With a hole already made in the fence, there was no longer a need for the cutting equipment brought by the fire service. Several SYCFS officers have said that when they arrived and asked where they were required, the initial response from the police was to suggest they weren’t needed. Other police officers could offer no direction or information. The SYCFS officers decided to go into the stadium anyway; when they saw the situation, they recognised the most useful way they could assist was with resuscitation and first aid.
Station Officer Brian Fletcher (SO Fletcher) was the day shift station officer at Sheffield Central Fire Station, from where three SYCFS vehicles had been dispatched. In a statement made in 2013, he said that due to the large number of casualties, he decided to go to the PCB to find out who was in charge and to see if there was a designated area for casualties. When he got there, he was told that Ch Supt Duckenfield (who he knew) was in charge, but away at that time. They were unable to provide him with any information, so he “decided to return back to the pitch area to set up my own casualty handling area.”
It appears this was at the time Ch Supt Duckenfield was visiting the SWFC boardroom, as discussed at paragraph 5.171.
In his 1989 account, SO Fletcher said that he instructed the SYCFS drivers to set up a casualty handling area behind the South Stand, as he knew there was access to that area, and to organise the ambulances when they arrived. He also arranged for his officers to provide first aid wherever necessary. He estimated that about 20–30 people were taken to the SYCFS casualty handling area on makeshift stretchers.
Station Officer Robert Horner, from a different fire station, described how he and his crew went straight onto the pitch when they arrived, bringing resuscitation equipment. He said that he and his crew spread out among the casualties to provide treatment and resuscitation where necessary. He recalled asking “two senior police officers if those spectators not injured in any way could be moved out of the congestion to enable those endeavouring to give assistance more room to work, the reply was 'we have already tried to do this'.” He commented: “Police co-ordination and control seemed to be non-existent on the playing area.”
The on-call SYCFS Divisional Officer David Lockwood arrived at the stadium at 3.24pm and assumed command of the fire service response. He too was unable to find a senior police officer, so went to the PCB and introduced himself. He said: “I didn't receive any direction from anyone in the police box as to what they wanted me to do.”
The evidence of the SYCFS personnel who arrived at Hillsborough Stadium is highly consistent. All highlighted a lack of direction or instruction when they arrived, with police officers apparently surprised at the arrival of the fire service and having no idea why SYCFS had been called. This reinforces the lack of communication between the PCB—which had requested the fire service attend with cutting equipment—and the rest of the police officers on duty. When SYCFS officers sought to identify and speak to the SYP officers in command of the situation, they were unable to do so.
Some SYCFS officers have described similar difficulties in engaging with SYMAS teams on site.
In the absence of any direction from the other emergency services, the SYCFS officers sought to assist as best they could, predominantly by providing first aid, making use of their resuscitation equipment and organising aspects of the triage and casualty clearance response. They took numerous practical steps from clearing the pitch to aiding the movement of ambulances and providing advice to supporters. The one thing they had been specifically called to provide—cutting equipment—proved not to be needed.
By 3.10pm, a huge number of police officers were involved in the rescue effort. Figure 5J shows the situation at 15:11:30. Numerous officers had climbed on the perimeter fence; some were in Pen 2, to the left of the photo. Many more were on the pitch. Some supporters were also on the fence; others were being helped into the West Stand above and still more were climbing the radial fences between pens.
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Figure 5J: View of the West Terrace, 15:11:30 (Source: BBC)
Figure 5K, taken at 3.11pm, shows the chaotic nature of the response from a different angle. While some officers were predominantly engaged at the exit gates, others were standing further back from the fence, appearing unsure how to help. Some may have been part of a cordon. The photograph offers no sign of a coordinated rescue effort.
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Figure 5K: The front of the West Terrace, 3.11pm (Source: SYP)
It was around this time that Ch Supt Nesbit arrived at the Leppings Lane end. Ch Supt Nesbit was the head of the SYP Traffic Division. In an account from 1989, he explained that he had been on patrol in Sheffield city centre and arrived at Hillsborough Stadium shortly after the referee had stopped the match. His arrival was not in response to the call for Operation Support. When he got to the gymnasium, Insp Sewell told him they were evacuating the West Terrace and that supporters had been injured.
