On the day the Taylor Interim Report was published, CC Wright wrote to the DPP to ask him to consider the question of criminal offences arising from the disaster. Over the following days, a series of conversations ensued, that led, on 8 August 1989, to CC Wright asking ACC Jones if WMP would undertake a criminal investigation. ACC Jones provisionally accepted this task, and the linked work for a police disciplinary investigation, on the basis that WMP saw these tasks as connected. On 16 August, WMP issued a press release confirming that it had been asked to “undertake a full criminal inquiry into all the circumstances that surrounded the events at Hillsborough on 15 April 1989.”
However, WMP did not immediately start work, even though members of the DPP’s team indicated they would like that to happen. This was due to questions around how the criminal investigation would be funded.
Following extensive correspondence involving the chief constables of both forces and the respective police authorities, on 27 September 1989 these financial issues were finally resolved. The South Yorkshire Police Authority (SYPA) agreed to reimburse WMP for its work, with no limit placed on the costs; the SYPA itself would subsequently be reimbursed by the Home Office. With this confirmed, WMP officially began the investigation.
The IOPC’s terms of reference included investigating: The conduct of officers involved in WMP’s investigations. This will include:
a) the involvement of WMP in the decisions taken about how to gather evidence/obtain witness accounts b) whether police officers involved in this investigation put inappropriate pressure on any witnesses to alter their accounts or influence the content of those accounts c) whether the summaries of evidence WMP presented at the individual inquests were accurate d) whether there is any evidence of bias in favour of SYP on the part of those involved in or leading the investigation e) whether any accounts provided were deliberately lost, inaccurately recorded, amended, or mishandled (including not following up on key witnesses) f) investigating other recorded complaints or conduct matters about the actions of WMP in the gathering or presenting of evidence
This chapter focuses on the criminal investigation WMP carried out in relation to the Hillsborough disaster.
What was found?
• WMP completed just 76 actions related to lines of enquiry for the criminal investigation: a very small number for a major manslaughter investigation.
• Only ten actions were raised in relation to lines of enquiry into the opening of the exit gates at the Leppings Lane end—which the Taylor Interim Report had described as “a blunder of the first magnitude.” Just two of these actions related directly to Gate C and only one of these was completed.
• The IOPC identified 37 potentially key witnesses that WMP did not approach or take statements from as part of its criminal investigation, including SWFC directors, representatives from Eastwood & Partners or SCC employees. All three organisations were under investigation for manslaughter. In addition, it did not initially interview the senior SYP officers who had been on duty.
• Though senior detectives had raised the issue that the SYP officer accounts submitted to the Taylor Inquiry had been amended and were not admissible as evidence for a criminal prosecution, WMP still did not take statements from officers and continued to rely on the SYP accounts.
• Further, in the file of evidence WMP submitted to the DPP for charging decisions, the lead author specifically highlighted that the accounts were not suitable for a criminal investigation—without acknowledging that WMP alone could have addressed that.
• The file of evidence did not accurately reflect the evidence that WMP had at its disposal. This was particularly notable in relation to the impact of traffic delays on supporters’ arrival times and the claim that there was a “consensus” among local residents that the behaviour of supporters at the 1989 Semi-Final was much worse than it had been at the 1988 game.
• In the section of the file where D Ch Supt Foster analysed the evidence submitted, he included repeated references to the behaviour of supporters and how much alcohol had been consumed, and indicated this was a mitigating factor in what had happened.
• When WMP did, belatedly, interview the suspects, the interviews did not meet the expected professional standards of the day.
Significant new evidence
ACC Jones’s policy books were a major source of previously unavailable evidence about WMP’s criminal investigation.
To assist with the review of WMP’s suspect interviews, the IOPC commissioned an expert in police investigative interviewing to review the interview transcripts using a methodology called the Griffiths Question Map.
After the Taylor Interim Report was published on 4 August 1989, strongly criticising SYP, CC Wright asked WMP to undertake a criminal investigation into the disaster. WMP was formally appointed to the task on 16 August 1989, with manslaughter the main offence under consideration. As well as SYP, three other organisations and their staff were under investigation: SWFC, Eastwood & Partners and SCC.
On 30 March 1990, WMP submitted a file of evidence to the DPP. This included the analysis by D Ch Supt Foster of whether there was sufficient evidence to justify bringing charges of manslaughter in relation to the disaster.
