The IOPC investigated the actions of SYP in the aftermath of the disaster, from its involvement in the immediate response and media coverage, through to the way it engaged with the Taylor Inquiry, the Popper Inquests and civil litigation that resulted from the disaster. It also examined the work of West Midlands Police (WMP), which had not previously been scrutinised, as well as some other issues that resulted from the disaster. The IOPC investigation is covered in chapters 7–21 of this report.
Behind the media coverage
The tone and content of the media coverage around the disaster has caused enormous distress, primarily due to recurring allegations that the disaster had in some way been caused by the actions of Liverpool supporters. Like the Taylor Inquiry had done 25 years previously, the Goldring Inquests wholly refuted this; the IOPC has found no evidence to challenge or change that central finding. The focus of the IOPC investigation into media coverage was to try to establish the sources of this coverage—in particular, what role SYP officers played in it.
The first reports blaming Liverpool supporters came in TV and radio coverage on the afternoon of the disaster, where it was stated that supporters had forced entry to the ground. These reports were based on comments made by Ch Supt Duckenfield to FA and SWFC officials, which he has since acknowledged were lies. They were corrected the same evening by CC Wright during a press conference but still featured in newspaper articles the next day. At the Goldring Inquests in 2015, Ch Supt Duckenfield said he apologised unreservedly to the families of those who died for the lies. However, the damage his comments caused was immense and enduring.
Even more damaging and distressing reports were to come, culminating in a notorious article in The Sun which included a number of allegations about the actions of supporters. As set out in chapter 7 of this report, the IOPC examined what evidence existed around each of these allegations and can confirm that there was little or none. There is no evidence that there were large numbers of supporters present without tickets. While some officers were jostled in the rescue efforts, or faced with angry and upset supporters, there is very little evidence to indicate that any supporters attacked or struck police officers. The IOPC found no evidence to support the most lurid allegations published in The Sun about supporter behaviour.
The article in The Sun was based on material that had been published by news outlets in South Yorkshire before it was picked up by the national media. The local coverage included quotes from several police officers. This is part of the evidence that indicates that, in the days that followed, numerous police officers spoke to the media about the disaster and, in several instances, about the behaviour of supporters. However, for the most part they did so anonymously. The IOPC contacted more than 200 journalists but was unable to establish the identity of any of the officers quoted anonymously. None of the officers interviewed said they spoke to journalists in this way. Based on a comparison with the words he has used in other accounts, and the description of the officer included in the media report, the IOPC has identified that Chief Inspector David Sumner (Ch Insp Sumner) was the most likely source of one published comment, that “excessive drinking was a major contributory factor” in the disaster.
Two individuals who spoke to the media gave their names: Police Constable Paul Middup (PC Middup), who was the SYP Police Federation representative, and Irvine Patnick, then MP for Sheffield Hallam. The strong impression is that in a bid to defend police officers, both repeated stories they had been told, without checking them. At an internal meeting, CC Wright indicated his support for PC Middup’s actions; however, the IOPC did not find evidence that he was directed by SYP or that he acted as part of a coordinated effort by the force. In fact, forcewide directions were issued twice, expressly instructing officers not to speak to the media without the express permission of the Chief Constable.
CC Wright’s own interactions with the media were also subject to scrutiny, in relation to allegations that he abused his position by commenting publicly on matters that were still under investigation and that he attempted to promote a false narrative, blaming supporters. Having examined all of his interactions with the media, from the day of the disaster to the day of his retirement, the IOPC view was that he would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, as his actions were insensitive and could have prejudiced the ongoing investigations, contrary to force Standing Orders.
SYP’s attempt to deflect blame for the disaster away from the police
While there was no evidence of coordination behind the media coverage, the IOPC did find consistent patterns in the way SYP responded to the Taylor Inquiry and then prepared for the Popper Inquests.
This evidence is set out across several chapters of this report. It shows how a group of senior officers within SYP, with the assistance of the legal team appointed by the force’s insurers, presented a case that the disaster was not caused by failings on the part of SYP corporately, or on the part of individual officers.
