The file of evidence WMP submitted to the DPP

The file of evidence WMP submitted to the DPP was more than 7,200 pages long. It included hundreds of statements, over 800 photographs and was supported by 60+ hours of video material.
It was produced in seven parts, ostensibly to divide the evidence into logical sections.
- Part 1 included an overall introduction, followed by evidence from SWFC staff.
- Part 2 covered the history of SWFC and the development of Hillsborough Stadium.
- Part 3 was visual evidence, including photographs and written summaries of the video footage.
- Part 4 provided evidence about Liverpool supporters, as well as evidence from Liverpool supporters.
- Part 5 consisted of material from SYP, including officers’ accounts and the Operational Orders.
- Part 6 focused on the emergency response and included evidence from SYMAS and SYCFS staff and SJA volunteers.
- Part 7 was titled “The report”. It sought to summarise the evidence presented and draw conclusions about each individual under scrutiny, to assist the DPP in making decisions about whether or not to charge anyone.
After it had submitted the main file of evidence, WMP submitted some additional evidence. This included transcripts of interviews under caution, which were conducted in June and July 1990, and some correspondence from SWFC. The additional evidence was clearly marked as such and linked to the relevant parts of the initial file. No further analysis or report was submitted.
Parts 1 to 6 started with a commentary from WMP, explaining the nature of the material provided in that part of the file and identifying key pieces of evidence.
The IOPC has analysed each part of the file in depth and identified a wide range of concerns regarding the content. These can be summarised as follows.
- Inaccurate presentation of information: while every statement cited was included in full, there were a number of instances where WMP’s commentary provided an inaccurate summary of the original statement. For example, in the commentary for part 1, there was a reference to a steward’s statement, in which he had described “500 or 600 Liverpool fans” turning up to the ground to protest about the FA’s decision to allocate fewer tickets to Liverpool than Nottingham Forest. In WMP’s commentary, an extra zero was added, meaning it referred to “5-6000 Liverpool fans”. This may well have been a mistake, but it changed the impression created considerably, implying a very large number of Liverpool supporters in an organised protest outside the ground—which would have caused considerable additional challenges for the police. In fact, the only other evidence WMP had of any protest came from the questionnaire of a different steward, who did not provide an estimated number of protesters.
- Selective presentation of information: it was the responsibility of WMP to select what it believed was the most relevant evidence to present to support its case. However, compared to the underlying body of evidence available, WMP consistently omitted information that portrayed SYP in a negative light. For example, though the commentary to part 5 acknowledged that there was evidence from police officers that the tunnel to the centre pens was closed at the 1988 Semi-Final and said that “relevant statements are included”, no such statements or officer accounts were in part 5. It did include the written account of Ch Insp Creaser, who had given evidence about tunnel closure in 1988 during the Taylor Inquiry hearings. However, he did not mention it in his written account. The account of PS Higgins, which specifically mentioned past actions to close the tunnel, was added to part 2 in June 1990—almost three months after WMP had originally submitted its file, even though WMP had obtained the statement in June 1989.
- Confusing decisions about where information was placed. The structure of the report might be deemed to indicate that all evidence from SWFC was in part 1, all evidence from supporters in part 4 and all evidence from SYP officers in part 5. However, this was not the case. The accounts of senior SYP officers Ch Supt Mole, Ch Supt Nesbit and ACC Jackson were included in part 2. Part 4 began with an account from a police officer, and it was over 300 pages into part 4 before WMP presented a statement from a Liverpool supporter. In total, around half of the statements included in this part were not from supporters: instead, they were from local residents, shop and licensed premises staff, coach drivers and even members of the public travelling between Liverpool and Sheffield on the day of the game.
- Recurring references to supporter behaviour and, in particular, alcohol consumption, which appears disproportionate when compared to the underlying evidence. For example, the commentary stated that there was a “consensus” among local residents that “the Liverpool supporters were generally badly behaved and that alcohol influenced this behaviour”. It further suggested that the behaviour was far worse in 1989 than it had been in 1988. While the file contained some statements that supported this claim, the IOPC has established that out of the 880 questionnaires WMP conducted with local residents for the Taylor Inquiry, 120 said they witnessed “drunkenness”: by no means an insignificant proportion, but emphatically not a “consensus” on the subject.
