At around 3.08pm, ACC Jackson arrived at the PCB from his seat in the South Stand. In his 1989 account, ACC Jackson said that when he got to the PCB, he spoke to Ch Supt Duckenfield, who was unable to explain what had happened, so decided to go down to the pitch to see what the problem was.
In evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, ACC Jackson said that on the pitch he spoke to Supt Greenwood who told him there were injuries. He could also see that a rescue effort was underway. He said he went back to the PCB and was asked what he intended to do there. He replied: “The first thing in my mind was to ensure that sufficient ambulances had been called and also it was clearly a necessity to implement the major incident procedure.”
In his 1989 account, ACC Jackson said that on his return to the PCB, he was made aware that a fleet of ambulances had been requested. He said: “Because of the seriousness of the situation and together with Chief Superintendent Duckenfield we gave instructions to the Control Room Staff for implementation of the major disaster plan.”
While this may have been his intention, a range of evidence shows that SYP did not follow the correct procedure for implementing its Major Incident Plan (or major disaster plan).
In his 1989 account, Ch Supt Duckenfield said that as a result of the request for a fleet of ambulances, he had become aware of the gravity of the situation. He said: “I then began to give instructions to the Control Room staff in conjunction with Mr Jackson for the implementation of the Major Disaster Plan.”
He further stated: “I asked for the Casualty Bureau to be set up, to warn hospitals of the large number of injuries, any doctors in the ground to Leppings Lane goal for deployment, off duty police officers to be called to duty and rendezvous at Hammerton Road Police Station. Mr Jackson supplemented my requests, asking Superintendent Torr to attend in respect of the Casualty Bureau; Detective Chief Superintendent Addis to attend to co-ordinate the investigation side of the enquiry. I asked for a Counselling Service and Victims Support Staff.”
Ch Supt Duckenfield's 1989 account gave the impression that he remained in control and issued a series of orders, with ACC Jackson supporting the process. However, in 2015, Ch Supt Duckenfield gave evidence over seven days to the Goldring Inquests. During extensive questioning by barristers representing different groups and organisations, he conceded that, having given the order to open the gates, he froze. The evidence of the other officers in the PCB tends to support this admission and indicates that they, and other officers at the ground, were increasingly acting on their own initiative.
The presence of ACC Jackson in the PCB meant the Force Control Room could ask for his authorisation for Operation Support, which was promptly given. The Force Control Room then issued the call for Operation Support at 3.10pm. At 15:17:01, the PCB asked SYP Force Control Room to contact the Northern General and Royal Hallamshire Hospitals.
However, despite the accounts of both ACC Jackson and Ch Supt Duckenfield that they intended to initiate the “major disaster plan”, there is no evidence that at any point SYP declared a major incident.
This was a critical omission. The declaration of a major incident immediately informs all emergency services of the severity and scale of what has happened. It therefore demands a comprehensive response from the emergency services, who are obliged to take it on trust from those declaring the major incident that their services are required. Further, once declared, it requires a coordinated multi-agency response, which should be led by the police, as clearly stated in SYP’s Major Incident Manual.
There were clear procedures in place in South Yorkshire for the declaration of a major incident, using an agreed code word, ‘Catastrophe’, to provide an unambiguous alert to all emergency services of the severity of the situation. Operation Resolve has found no evidence in Racal transcripts, or in the accounts of other emergency services or police officers who were on the pitch, to show that a major incident was declared, or that the code word was used.
The evidence shows that Ch Supt Duckenfield and ACC Jackson implemented certain aspects of the Major Incident Plan at the time the call for Operation Support was made. For example, instructions were issued for the Casualty Bureau to be set up, and for hospitals to be warned about the disaster. The instruction to set up a Casualty Bureau features as a consideration in both the Major Incident Plan and the actions to be taken after the call for Operation Support.
While some aspects of the SYP Major Incident Plan were initiated, they were not coordinated. Others within SYP were not informed that these actions were being implemented as part of a bigger response.
Ch Supt Duckenfield told the Taylor Inquiry that while in the PCB, he “gave the instructions to activate the Major Incident Plan.” He was then asked what instructions he had given. He replied: “Only in general terms that we would require ambulances”.
At the Goldring Inquests on 10 March 2015, Counsel to the Inquests asked Ch Supt Duckenfield about his knowledge of the SYP Major Incident Manual. Ch Supt Duckenfield confirmed that he was aware that it stated that the police were in control of the response to a major incident, and of the various roles and responsibilities described in the document. He said he understood how important it was to declare a major incident as soon as possible and to ensure that all of the emergency services worked in accordance with the major incident plans and procedures.
However, when asked specifically whether he knew the code word 'Catastrophe', he conceded that at the time of the disaster he did not.
In his original account from 1989, ACC Jackson wrote that, when he was in the PCB with Ch Supt Duckenfield, they instructed the PCB staff to implement the Major Incident Plan because of the seriousness of the situation. In a criminal and discipline interview under caution conducted by WMP on 28 June 1990, he was asked whether he was surprised that there was no record of the activation of the Major Incident Plan. He said he wasn’t and suggested that when he confirmed that Operation Support should be called for and that a fleet of ambulances was required, officers would immediately implement the Major Incident Plan.
There was no guidance anywhere that suggested a major incident should or would be activated automatically if a request was made for both Operation Support and ambulances.
ACC Jackson told the Goldring Inquests that he believed either he or Ch Supt Duckenfield had declared a major incident. However, he accepted that communication records showed that no one actually used those words. He said he also regretted the fact that he never used the word 'Catastrophe', adding that he was aware that if he had, then everyone would have known the severity of the incident they were dealing with. He accepted the suggestion that he simply assumed that officers in the Force Control Room would implement the Major Incident Plan based on what the officers at the ground were saying. While Chief Inspector Malcolm Edmundson in the Force Control Room ultimately did inform the other emergency services there was a major incident, he was acting independently and had insufficient information to work from.
SYP's Major Incident Manual made it clear that the first essential action in the event of a major incident was to alert the other emergency services. In this instance, it did not take place. Further, the evidence not only indicates that neither ACC Jackson nor Ch Supt Duckenfield called a major incident, but that they did not instruct anyone else to do so either. This meant that even though Ch Supt Duckenfield and ACC Jackson had recognised there was a major incident, the other emergency services were still not aware.
Officers responding to the call for Operation Support had still not been given any clear indication of the situation they were attending, and those in areas such as the Casualty Bureau had not been given a clear picture either.
This persistent lack of effective communication was therefore a substantial failure of SYP’s emergency response, and one of the reasons for the IOPC reaching the view that Ch Supt Duckenfield and ACC Jackson would have had a case to answer for neglect of duty.
During this period, FA officials Graham Kelly and Glen Kirton also visited the PCB to find out what was going on. Though there is no recording of what was said, Ch Supt Duckenfield led them to understand that a gate had been forced by Liverpool supporters. When speaking to the BBC shortly after, Mr Kelly repeated this explanation of what had happened. Ch Supt Duckenfield has since acknowledged it was a lie. The consequences of this lie in terms of public perceptions of the disaster are considered further in chapter 7.
