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2.30pm–2.48pm: the crush intensified

  1. Having decided not to delay the kick-off, Ch Supt Duckenfield did not then consider whether there were other tactics that could be used to alleviate the situation at the turnstiles. Evidence from supporters and police officers suggests that in the period immediately after 2.30pm, the crowd outside the Leppings Lane entrance began to increase rapidly.
     
  2. Supporters’ accounts of this period describe being unable to move freely and being crushed against walls and turnstiles. Many have stated it was the worst crowd situation they had ever experienced, with some feeling faint or unable to breathe, and others recalling people screaming in pain. They also commented on police officers in the crowd, including mounted police officers, becoming overwhelmed.
     
  3. Officers closed the outer perimeter gates, to reduce some of the pressure on the bottleneck at the turnstiles. However, the pressure outside was so intense that one of the gates sprung back open a couple of minutes later. It was later established that the bottom bolt holding it closed had buckled. Several mounted officers have described how their horses were being lifted off the ground by the sheer pressure of the crowd.
     
  4. Chief Inspector Robert Creaser (Ch Insp Creaser) was one of the most experienced officers on duty outside the stadium at the Leppings Lane end. In his original account, he recalled that at about 2.30pm he could see that difficulties were being experienced at the turnstiles and commented that the build-up of supporters was later and larger than was usually the case.
     
  5. Figure 4F, taken from CCTV footage at 14:33:35, demonstrates the density of the crowd outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles at this time. 

 

CCTV still of the crowd build-up outside the Leppings Lane entrance at Hillsborough Stadium, 14:33:35

Figure 4F: View of the crowd build-up outside the Leppings Lane entrance, 14:33:35 (Source: SYP CCTV) 

  1. With increased pressure on the turnstiles, some supporters climbed onto the walls and over the turnstiles to escape the crush. Turnstile operators recalled the state of supporters as they finally entered the ground, with many distressed, red-faced and out of breath. Another turnstile operator said that after 2.30pm, the crush was so intense that “some supporters were unable to take tickets from their pockets.”
     
  2. Figure 4G shows the situation at 14:37:03 from the opposite angle, looking towards the stadium from Leppings Lane. Supt Marshall has been identified between the turnstiles and the outer perimeter gates, surrounded by supporters. Police horses can be seen between the outer perimeter gates and the turnstiles, also surrounded by the crowd. Some supporters can be seen on the walls above the turnstiles.

 

The crowd outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles at Hillsborough Stadium at 14:37:03

Figure 4G: The crowd outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles at 14:37:03 (Source: BBC) 

  1. Inspector Robert Purdy (Insp Purdy) was part of sector 1, officially under Supt Greenwood. He was on duty on the outer concourse, by the turnstiles. In evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, he explained that around this time he felt the officers outside the turnstiles were no longer effective because they themselves were in danger, so he decided to redeploy them.
     
  2. Other officers described their efforts to try to help particular individuals out of the crush, unable to control the crowd as a whole. Many mentioned supporters pleading with them to do something to relieve the crush.
     
  3. Supt Marshall told the Taylor Inquiry that the situation was worsening by the minute with more supporters arriving. He had attempted to get a better vantage point away from the crush, by heading to a bridge outside the stadium, but from there he saw what he described as “A vast and progressively more unruly crowd” that officers were struggling to control.
     
  4. Insp Purdy was also seeking a better vantage point by standing on the funnel bar, a railing that separated the turnstiles from the service road. He had initially attempted to direct supporters from there, but at 14:39:41 was handed an injured child from the crowd.
     
  5. In a statement to Operation Resolve, he recalled: “I thought at first he was dead. He was limp in my hands.” However, the child was taken by another officer to a first aid point and recovered. 
     
  6. By the point at which the injured child had to be lifted out of the crowd, it should have been apparent to officers outside the ground that this was now a very serious crush, and that urgent action was required. 
     
  7. At around this time, Insp Purdy had a conversation with D Supt McKay, who was close by; D Supt McKay suggested that the gates would have to be opened.
     
  8. Officers on the inner concourse were equally concerned. In a statement made in 2013, Inspector John Bennett (Insp Bennett) recalled sending a radio request for more officers to be deployed to the Leppings Lane end of the ground, based on both his own observations and the comments of supporters entering through turnstiles A–G that someone could be killed. He did not recall receiving an acknowledgement. 
     
  9. The PCB had received an earlier request for additional officers to be sent to the Leppings Lane end. In response, PS Goddard had radioed a Mounted Section sergeant to deploy all available mounted officers to the area, and Supt Murray also deployed reserve Serial 20 from the gymnasium. Insp Bennett said this serial arrived close to him at Gate A shortly after his request. Gate A was an exit gate closest to the North Stand. A few minutes later, another serial joined them there. 
     
  10. At about this time, Supt Marshall attempted to contact the PCB by radio to request that an announcement be made over the Tannoy system to urge supporters to queue in an orderly fashion. He also asked for Police Constable Michael Buxton (PC Buxton), who was driving a Land Rover equipped with a public address system, to make his way to Leppings Lane.
     
  11. Though there was no reply from the PCB, PC Buxton himself confirmed by radio that he was on his way. He arrived a few minutes later. However, he could not be heard over the noise of the crowd. Believing that his messages were not getting through to the PCB, Supt Marshall radioed the Force Control Room at SYP HQ, to ask officers there to contact the PCB regarding a Tannoy announcement. This was one of several examples Operation Resolve has identified where problems with radio communications appear to have hampered the police response. More generally, officers have commented on the fact that radio communications were inaudible, or unclear; many simply did not have access to a radio. 
     
  12. By this stage, the crowds on Leppings Lane had extended beyond the funnel bar and were between the outer perimeter gates and Gate C. Figure 4H, taken from SYP CCTV footage, shows the situation at 14:44:51.

 

CCTV still of the crowd outside the Leppings Lane entrance at Hillsborough Stadium, 14:44:51

Figure 4H: The crowd outside the Leppings Lane entrance, 14:44:51 (Source: SYP CCTV)

  1. At 2.47pm, Supt Marshall radioed the PCB again. This time, he requested that the exit gates at the Leppings Lane end should be opened, to allow supporters to escape the crush outside.
     
  2. He did this after speaking to Insp Purdy near the outer perimeter gates. Insp Purdy commented that because he was unable to contact Supt Marshall, he had to force his way through the crowd to speak to him. Though this was a distance of only approximately 30 yards, Insp Purdy said it took minutes, rather than seconds to reach him.
     
  3. In his 1989 account, Supt Marshall said that once he arrived at the outer perimeter gates, “Inspector Purdy told me that people at the front of the crowd by turnstiles A-G were being crushed and asked me to open gates.” Supt Marshall further explained: “He was not specific as to which gates he thought should be opened but his anxiety was apparent.”
     
  4. Supt Marshall said he was reluctant to do so, as it would result in uncontrolled access to the stadium. However, because an officer with the experience of Insp Purdy seemed extremely concerned about the situation, he agreed to ask the PCB to authorise the opening of the gates.
     
  5. Again, there was no acknowledgement, so he borrowed a radio of a different type from another officer and tried to send the message a second time. Still there was no acknowledgement. He made a third attempt, suggesting that if the gates weren’t opened, people would be killed.
     
  6. Supt Marshall has repeatedly stated that he requested the PCB’s authority before opening the gates, and various officers have said that they heard his increasingly frantic radio requests.
     
  7. However, Insp Purdy has consistently recalled that Supt Marshall gave him the authority to open the gates when they spoke. Specifically, he believed he had authority to open Gate C.