Ch Supt Nesbit went onto the pitch at the Spion Kop end and saw what he first thought to be a pitch invasion. However, he then spotted that some of the supporters climbing over the perimeter fence were being assisted by police officers. In his 1989 account, he said that as he approached the goal area, he saw that the perimeter track was filled with police officers and supporters, and that a number of casualties were being attended to by SJA personnel and uniformed police officers.
He said that when he reached the front of Pen 3, “to my horror I could see bodies piled on top of each other with other spectators being pressed against the fencing.” He said that Gate 3 was open but blocked by two supporters who were unable to move; he assumed they had died. He instructed officers to try to move them, to free the gateway.
He quickly realised that “Police Officers and spectators in their endeavours to help, were getting in each others way.” He instructed officers to form a chain onto the pitch, so that casualties could be pulled out and carried away from the pens.
This approach began to create some order in the rescue effort. Figure 5L shows the scene at 15:20:24. By this time, Supt Greenwood was standing on what appears to be a stepladder with a loud hailer in his hand. Ch Supt Nesbit was in the open gateway, attempting to pull people out of Pen 3. There were fewer supporters at the gate, with the police taking control of the rescue operation.
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Figure 5L: The front of Pen 3, as viewed from the West Stand, 15:20:24 (Source: BBC)
The more organised response at the gates was assisted by having increased access to the pens. In a statement from 2014, Inspector Richard Dews recalled that shortly after Ch Supt Nesbit arrived at Gate 3, he saw police officers and supporters kicking and pulling the wire of the perimeter fence back to create another escape route. He said that he radioed the PCB and asked for bolt cutters to assist in cutting the mesh.
At 15:13:09, the Racal system recorded a radio transmission from the PCB to the Force Control Room, requesting that SYCFS be contacted to attend the stadium with cutting equipment. The Force Control Room promptly contacted their counterparts at SYCFS and requested this, but they were still unable to provide SYCFS with details of what had happened. However, the Force Control Room operator did refer to there having been a “major accident” and later in the conversation “a major incident inside the ground”, even though one had not been formally declared, and they did not have the knowledge or authority to do so. In accordance with the SYCFS Major Incident Contingency Procedures, SYCFS dispatched six standard fire engines, a control unit and an emergency tender (a vehicle designed to carry extra water supplies) to Hillsborough Stadium.
The first of these did not reach Hillsborough Stadium until 3.22pm. By this time, supporters and police officers had managed to bend back a small section of the perimeter fence at the front of Pen 3, adjacent to the radial fence with Pen 4. This created an additional escape route from the pens, through which officers and supporters worked to free more people. The impact of this is shown in figure 5M, taken from BBC footage a few minutes later at 15:26:28. By this time, large numbers of officers were inside Pen 3, both at Gate 3 to the right-hand side of the ambulance and at the newly created break in the perimeter fencing, at the bottom left of the image.
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Figure 5M: The rescue effort aided by the hole in the perimeter fence, 15:26.28 (Source: BBC)
After alerting the other emergency services to a major incident, one of the next crucial steps is to coordinate the other services. SYP took no steps to do this or to achieve a common understanding of the situation. This was demonstrated when SYMAS did not immediately dispatch the requested “fleet of ambulances.”
At 15:08:01, SO Higgins informed SYMAS Control that there were casualties and asked for the ambulance that was already on standby to be sent to the gymnasium entrance of the ground. In his 1989 account, SO Higgins said SYMAS Control asked him whether this was the same incident that the police had notified them of. He said that he simply confirmed the location and told them that they would need to access the pitch from the gymnasium end of the ground. He then began to treat other casualties at the ambulance.
At 3.09pm, the Racal system recorded a phone call from the SYP Force Control Room to SYMAS Control, reiterating that they wanted as many ambulances as possible on site immediately. SYMAS replied that one was on its way, and they would assess the situation. In his 1989 account, SYMAS Supt Clarke said that at this point, he assessed how many ambulances SYMAS would require to maintain normal duty cover and then arranged for the remaining eight vehicles to go to Hillsborough Stadium.
