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The replacement of Ch Supt Mole as match commander

  1. In many eyes, the most significant change in the police operation for the 1989 game was that Ch Supt Mole was replaced as match commander by Ch Supt Duckenfield.
     
  2. Ch Supt Mole had extensive experience overseeing police operations at Hillsborough Stadium, including being in charge of the 1987 and 1988 FA Cup Semi-Finals there. By contrast, Ch Supt Duckenfield had never commanded a match at Hillsborough Stadium or indeed commanded a match of this scale anywhere else. His experience policing football matches was limited; he had worked as an inspector at Hillsborough Stadium around a decade previously, including policing the 1980 FA Cup Semi-Final there.
     
  3. He told the Taylor Inquiry that when he was a superintendent and deputy divisional commander of D Division, he had regularly policed matches at Bramall Lane, the stadium of Sheffield United Football Club (SUFC). However, at the Goldring Inquests he accepted that he only became involved in policing at Bramall Lane on the periphery, if a major match was played, and that he had never policed matches there on a regular basis.
     
  4. The consequences of this change have been subject to considerable scrutiny, with numerous suggestions that if the vastly more experienced Ch Supt Mole had been in charge on the day, the disaster could have been avoided. This became more contentious when allegations emerged that Ch Supt Mole was moved from the role for disciplinary reasons. 
     
  5. Specifically, it has been suggested that Ch Supt Mole was moved following a ‘prank’ played on a probationary officer in the division. Though Ch Supt Mole was not in any way involved in the prank, he was the divisional commander, and this was seen as indicative of poor discipline in the division.
     
  6. Operation Resolve investigated the circumstances leading up to Ch Supt Mole’s transfer and found the evidence around it is inconclusive. Senior officers close to the decision had different recollections and opinions about why he was moved. Ch Supt Mole himself told the Popper Inquests that the decision was made by CC Wright and that he had not applied for the move. However, he said that he had been divisional commander of F Division for several years and felt “the time was ripe for a move.”
     
  7. CC Wright died before the Operation Resolve investigation began and had never given a public explanation for the decision. However, DCC Hayes told the Goldring Inquests that Ch Supt Mole was moved for positive career development reasons—to offer him command experience in a different location which would improve his promotion prospects. He added that the prank “was of no consequence whatever” in the decision.
     
  8. ACC Jackson on the other hand told the Goldring Inquests he felt sure the prank would have been a factor.
     
  9. Assistant Chief Constable Stuart Anderson (ACC Anderson) was head of staff services for SYP, which covered human resources and related issues. In a prepared statement submitted to the Solicitors to the Goldring Inquests he provided a detailed explanation of the transfer of Ch Supt Mole and the promotion of Ch Supt Duckenfield. In this, he indicated it was beneficial to both officers in career development terms, and also beneficial to the force, in terms of filling a command vacancy in B Division. He did not mention the prank.
     
  10. ACC Anderson stated that the proposed transfer of Ch Supt Mole was discussed at a meeting of senior officers, where those present at the meeting “were well aware of the impending FA Cup Semi-Final”. He said that it was noted that the Operational Order had already been written, and all the same supervisory officers were in post—meaning that Ch Supt Duckenfield would not have to start the planning process. He also recalled that it was reiterated that the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final involved the same teams that had been involved in the previous year’s fixture, which was considered to have been a success in policing terms. 
     
  11. Operation Resolve has found no documentary evidence of a senior officers’ meeting to support ACC Anderson’s account. Further, it does not fit the known timeline. The appointments were announced on 6 March 1989, two weeks before Hillsborough Stadium was chosen as the venue, rather than after the Operational Order was written as ACC Anderson has suggested.
     
  12. Operation Resolve has also examined the appointment of Ch Supt Duckenfield, including considering his career record to that point and the appointment process. The available evidence does not suggest that the decision to appoint Ch Supt Duckenfield as the head of F Division was inappropriate in the context of the established standards and approach at that time. He had been a superintendent for around four years and had recently attended a command course. Further, the decision appears to have been made before the match was allocated to Hillsborough Stadium. 
     
  13. It is nonetheless clear that he lacked experience of commanding football matches of the scale of an FA Cup semi-final. Yet, due to the expectation within SYP at the time, that the divisional commander of F Division would be the main match commander at Hillsborough Stadium, he felt obliged to do so, with just a couple of weeks to prepare. At the Goldring Inquests, he was asked what he thought CC Wright’s reaction would have been if he had suggested that someone with more experience should manage the 1989 Semi-Final. He replied that he thought CC Wright would have then appointed a different officer to the role of divisional commander.
     
  14. While this appears to have been the standard expectation, there was no documentary evidence that the divisional commander had to be the match commander. In fact, in an SYP document titled ‘Duties and Responsibilities of the Chief Superintendent’, there was no reference whatsoever to a chief superintendent having to take command of major events.
     
  15. SYP senior officers have consistently stated they felt Ch Supt Duckenfield’s experience was adequate for the role, particularly in response to suggestions that Ch Supt Mole could have remained as match commander for one more high-profile fixture. Expert witness Mr Hopkins disagreed and felt that Ch Supt Mole should have been asked to manage the 1989 Semi-Final.
     
  16. Perhaps the biggest issue therefore is not the decision to promote Ch Supt Duckenfield, but rather the internal expectation that the divisional commander of F Division would be the match commander at Hillsborough Stadium, regardless of the officer’s suitability for that role.