11. SYP’s presentation of evidence to the Popper Inquests and contribution proceedings

What was investigated?

The IOPC investigated:
The evidence that was put forward on behalf of SYP, or by individual officers, to the WMP investigations, Lord Justice Taylor’s Inquiry, the contribution proceedings, and the inquests, or in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, considering:

a) whether any police officer gave or produced evidence that was inaccurate, false or deliberately misleading (or was involved in attempts to do so) 
b) whether such evidence contained inaccurate, misleading or irrelevant criticism of supporters’ behaviour 
c) whether the ‘Wain Report’ was an accurate and complete picture of the evidence 
d) whether any police officer was party to, or directed the production or selection of, evidence that was inaccurate or misleading, including irrelevant criticism of supporters’ behaviour and evidence regarding operational police tactics/actions to control supporters

This chapter focuses on the evidence presented to the Popper Inquests and contribution proceedings, and how SYP prepared for both.
 

What was found?

• After SYP had agreed to pay compensation to those seeking damages in relation to the disaster, it took court action to seek financial contributions from SWFC, Eastwood & Partners and SCC towards the payment. This approach was advocated by both DCC Hayes and Mr Metcalf, even after newly appointed Counsel Richard Payne QC had suggested SYP was likely to be liable for the majority of compensation payments.

• In preparation for the contribution proceedings, a team of officers under Ch Supt Wain was tasked with carrying out a series of actions requested by the lawyers. These included reviewing the Taylor Interim Report to see if there was anything the force should challenge and re-examining evidence around the 1988 tunnel closure.

• In their evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, four officers had indicated they were aware of previous police actions to close the tunnel to the centre pens. The team under Ch Supt Wain was instructed to ask these officers to review the transcripts of the evidence they had given to the Taylor Inquiry and, if they felt it had given the wrong impression, provide a statement correcting it. All four refused.

• In preparation for the generic hearing of the Popper Inquests, Ch Supt Wain issued an instruction to identify the officers who could provide the best evidence about various aspects of alleged misbehaviour by supporters. 

• Mr Metcalf described on three occasions the “strategy” he proposed to follow at the Popper Inquests on behalf of his client, which involved a “low key approach avoiding too much individual criticism” but highlighting “drink induced hooligan behaviour”.

• In their evidence to the Popper Inquests, senior officers again sought to play down the force’s responsibility for safety in the pens or at the stadium and to avoid the suggestion that senior officers on duty on the day had failed to take relevant action, such as to close the tunnel. 
 

Significant new evidence 

There were two main sources of new evidence around the Popper Inquests and contribution proceedings. These were: 

• the attendance notes and other documentation held by Hammond Suddards. This information had been disclosed to the HIP, but only at the very end of its work, so had not been assessed in depth

• the policy books of ACC Jones of WMP, who had worked closely with Dr Popper in preparation for the generic hearing of the inquests. These had not previously been available