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The decision to stop the match

  1. At 3pm, Supt Greenwood was standing by the players’ tunnel, in front of the South Stand by the halfway line. In an account dated 3 May 1989, he said he saw supporters climbing over the perimeter fence behind the goal at the Leppings Lane end of the ground. Because two or three police officers were with them, he immediately realised there must have been a crowd problem. However, he did not believe it was fighting or a pitch invasion, because he did not expect that to happen so early in a match. He immediately made his way to the West Terrace, along the perimeter track.
     
  2. At this stage, he was still unaware that there had been any issues outside the stadium.
     
  3. By 15:01:11, Supt Greenwood was close to Gate 1, which was open. CCTV footage shows that he walked past PC Richardson, who was ushering supporters into Pen 1, and past Ch Insp McRobbie, without apparently speaking to either. He arrived in front of Pen 3 by 15:02:01.
     
  4. In his first written account of the disaster dated 3 May 1989, which was submitted to WMP and the Taylor Inquiry, Supt Greenwood recalled that he looked at the crowd in Pen 3 behind the goal and saw that people were being crushed against the perimeter fencing. He said the area behind the gate was heavily congested, preventing people from getting out, though police officers were trying to help them.
     
  5. He climbed on an advertising hoarding to get a better view, and at first gestured to the crowd to move back, as he thought this could help. He said that when this proved ineffective, he decided to stop the match. In a prepared statement dated 27 June 1990, ahead of his interview under caution by WMP, Supt Greenwood said: “I broadcasted by personal radio to the Control Box that there were potential casualties and that the game had to be stopped. I also waived [sic] both my arms towards the Control Box in a signaling motion to the effect that the game must be stopped.” 
     
  6. After doing so, he ran onto the pitch to attract the referee’s attention to stop the match. Figure 5F, taken from BBC footage, shows Supt Greenwood on the pitch approaching the referee at 15:05:29. He then returned to the perimeter fence in front of Pen 3.

 

Supt Greenwood approaching the referee on the pitch at Hillsborough Stadium at 15:05:29

Figure 5F: Supt Greenwood approaching the referee, 15:05:29 (Source: BBC)

  1. In their original accounts, both Supt Murray and Ch Supt Duckenfield referred to seeing Supt Greenwood signalling towards the PCB that the match should be stopped. Ch Supt Duckenfield said he sent Supt Murray to do this; Supt Murray said he was preparing to go, when Ch Supt Duckenfield confirmed he should.
     
  2. Supt Murray suggested this was at 3.03pm. They both said that there were increasing numbers of supporters on the pitch by this stage. Racal recordings confirm that at 3.03pm, the PCB sent a radio message to the SYP Force Control Room at Snig Hill Police Station asking for dog handlers to be dispatched to the stadium, indicating they assumed they were dealing with some sort of crowd trouble.
     
  3. When interviewed under caution by WMP on 25 June 1990, Supt Murray said that when he went onto the pitch, his intention was to stop the match. However, before he was able to attract the attention of match officials, he saw Supt Greenwood speaking to the referee, so returned to the PCB. He said he did not recognise that there was a serious problem on the West Terrace because he had not gone far enough across the terrace. 
     
  4. Figure 5G is taken from BBC footage timed at 15:05:43. It shows Supt Murray on the perimeter track facing the West Terrace, just after the game had been stopped. There were dozens of supporters on the perimeter track and officers at Gates 3 and 4 were engaged in an effort to help supporters out of the pens. Almost all of the D Division officers under PS Swift have given accounts in which they stated they were aware by this time of supporters being crushed. In the background of figure 5G, supporters can be seen on the pitch in front of the pens. It is therefore striking that even at this point Supt Murray and others in the PCB had not recognised the severity of the situation. 

 

Supt Murray on the perimeter track at Hillsborough Stadium at 15:05:43

Figure 5G: Supt Murray on the perimeter track, 15:05:43 (Source: BBC)

  1. During this same interview under caution, Supt Murray said that when he returned to the PCB, Ch Supt Duckenfield sent him straight out again to clear the supporters from the pitch. However, when he reached the pitch, he realised that the situation was different: he saw people crushed against the fence, so borrowed a radio to contact the PCB and asked for ambulances to be dispatched to the stadium. This call was made at about 3.07pm and is examined further from paragraph 5.79.