On 30 August 1990, the DPP announced that no criminal charges would be laid against any person or organisation.
WMP’s criminal investigation has not previously been re-examined in depth. However, the HIP Report included various observations on the file of evidence WMP had submitted to the DPP—in particular suggesting that it put “the issues of drunkenness and ticketless fans… back on the agenda.”
As part of its wider investigation into the work of WMP, the IOPC sought to re-examine WMP’s criminal investigation. It considered the overall quality and professionalism of the criminal investigation that WMP conducted, comparing it to the standards that would have been expected at the time and assessing whether there was any evidence of bias towards fellow police officers.
On 13 July, Counsel to the Inquiry Mr Collins gave his final observations. These began with some highly complimentary remarks on WMP’s “immense effort in interviewing witnesses and collecting the necessary evidence and in producing for us, often at very short notice, exceedingly helpful reports and summaries of their enquiries.”
Mr Collins then provided a summary of the evidence heard, expressing views on issues such as failings around stadium safety and the fact that Ch Supt Duckenfield did not foresee the consequences of his order to open the gates.
Mr Collins also set out his view of the evidence that had been heard relating to the behaviour of supporters. While he stated that there was “a considerable amount of boorish and loutish behaviour”, he said he believed “it was a minority of fans who were guilty of it.” Crucially, he added that such behaviour “did not cause the trouble.”
D Ch Supt Foster sent ACC Jones a memo in response to Mr Collins’s closing observations. The IOPC found this on one of the floppy disks obtained from the Sheffield Archives. It has not previously been published and was not examined by the HIP.
In the memo, which according to its title was written at ACC Jones’s request, D Ch Supt Foster listed a number of areas where he disagreed with Mr Collins’s conclusions.
For example, D Ch Supt Foster challenged Mr Collins’s assertion that the crush on the terraces was an “inevitable result” of not blocking the tunnel to the centre pens once the gates were opened. D Ch Supt Foster wrote: “I find it difficult therefore to have expected and planned for the majority to have gone down the tunnel to Pen 3 and Pen 4” and later added: “Mr Duckenfield could not have anticipated it.” D Ch Supt Foster offered the view that “If anyone should [have anticipated it] then it is my contention the experience of Mr Marshall, Mr Murray places that responsibility firmly with them.”
However, perhaps the most notable feature of the memo was the number of references D Ch Supt Foster made to alcohol consumption and supporter behaviour.
The first of these was on the first page of the memo, where D Ch Supt Foster wrote: “I would suggest many Liverpool supporters left it late, deliberately having no tickets or consuming alcohol to a greater degree then [than] emphasised at the Public Inquiry.” The IOPC has not found compelling evidence in the wider body of questionnaires or statements taken by WMP to support any of these three suggestions.
D Ch Supt Foster then commented: “I question the use of the word minority in relation to Alcohol etc outside [sic] who forced open the Leppings Lane perimeter gates. I suggest (and the statements confirm) that the final crowd build up were in the majority those who had been drinking.” [Emphasis in original.] It is not clear which statements he was referring to here. Some officer accounts did refer to large numbers of supporters consuming alcohol or appearing drunk; however, there were also plenty of officers who did not suggest this was the case. The overwhelming majority of actual statements WMP had taken, from supporters and other witnesses, certainly did not support D Ch Supt Foster’s assertion.
Next, in a section of the memo subtitled “Alcohol”, D Ch Supt Foster wrote: “I really do believe this is more of a problem than identified. I have to say that the evidence suggests the majority of the latecomers were those who had been detained drinking. There is no other explanation based upon the times of arrival of the coaches, private cars etc. Add to this the evidence of the local residents, licensees, supermarket outlets, Police on duty and the picture is clear.”
The evidence WMP had gathered from local residents and licensed premises absolutely did not support this assertion.
D Ch Supt Foster stated at the end of the memo that his comments were made “straight off the hip with no real preparation time”. It was an internal memo, not intended for external audiences. Nonetheless, the memo appears to set out a very different view of the available evidence to that articulated by Mr Collins.
IOPC investigators asked D Ch Supt Foster about this memo when interviewing him under caution. D Ch Supt Foster stated: “I’ve written that based on the evidence that was before me at that particular time.”
In a response to the summary of proposed criticisms of D Ch Supt Foster sent by the IOPC in 2024, his solicitors wrote that he did not accept that this memo indicated he disagreed with Mr Collins’s conclusions. They emphasised that the memo was an initial reaction to the closing observations and highlighted that the memo also included a number of points where he directly agreed with Mr Collins.