In a statement dated 8 May 1989, Deputy Chief Ambulance Officer Alan Hopkins (DCAO Hopkins) recalled that he was in the SYMAS Control Room on an unrelated matter when SYP telephoned and asked for a fleet of ambulances to attend the Leppings Lane end of Hillsborough Stadium. He said that he knew the liaison officers inside the ground would have difficulty getting out to Leppings Lane to report what was happening there, so he left the SYMAS Control Room to go to the ground. On his way out, he met Assistant Divisional Officer Rodger Morley (ADO Morley), and they set off for the stadium together. While they were on their way to the stadium, he could hear SYMAS Control sending multiple vehicles to the stadium. He said he told ADO Morley to radio SYMAS Control to instruct all ambulances to make themselves available for redeployment to Hillsborough Stadium as soon as possible, particularly those in the Sheffield area.
At 3.11pm, SYMAS Control radioed SO Higgins to ask for an update. He advised them that there were a number of people on the pitch, but that they were “probably just winded”. Then at 15:12:08, SYMAS Control contacted him again to say they had received reports from the police that “There could be quite a number crushed.” SYMAS Control asked SO Higgins to look into this. At 15:13:54, he advised them that there was a possibility that some people had died. He suggested that ambulances should not be directed to the Leppings Lane entrance but should come to the gymnasium, which was where he then headed.
At 15:14:19, the first SYMAS ambulance arrived at Hillsborough Stadium. It drove through the outer perimeter gates at Leppings Lane and stopped outside Gate C. The ambulance team recalled police officers giving them no direction; one said the officers seemed surprised at their presence “and were not aware that ambulances had been requested.”
They were about to go into the ground when Gate C opened, and they met a group of supporters carrying a casualty with a chest injury. The casualty was taken to the ambulance for treatment. As they were dealing with the first casualty, more supporters began to spill onto the inner concourse from the central tunnel. At the same time, police officers entered the stadium through Gate C, which was open. The scene became increasingly chaotic.
Supporters and officers began to carry casualties out of the tunnel and either laid them on the ground on the inner concourse or took them through Gate C to the ambulance that was parked there. Supt Marshall later recalled that police officers tried to take casualties out to the service road. He said the casualties “…were there separated into three groups – those apparently dead, those seriously injured, and those less seriously hurt.”
While ambulances were arriving on the service road, with the number of casualties on the pitch increasing, police officers in front of the West Terrace became concerned about the lack of ambulances at their location.
Supt Greenwood dispatched a detective sergeant to ask the SJA ambulance to come to the West Terrace. The detective sergeant recalled that this took some persuasion, but at 15:15:29, the ambulance was driven onto the pitch from the vehicle access ramp at the north-east corner of the ground. It continued along the side of the pitch; BBC footage shows it coming to a stop near Gate 3 about two minutes later.
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Figure 5I: The SJA ambulance arriving on the pitch (Source: BBC)
There were still no signs of SYMAS ambulances on the pitch. More had arrived close to the stadium, but due to limited access had parked a short distance away and gone to assess the scene. At 15:18:42, a qualified ambulance officer (QAO) from the crew that had been dispatched at 3.05pm used the radio from the ambulance that was already at Gate C to inform SYMAS Control that this was a major incident. SYMAS Control did not pass the message on.
In his 1989 account, the same QAO then described the efforts being made by police officers, SYMAS staff and others to resuscitate supporters and help casualties into the ambulance. He observed: “During this time I did not see any sort of command and control structure anywhere around the ground. I saw a lot of police officers but no one seemed to be in control. All the officers I saw were busy treating casualties.”
This was correct; the police had taken no steps to coordinate the medical response or triage the injured, focusing on rescue and in some cases resuscitation. While both tasks were vital, this meant that the available medical resources were not used as effectively as they could have been. The PCB for example could have identified an officer to oversee triage but did not.
Instead, its focus was on the lack of response from SYMAS. At 15:19:48, a message was sent to ask the Force Control Room to confirm the situation. The PCB operator said they needed at least 20 ambulances, but at present there were only three, all of which were near Gate C. At 15:20:47, the first SYMAS ambulance arrived on the pitch.
Though the number of casualties was still uncertain, at 15:21:26, SO Higgins advised SYMAS Control that was this a major incident. SYMAS Control assured SO Higgins that nine or ten vehicles were on their way to the stadium but still did not inform the other emergency services.
