Operation Resolve identified a series of recurring issues that restricted the effectiveness of the emergency response. The first of these was a lack of coordination, command and control. This was mentioned in many of the accounts of SYCFS officers who came to the stadium, but also by SYMAS and a significant number of SYP officers. The most visible police leadership came from Ch Supt Nesbit, in organising officers at the gates. Others—from each emergency service and some of the off-duty medical professionals—also took the initiative to provide some coordination, albeit of small groups, which made the response more effective.
Throughout, the processes that formed part of the Major Incident Plan and Manual were not followed. Key omissions included the failure to declare a major incident, and the failure to have a visible site commander in overall control of the emergency response.
Both Ch Supt Duckenfield as match commander and ACC Jackson as the on-call chief officer could have performed this role. Even after both have given evidence on multiple occasions, it is still not clear which of them was the site commander or who was in charge of the emergency response.
At the Taylor Inquiry, ACC Jackson told Counsel to the Inquiry that he did not at any point tell Ch Supt Duckenfield that he was no longer in charge. ACC Jackson said that as the senior officer there, he was at Ch Supt Duckenfield's side, assisting and making sure that everything was done that possibly could have been done. However, ACC Jackson agreed with Lord Justice Taylor that, by the time Ch Supt Mole arrived at the PCB, he had taken over control from Ch Supt Duckenfield.
At other times, ACC Jackson has insisted that Ch Supt Duckenfield had remained in control and assumed the role of site commander in the major incident response. Then at the Goldring Inquests, he said he couldn’t remember whether Ch Supt Duckenfield had performed that role.
At the Goldring Inquests on 18 March 2015, Ch Supt Duckenfield told his own Counsel that ACC Jackson had not offered to take over command, had not overruled any of his decisions and had not given him advice. Two independent expert witnesses—both highly experienced match commanders—said they would have expected ACC Jackson, as the more senior officer, to have assumed command in this situation.
Aside from this lack of clarity about command, from 3.35pm to 3.48pm, both ACC Jackson and Ch Supt Duckenfield were away from the PCB in the boardroom, updating FA and SWFC officials about what had happened and their proposed approach. In the boardroom, Ch Supt Duckenfield repeated the lie that the disaster had been caused by supporters forcing their way into the stadium.
During this period, Supt Murray was left in charge, having recently returned to the PCB from the pitch. Operation Resolve found no evidence to suggest that Supt Murray was given any formal handover of control before ACC Jackson and Ch Supt Duckenfield left the PCB to go to the meeting in the boardroom. It was during this time that SO Fletcher visited the PCB to speak to the senior police officer but received no useful information.
Ch Supt Duckenfield told the Goldring Inquests that he was annoyed at being taken away from the PCB to brief the officials and suggested ACC Jackson should have done this alone.
