With a hole already made in the fence, there was no longer a need for the cutting equipment brought by the fire service. Several SYCFS officers have said that when they arrived and asked where they were required, the initial response from the police was to suggest they weren’t needed. Other police officers could offer no direction or information. The SYCFS officers decided to go into the stadium anyway; when they saw the situation, they recognised the most useful way they could assist was with resuscitation and first aid.
Station Officer Brian Fletcher (SO Fletcher) was the day shift station officer at Sheffield Central Fire Station, from where three SYCFS vehicles had been dispatched. In a statement made in 2013, he said that due to the large number of casualties, he decided to go to the PCB to find out who was in charge and to see if there was a designated area for casualties. When he got there, he was told that Ch Supt Duckenfield (who he knew) was in charge, but away at that time. They were unable to provide him with any information, so he “decided to return back to the pitch area to set up my own casualty handling area.”
It appears this was at the time Ch Supt Duckenfield was visiting the SWFC boardroom, as discussed at paragraph 5.171.
In his 1989 account, SO Fletcher said that he instructed the SYCFS drivers to set up a casualty handling area behind the South Stand, as he knew there was access to that area, and to organise the ambulances when they arrived. He also arranged for his officers to provide first aid wherever necessary. He estimated that about 20–30 people were taken to the SYCFS casualty handling area on makeshift stretchers.
Station Officer Robert Horner, from a different fire station, described how he and his crew went straight onto the pitch when they arrived, bringing resuscitation equipment. He said that he and his crew spread out among the casualties to provide treatment and resuscitation where necessary. He recalled asking “two senior police officers if those spectators not injured in any way could be moved out of the congestion to enable those endeavouring to give assistance more room to work, the reply was 'we have already tried to do this'.” He commented: “Police co-ordination and control seemed to be non-existent on the playing area.”
The on-call SYCFS Divisional Officer David Lockwood arrived at the stadium at 3.24pm and assumed command of the fire service response. He too was unable to find a senior police officer, so went to the PCB and introduced himself. He said: “I didn't receive any direction from anyone in the police box as to what they wanted me to do.”
The evidence of the SYCFS personnel who arrived at Hillsborough Stadium is highly consistent. All highlighted a lack of direction or instruction when they arrived, with police officers apparently surprised at the arrival of the fire service and having no idea why SYCFS had been called. This reinforces the lack of communication between the PCB—which had requested the fire service attend with cutting equipment—and the rest of the police officers on duty. When SYCFS officers sought to identify and speak to the SYP officers in command of the situation, they were unable to do so.
Some SYCFS officers have described similar difficulties in engaging with SYMAS teams on site.
In the absence of any direction from the other emergency services, the SYCFS officers sought to assist as best they could, predominantly by providing first aid, making use of their resuscitation equipment and organising aspects of the triage and casualty clearance response. They took numerous practical steps from clearing the pitch to aiding the movement of ambulances and providing advice to supporters. The one thing they had been specifically called to provide—cutting equipment—proved not to be needed.