In his 1989 statement, SO Higgins recalled that at 3.23pm DCAO Hopkins and ADO Morley arrived and parked next to his ambulance. SYMAS Divisional Superintendent Trevor Dale arrived shortly after. This meant that several senior SYMAS staff were now on site. More ambulances followed shortly after.
SO Higgins said he told DCAO Hopkins that 30–40 supporters had died and many more were injured; DCAO Hopkins ran down to the pitch to see what was happening for himself.
In his own account, DCAO Hopkins said he returned almost immediately and told ADO Morley to contact SYMAS Control to get the major incident vehicle and ambulances to go to the Penistone Road end of the ground.
ADO Morley recalled that the matchday ambulance was parked on the vehicle access ramp with its rear doors wide open, but there were no wheeled stretchers inside and there were no SYMAS staff with it. He commented: “the whole area of the entrance off Penistone Road was bedlam at the time.” He then began to organise the arriving ambulances to receive casualties.
SWFC CCTV footage timed at 15:28:00 captures the first SYMAS ambulance departing from Gate C taking casualties to hospital. Rather than reversing out, it went along the service road behind the South Stand towards Penistone Road.
By this stage, several of the tasks that formed SYP’s Major Incident Plan had been undertaken but none of this was done in a controlled or systematic way. In his expert report for the Goldring Inquests dated 29 November 2013, paramedic David Whitmore observed that SYMAS staff had been left to act on their own initiative and without any formal command and control in place. He added that SJA staff had also been left “largely to their own devices.”
Operation Resolve found no evidence to suggest that the police coordinated the activity of the other emergency services or SJA volunteers. Instead, the evidence highlights a lack of communication and coordination, particularly between SYP and SYMAS.
At 15:31:38, a radio message was sent from the PCB to the SYP Force Control Room, asking for SYMAS Control to be contacted so that the senior SYMAS officer could be sent to the PCB. While such coordination would have been desirable, this request from the PCB was almost 24 minutes after the initial request from the PCB for a fleet of ambulances, and almost ten minutes after DCAO Hopkins and ADO Morley had arrived at the ground. The ambulance operation was by this stage underway, taking casualties to hospitals. In short, the request was too late.
No evidence has been found to suggest that SYP took any action to locate the senior ambulance officer at the ground in an effort to coordinate the rescue activity.
At around 3.08pm, ACC Jackson arrived at the PCB from his seat in the South Stand. In his 1989 account, ACC Jackson said that when he got to the PCB, he spoke to Ch Supt Duckenfield, who was unable to explain what had happened, so decided to go down to the pitch to see what the problem was.
In evidence to the Taylor Inquiry, ACC Jackson said that on the pitch he spoke to Supt Greenwood who told him there were injuries. He could also see that a rescue effort was underway. He said he went back to the PCB and was asked what he intended to do there. He replied: “The first thing in my mind was to ensure that sufficient ambulances had been called and also it was clearly a necessity to implement the major incident procedure.”
In his 1989 account, ACC Jackson said that on his return to the PCB, he was made aware that a fleet of ambulances had been requested. He said: “Because of the seriousness of the situation and together with Chief Superintendent Duckenfield we gave instructions to the Control Room Staff for implementation of the major disaster plan.”
While this may have been his intention, a range of evidence shows that SYP did not follow the correct procedure for implementing its Major Incident Plan (or major disaster plan).
In his 1989 account, Ch Supt Duckenfield said that as a result of the request for a fleet of ambulances, he had become aware of the gravity of the situation. He said: “I then began to give instructions to the Control Room staff in conjunction with Mr Jackson for the implementation of the Major Disaster Plan.”
He further stated: “I asked for the Casualty Bureau to be set up, to warn hospitals of the large number of injuries, any doctors in the ground to Leppings Lane goal for deployment, off duty police officers to be called to duty and rendezvous at Hammerton Road Police Station. Mr Jackson supplemented my requests, asking Superintendent Torr to attend in respect of the Casualty Bureau; Detective Chief Superintendent Addis to attend to co-ordinate the investigation side of the enquiry. I asked for a Counselling Service and Victims Support Staff.”
Ch Supt Duckenfield's 1989 account gave the impression that he remained in control and issued a series of orders, with ACC Jackson supporting the process. However, in 2015, Ch Supt Duckenfield gave evidence over seven days to the Goldring Inquests. During extensive questioning by barristers representing different groups and organisations, he conceded that, having given the order to open the gates, he froze. The evidence of the other officers in the PCB tends to support this admission and indicates that they, and other officers at the ground, were increasingly acting on their own initiative.
