While there is no documentary evidence of the briefing described by Insp Davis, there are detailed notes of several meetings of SYP officers in the days after the disaster.
At 9am on 16 April, around 20 officers who had a key role in the policing of the match and/or the immediate police response attended a meeting led by CC Wright.
CC Wright opened the meeting by setting out his aim: to get a clear understanding of the sequence of events. Building on the discussions he had the previous evening, including a debrief with Ch Supt Duckenfield and ACC Jackson, he stated: “I think I've got a good idea of it now”, but added that he wanted to confirm the details.
According to the notes, his first question was: “Did anything happen before 2.30pm that anybody sees as significant?” The meeting notes then show a consistent pattern throughout, of CC Wright setting out his understanding of the situation then asking others to confirm it.
For example, at one point CC Wright asked: “Have we got any evidence that there was a delay in traffic that resulted in the Liverpool fans' arrival at the ground being as late as it was?” The assumption here was that a majority of Liverpool supporters arrived late; evidence does not support this, as examined in chapter 4, with some supporters in the ground from an early stage and significant numbers around the Leppings Lane entrance by 2.15pm. Ch Supt Nesbit responded to CC Wright’s question to say that by 2.30pm, three major roads near the stadium—Penistone Road, Halifax Road and Langsett Road—”were completely sterile of football traffic.”
Although these were not necessarily the routes that Liverpool supporters would have taken, CC Wright concluded: “there is no evidence whatsoever of the delay in transit of the fans. The fans arrived at the ground vicinity early enough to go in the ground but instead went drinking.”
Some commentators have seen this meeting as a pivotal point in shaping SYP’s response to the disaster. However, on closer examination it seems that several of the issues discussed—and the provisional understanding that was reached—had little impact on SYP’s subsequent evidence gathering.
Similarly, the first CID briefing at 12 noon on 16 April ended up having little impact. D Supt McKay instructed his CID colleagues to prepare for “an enquiry the like of which we have never contemplated before.” He listed some key groups of witnesses that they would need to take statements from, including all the officers who had been at the ground. However, he stated clearly that this would not start that day.
Shortly after the briefing, a HOLMES database was set up for the enquiry and the first action raised on it at 1pm on 16 April. There were 25 actions raised in total on that first day. Most were in line with D Supt McKay’s administrative focus and included:
identifying officers who were on duty, via a forcewide questionnaire
compiling lists of names of stewards and turnstile operators on duty
collecting and preserving video evidence
However, IOPC investigators identified one item that stood out; a policy decision, reportedly made as early as 7.55pm on 15 April, that “All officers statements to be registered as officers reports”. This meant they would be given the HOLMES code R, rather than being coded as statements (S). This was unusual, because a specific decision was taken at this very early stage—before any actions had even been raised to collect evidence—about how to classify the evidence collected from officers.
During the briefing, D Supt McKay also instructed CID colleagues: “I would say to you all, anyone who was involved yesterday, after this briefing take time to sit down and make some notes. Is there anyone in this briefing who has made a pocket book brief? No one. Do not start making pocket book entries. Yesterday was the most traumatic experience of my life and large chunks of it I cannot remember. I am sure it must be the same for many of you.”
This has been taken as central evidence for those who have asserted there was a forcewide instruction to officers not to make pocket notebook entries as normal after the disaster. However, as the next section explores, there is conflicting evidence around this.
D Supt McKay then attended a meeting of senior officers on 17 April led by CC Wright, which appears to have had more of an influence on SYP’s approach.
This took place after WMP had been appointed to carry out—in the words of the press statement read out by ACC Anderson at 5pm on 16 April—”the gathering and assessment of evidence” regarding “The planning and the operational decisions of South Yorkshire Police officers” around the disaster.
This meeting covered similar ground to the one CC Wright had led the previous day, in terms of looking at the events leading up to the disaster and the police response. However, the tone of this meeting was markedly different. Instead of purely confirming a chronology of events as he had done the day before, at this second meeting CC Wright challenged the senior officers present to explain potential discrepancies and prepare for the kind of questions an independent investigator might ask. For example, he asked: “Why is it with the same crowd, the same factors, what happened this year to change it? [...] what is the unknown factor?” At one point, he commented: “There was a problem and what were we doing to address it – we seemed to be adding to it.”
Most notably, in terms of some of the evidence subsequently gathered and presented, there were a series of references to the police closing the central tunnel that led to Pens 3 and 4 of the West Terrace once those pens were full.
The notes show that relatively early in the meeting CC Wright asked those present: “Go back to the control inside the tunnel. Whose responsibility is it there to divert people – anybody?”
Ch Supt Duckenfield replied: “Inspector White with serials 14 and 15. Specific instructions on the Order at phase 2.”
The reference to phase 2 reflects the fact that the SYP F Division Operational Order—the main planning document for the police operation—divided the operation into three broad phases:
before kick-off (phase 1)
during the match (phase 2)
after the match (phase 3)
Ch Supt Duckenfield’s recollection was accurate: the Operational Order instructed that in phase 2 Serial 14 would “be located in the central tunnel to the Leppings Lane terraces to maintain order as required.” However, this meant the officers would only be employed to divert people away from the tunnel once the match had started.
Shortly after Ch Supt Duckenfield’s comment about the duties of Insp White, the meeting notes included the observation: “Top of the tunnel solid with horses – that procedure happened last year.”
CC Wright then asked: “Was there any element of that control put in the Order?” No response was recorded.
Later in the meeting, there was a discussion about how SYP had responded when the decision was made to open the exit gates to relieve the crush outside. Summing up the discussion, CC Wright observed: “the control of movement of people once they were going through gate C, there was no action taken on that. You were well aware there were contingencies to deal with the filled stand, i.e. the shutting off of the tunnel.”
This comment demonstrates CC Wright’s awareness of both a key failing in the police response on the day—that they did not control the crowd coming through Gate C—and of the fact that SYP had at least one established contingency that could have been used. Further, he clearly stated that at least some of the officers present at this meeting would have been “well aware” of such contingencies. There was no direct response or acknowledgement of this recorded in the meeting notes, but no one contradicted him or suggested such contingencies were not available to SYP on the day.
The last section of the meeting was dedicated specifically to the actions that SYP should take next. CC Wright asked how SYP should proceed. D Supt McKay took the lead in responding and proposed that officers who had been at the game should set down their recollections. CC Wright confirmed this action: “Very good point – all officers at the game to make records of their recollections.”
CC Wright concluded the meeting by stating: “The judicial review which is going to be announced today is going to review the evidence that is gathered and if we leave it to West Midlands to provide the evidence we might not get the broad scope of evidence flowing in. We have to be the authors of most of the information fed in. We have to be active and find the areas where the evidence can be found.” These concluding remarks about SYP being “authors” have been viewed by some commentators as an indication of an intent to control the evidence given to WMP.