Having collected a range of evidence, including written accounts from officers who had been on duty, SYP sought to:
minimise potential criticisms of leadership on the day
downplay the significance of changes in the police operation for the 1989 Semi-Final compared with the 1988 game
deny that SYP had any responsibility for monitoring safety in the pens
refute that there was any official police tactic to close the tunnel to the centre pens of the West Terrace, once they were full
In support of this, SYP and its legal team reviewed every officer’s account before it was submitted to WMP and the Taylor Inquiry and amended almost 1 in 4 of them. Through its comprehensive investigation with access to all accounts, the IOPC established that 327 SYP officers’ accounts were amended: 133 more than identified in the HIP Report.
Further analysis of the 327 amended accounts showed that there were 63 accounts from which criticisms of senior officers and/or police command and control were removed or reworded, although the IOPC also identified 49 accounts where such criticisms were not changed. Comments about aspects of police planning and tactics, including pre-match briefings, an apparent shortage of officers and a lack of coordination in the rescue effort were amended in 31 accounts, but left unchanged in 13.
Every reference to monitoring the pens or tunnel closure was removed from the accounts. That was despite senior officers demonstrating their knowledge of such tactics in meetings after the disaster, and SYP having successfully argued in a court case a few years previously that its officers’ role involved maintaining safety on the terraces.
Some officers objected to their accounts being amended. They were then pressured to accept the proposed changes. One of the officers involved in making the amendments was DCI Foster. He also engaged with some of the officers who resisted amending their accounts; the IOPC found he would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, for directly or indirectly pressuring them to accept the changes.
However, neither DCI Foster nor Ch Supt Denton, who has accepted overall responsibility for the amendment process, would have had a case to answer in relation to the amendment of accounts itself. This was because, as long as the amendments did not actively mislead, SYP was under no obligation to put forward evidence that might undermine the version of events the force and its legal team wanted to portray, unless that evidence was specifically requested.
The same patterns, of removing information that could suggest SYP was responsible for monitoring the pens or had previously closed the tunnel, can be seen in the 120+ page document known as a ‘proof of evidence’ the force submitted to the Taylor Inquiry, and in particular how the content related to such issues was removed or edited by the legal team in the production of the final version. There is some evidence to suggest that several SYP officers, including CC Wright, did have knowledge of previous police actions or available contingencies to close the tunnel. However, even though this material was removed from the written submission, the Taylor Inquiry heard about these actions from some SYP officers who gave evidence.
Before they gave evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, senior officers met with the legal team and agreed some appropriate answers to potential questions they may be asked or criticisms the force could face. In some cases, the answers they then gave could not have been based on their personal experience.
After the Taylor Inquiry hearings, SYP, like other parties was invited to make a closing submission. SYP’s was produced by the appointed Counsel and included numerous references to alleged drunken or disruptive behaviour by supporters, which had not been mentioned in the proof of evidence. It also asserted that no “reasonable relevant criticism can be levelled at police planning for this event.” The evidence available to SYP did not support this assertion. CC Wright and Deputy Chief Constable Peter Hayes (DCC Hayes) were reported to be “very pleased”. This indicates they were aware of its content and tone.
After SYP had agreed to settle claims for compensation relating to the disaster, it started legal proceedings against other parties involved—including SWFC and Sheffield City Council (SCC)—to request that they contributed to the costs.
SYP and its legal team again sought to minimise the available evidence about its responsibility for monitoring the pens and its previous actions to close the tunnel. At the suggestion of Mr Metcalf, four officers were asked to review the evidence they had given to the Taylor Inquiry about these issues, to see if they felt it had given the wrong impression: all refused.
Ahead of the Popper Inquests, SYP also sought to identify witnesses who could give evidence about alleged drunken behaviour by supporters, in keeping with what their solicitor described as a strategy “to bring out the issue of drink-related hooliganism.”