The presence of ACC Jackson in the PCB meant the Force Control Room could ask for his authorisation for Operation Support, which was promptly given. The Force Control Room then issued the call for Operation Support at 3.10pm. At 15:17:01, the PCB asked SYP Force Control Room to contact the Northern General and Royal Hallamshire Hospitals.
However, despite the accounts of both ACC Jackson and Ch Supt Duckenfield that they intended to initiate the “major disaster plan”, there is no evidence that at any point SYP declared a major incident.
This was a critical omission. The declaration of a major incident immediately informs all emergency services of the severity and scale of what has happened. It therefore demands a comprehensive response from the emergency services, who are obliged to take it on trust from those declaring the major incident that their services are required. Further, once declared, it requires a coordinated multi-agency response, which should be led by the police, as clearly stated in SYP’s Major Incident Manual.
There were clear procedures in place in South Yorkshire for the declaration of a major incident, using an agreed code word, ‘Catastrophe’, to provide an unambiguous alert to all emergency services of the severity of the situation. Operation Resolve has found no evidence in Racal transcripts, or in the accounts of other emergency services or police officers who were on the pitch, to show that a major incident was declared, or that the code word was used.
The evidence shows that Ch Supt Duckenfield and ACC Jackson implemented certain aspects of the Major Incident Plan at the time the call for Operation Support was made. For example, instructions were issued for the Casualty Bureau to be set up, and for hospitals to be warned about the disaster. The instruction to set up a Casualty Bureau features as a consideration in both the Major Incident Plan and the actions to be taken after the call for Operation Support.
While some aspects of the SYP Major Incident Plan were initiated, they were not coordinated. Others within SYP were not informed that these actions were being implemented as part of a bigger response.
Ch Supt Duckenfield told the Taylor Inquiry that while in the PCB, he “gave the instructions to activate the Major Incident Plan.” He was then asked what instructions he had given. He replied: “Only in general terms that we would require ambulances”.
At the Goldring Inquests on 10 March 2015, Counsel to the Inquests asked Ch Supt Duckenfield about his knowledge of the SYP Major Incident Manual. Ch Supt Duckenfield confirmed that he was aware that it stated that the police were in control of the response to a major incident, and of the various roles and responsibilities described in the document. He said he understood how important it was to declare a major incident as soon as possible and to ensure that all of the emergency services worked in accordance with the major incident plans and procedures.
However, when asked specifically whether he knew the code word 'Catastrophe', he conceded that at the time of the disaster he did not.
In his original account from 1989, ACC Jackson wrote that, when he was in the PCB with Ch Supt Duckenfield, they instructed the PCB staff to implement the Major Incident Plan because of the seriousness of the situation. In a criminal and discipline interview under caution conducted by WMP on 28 June 1990, he was asked whether he was surprised that there was no record of the activation of the Major Incident Plan. He said he wasn’t and suggested that when he confirmed that Operation Support should be called for and that a fleet of ambulances was required, officers would immediately implement the Major Incident Plan.
There was no guidance anywhere that suggested a major incident should or would be activated automatically if a request was made for both Operation Support and ambulances.
ACC Jackson told the Goldring Inquests that he believed either he or Ch Supt Duckenfield had declared a major incident. However, he accepted that communication records showed that no one actually used those words. He said he also regretted the fact that he never used the word 'Catastrophe', adding that he was aware that if he had, then everyone would have known the severity of the incident they were dealing with. He accepted the suggestion that he simply assumed that officers in the Force Control Room would implement the Major Incident Plan based on what the officers at the ground were saying. While Chief Inspector Malcolm Edmundson in the Force Control Room ultimately did inform the other emergency services there was a major incident, he was acting independently and had insufficient information to work from.
SYP's Major Incident Manual made it clear that the first essential action in the event of a major incident was to alert the other emergency services. In this instance, it did not take place. Further, the evidence not only indicates that neither ACC Jackson nor Ch Supt Duckenfield called a major incident, but that they did not instruct anyone else to do so either. This meant that even though Ch Supt Duckenfield and ACC Jackson had recognised there was a major incident, the other emergency services were still not aware.
