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The second opening of Gate C

  1. However, after Gate C was closed, Supt Marshall made further radio requests—potentially without realising Gate C had even been opened. The evidence of the police officers in the PCB about this has been consistent. Having heard the increasingly desperate requests from Supt Marshall to open the gate, Ch Supt Duckenfield deliberated on what to do and then gave an instruction to open the gates. It is not clear exactly when this instruction was issued.
     
  2. At 2.52pm, Gate C was opened again, possibly shortly before the instruction from Ch Supt Duckenfield, and remained open for several minutes. Estimates vary as to how many supporters entered the ground through Gate C at this point, but the commonly accepted figure is more than 2,000.
     
  3. Despite comprehensive analysis, Operation Resolve has not been able to establish whether Gate C was opened at 2.52pm as a result of Ch Supt Duckenfield’s instruction, as has largely been assumed, or whether it was opened for other reasons.
     
  4. What is clear is that none of those directly involved in the opening of Gate C has at any point said they heard a radio message or received an instruction from the PCB to open it.
     
  5. Further, Operation Resolve has found no evidence from the Racal recordings of communications from officers in the PCB, or from officers on duty elsewhere, that any further instruction was issued to officers inside the turnstiles, or inside the ground itself, that the gates were about to be opened, or even clarification of which gates were to be opened or by whom.
     
  6. CCTV footage shows that Gate C was physically opened by steward Ian Marsh at 14:52:37. He was assisted by another steward. The recollections of both about exactly what happened have been inconsistent. Ian Marsh has accepted various possible explanations put to him, including that he opened the gate to allow a supporter out, and that he opened it in response to a request from a police officer outside. 
     
  7. Several supporters in the crush have described a police officer outside shouting to the stewards inside to open the gate. Others have described a police sergeant outside the ground directing them to Gate C, with the assurance that it would shortly be opened. 
     
  8. PS Morgan has confirmed that he did this, with the intention of allowing small groups of supporters in through Gate C in a controlled way to reduce the crush. However, he did not communicate this plan to other officers, with the possible exception of Insp Purdy.
     
  9. Insp Purdy has also described an attempt to bring small numbers of supporters out of the crush and under the funnel bar, so that they could enter through Gate C in a controlled way when it was next opened. Mounted officers were being used to try to restrict the number of supporters waiting outside. 
     
  10. CCTV footage shows the situation outside Gate C twenty seconds before it opened. 

 

Mounted officers outside Gate C at Hillsborough Stadium at 14:52:17

Figure 4O: Mounted officers outside Gate C, 14:52:17 (Source: SYP CCTV)

  1. In footage three seconds later, PS Morgan has been pinpointed close to the funnel bar, with Insp Purdy nearby. Figure 4P then shows PS Morgan and a group of supporters making their way along the service road towards Gate C at 14:52:26.

 

PS Morgan leading supporters on the service road by Hillsborough Stadium at 14:52:26

Figure 4P: PS Morgan leading supporters on the service road, 14:52:26 (Source: SYP CCTV)

  1. Ten seconds later, Gate C was opened. 
     
  2. At the Goldring Inquests, PS Morgan was shown this footage. He accepted it was him but insisted he had not requested the gate to be opened at the point it was. Instead, even though he had intended the gate should be opened, his evidence was that it came as a surprise. He accepted the possibility that Gate C was opened by stewards for another reason at this time.
     
  3. Though there was an immediate surge through Gate C—in which PS Morgan was swept into the crowd—CCTV evidence indicates that at first the opening showed an element of controlled access. At 14:53:20, mounted officers had formed a line of horses across the service road outside Gate C and were guiding supporters through the open gate. Four of the outer perimeter gates were closed and two partially open, being monitored by a line of mounted police officers, which helped control the rate at which supporters were approaching Gate C. 

 

The area around Gate C at Hillsborough Stadium at 14:53:20

Figure 4Q: The area around Gate C at 14:53:20 (Source: SYP CCTV)

  1. However, just after 2.54pm, one of the outer perimeter gates burst open, and supporters ran through the opening. Almost immediately, this was repeated at the other outer gates. A large number of supporters made their way onto the outer concourse, which had been cleared, and then through the open Gate C. 
     
  2. Crucially, there had been no plan in place for what should happen once supporters entered through Gate C. There were no officers in place to direct the incoming supporters, who made their way across the inner concourse to the most obvious route to the terraces: the central tunnel under the West Stand, leading to Pen 3 and Pen 4. 
     
  3. At 14:57:01, large numbers of supporters were still entering the stadium through Gate C, which had been open for more than four minutes. As figure 4R shows, there was still no sign of police control on the inner concourse. However, a line of mounted officers can be seen positioned at the end of the service road, close to the side of the funnel bar.
     
  4. Not only had the officers at Gate C not communicated with those on the inner concourse, but there is also no evidence to suggest that the opening of the gate was communicated to the PCB. Ch Supt Duckenfield therefore did not know about the intention of officers near Gate C to allow supporters into the ground in a controlled way when he issued his instruction to open the gates. It is also not clear what those in the PCB knew once Gate C had been opened. 

 

The area around Gate C at Hillsborough Stadium at 14:57:01

Figure 4R: The area around Gate C, 14:57:01 (Source: SYP CCTV)

  1. At the Taylor Inquiry, Ch Supt Duckenfield confirmed that he had not given any specific instruction to police officers or stewards that the gate was going to be opened. He said that he had not thought to give instructions to the police officers on the inner concourse to try to direct the flow, because he had been busy watching what was happening. 
     
  2. He said that his instruction to open the gates was passed over the radio for all to hear at the ground; he hoped that the police officers on the inner concourse, who were trained to act on their initiative, would have done something around the central tunnel. He accepted that he had made a mistake by not giving an instruction for the central tunnel to be closed but said he hoped that others would have remedied that mistake.
     
  3. At the Goldring Inquests, Ch Supt Duckenfield said he thought that the supporters would have gone onto the inner concourse and gathered themselves for a moment or two to recover. He said that he did not for a moment consider the possibility that they might go down the central tunnel.
     
  4. Supt Murray and Supt Marshall have also both said, at separate times, that they did not think about where the incoming supporters would go. Crucially, Supt Greenwood was still not aware of the situation outside.
     
  5. Strikingly, officers on duty on the inner concourse with experience of policing matches at Hillsborough Stadium immediately recognised the likely direction of supporters. Police Sergeant William Crawford told the Popper Inquests that if he had had prior knowledge that Gate C was going to be opened, he could have considered arranging for the central tunnel to be closed.
     
  6. The cumulative result was a rapid influx of large numbers of supporters into the centre pens, which is examined further in the next chapter.
     
  7. While it has not proven possible to establish on whose authority Gate C was opened, Operation Resolve’s investigation has reaffirmed that it was opened in response to the fact that the police had lost control of the situation outside the ground. Further, the evidence is clear that the police did not take control of the situation, either inside or outside the ground, when the gate was opened at 2.52pm. The person with overall responsibility for this was the match commander, Ch Supt Duckenfield.