One of the significant changes in the SYP plans for the 1989 Semi-Final related to a change in personnel in key roles. At the 1988 game, Supt Greenwood had been the commander of sector 2, covering the arrival of Liverpool supporters and the Leppings Lane entrance. Supt Marshall had been the sector 1 commander.
For the 1989 Semi-Final, their roles were reversed. In evidence to the Popper Inquests, Supt Marshall said he had asked for the change in roles. Ch Supt Mole indicated it was his decision to switch them, to reflect the fact that Supt Marshall had regularly supervised the area outside the Leppings Lane end that season.
Ch Supt Duckenfield has confirmed he knew that Supt Marshall had not performed the role of sector 2 commander at previous semi-finals, but he said he was not aware, at the time, that the two had switched roles.
On the day of the disaster Supt Marshall assumed command of Serials 16 to 19 of sector 1, who were stationed on the outer concourse, in addition to his sector 2 responsibilities.
Both Supt Marshall and Supt Greenwood later acknowledged that this was in contravention of the F Division Operational Order. They separately explained that it was a result of their combined working experience at the 1987 and 1988 FA Cup Semi-Finals, through which both had recognised that the sector 2 commander (outside the stadium) was better placed to manage the police officers on the outer concourse prior to kick-off.
Operation Resolve has found no evidence that either Supt Marshall or Supt Greenwood reported any concern about the sector 1 commander’s difficulty in being able to manage the outer concourse as part of the debrief process following the 1988 FA Cup Semi-Final or as part of the planning process for the 1989 fixture. Nor is there any evidence that they informed Ch Supt Duckenfield of the change to command arrangements for Serials 16–19 of sector 1.
Similarly, the head of the SYP Mounted Section, Inspector Paul Hand-Davis, stated that he amended the deployment of his officers from that set out in the Operational Order, based on his own experience and knowledge of trouble spots. There is no indication that these amendments were communicated to Ch Supt Duckenfield or the PCB.
These changes highlight a lack of precision and rigour in the process, as well as a lack of coordination between the different divisions and senior officers.
Operation Resolve identified that this lack of precision extended to other issues. For example, SYP aimed to encourage supporters to arrive at the stadium as early as possible. It made announcements on local radio stations in Sheffield, Liverpool and Nottingham and published articles in local newspapers and match programmes of the competing clubs. Letters were sent to coach companies encouraging them to arrive in Sheffield early, stating that the turnstiles would be open from 11am and that pre-match entertainment and refreshments would be available inside the ground.
Yet according to the Operational Order, the turnstiles were not due to open until 12 noon and no pre-match entertainment was provided. This inconsistency resulted in arrangements having to be made at the last minute to deal with the arrival of supporters before the turnstiles opened.
More significantly, there was also a substantial reduction in the number of officers on duty. In 1988, there had been 901 staff identified on the “schedule of manpower” (a single list of the officers on duty) in the F Division Operational Order, but in 1989 there were 729 on the equivalent list. This equated to a total reduction in staff of 19%.
This was therefore a substantially greater reduction than the 10% requested by Ch Supt Mole at the start of the planning process. There is nothing to suggest that SYP recognised this or revisited officer numbers as part of its planning.
Operation Resolve further analysed staffing levels in the schedule of manpower by operational sector. This showed that the reduction in sector 2, the area covering the arrival of Liverpool supporters, was 21.6% compared to 1988. By contrast, the reduction in sector 3, covering the arrival of Nottingham Forest supporters, was 14.5%.
Although these reductions appear significant, policing expert Mr Hopkins was of the view that SYP had allocated ample resources for policing a semi-final—as long as they were deployed and managed effectively.
Other changes in the F Division Operational Order for 1989 included the decision not to use a fixed-wing aircraft or ‘spotter plane’, even though some sources indicated it had been invaluable in 1988 in identifying potential traffic issues.
