The final aspect of WMP’s work in relation to the Popper Inquests that the IOPC investigated was the preparation for the generic hearing. This began in earnest after the DPP’s decision in August 1990 that no charges would be brought against anyone in relation to the disaster. The generic hearing then began in November 1990.
Throughout this period, Dr Popper continued to ask WMP for advice and assistance on a range of matters, as is typically the case with coroners preparing for an inquest of any size. The evidence available to the IOPC does not indicate that WMP overstepped the mark in the work it undertook, or in providing their views where they were asked for.
Nonetheless, it was notable that in a report produced after a meeting of WMP’s Hillsborough investigation management team on 31 August 1990, there was a suggestion that Dr Popper may want to examine “the amount of drunkenness and unruliness during the build up to the crush outside the ground at about 1420 hours onwards.” This was in the context of a discussion around the evidence that should be heard at the generic hearing. In relation to this, the officers advised Dr Popper: “we would suggest that you concentrate on the period between say 1420 hours when the crowd had noticeably built up, through to Superintendent Greenwood running on to the pitch at 1505 hours plus to stop the match.”
These points appeared to suggest that, in WMP’s view, events after 3.05pm had no impact on how people died, but alcohol consumption before 2.20pm may have done.
At a meeting with WMP a few days later, Dr Popper stated his intention to hear evidence up to about 3.20pm but also that “he would hear evidence for example, on the routes, the pubs, local residents etc.”
It is not clear that this was a result of WMP’s recommendation in its report of the earlier meeting. Some documents indicate that Dr Popper was already considering hearing evidence about these topics.
One of the central questions the IOPC sought to investigate in relation to WMP was whether it displayed any bias towards fellow police officers in its work. The IOPC identified one occasion in the preparation for the generic hearing where it appears ACC Jones shared information with SYP that he did not share with other parties. This was when he gave ACC Anderson a list of SYP officers who it was proposed to call as witnesses. No evidence has been found to suggest that a similar list of staff likely to be called was shown to SWFC or any other organisation.
This was one of the handful of instances identified by the IOPC across the whole of WMP’s work where ACC Jones appeared to favour SYP in some way.
Taken as a whole, the work conducted by WMP in support of the Popper Inquests was largely in line with expected standards. WMP officers went to great lengths to track the movements of those who died on the day. When Operation Resolve conducted the same exercise 25 years later for the Goldring Inquests, using more advanced technology and additional evidence, it found that a substantial share of WMP’s work on tracking movements had been accurate.
Though WMP officers advised Dr Popper, the evidence does not suggest this was inappropriate. Further, the main allegations around the Popper Inquests have not been proven. Though there were errors in some of the summaries produced for the individual inquests, these do not appear to have been deliberate. The evidence also does not support that WMP overstepped the mark in seeking to secure further statements from two key witnesses.
At the generic hearing, the jury returned a verdict of accidental death for all of the 95 who had died by this point. The evidence does not suggest that WMP had any inappropriate influence on the process, or the outcome.