The content of this memo appears to illustrate that D Ch Supt Foster had formed a closed view of the available evidence. While this was arguably of limited impact on the Taylor Inquiry, the consequences of such a closed view became more apparent in the criminal investigation that followed.
Though the IOPC has identified some issues with WMP’s work for the Taylor Inquiry—particularly in relation to its collection of evidence from police witnesses—it remains clear that WMP was working at this stage on behalf of the Taylor Inquiry team. Supporting a public inquiry was an unusual role for a police force; the need to gather so much evidence at speed meant that decisions had to be made about priorities. The IOPC’s concerns should therefore be balanced against the consistent view of the Taylor Inquiry team that WMP performed a complex task very well.
There is some evidence to indicate that WMP—and specifically ACC Jones—may also have contributed to a report submitted by SYP to the Taylor Inquiry. This report was produced on the instruction of Ch Supt Wain and compiled by Detective Inspector Alan King of SYP (DI King) and is informally known as the King report. Its aim was to examine and provide evidence of a so-called ‘conspiracy theory’, apparently circulating within SYP, that large numbers of Liverpool supporters without tickets would intentionally congregate outside a ground then collectively force their way in. The report primarily consisted of information from a number of police forces about the behaviour of Liverpool supporters at matches in their area in the preceding seasons. Despite considering several matches at different grounds, it provided little evidence to support the conspiracy theory.
Paragraph 4.2 of the King report included a comment that appeared to be based on input from WMP. This read: “Whilst the evidence does not have any bearing on the match played between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest at Hillsborough, or the fans who attended the match, the Everton supporters behaviour at Villa Park shows a remarkable coincidence with the Liverpool supporters at Hillsborough which may indicate some Liverpool characteristic.”
This referred to the other 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final, involving Everton (a club based in the city of Liverpool) and Norwich City, which had taken place at Villa Park—a large stadium in Birmingham—on the same day as the disaster. WMP had been the force responsible for policing the match and ACC Jones had been on duty.
SYP submitted the King report to the Taylor Inquiry on 22 June, a few days before the end of the Inquiry hearings.
On 9 June, almost a fortnight before DI King’s report was submitted to the Taylor Inquiry, ACC Jones had written to Peter Whitehurst at the Treasury Solicitor’s Department about the “behaviour of Everton supporters at the semi-final on 15 April 1989”. In the letter, ACC Jones referred Mr Whitehurst to a previous conversation between them in which he had mentioned he had been at this other semi-final. He continued: “I expressed my concern about aspects of that event which reflected similar behaviour to the Liverpool supporters at Hillsborough.”
ACC Jones wrote that, following this conversation with Mr Whitehurst, he had asked senior officers who had been on duty at the Everton v Norwich City game to provide him with statements. He enclosed three statements with the letter, which ACC Jones concluded: “I would only add that, in my opinion, I had not previously experienced dealing with supporters in such great number who had consumed so much alcohol. Consequently the accounts that I have read on Liverpool supporters behaviour at Hillsborough show some remarkable coincidences which may indicate some Liverpool characteristic.”
Aside from questions about the accuracy of such a comparison, this appears a highly inappropriate comment for the officer in charge of evidence gathering to make. It appears to suggest the actions of a small number of football supporters were representative of the alleged behaviour and character of a city of almost half a million people. It further could be taken to imply that ACC Jones had a fixed mindset or preconceptions about the behaviour of people from the city, while investigating a disaster involving those same people.
The similarity between the wording of ACC Jones’s letter and DI King’s report is striking—and indeed a copy of the letter was found in a bundle of papers related to the King report. This raised the possibility that ACC Jones had provided his input directly to DI King; that a colleague at WMP had done so; or, that Mr Whitehurst had done so.
There is no evidence to suggest that, as part of his research in compiling the report, DI King contacted the Treasury Solicitor’s Department. However, he did contact all police forces. It therefore seems most likely that the letter was provided to DI King by WMP.
If ACC Jones himself had submitted a letter to an officer compiling a report in defence of the very force ACC Jones was investigating, this could be construed as a conflict of interest. When interviewing ACC Jones under caution, the IOPC showed him a copy of the letter he had sent to Mr Whitehurst and asked him to comment on it. ACC Jones responded: “I have no independent recollection of writing this letter twenty-five years ago however I accept writing it. I had not recalled using the term Liverpool characteristic before.”