- Assertions which appear to be based on a selective reading of the evidence. This was particularly significant in part 7, which drew conclusions about the evidence in the rest of the file. However, there were other examples: in part 3, there were 23 photographs with captions that referred in some way to misbehaviour by supporters. However, the actual evidence of criminal or antisocial activity in these images is minimal. Some photographs showed supporters gesticulating or with what appear to be angry expressions; in the context of the events of the day, it would be no surprise that some were angry or upset.
- Nine photographs were included which focused purely on litter, either on the streets or in waste bins in the Leppings Lane area. These were simply listed in the file and there was no reason given as to why they were included. There was a close-up photograph of a single beer can on the ground, the evidential value of which is hard to discern. The only photographs of supporters drinking alcohol showed Nottingham Forest supporters, which was not acknowledged.

Figure 15B: Photograph of litter, submitted by WMP to the DPP (Source: SYP Archive)

Potentially key issues were overlooked. For example, WMP asserted in its commentary that traffic delays did not affect the arrival of Liverpool supporters in Sheffield, even though more than 2,000 supporters had reported experiencing delays on their journey. In a section comparing the Operational Orders for the 1988 and 1989 Semi-Finals, the file’s lead author D Ch Supt Foster commented that the 1989 plan was essentially the same as the 1988 one, with just a small reduction in officer numbers. However, WMP’s own analysis had found several differences between the two.
Part 6 included statements from several SYMAS and fire service staff involved in the rescue effort who said that they had asked the police for information about what had happened and where they could best assist but had not been given helpful answers by SYP. This was not acknowledged in the commentary. Instead, D Ch Supt Foster wrote that “The police plan indicates they have the key role in control and coordination at the scene of a disaster” and commented: “To some extent this reflects what took place at Hillsborough” and further, that liaison “at a lower level” between services “appears to have worked well.”
Part 5 of the file was focused on evidence from police officers. At the start of it, D Ch Supt Foster commented on the fact that the accounts of SYP officers were not CJA statements and that some of them had been amended by SYP’s legal team. While it was important to make the DPP aware of this fact, there was no explanation in the file that this was a result of WMP’s decision not to interview SYP officers and take statements from them.
However, the most significant part of the file was part 7, “the report”, which was D Ch Supt Foster’s summary of the evidence gathered. It was 178 pages long (including two appendices) and, unlike the previous parts, did not include any supporting statements or accounts. Instead, it referred to statements, accounts and documents included in the six previous parts, as well as to the Taylor Interim Report.
It began with several pages of background, covering the Taylor Inquiry, the ongoing Popper Inquests and the decision to launch a criminal investigation. It also summarised the organisations and individuals under investigation and why, as well as the volume of evidence considered.
In these initial pages, D Ch Supt Foster again drew attention to the fact that the file included written recollections, rather than CJA statements, and noted: “from a criminal investigation perspective this is clearly unsatisfactory.” He offered an explanation for why recollections had been gathered—to meet the Taylor Inquiry timetable—but not why WMP had not taken action to convert the recollections into CJA statements.
D Ch Supt Foster also stated early on: “The evidence on which Lord Justice Taylor drew his conclusions has not been added to significantly nor contradicted by our investigation findings since the publication of his Interim Report. Notwithstanding there are aspects of this disaster which in the opinion of the Investigating Officer may not have been given sufficient prominence; for example, the role of supporters.”
When the IOPC asked D Ch Supt Foster, during an interview under caution, why he felt this was the case, he said his position was based on the evidence. He did not specify what evidence.
A couple of pages later, he wrote: “The extent to which the effects of alcohol played a part, the late arrival of many thousands of Liverpool supporters and even perhaps their own failure to recognise the distress of fellow supporters in pens 3 and 4 are important issues in this disaster investigation.”
This comment from D Ch Supt Foster clearly contradicted the body of evidence from Liverpool supporters on the terraces—corroborated by video footage and media coverage—that they had repeatedly sought to draw police attention to the crush and had begun rescue attempts before the emergency services arrived. It also offered a very different perspective from the Taylor Interim Report, which had stated unequivocally that “the great majority were not drunk nor even the worse for drink”.
WMP had repeatedly adhered to the assertion that it had not substantially added to the evidence that was available to Lord Justice Taylor. This comment from D Ch Supt Foster about the importance of examining supporter behaviour appears to suggest that, though WMP had viewed the same evidence as Lord Justice Taylor, they had reached very different conclusions.
