Assessment of SYP’s presentation of evidence against the terms of reference

As the evidence summarised has shown, significant questions remain about the accuracy and completeness of the evidence presented by SYP and by individual officers to the Taylor Inquiry. These questions are not predominantly concerned with the evidence individual SYP officers gave about supporters’ behaviour. Given the evidence now available, and the gaps in that evidence, it is neither possible to verify nor wholly disprove officers’ accounts and testimony about issues such as supporters’ alcohol consumption.
The question of whether the evidence presented by officers about supporter behaviour was relevant is a complex one to answer. The material considered in this and other chapters strongly indicates that many SYP officers believed supporters’ behaviour—and in particular the amount of alcohol consumed—was relevant to an understanding of the disaster. This stance was reiterated at the Goldring Inquests, where officers such as Supt Marshall and Insp Sykes stated that, while accepting there were flaws in police action and indeed their own actions, they still feel the role of the supporters in the disaster should be taken into account.
It is acceptable for a police force to present the evidence of its officers to an inquiry or external investigation and for that inquiry or investigation to consider it. Logically, the evidence the force presents will be whatever it considers relevant. However, as detailed in the previous chapter, IOPC analysis indicates that SYP sought to amplify the evidence about supporter behaviour.
This was the case with the claim that a police horse was deliberately and repeatedly burned with a cigarette. This was accepted as fact by Lord Justice Taylor. However, evidence gathered by the IOPC strongly indicates it did not happen and that the officer involved, PC Scott, exaggerated the incident to justify him striking out a supporter. This led the IOPC to the view that the officer would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct.
While some officers made comments about supporter behaviour when they gave oral evidence, information about supporter behaviour was deleted almost wholesale from SYP’s proof of evidence before it was submitted to the Taylor Inquiry. The deletion was made by the legal team and was part of a comprehensive edit made before submission.
This took place at around the time when SYP was first advised that WMP would not be taking statements from its officers; instead, the recollections of SYP officers would be submitted to the Taylor Inquiry. In such a context, it could be argued that there was therefore no need to include a narrative summary of the recollections in the SYP proof of evidence; instead, the Taylor Inquiry team could simply read the recollections in full.
The result of the legal team’s editing of the SYP proof of evidence was that the submitted version contained no details about events of the day after 12 noon (though these were covered in the officers’ accounts). To answer part of the IOPC’s terms of reference, this submitted version was not, and cannot have been, a complete picture of all the evidence available to SYP.
The IOPC’s analysis of the different versions has also highlighted that several areas of information that would have been relevant to the Taylor Inquiry were removed from the proof of evidence before submission. Details of the number of officers on duty at the 1988 Semi-Final were cut, making it hard to compare the police preparation for the two games. Also, all references to the possibility of SYP closing the tunnel and having responsibility for monitoring capacity in the pens were deleted.
When senior officers gave oral evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, they denied that the police were responsible for monitoring capacity in the pens—suggesting instead it was the responsibility of SWFC stewards. In addition, they denied knowledge of past actions to close the tunnel. The IOPC view is that these denials appear to have been coordinated or formed part of an agreed stance.
In the face of substantial evidence from junior officers, some spectators and SWFC officials that the tunnel was not only closed at the 1988 Semi-Final but also that it was a relatively common practice to do so at league games, SYP and its legal team were forced to accept that the tunnel had been closed at the 1988 Semi-Final. However, they then claimed this was as a result of junior officers acting on their own initiative. Lord Justice Taylor accepted this.
Overall, the IOPC has found a range of evidence to suggest that SYP did seek to control the story it presented to the Taylor Inquiry, about certain topics. There is a consistency between the amendments made to officer accounts, the material in the proof of evidence and oral evidence given by senior officers. This consistency was not focused on the behaviour of supporters, but rather on the extent of police responsibility.
However, as set out in other chapters, there was no duty of candour to the Taylor Inquiry, as long as evidence was not misleading. Officers and the force as a whole were entitled to present their best case and not put forward material that could undermine the overall argument SYP and its legal team was seeking to make.
However, acting in this way was not in keeping with the aims of the Taylor Inquiry, to prevent such events recurring. SYP adopted a highly defensive approach and was selective in what it put forward as evidence, particularly in relation to tunnel closure and monitoring the pens. Though evidence around this came out during the oral hearings, the Taylor Inquiry still could not make safety recommendations based on a full understanding of how the police managed matches at Hillsborough Stadium.
The written submissions to the Taylor Inquiry were made in CC Wright’s name. He was reportedly pleased with the closing submissions sent, which included unsubstantiated claims about the behaviour of supporters.
CC Wright had the authority to set the direction for the force’s approach. He was directly aware of evidence pointing towards police culpability for the disaster. Instead of acknowledging this and seeking to assure the public that SYP would act to prevent any future reoccurrence, CC Wright appears to have sanctioned an approach that sought to deflect blame onto others.
It was clearly in the public interest that such information should have formed part of the Taylor Inquiry’s considerations and not providing it was potentially detrimental to the Inquiry. The IOPC was therefore of the view that, CC Wright could be deemed to have breached the Police Disciplinary Code for the offence of discreditable conduct. This was because he permitted and even appears to have endorsed the approach SYP took: one of defensiveness and deflection, rather than transparency. SYP senior officers were aware from an early stage that there was evidence suggesting that the actions of the police had caused, or contributed to, the disaster.
By contrast, as the Inquiry progressed, it was clear there was limited or no evidence of supporter behaviour being a causative factor. Despite this, SYP persisted in putting forward the case that it was, particularly in its closing submissions; hence Lord Justice Taylor’s criticism of the police case as unrealistic. CC Wright had the authority to insist SYP adopted a different position, which was less defensive and did not seek to blame supporters; he made no efforts to do so. If he was still serving, his actions would have resulted in a case to answer for gross misconduct.