Operation Resolve’s investigation demonstrated that throughout the day of the disaster, there was a recurring issue in the way the police managed the situation: a marked lack of effective communication. This began early, when groups of officers chose to apply different tactics to those detailed in the Operational Order, without informing colleagues.
It continued as officers made their own decisions about managing supporters around the city. When PS Miller instructed that certain pubs should be closed, he didn’t advise colleagues at the Leppings Lane end that he would be escorting a large group of supporters to the stadium. He did tell the PCB, but no one passed the message on.
The PCB was not alerted to potentially significant traffic delays further afield, which could have been important in the decision about whether to delay the kick-off. Nor did officers there seek to check the situation.
Most significantly, as the crush built outside the stadium, officers inside had no idea what was happening. They therefore had no reason to be concerned about the unequal distribution of supporters between pens on the West Terrace.
This communication failure culminated in the fact that before Gate C was opened neither the PCB nor the officers inside the gate were informed, so could not prepare. While some did have access to a radio, there were well-documented problems in terms of messages breaking up or simply being inaudible due to the crowd noise. Instructions were not precise and were uncoordinated. The result was the rapid influx of supporters, who took the most logical route to their target destination: the tunnel signposted “standing” which led to the full centre pens. The consequences of this are examined in the next chapter.
