to organise it, and CC Wright corrected it on the night of the disaster. Aside from CC Wright, the central figures quoted in the media reporting did not act or speak on behalf of SYP. The IOPC has not found evidence to indicate that the ensuing coverage was a result of any organised effort by SYP or its legal team.
Though large numbers of SYP officers have provided accounts or statements, and given oral evidence, in which they have highlighted the behaviour of supporters, it is not clear that these accounts were made purely or primarily in an attempt to deflect or minimise blame. Many were responding to a request to provide recollections of what they did and saw, “including crowd behaviour” and to comment on issues such as the mood of the supporters and their own “fears, feelings and observations.”
While the result is that officers described personal experiences that, when viewed collectively, may have supported an attempt to deflect the blame, the IOPC has not found evidence that they wrote their accounts to fit an ‘agreed’ storyline, on the instruction or under direction from senior officers.
Officers made these accounts in an unusual format (see paragraph 9.80). This offered SYP an opportunity to control and amend the evidence its officers gave. However, it cannot be determined that this was SYP’s intention from the outset. Some senior officers have provided plausible alternative explanations for the approach. Further, the evidence indicates there was no forcewide instruction to officers that they should not write pocket notebook entries as normal. Therefore, the IOPC does not view the fact that accounts were made in an unusual format, or the fact that some officers have stated they were not to use their pocket notebooks, as part of the coordinated attempt to deflect blame.
Despite these findings, SYP continued to advance a similar case in the period from the publication of the Taylor Interim Report up to the end of the Popper Inquests.
SYP arranged two events where MPs were shown a video about the disaster, compiled by Ch Insp Bettison and colleagues. At the first of these, attended by a single MP, individual officers were encouraged to share their experiences and recollections, so that the MP present could later “speak up” for the police (see paragraphs 8.21–8.32). Most of the officers at this first meeting then gave graphic accounts of supporters being under the influence of alcohol; in several cases, these included details that had not been in their original written accounts. The second meeting involved Ch Insp Bettison presenting the same video to an audience of MPs at Parliament; the MPs who recall it have all agreed it was an unpersuasive attempt to position SYP’s side of the story.
On the advice of legal representatives, the SYP action team invited some officers to “review” aspects of the evidence that they had given to the Taylor Inquiry, which contradicted or undermined SYP’s preferred account of events. In particular, this request focused on evidence given about police responsibility for monitoring the pens and past actions to close the tunnel (see paragraphs 11.37–11.42).
In preparation for the Popper Inquests, SYP sought to identify witnesses whose accounts discussed supporters’ alcohol consumption, so that it could ask, via its legal team, for them to be called to give evidence (see paragraphs 11.55–11.62).
On legal advice from Mr Metcalf, SYP adopted a “strategy” for the Popper Inquests which sought “to bring out the issue of drink-related hooliganism” (see paragraph 11.63).
Senior officers also repeatedly made clear to their legal team that at the contribution hearings they wished to challenge the Taylor Inquiry finding that SYP had accepted “de facto” responsibility for monitoring the safety of supporters in the pens. While this was consistent with the case they had sought to put to the Taylor Inquiry, doing so was against the advice of SYP’s appointed barrister (see paragraphs 11.17–11.23 and 11.45–11.46). This therefore undermines the argument, made by several of these senior officers at different times, that they were simply following legal advice.
Further, in interactions with the media right up to his retirement, CC Wright continued to indicate that he believed alcohol was a factor in the disaster and that more evidence would still emerge.
The IOPC investigation has not identified any single act, or found a document, that unequivocally demonstrates a clear intention to this effect. However, it has found evidence of patterns of behaviour by senior officers within SYP, over a substantial period of time, which together indicate a deliberate and sustained attempt to deflect or minimise blame.
Broadly, this evidence relates to the way that a group of senior officers within SYP, with the assistance of the legal team appointed by the force’s insurers (rather than the force’s in-house solicitors), sought to show that the disaster was not caused by failings on the part of SYP corporately, or on the part of individual officers. Instead, they advanced a case that the disaster was a result of unprecedented and unforeseeable events—meaning that SYP could not be blamed for failing to foresee, or prepare for, what happened.
The following examples of this can be identified from the initial period up to the publication of the Taylor Interim Report.
The core team of officers and legal representatives took steps to control the content of the accounts that were submitted to WMP and the Taylor Inquiry, in many cases leading to substantive amendments being made to officers’ accounts, as detailed in paragraphs 9.129–9.147. Notable amendments included removal of many comments that criticised the inaction of senior officers and of all comments related to previous actions to close the tunnel to the centre pens. When WMP alerted CC Wright to concerns raised by junior SYP officers about this review and amendment process, CC Wright did not seek to stop it (see paragraphs 9.125–9.128).
SYP actively sought evidence that purported to demonstrate supporters’ alcohol consumption, including through videos and photos that showed litter which potentially could have been left by supporters (see paragraphs 9.11–9.27), and by asking officers to include in their accounts comment on the mood of supporters (see paragraphs 9.85–9.88).
Senior officers, including the match commanders, were invited to meet and agree suitable answers to potential criticisms of them, and of the police operation in general, before they gave evidence to the Taylor Inquiry (see paragraphs 10.94–10.104). In some cases, the answers they then gave could not have been based on their personal experience.
In SYP’s written submissions and the oral evidence of officers, it was repeatedly asserted that there was very little difference between the police operation at the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final and the police operation at the 1988 Semi-Final (see paragraphs 3.9–3.10), and evidence to the contrary was minimised (see paragraph 10.39).
SYP maintained that previous police actions to close the tunnel to the centre pens were solely the result of junior officers acting on their own initiative and that SYP was not responsible for monitoring capacity on the Leppings Lane terraces. In line with the way that all references to past actions to close the tunnel were removed from SYP officers’ initial accounts (see paragraphs 9.145–9.146), several senior officers who had been on duty argued in their evidence to the Taylor Inquiry that SWFC stewards were responsible for monitoring capacity and safety in the pens. However, their accounts contradicted the evidence other SYP officers had given in the 1985 court case of Harris v Sheffield Utd (see paragraphs 9.151–9.153), as well as comments some of the same officers had made in meetings following the disaster (see paragraphs 9.148–9.150).
The IOPC has identified a range of evidence that appears to undermine the denials made by Ch Supt Duckenfield, Ch Supt Mole, Supt Greenwood, Supt Marshall and Supt Murray at the Taylor Inquiry and Popper Inquests of their prior knowledge of police tactics such as tunnel closure (see paragraphs 10.70–10.82).
These denials mirrored the approach taken in SYP’s written submissions to the Taylor Inquiry, where evidence that may have indicated police responsibility for monitoring the capacity of the pens and controlling access to them, via closing the tunnel, was removed from the final versions, despite having been in earlier drafts.
Further, SYP actively sought to gather and submit additional written evidence to the Taylor Inquiry to refute oral evidence, given by non-police witnesses, that SYP was responsible for monitoring the pens (see paragraphs 10.106–10.109).
As a whole, these actions meant that SYP’s evidence to the Taylor Inquiry painted a largely consistent picture of its officers being overcome by unforeseeable circumstances, including unprecedented levels of drunkenness among the supporters. Lord Justice Taylor summarised this evidence in his interim report as follows: “the police case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk, and to blame the Club for failing to monitor the pens.”
Given the considerable differences between this narrative and the evidence of other parties—notably the evidence provided by supporters—Lord Justice Taylor described the SYP case as an “unrealistic approach” and concluded that the main cause of the disaster was a failure of police control.