He was then asked about it at the Goldring Inquests and rejected the suggestion that this was an example of a lack of independence and impartiality from WMP.
One of WMP’s key tasks for the Taylor Inquiry was to provide some analysis and summary reports of the evidence that had been collected. In some cases, reports were produced in response to specific requests from the Taylor Inquiry team. In other instances, it appears WMP chose to produce summaries or reports on issues that senior officers viewed as relevant.
The largest of these reports was a document referred to by ACC Jones as “an interim report on the progress of our investigation.” Submitted to the Taylor Inquiry on 26 June, it was 148 pages long and appears to be a compilation of reports written by multiple different authors, some of which had already been submitted separately, such as the comparison of the Operational Orders.
The report was not made available to the HIP. The IOPC found a copy of it in some boxes of papers retrieved from the archives of the Government Legal Department in June 2015.
Towards the end of the report, there was a summary section which began by noting that, to date, because WMP had been “a supply on demand team for Lord Justice Taylor”, it had “made little progress in actual investigation work”. The report suggested: “The time is now approaching when we can assess the vast amount of written and visual evidence with a view to identifying major issues.” It then gave some examples of the issues that would be addressed, such as examining whether there was a link between supporters coming through Gate C, “the 'forcing' of the iron gates, the surges in Pens 3 and 4 clearly visible on video and related in numerous statements and the time the barrier broke.”
Strikingly, it also suggested: “Alcohol has featured to a large extent but there is no direct evidence of drunkenness to the degree of this factor alone being a primary cause. Nevertheless one third of [the] deceased were over the legal driving limit and a further third had traces of alcohol. Consideration is being given to a statistical analysis of this to the total amount of supporters on the terraces. Expert evidence is being sought because it is felt that the behaviour of the crowd was a factor and alcohol was a feature.”
The report did not state who felt that the behaviour of the crowd was a factor or that alcohol was a feature. Further, the observation about the number of those who died who were over the legal driving limit was neither accurate (the figure was far lower than a third) nor relevant in itself, or as the basis for extrapolating a figure for a crowd of over 10,000.
The IOPC has identified that, from even earlier in WMP’s evidence gathering for the Taylor Inquiry, ACC Jones wanted to bring the alleged behaviour of Liverpool supporters to the fore. In notes of a WMP management team meeting on 23 May, there was an action for ACC Jones “to write to Andrew Collins re his opening speech, include in the letter items such as: i) Alcohol ii) Fans without tickets.”
There is no record in the policy books of any letter to Mr Collins to that effect, but ACC Jones did send a letter dated 1 June to Mr Brummell, with information about ticket touts.
The WMP interim report picked up the issue of supporter behaviour, with the authors observing that “The video evidence for 1988 shows a totally different picture to 1989 in the crowd build up at, for example, 2.50pm. This needs to be explored and questions posed on the reasons why.” It included some possible reasons for this: all of these were related to the alleged presence of large numbers of supporters without tickets. However, it did not make any reference to the possibility that this different picture could have been linked to other factors, such as changes in police tactics or traffic delays en route, even though there was evidence available to WMP to suggest that either could have been relevant.
The evidence indicates that WMP was similarly passive when SYP did not provide some of the documentation it had asked for.
On 25 April, at the very outset of WMP’s evidence-gathering process, Detective Superintendent Roy Taylor (D Supt Taylor) requested that the Operational Orders for both the 1988 and 1989 Semi-Finals should be obtained from SYP. An action was promptly raised in the WMP MIR to obtain the original versions, rather than copies, of both. The instructions stated that the 1988 Order was “required urgently” and gave a deadline for obtaining both documents of 4 May, so they could be made available to Lord Justice Taylor and his team before the hearings started.
By comparing the two main Operational Orders, WMP would have been able to identify how SYP’s plan changed between 1988 and 1989. In turn, this would allow WMP to consider whether any such changes may have had an impact on the events that unfolded in 1989.
The action result was recorded on 7 May, noting that SYP did not know where the original versions of either document were. The IOPC has found no evidence to suggest that WMP made any further effort to trace the originals, despite viewing this initially as an urgent requirement.
