The various alterations to Hillsborough Stadium should have resulted in a review of the Safety Certificate and its terms and conditions, but did not. However, from 1986, work began to review the conditions of the Safety Certificate, both by SCC and, separately, Eastwood & Partners on behalf of SWFC.
However, by the time of the 1989 Semi-Final, this had only resulted in revised draft conditions being presented for consideration by the SSGAG. The revised version contained the same capacity figures as the original Safety Certificate, with the exception of the capacity for the Spion Kop, which had been revised upwards to 21,000 following work to extend it. SWFC and Eastwood & Partners had requested this upward revision, which increased the overall capacity of the stadium from 50,174 in the original Safety Certificate, to over 54,000.
In 1987, SWFC specifically asked Eastwood & Partners' advice as to the capacity of the West Terrace in light of all of the alterations that had taken place over the years. Eastwood & Partners advised that there was no need to change the capacity of 10,100.
In June 1986, Insp Calvert sent the newly appointed SYP match commander, Chief Superintendent Brian Mole (Ch Supt Mole) a summary of officers' suggestions for improving policing at Hillsborough Stadium. One issue he raised was that some of the crush barriers on the West Terrace caused congestion as supporters entered the centre pens from the central tunnel. He raised the concern that similar problems could occur with getting into the tunnel if an emergency evacuation was needed.
The primary cause of concern was barrier 144, a 7.625m-wide barrier consisting of three parts, located directly in front of the central tunnel. In evidence to the Taylor Inquiry in 1989, Insp Calvert explained that “the barrier was right across the entrance to the tunnel and the fans got to the barrier and stopped and we would have a build-up right back up the tunnel, fans would not move out and we could not control what was happening.”
He and some colleagues felt that the West Terrace would be safer if the crush barrier was removed, or at least partially removed. After discussion with senior officers, it was agreed to propose this at the next OWP meeting, where after initial reservations by some members, it was agreed to remove parts of barrier 144.
In a statement from 1990, the surveyor from South Yorkshire County Council (SYCC), who was part of the OWP, recalled this and said he had agreed with the proposal. However, he noted two key points. Firstly, he understood that the police would be present near the tunnel entrance and would work to keep the area clear of supporters. Secondly, he suggested marking out a ‘sterile area’ in front of the central tunnel mouth that should be kept clear of spectators at all times.
Two parts of the barrier were removed as proposed and yellow markings painted on the floor to mark the sterile area. These markings are just visible either side of the radial fence in figure 2H, which was taken after the disaster. However, no evidence has been found that either SYP or SWFC managed the sterile area at the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final or took steps to prevent supporters standing there.
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Figure 2H: The location of barrier 144 and the central tunnel, April 1989 (Source: Philip Rich, SYP)
In his first report, Mr Cutlack commented: “Clearly, it was intended that the removal of part of barrier 144 was to have a beneficial effect on safety however in my opinion the reverse was true.” He explained that “The removal of this barrier created an un-obstructed path for a crowd surge in the tunnel” and added: “In my opinion EP [Eastwood & Partners] should have resisted this alteration and advised the Club and the Police of the likely implications of removing Barrier 144.”
On the day of the disaster, a crush barrier in Pen 3 collapsed. This has been identified as one of the key moments in the disaster. The evidence does not suggest that the removal of barrier 144 had any direct effect on the barrier that collapsed.
In his report, Mr Cutlack explained that during the crush, barrier 124A was subjected to a pressure greater than it had been designed to withstand, as a result of three factors:
crowd density
the depth of the crowd behind the barrier
the fact that barrier 136 (higher up the terrace) was substantially lower than recommended, resulting in the crowd behind this barrier exerting a greater forward pressure
However, he did not believe that the removal of barrier 144 could have had any impact on barrier 124A, because the additional pressure on barrier 124A came from an area outside of where barrier 144 had been.
Around this same period, there was also discussion between SYP and SWFC about changing the turnstile configuration at the Leppings Lane end. This occurred after SWFC returned to the top division and had larger numbers of away supporters at its games. SYP found it harder to keep these away supporters segregated from the home supporters accessing the Leppings Lane turnstiles. Figure 2F shows the layout at the time, which required barriers to separate opposing supporters.
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Figure 2F: Drawing of Leppings Lane entrance layout as it was in 1985 (Source: Eastwood & Partners)
Inspector Clive Calvert (Insp Calvert), who regularly policed the Leppings Lane end in this period, proposed that the whole of the Leppings Lane turnstiles, which were then in a crescent shape, should be demolished and replaced with new ones parallel to and near the rear of the stand. These new turnstiles would then offer direct access to individual pens and to the stands—meaning opposing supporters could be separated earlier. They would also have separate toilets and food and drink facilities, to avoid potential conflict. Senior officers agreed that this proposal should be discussed with SWFC, and the main match commander at the time wrote to the SWFC Secretary, Richard Chester, setting out SYP’s suggestions.
Mr Chester discussed these with Dr Eastwood, and they agreed an alternative proposal, which would require less work but still offer complete segregation of opposing supporters. It involved adding six new turnstiles but not changing the entire layout.
This was discussed further at an OWP meeting, and SYP accepted the proposals, subject to a few additional recommendations. The design was revised and by the end of April a clear plan was in place, as shown in figure 2G. This would have resulted in 30 turnstiles rather than the 23 which existed at the time. Each block of turnstiles was also clearly aligned with a specific area of the stadium; for example, on the far left, turnstiles 28 to 30 would have offered access only to the south pen of the West Terrace.