This comment also appeared to echo the views D Ch Supt Foster had expressed in his memo to ACC Jones in response to Mr Collins’s closing observations at the Taylor Inquiry.
After the introduction, there was a section covering “Key issues”. Under the subheading “The Build up at the turnstiles”, D Ch Supt Foster wrote: “the behaviour of the fans undoubtedly contributed to the problems”. He acknowledged this was his opinion but did not mention some of the other factors that could have contributed to this build-up, such as travel delays or the changes to turnstile arrangements. This again reflected the views he had set out in his memo to ACC Jones regarding Mr Collins’s closing remarks, where he had similarly linked late arrivals at the ground to supporter behaviour.
D Ch Supt Foster then considered SYP’s failure to take appropriate steps to prepare for the opening of the exit gates. He described this issue as “perhaps the most important of all in respect of possible criminal culpability.” He accepted as fact that Ch Supt Duckenfield and Supt Murray had not considered the consequences of opening the gates before they issued the order to do so, but asked, “can that be construed as a criminal or disciplinary offence? Or is it incompetence?”
To answer this, D Ch Supt Foster examined past evidence of crushing at the Leppings Lane end and what SYP knew of it. He identified that the crush at the 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final was very similar to the events in 1989. However, he then stated that the 1987 Semi-Final passed without incident. That was despite the fact that the Taylor Inquiry had heard evidence from a supporter who had been caught up in a crowd crush at the Leppings Lane end before and during the 1987 game. Later in his report, D Ch Supt Foster cited this very individual’s evidence, in reference to SWFC’s knowledge of previous crushing incidents.
Regarding the 1988 Semi-Final, D Ch Supt Foster stated that there was evidence of a crowd crush leading to injuries. He also wrote that there was evidence that SYP officers had closed the tunnel to the centre pens of the Leppings Lane terraces. However, he accepted that the match commander at the 1988 Semi-Final, Ch Supt Mole, did not know about the injuries or the tunnel closure, so could not have informed Ch Supt Duckenfield about them. Furthermore, because Ch Supt Mole believed the 1988 Semi-Final had been a successful police operation, D Ch Supt Foster suggested that there would have been no need to give Ch Supt Duckenfield any information about any previous incidents. D Ch Supt Foster wrote that as a result: “the link with the 1981 problem was broken.”
Yet D Ch Supt Foster had asked neither Ch Supt Mole nor Ch Supt Duckenfield about this. He also did not appear to consider whether anyone else could have informed Ch Supt Duckenfield about the 1988 incident.
Later in the report, D Ch Supt Foster referred to allegations made about other SYP officers and, for the most part, dismissed them.
For instance, the complaints against PC Smith and PC Illingworth related in part to the fact that, despite being stationed on the perimeter track and thus having the closest view of the terraces, they failed to recognise the severity of the crush, as examined in chapter 5 of this report. D Ch Supt Foster wrote that “no one either police or Club employee, recognised the fact that pens 3 and 4 were overcrowding. Nor for that matter did any other observer recognise the fact including professionals who regularly attend matches, such as the media personnel.”
Yet some of the evidence cited in WMP’s file to the DPP directly contradicted this. Some supporters, members of SWFC ground staff and media representatives, including well-known and experienced football journalists Jeff Powell and Colin Gibson, had all stated to WMP that they saw a situation of overcrowding and distress, where there was serious potential for a crush incident. Some SYP officers, cited in part 5, had indicated that they had identified overcrowding. There was even an account in part 5 from the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police to the same effect.
Further, it contradicted previous WMP analysis of the evidence. In a report written in August 1989, in response to a request from D Supt Taylor, DCI Ross had found that “the Constables, without exception, noticed a large build up of fans in the Pens 3 and 4, some becoming concerned about the matter, but no action was taken by any of them”. This evidence was either overlooked by D Ch Supt Foster in preparing this summary or deliberately ignored.
The IOPC also identified that some potentially valuable analysis conducted by WMP during its investigation was not included in the file it submitted. IOPC investigators reviewing WMP’s HOLMES account found a detailed sequence of events around the opening of Gate C, built on some 452 references to statements and questionnaires. This was not submitted to the DPP.
The file also contained little or no analysis of what caused the build-up of supporters on Leppings Lane, which ultimately led to the gates being opened. It offered minimal examination of whether deficiencies in the police planning arrangements and/or ground layout contributed to this build-up. Above all, it did not consider in detail the police planning for the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final, the crowd crush that occurred during it or the circumstances leading to the closure of the tunnel—all of which could have served as vital points of comparison to the events of 1989.