Using copies, WMP did conduct a comparison of the Operational Orders, which identified a series of changes between the two. This was significant, because SYP officers involved in match planning said in evidence to the Taylor Inquiry that the 1989 Operational Order largely followed the 1988 one. In a report on what the comparison had showed, WMP officers explained that the most notable change was a significant reduction in the number of officers on duty at the Leppings Lane end. WMP’s analysis found that the reduction was higher than had been suggested by SYP officers. Despite this, WMP raised no further investigative actions into the difference.
It appears that almost as soon as SYP decided to have the accounts reviewed before submitting them to the Taylor Inquiry, WMP was made aware of this change in process. On 9 May, the same day that Ch Supt Denton sent the first batch of SYP accounts to Mr Metcalf at Hammond Suddards, ACC Jones recorded in his policy book a discussion with Mr Brummell from the Taylor Inquiry team expressing concern that they would not receive accounts until 11 May at the earliest.
Though ACC Jones did not record any explanation as to why submissions would not be provided before 11 May, the policy note included an agreement “that Mr Brummell would speak to South Yorkshire Police’s solicitors and indicate the importance of a balanced account.” This indicates that both WMP and the Taylor Inquiry team appeared to attribute the delay to the involvement of SYP’s solicitors, and that they had concerns about potential imbalance in the accounts as a result. However, there is no evidence of any action from WMP to intervene in this process, which—as detailed in chapter 9—there was no bar to SYP following.
On 23 May, DCI Ross sent a memo to ACC Jones, describing a telephone call he had received from an SYP officer who was upset about his account being amended in a way the officer felt was significant. According to the memo, DCI Ross explained to the caller that this was an “accepted procedure” that the Taylor Inquiry team was aware of. He added that “statements were being examined by South Yorkshire Police Legal Department in an attempt to remove from the recollections any comments which were made with full emotion following the incident and which were or could be considered embarrassing or detrimental to the South Yorkshire Police in general and individual officers in particular.” The memo to ACC Jones did not provide further details of what the significant changes were, and there is no evidence to show that DCI Ross asked for details.
This explanation—and in particular the reference to comments which “could be considered embarrassing or detrimental to the South Yorkshire Police”—suggested that WMP understood that the review process involved more than simply removing inadmissible evidence, as SYP had by this stage claimed was the purpose of the legal review.
DCI Ross concluded his note by saying he had advised the caller to take the matter up with his senior officers within SYP. The IOPC has found no evidence to suggest that WMP offered any further support to the caller.
In a statement to the IOPC, DCI Ross commented: “they may have been editing hearsay and opinion which would not cause me concern as I believed that we would need to obtain CJA statements in the event of any legal proceedings.”
ACC Jones informed the Taylor Inquiry team of the telephone call and then separately wrote to CC Wright about it. The letter began: “I thought I would advise you discreetly that we have had two approaches from separate sources suggesting that certain omissions have been made from officers’ recollections.” The first approach was the call received by DCI Ross and the second approach was a call from a Sheffield Star journalist “who said a man purporting to be the brother of a South Yorkshire Police Officer had also had his recollection subjected to some editing.”
ACC Jones did not ask CC Wright whether he was aware accounts were being amended to this extent, or to ensure that no more material changes were made.
This letter was sent to CC Wright the day after the Taylor Inquiry team had expressed concerns to ACC Jones about the speed at which SYP officer recollections were being provided to them. However, ACC Jones did not ask CC Wright about the delay, or whether the review process was part of the reason for it.
Neither WMP nor the Taylor Inquiry team asked for the review process to be changed or stopped, even when after this there were further delays in SYP providing accounts. That was despite the fact that the Taylor Inquiry team did not believe the review process was necessary.
As part of the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny, D Ch Supt Foster was sent six accounts that had been amended and asked for his comments. In a written response, he indicated that in his view, in all but one instance, the amendments made were unnecessary or inappropriate. He told the IOPC that, though he was aware at the time that accounts were being reviewed by SYP’s legal team, the first time he was aware of any concerns with the process was when it was raised by the Stuart-Smith Scrutiny.
When interviewed under caution by the IOPC, ACC Jones was asked about his awareness of SYP’s amendment process, in the context of the memo from DCI Ross. He stated: “What was going on in South Yorkshire Police was of no concern really... we didn’t have time to start getting involved in that.”
Even allowing for the time pressure around gathering material for the Taylor Inquiry, this appears an extraordinary response. It suggests that a senior officer in charge of gathering evidence for a public inquiry effectively dismissed an allegation that material changes were being made to other police officers’ evidence as “of no concern”.
