3. Police planning for the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final

What was investigated?

Under the terms of reference for the managed investigation, Operation Resolve investigated:
Planning and preparation for the match by the police, including organisational and individual decision making in relation to:

a) the resourcing of the event
b) any role played by the police in allocation of areas within the ground to the visiting teams’ supporters
c) the arrangements for the policing of the match, including arrangements for the arrival of supporters and their management outside the stadium
d) the arrangements (or lack of) for precise monitoring of the crowd numbers and their safety within the pens at the Leppings Lane end
 

What was found?

• Though SYP officers have repeatedly insisted that their planning for the 1989 Semi-Final was broadly the same as for the 1988 Semi-Final involving the same teams, there were several important differences, including changes in key personnel. No allowances were made for these changes.

• For the 1989 Semi-Final, there was a 14% reduction in the number of officers on duty compared to the previous year. In the area where Liverpool supporters would arrive, there were 21% fewer officers on duty. SYP had intended to reduce the number of officers on duty by just 10%. 

• A significant change made by SWFC to entrance arrangements for the terraces at the Leppings Lane end meant that all 10,100 Liverpool supporters who had standing tickets had to enter through just seven turnstiles. For these spectators to get in on time, each of the turnstiles would have had to operate continuously at maximum speed for almost two hours. It is not clear whether any SYP senior officers understood the potential consequences of this change.

• There were various gaps and inconsistencies in the key planning documents developed by SYP, known as Operational Orders. A major gap was a total absence of contingency plans with clear tactics to address known risks that had occurred at previous matches, including crushing on the West Terrace. Another was around responsibility for monitoring capacity on the West Terrace to prevent such crushing occurring. 

• The three SYP divisions involved in the police operation all developed their own Operational Order without working together. They were approved by senior officers in each division, without looking at the other Orders. This resulted in a lack of coordination. Some accounts suggest that the Force Control Room was supposed to provide a coordinating role, but this was not documented anywhere. Beyond that, SYP relied solely on briefing meetings led by the match commander to bring the different divisions’ activities together. 

• The replacement of the highly experienced match commander Ch Supt Mole was poorly timed. It was a direct result of the decision to move Ch Supt Mole from the role of divisional commander for F Division and to replace him with the newly promoted Ch Supt Duckenfield. There was an unwritten policy that the divisional commander would be match commander at Hillsborough Stadium.

• There is no definitive explanation for the decision and no evidence that Ch Supt Duckenfield’s appointment as divisional commander was inappropriate or conducted improperly. However, it meant that someone who had never previously commanded a match at Hillsborough Stadium was given responsibility for a major game, with just a few weeks’ notice. 
 

Significant new evidence

The Operational Orders and police planning for the 1989 FA Cup Semi-Final have been examined by a range of previous investigations and inquiries. In this investigation, Operation Resolve was able to draw on the views of Douglas Hopkins, a former Metropolitan Police chief superintendent with a wealth of experience commanding football matches in the 1980s and 1990s. Mr Hopkins was appointed by the Goldring Inquests as an expert witness on the policing standards of the day. He also gave evidence at the criminal trials of Ch Supt Duckenfield and Mr Mackrell.