4. The events of 15 April 1989
This chapter includes witness accounts, images and descriptions of scenes that may be distressing.
What was investigated?
Under the terms of reference for the managed investigation, Operation Resolve investigated:
Actions of the police on 15 April 1989 prior to the disaster, including:
a) actions of police officers outside the football ground—including the alleged failure by the police to prevent supporters entering the Leppings Lane end, failure to prevent build-up of supporters outside the Leppings Lane turnstiles and filter supporters away from those turnstiles
b) the decision not to postpone the kick-off of the match
c) the monitoring of crowd numbers in the pens—both the alleged failure to prevent the pens from becoming overcrowded and the alleged failure to act once the pens became overcrowded
d) the opening of Gate C
e) the actions (or lack of) to direct supporters once Gate C was opened
What was found?
• The briefings to officers on the day did not cover the gaps identified in the police planning for the match. In sector and serial briefings, some officers then issued instructions that contradicted the F Division Operational Order.
• After addressing all officers on duty at the stadium in a 10am briefing, Ch Supt Duckenfield then toured the area around the stadium for over two hours before going to the PCB where he intended to base himself for the match. Though his activities in this period lacked focus and did not amount to adequate preparation for the match, there is no evidence to support the allegation that Ch Supt Duckenfield drank alcohol in this time.
• From about 2.15pm, there were clear signs of crowd build-up outside the stadium. Supporters arriving at the Leppings Lane entrance around this time have described their surprise at the size of the crowds they encountered, and some have described there already being a crush towards the turnstiles. Several have commented that there was a lack of control, especially compared to the previous year’s Semi-Final.
• Officers inside the stadium—including some in the PCB—observed that the areas allocated to Nottingham Forest supporters were much fuller than those allocated to Liverpool supporters. However, Operation Resolve did not find evidence that any concerns were communicated to the match commander, Ch Supt Duckenfield. Further, no efforts were made to check this by reference to turnstile count data, which was readily available in the SWFC control room.
• From the PCB, it was possible to see the situation both on the West Terrace—directly in front of the PCB window—and outside the stadium, on the CCTV monitors. At around 2.30pm, with the crowd increasingly built up outside, Ch Supt Duckenfield consulted Supt Murray on whether to delay the kick-off to ensure spectators could safely enter the stadium. Referring to a very limited set of pre-determined criteria to inform the decision, he chose to allow the game to kick off as planned. He did not consult other officers or consider turnstile count data as part of his decision making.
• Over the next short period, the situation at the Leppings Lane entrance deteriorated rapidly as supporters arrived more quickly than they could enter through the turnstiles. Supporter accounts describe intense crushing; officers on duty outside feared for their wellbeing and police horses were lifted off their feet by the crowd. Many of the supporters who made it through the turnstiles appeared to be in discomfort.
• By around 2.45pm, officers outside the Leppings Lane entrance had become increasingly concerned about the pressure of the crowd outside the stadium. At 2.47pm, radio requests were made to open the wide exit gates next to the turnstiles, to allow supporters into the stadium at a greater rate and reduce the pressure outside.
• Over the next ten minutes, all three exit gates (A, B and C) were opened. The most significant of these was a prolonged, uncontrolled opening of Gate C, which resulted in a large number of supporters entering the ground. By contrast, the opening of Gate A was tightly controlled and caused no issues.
• It has previously been largely accepted that Gate C was opened at the instruction of Ch Supt Duckenfield. However, Operation Resolve’s investigation casts doubt on this. While Ch Supt Duckenfield did issue an instruction to open the gates, evidence indicates that no officers acted on this.
• One reason was that Gate C had already been opened, with a view to allowing small numbers of supporters into the stadium in a controlled way. However, the police lost control, and this became an uncontrolled flow.
• Those involved in this intentional opening of Gate C did not inform Ch Supt Duckenfield about what they were doing or why.
• While opening Gate C did help to relieve the pressure outside, a lack of communication had catastrophic consequences. No one inside the stadium was informed that officers were opening the gates and so they could not—and did not—prepare for supporters arriving at a far greater rate than through the turnstiles. Officers near the gates had no awareness of the situation inside the stadium, where the centre pens of the West Terrace had become quite full while other areas were still comparatively empty. There was no attempt from the police to control or guide the supporters coming in, who headed in large numbers towards what appeared the most direct route to the terraces: the tunnel that led to the centre pens.
• Though Ch Supt Duckenfield ordered the opening of the gates, he gave no instructions to anyone to manage the inflow of supporters.
Significant new evidence
In examining the events of the day, Operation Resolve was able to draw on a substantial volume of existing evidence gathered by previous investigations. This included documents, photographs and video footage.
Using today’s technology, investigators were able to synchronise the footage from different sources, including SYP and SWFC CCTV cameras and from broadcasters that had been filming the match. Many images shown in this chapter are presented with the synchronised time in the 24-hour clock format by hour, minute, second and video frame, for example, 14:55:29:13 (meaning 2.55pm and 29 seconds, frame 13).
Once the material was synchronised, specialist equipment and software enabled investigators to view moving footage at 25 frames per second, and to stop and start at any point and move the footage backwards and forwards frame by frame. This approach was used to follow the movements of those who died in the disaster, then combined with documentary evidence and photographs to provide individual timelines for the Goldring Inquests. It was also used to follow the movements of certain officers at key times, such as those involved in the opening of each of the exit gates.
Operation Resolve also examined in detail recordings and transcripts of police radio communications and telephone conversations, including those between the PCB and SYP’s Force Control Room at Police HQ, some of which had not previously been open to scrutiny.
- This strand of the Operation Resolve investigation examined the events of the day of the disaster, up to the critical point when the exit gates (Gates A, B and C) at the Leppings Lane end were opened. Using a broadly chronological approach, it brought together evidence from supporters, police officers, SWFC officials and other witnesses, as well as video material and photographs, covering the arrival of supporters at the stadium, the build-up of supporters outside the Leppings Lane entrance and how the police responded.
- In particular, Operation Resolve undertook an extensive investigation into the sequence of events around the openings of Gate C. This involved frame-by-frame analysis of CCTV footage, radio transmissions, witness accounts and minutes of meetings after the disaster.
- This chapter refers to numerous specific features of the Leppings Lane entrance area. These are shown in the diagram below.
Figure 4A: Plan of Leppings Lane entrance area and turnstile locations (Source: Operation Resolve, based on Mr Cutlack’s diagram)