As examined in chapter 9, WMP did not take statements from SYP officers. Instead, it requested that SYP send officers’ own accounts for the Taylor Inquiry team to review. This was a significant decision because there are important differences between a statement, made under CJA rules, and a written account.
Firstly, a statement includes a declaration of truth that the maker must sign, acknowledging that they are aware that it is a criminal offence to include anything they know to be untrue. Secondly, the process of producing a statement typically involves an interview, where the witness can be asked to explain gaps or inconsistencies in their statement; their evidence can be probed and challenged before the statement is signed.
The available evidence indicates that, at first, WMP did intend to take statements from SYP officers, and that SYP expected this. The initial instructions sent to SYP officers included that their accounts should be an aide-memoire for when WMP interviewed them. When DCC Hayes told ACC Jones, on 25 April 1989, that SYP wished to obtain accounts from its officers, ACC Jones confirmed that he had no objection but hoped that “these could be made available at a later time when my officer’s interview yours.”
Then, on 29 April 1989, WMP received an instruction from Lord Justice Taylor that six senior SYP officers who had been on duty should provide written recollections. ACC Jones wrote to CC Wright at SYP to ask for these accounts, adding that “Lord Justice Taylor has indicated some urgency on this particular action.” He further confirmed that WMP would not interview the senior officers (at least at this stage). The first of the senior officers’ accounts was received by WMP on 3 May 1989 with more following on 4 May.
At a meeting on 3 May involving WMP senior officers and representatives from the Taylor Inquiry team, there was further discussion of how accounts would be obtained. Chief Superintendent David Baker of WMP was reported as noting that “South Yorkshire Police are calling their key police officers in and taking statements from them.” ACC Jones responded: “I don’t want to get into interviewing I just want a written submission.”
ACC Jones compiled a list of policy directives from the meeting. One of these was that “officers who were posted to the Leppings Lane area are to be identified, and actions raised to invite written recollections of their account of the day from 2.30 pm onwards.” This indicates that a decision had been made at, or as a direct result of, the meeting to extend the request for written accounts to a wider group of officers. There was no indication in the meeting notes that any member of the Taylor Inquiry team requested this.
Though the policy decision was made on 3 May, it was not communicated to SYP until 7 May (just over a week before the Taylor Inquiry hearings were due to start). In a letter to CC Wright, ACC Jones wrote: “I have now been asked by Counsel appointed by Lord Justice Taylor to request from a selected number of your officers their recollections in writing, of what happened at Hillsborough on 15th April 1989.”
The wording of the letter appeared to suggest ACC Jones was simply following Counsel’s instructions. However, the IOPC has not found any other documentary evidence of such an instruction. D Ch Supt Foster suggested it was agreed in a conversation between ACC Jones and Mr Collins, at which he was not present.
The letter then listed 122 officers from whom accounts were requested. Most of these had been on duty at the Leppings Lane end of the stadium.
Over the following weeks, WMP issued SYP further requests for accounts from other groups of officers.
The request on 7 May was the catalyst for SYP to start its review and amendment process, which resulted in it sending accounts to WMP only after they had been reviewed by either Hammond Suddards or (later) SYP’s in-house team. As detailed in chapter 9, around 1 in 4 SYP accounts were amended before WMP received them.
The IOPC sought to understand why WMP had chosen to use the accounts written by SYP officers, rather than taking statements. ACC Jones stated to IOPC investigators that the possibility of WMP taking statements from SYP officers “never came on the agenda.” The meeting notes detailed here, taken from his policy books, indicated differently.
In evidence to the Goldring Inquests, he explained that the decision was made on a purely practical basis: there would not have been the time for WMP to interview all the SYP officers concerned.
This was echoed by D Ch Supt Foster, who suggested to the IOPC that allowing SYP officers to write their accounts was the only way to get sufficient evidence from them in advance of the Taylor Inquiry hearings, which were scheduled to start on 15 May. He added it was not “practically possible” for WMP officers to interview all the SYP officers required in the time available.