The 1989 Semi-Final took place at the same ground and involved the same teams as in 1988. The sets of supporters were allocated the same ends of the ground. As ACC Jones had identified at the very start of the WMP investigation, the pivotal question therefore was “what was the difference?” This was never adequately explored by WMP, neither in its investigation, nor in the file it submitted to the DPP.
This point was raised by the barristers appointed by the DPP to review the file. Notes of a meeting on 20 April 1990—three weeks after the file was submitted—involving one of the barristers (Peter Birts QC), D Ch Supt Foster and Mr Kennedy of the CPS recorded that “Mr Berts [sic] was particularly concerned about learning more concerning the procedures for the passing on of information to other officers following the earlier incidents which had happened at the semi finals at Hillsborough in 1987 and 1988.” The notes included Mr Birts’s observation that these previous incidents of overcrowding at the Leppings Lane end were “of crucial significance to any decision to prosecute the police for corporate manslaughter in this case.”
In response to the request from Mr Birts, D Ch Supt Foster personally conducted follow-up enquiries and secured CJA statements from Ch Supt Mole and Ch Supt Denton, which he submitted to the CPS on 8 May 1990 with a brief covering letter. In these statements, both officers referred to an SYP file for football matches, which contained among other things the minutes of the debrief following the 1981 Semi-Final. They both stated they showed this to D Ch Supt Foster.
However, there is no evidence that D Ch Supt Foster asked to retain this potentially invaluable file to examine it, make copies of the documentation to support WMP’s investigation, or pass it to the CPS.
D Ch Supt Foster was interviewed under caution on four separate days and the file of evidence submitted to the DPP was discussed on each occasion. As noted earlier, he made clear from the outset that he was the lead author of the file and accepted responsibility for its content. He also acknowledged that there may have been mistakes in the WMP investigation and suggested that if he himself were to review it in depth, he was certain he would find aspects he was not happy with. However, he stated categorically that any such mistakes were not the result of bias.
He accepted that the decision not to take any statements from SYP officers was a mistake. He said his logic at the time was that it would be easy to convert recollections into CJA-compliant witness statements if the DPP chose to prosecute. While this may have been his intention, this was not how it was presented in the file. There, the fact that recollections would not be admissible was cited as an obstacle to a successful prosecution; D Ch Supt Foster did not explain in the file that if a prosecution was launched, it would be easy to resolve the issue.
IOPC investigators asked D Ch Supt Foster specifically about some of the information included in or omitted from the file.
On the subject of the tunnel closure, D Ch Supt Foster recalled that he had written a “considerable section on the tunnel”, adding: “I think I made it clear that the failure to close the tunnel by South Yorkshire Police officers was a major cause of the deaths of many of the supporters.” While D Ch Supt Foster did indeed write that not closing the tunnel was a major cause of death, he did not clearly attribute that failure to SYP officers. Instead, the file content concluded that Ch Supt Duckenfield would not have known there was any need to close the tunnel—a very different point.
On the subject of the emphasis he had placed on supporters’ alleged behaviour, unsupported by evidence, D Ch Supt Foster had acknowledged, when interviewed as a witness by the IOPC at the outset of its investigation, that WMP put this issue “back onto the table” for the criminal investigation, adding: “we felt it was a factor.”
During his interview under caution, D Ch Supt Foster pointed investigators to the end of part 4, stating: “I think it’s at the very conclusion what I write and say is although alcohol played a part it was a sunny day erm it was no different in alcohol terms to most other football matches in that era.” If that was the case, it is not clear why he then suggested that alcohol had not been considered adequately.
IOPC investigators referred him to his comments in part 7 that the behaviour of supporters had not been “given sufficient prominence” and that “the extent to which the effects of alcohol played a part” was an important issue, asking if these were intended to show that supporters had been at fault. D Ch Supt Foster replied: “I don’t think that’s a conclusion I just … I just think I say there these are important issues in this disaster investigation I don’t say that they are reasons for the disaster.”
D Ch Supt Foster further stated: “It’s important that they [the DPP and his QCs] didn’t come back and say I think this report is wrong or that I think there’s things in there that … the evidence doesn’t justify.” Instead, he stated that the discussions after the file was submitted focused on who would be interviewed under caution.
These interviews were then arranged in June and July but also proved flawed.