As detailed in the final chapter of this report, the consistency of these actions and of the case SYP advanced led the IOPC to the view that this was a deliberate attempt to deflect the blame. However, SYP was legally entitled to do this. As long as they did not actively mislead the courts or the Taylor Inquiry, neither the force nor individual officers were obliged, unless specifically requested, to put forward any information which might undermine the case SYP was seeking to present.
However, acting in this way was not in keeping with the aims of the Taylor Inquiry, to prevent such events recurring. The IOPC’s analysis found that SYP adopted a highly defensive approach and was selective in what it put forward as evidence. That was despite officers, including CC Wright, knowing from an early stage that the police bore at least some responsibility for the disaster, including for the events around the opening of Gate C.
As he was the officer with overall responsibility for his force’s approach, the IOPC was of the view that CC Wright could be deemed to have breached the Disciplinary Code for discreditable conduct. If he was still serving, he would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct in relation to this, particularly given his stated approval of SYP’s closing submission to the Taylor Inquiry.
Flaws in the work of WMP
As the police force tasked in 1989 with investigating the disaster, WMP was best placed to have gathered and presented evidence to offer a different version of events to that presented by SYP, or at least to question it.
WMP took on a series of responsibilities, starting with gathering evidence for the Taylor Inquiry. The force then conducted a criminal investigation focused on potential manslaughter, a police disciplinary investigation into complaints relating to the disaster and also supported the Popper Inquests.
WMP’s work has not previously been subject to scrutiny. The IOPC examined what WMP did, against the standards of the day, to establish whether the force demonstrated bias or in any way inappropriately influenced the outcomes of the various inquiries and investigations. The findings are summarised in chapters 14–17 of this report.
The first step in the IOPC’s investigation of WMP was a major witness appeal, asking those who had contact with the force in the aftermath of the disaster to share their experiences. This led to 118 complaints about the actions of WMP officers, predominantly around the way they interviewed supporters in the aftermath of the disaster. In total, 41 complaints about WMP were upheld, or the IOPC found that the officers would have had a case to answer.
Further investigation of these complaints found that, while there were several occasions where WMP officers did not show sufficient compassion for traumatised and vulnerable witnesses—leading to complaints being upheld—most officers did attempt to conduct this challenging task with professionalism and sensitivity. Though the evidence indicates that there were instances where WMP officers introduced significant inaccuracies when writing up some witness accounts, again leading to some complaints being upheld, the IOPC did not find that this was a recurring or widespread issue.
Many supporters interviewed by WMP recalled being questioned extensively about their alcohol consumption on the day, and about whether others were drinking. However, the questionnaires and statements WMP completed with supporters included very few responses or comments about alcohol consumption. When supporters either found their accounts on the HIP website or were shown them by the IOPC, they were surprised not to see such information in them.
Senior WMP officers have stated to the IOPC that they believe it was appropriate to ask questions about alcohol consumption in the questionnaire. It was identified early as a necessary line of enquiry, particularly given the media coverage.
The IOPC fundamentally accepts that, in a set of circumstances where alcohol consumption had been publicly and widely identified within days of the disaster as a potential causative factor, it was necessary to ask supporters about this. The fact that it has since been established that the reports of alcohol consumption were exaggerated and that it had no bearing on the events does not change this.
Even though the line of enquiry was relevant, this would not have justified asking supporters aggressively or insistently about the subject. Further, the questions included on the questionnaire appear of limited value in addressing the issue. They offered no insight into whether any alcohol consumption that was witnessed was different from normal. In short, WMP investigated this important topic ineffectively.
WMP also did not interview SYP officers at all. Instead, it chose to rely on the amended accounts submitted by SYP. While this may have been a matter of necessity due to the tight timings of the Taylor Inquiry, when WMP senior officers were alerted to the fact that SYP officers’ accounts were being amended before SYP submitted them, they took no action to check the process or stop it. Instead, Assistant Chief Constable Mervyn Jones (ACC Jones) of WMP, who was leading the work for the Taylor Inquiry, wrote to CC Wright to inform him that officers had expressed concerns about the process.
