Yet even while both were in the PCB, the police control of the incident remained poor. Though the PCB was in ongoing communication with the Force Control Room, at no point did it provide a clear explanation of what had happened. The Force Control Room operators therefore had to make assumptions in their communication with SYMAS and SYCFS counterparts.
Requests were made for Operation Support and for all officers at the stadium to head to the Leppings Lane end, but with no explanation given. Those responding did not know what they were responding to. As was the case earlier in the afternoon, those outside the stadium did not know what was happening inside and vice versa. When SYMAS and SYCFS teams turned up, the police officers at the entrances did not know why they were there and could provide no useful direction.
Throughout, radio communications were problematic, but there were other means of communication available. Despite the proximity of the PCB to the unfolding situation, Ch Supt Duckenfield did not at any point go on the pitch to make his own assessment. He has subsequently acknowledged that he froze. Supt Murray did go on the pitch but appears to have done little to assist; he did not provide any instructions beyond the reported words to PS Morgan to do whatever they could.
In short, though the senior officers in the PCB had the means to coordinate a response, and a view of the situation unfolding, they failed to manage the police resources and the other emergency services effectively.
Even by the time they left the PCB, they had still not provided the Force Control Room or other locations with clear information about what had actually happened. This inevitably hampered the efforts of those involved with attempting to assist traumatised supporters and the families and friends of those who were injured, missing or who had already died. This is the focus of chapter 6.