There was a reasonable argument that by 7 May—the date of the letter to CC Wright—it would not have been possible to take statements from 122 officers before the Taylor Inquiry hearings were due to start on 15 May. However, 7 May was some two weeks after WMP had begun its investigation and four days after the policy had been agreed. By this time, the WMP team in Liverpool had interviewed hundreds of witnesses and the WMP team in Sheffield had conducted extensive house-to-house enquiries and interviewed SWFC stewards and turnstile operators. It seems reasonable to suggest that, if WMP had taken a different approach from the start, or prioritised activity differently, they would have been able to take statements from at least some of these officers.
D Ch Supt Foster also indicated he was not concerned about the accuracy of the accounts, as there was a basic expectation that police officers would tell the truth. Another WMP officer, DCI Ross, was of a similar view. He stated to the IOPC that it was “standard practice for police officers to write and provide their own statements.”
Both D Ch Supt Foster and DCI Ross pointed out that using officer accounts at this stage did not remove the possibility of taking statements later, for example, in the event of a criminal investigation where statements made under CJA rules would be necessary for a prosecution. However, as is detailed in chapter 15, when WMP did begin a criminal investigation, they did not attempt to convert the accounts into CJA statements. To add further confusion, WMP recorded the officers’ accounts as statements on the HOLMES system.
Some caution is advised when looking at the percentage of reviews that found the complaint case outcome was not reasonable and proportionate due to the sometimes small number of reviews involved.
Supporters complained that some WMP officers were rude or intimidating, or that they did not seem interested in what they had to say. For example, one witness told the IOPC: “One officer sat down and the other stood up in front of me, with his hands in his pockets for the whole time he was in my house.”
In May 1989, WMP also received a complaint about the manner of its officers in Sheffield. A young man, who was a student in the city and had been at the match, responded to the witness appeal and agreed to go to a police station and provide a statement. However, when he was interviewed, he was upset by the manner of the questioning and what he felt were unfair allegations.
He detailed his experiences in a letter to his mother. These included one of the officers adopting an aggressive manner and appearing not to believe his account, to the extent of expressing doubt that he had even been at the game, because he had no injuries.
The man’s mother showed the letter to his godfather, who was a former detective chief superintendent. The godfather then wrote to WMP to complain. This was not recorded as a formal complaint, but ACC Jones instructed D Ch Supt Foster to “Initiate a follow-up to smooth troubled waters.” [Emphasis in original.] The officers who had conducted the interview were contacted and responded that they thought the young man’s evidence had been inconsistent and that he was ‘anti-police’.
On 19 June 1989, D Ch Supt Foster wrote back to the man’s godfather on behalf of WMP and told him that he had spoken with the two officers in question. He further explained that the WMP team as a whole had dealt with approximately 4,000 supporters as part of their enquiries, and that this was the only incident where someone had raised concerns. While there was in fact some evidence of other supporters expressing concerns about WMP’s approach, very few raised such concerns to WMP at the time.
The man complained to the IOPC about the WMP officers who had interviewed him. Having reviewed the evidence, the IOPC upheld his complaint that WMP had recorded his comments inaccurately and incompletely, with several material errors in the accounts they drafted. The IOPC also upheld, in relation to one of the two officers, the man’s complaint that during the interview process, he was accused of lying and was intimidated and threatened with charges of wasting police time.
Complaints about specific interactions between WMP officers and individual witnesses are inherently difficult to investigate. The interviews were not audio- or video-recorded, so the only documentary evidence from the time is the questionnaires or statements themselves. The IOPC has sought to contact the officers involved; not all have agreed to speak to investigators, as is their right, but those who have replied denied behaving inappropriately.
The IOPC has also looked at the evidence of the wider work undertaken by each pair of officers complained about. In all of the cases, there was no documentary evidence or witness evidence to suggest that these officers were repeatedly or consistently rude, intimidating or biased.
It is apparent that some interviews ended acrimoniously or abruptly, where witnesses were upset or angered by the questions, or simply by the emotional trauma of recalling the events. While clearly this is regrettable, it is also not surprising that this happened on occasion, given the number of interviews conducted by WMP and the nature of the matters under investigation.
This does not alter the fact that some supporters were sufficiently upset or shocked by WMP’s behaviour that they wished to complain.
These issues were undoubtedly of deep significance to those affected. In some cases, the manner of evidence collection added to the trauma of being present on the day; for others, it damaged trust in the integrity of the investigation into the disaster.
However, the broader picture demonstrates that these issues were experienced on an individual level rather than a systemic one. Further, the overall body of evidence does not support the allegation that WMP deliberately lost, inaccurately recorded, amended or mishandled witness accounts.