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Figure 2G: Drawing of proposed modification to Leppings Lane entrance (Source: Eastwood & Partners)
In his first report, Mr Cutlack commented that if this plan had been implemented “it is quite possible that the events of 15th April 1989 would not have occurred with the same consequence.” As well as having more turnstiles available, which would have made a crush outside less likely, he noted that the plan would have enabled better use to be made of turnstile count data. Because the banks of turnstiles would have been directly linked to specific areas, the data would have shown the numbers of spectators that had been admitted into each area. When an area reached capacity, the associated turnstiles would simply have been closed.
SWFC asked Dr Eastwood to provide an estimated cost for the work. At a board meeting on 2 May 1985, SWFC directors rejected the proposal as too expensive. A few days later, the Bradford fire occurred (see paragraph 2.8) in a wooden stand. Even before the investigation was complete, football clubs realised that they would need to fund fire safety improvements; SWFC was no exception.
There was further discussion between Eastwood & Partners and SWFC, and in August 1985, a revised plan was implemented. This involved no increase to the number of turnstiles but allocated each bank of turnstiles to a specific area of the stadium, to assist with segregation. Under this plan, there were seven turnstiles allocated to the terraces, eight to the North Stand and six to the West Stand.
Mr Cutlack commented that these alterations “resulted in it being more likely that over-crowding would occur outside the turnstiles because fewer turnstiles were allocated to the West Terrace.” He added: “This was reasonably foreseeable by any competent party.”
Once again, the changes to the turnstile layout should have resulted in a review of the Safety Certificate; they did not.
In the summer of 1985, Eastwood & Partners installed two additional radial fences on the West Terrace. One radial fence extended from the mouth of the central tunnel to the perimeter fence, dividing the existing centre pen into what became Pen 3 and Pen 4. The second fence was installed parallel to an existing one, to create a 2m-wide corridor, referred to as Pen 5. This was for police use.
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Figure 2E: Digital reconstruction of the West Terrace layout in 1985, following the installation of two further radial fences (Source: R2S)
The evidence tends to suggest that Eastwood & Partners installed these as part of a general review of the layout of the Leppings Lane end and arrangements for segregation of supporters, initiated at the request of SYP.
In his report, Mr Cutlack made clear that, following the installation of these additional fences, the capacity of the West Terrace should have been recalculated based on the revised capacity of the individual pens, rather than considered as a whole. He calculated that the changes that created Pen 5 reduced the combined capacity of Pen 3 and Pen 4 by approximately 26.5m2, meaning that capacity should therefore have been reduced by a further 143.
He also highlighted that the installation of the radial fences should have resulted in a requirement for amendments to be made to the existing Safety Certificate.
On 11 April 1981, Hillsborough Stadium hosted the FA Cup Semi-Final between Tottenham Hotspur and Wolverhampton Wanderers. The game was attended by over 50,000 spectators.
Just after kick-off, a crushing incident took place on the West Terrace near the PCB. SWFC received reports that 38 people sustained injuries. SJA treated 30 supporters on site for minor injuries. Eight people were taken to hospital; three had broken limbs and two required stitches.
Following the match, SYP held an internal debrief, where senior SYP officers expressed concerns about the layout of the Leppings Lane terraces (the West Terrace and North West Terrace). Assistant Chief Constable Robert Goslin felt that, to assist with crowd control, the terraces required more divisions into separate pens, so that the supporters were not in such a solid mass. He also suggested that the permitted capacity of 10,100 for the two terraces was too high.
SYP followed this up with SWFC. Chief Superintendent Robin Herold (Ch Supt Herold), who had been the match commander for the 1981 FA Cup Semi-Final, had a meeting with Eric England, the Secretary of SWFC at the time. He explained SYP's concerns and the proposal that the terrace should be divided into pens. According to Ch Supt Herold’s notes, Mr England disagreed with the view that the capacity was too high and suggested that, instead of fixed fences, portable barriers could be used to assist with crowd control.
SYP persisted, and the then Chief Constable wrote to the SWFC Chairman, reiterating SYP’s concerns and recommending that the issues should be discussed with the local authority.
The OWP visited Hillsborough Stadium on 8 June 1981. Meeting minutes recorded that SWFC, together with SYP, were considering revising arrangements on the West Terrace. By early September, Dr Eastwood had been instructed by SWFC to arrange the installation of two fences on the West Terrace, to divide it into three approximately equal sections, each with its own entrance. This would allow parts of the terrace to be used by supporters of SWFC at home league games, with a smaller area allocated to away supporters, separated by the fences.
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Figure 2C: 3D model of the West Terrace layout in 1981, following the installation of two radial fences (Source: Operation Resolve, based on image produced by Return 2 Scene LTD (R2S))
There was to be a gate at the top of each fence, which could be either locked shut or secured against the back wall, allowing people to move between pens. The latter option would only be considered if the whole terrace was allocated to supporters of the same team.
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Figure 2D: Example of gates in radial fence (Source: Dennis Bond, SYP)
According to Dr Eastwood and an SYCFS officer who regularly attended the OWP, if the gates were open, this would be under police control. SYP officers have disputed this and said they had no responsibility for managing the gates.
The plan was approved by the local authority on 14 September 1981, and the fences were installed in October and November that year. Subsequent documents indicate that SYP was largely happy with the new arrangements.
Following a change to the terrace such as this, the capacity should have been formally reassessed. There is no evidence that it was.