Further, WMP then continued to rely on these accounts as primary evidence in the criminal investigation, even though in the case file submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), WMP made clear that such accounts were not admissible as evidence for a prosecution.
This was one of several areas identified by the IOPC where WMP’s criminal investigation appeared inexplicably narrow. Between August 1989 and March 1990, it completed just 76 additional actions, beyond the work already undertaken for the Taylor Inquiry, related to lines of enquiry for the criminal investigation. This was an astonishingly limited number for a manslaughter investigation of this size. WMP also delayed interviewing the suspects until after it submitted the file of evidence, and when it did, belatedly, interview the suspects, the interviews were conducted poorly, when measured against the expected professional standards of the day.
The IOPC has further established that the file WMP submitted to the DPP did not accurately reflect the totality of the underlying evidence that WMP had at its disposal. In the section of the file where Detective Chief Superintendent Michael Foster (D Ch Supt Foster) analysed the evidence submitted, he included repeated references to the behaviour of supporters and how much alcohol had been consumed. Unlike other investigations, including the Taylor Inquiry and the Goldring Inquests, he indicated that supporters’ behaviour had affected the events and cited it as a mitigating factor against prosecutions.
Further evidence identified by the IOPC, in the form of a memo he sent to ACC Jones after Counsel to the Taylor Inquiry had made his closing submission in July 1989, indicate that by that stage D Ch Supt Foster had already concluded that alcohol was a key factor in the disaster, and that the Taylor Inquiry did not consider it sufficiently. It appears that he then approached the criminal investigation with this fixed view of the evidence.
The IOPC reached the view that both ACC Jones and D Ch Supt Foster would have had a case to answer for gross misconduct, for failing to investigate SYP effectively and for not intervening in SYP’s account amendment process. Further, D Ch Supt Foster would have had a case to answer for not submitting all relevant evidence to the DPP and for failing to investigate the competence of SYP’s match commander.
Importantly, the IOPC did not find any evidence of an instruction from SYP or any external party to WMP to focus on alcohol consumption or the behaviour of supporters, or to deflect blame from the police. There was no evidence that indicated the flaws in WMP’s investigations were the result of a wider ‘establishment’ cover-up.
The need for a change in the law
The public, understandably, expects that the police will act in an open, honest and transparent way, including when police officers and forces face inquiries and investigations into their actions. The basic assumption is that they should assist the search for the truth in every way and not conceal or omit relevant documents and facts, even if such facts paint the police or individual officers in a bad light.
The aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster shows the consequences when this does not happen. It served as the catalyst for a longstanding campaign for justice, involving families of those who died, survivors of the disaster and others, who correctly recognised that the whole truth had not emerged. This in turn led to a series of investigations and re-examinations of the events, prolonging the trauma and distress for decades, for the families of those who died, for individuals under investigation and for all those who attended the match in any capacity. Public confidence in the police and the justice system has been damaged and the costs to the public purse have been substantial.
It is in this context that the IOPC has supported proposals to introduce a stronger duty of candour for all public servants, including police officers. The Public Office (Accountability) Bill, introduced to Parliament in 2025, includes a positive duty for all public officials, including police officers, to engage with candour, transparency and frankness in their dealings with investigations and inquiries. If they do not, they risk criminal sanctions. This is in addition to the duty to cooperate with investigations and inquiries set out in Schedule 1 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 and the duty of candour for police chief officers introduced in December 2023 as part of a new Code of Practice for Ethical Policing.
If this stronger duty had been in force in 1989, it may have helped bring the full facts of what occurred to light far sooner. The years and costs of multiple investigations could have been avoided, and most importantly the families of those who were unlawfully killed in the Hillsborough disaster would have experienced a far less traumatic fight for answers about what happened to their loved ones.