Officers responding to the call for Operation Support had still not been given any clear indication of the situation they were attending, and those in areas such as the Casualty Bureau had not been given a clear picture either.
This persistent lack of effective communication was therefore a substantial failure of SYP’s emergency response, and one of the reasons for the IOPC reaching the view that Ch Supt Duckenfield and ACC Jackson would have had a case to answer for neglect of duty.
During this period, FA officials Graham Kelly and Glen Kirton also visited the PCB to find out what was going on. Though there is no recording of what was said, Ch Supt Duckenfield led them to understand that a gate had been forced by Liverpool supporters. When speaking to the BBC shortly after, Mr Kelly repeated this explanation of what had happened. Ch Supt Duckenfield has since acknowledged it was a lie. The consequences of this lie in terms of public perceptions of the disaster are considered further in chapter 7.
At around this time, PS Morgan arrived on the perimeter track having responded to the radio requests for assistance. In his 1989 account, he said that as he arrived, he saw Supt Murray, who seemed deeply shocked and told him simply to “do whatever you can”. PS Morgan said that as he reached the pens, he immediately saw the horror of the situation but also noted a lack of organisation in the police response: “I quickly realised that I would be able to achieve very little if I remained on the track. A lot of officers were standing looking at the scene in stunned disbelief”. He decided to enter the centre pens from the tunnel at the rear, so that he could get supporters to move back, or out, and reduce the crush. He ordered some officers to come with him.
He found no problems getting through the tunnel but when he reached the pens, spectators and police officers there appeared to have no idea what was happening. He went into the pens and tried to persuade supporters to leave. He said: “I was obliged to grab each person and haul them backwards, just shouting, ‘Get out’ to each one as I progressed towards the front. Many were in deep shock and resisted me, pulling away and refusing to co-operate. The crowd was not densely packed and I was able to move quite freely.”
While PS Morgan’s actions may have had some positive impact, they were not coordinated with any other part of the rescue effort, and he did not communicate his intent to the PCB or any senior officer. Other officers also took action without seeking to coordinate them, adding to the sense of disorganisation at the heart of the police response.
The SJA and SYMAS staff present at this stage were those who had been at the stadium before kick-off. The accounts of several of the SJA volunteers stationed in corners of the ground indicate that they saw supporters coming out of the pens—either through gates or over the fence—but were initially unsure what was happening. As they got closer, they realised that supporters were being crushed; they began to treat casualties as best they could. They did so without any specific instruction from the police.
Two SYMAS officers were on their usual duty at the stadium: Station Officer Paul Eason (SO Eason) and Station Officer Patrick Higgins (SO Higgins). They were supported by Qualified Ambulance Officer Stephen Chippendale (QAO Chippendale) and Qualified Ambulance Officer Leslie Worrall. They were standing near their ambulance which was parked close to the gymnasium, the designated casualty treatment area at the stadium.
In a 1989 account, SO Eason said that at about 3.03pm, he saw what he believed to be a scuffle taking place in the middle of the West Terrace. He and QAO Chippendale walked along the perimeter track past the North Stand to investigate. As they got closer, they saw that several supporters were on the pitch and some seemed injured. SO Eason tried to radio SO Higgins to bring a stretcher and first aid equipment but couldn’t get through.
At 15:05:48, when Supt Greenwood was on the pitch, SO Higgins contacted SYMAS Control. He advised them that there were some crowd problems and that one or two may be injured, but he thought the injuries could be slight.
In short, SYMAS officers did not recognise the severity of the situation at the West Terrace any sooner than the police. They were positioned further away from the pens than the police, but even on arrival in front of the West Terrace they did not immediately identify that there were large numbers of casualties.
Very soon after SO Higgins had contacted SYMAS Control, the SYP Force Control Room did too. This was after the PCB had requested Operation Support. Recordings show that Police Constable Kenneth Rook (PC Rook) in the Force Control Room at first told SYMAS: “There's been an incident at the Leppings Lane End at the Hillsborough Football ground, where we may—we may need a few ambulances. It's just an advisory at this stage. There's been pushing and shoving and there might have been quite a few injuries.”
However, while PC Rook was speaking to SYMAS Superintendent Raymond Clarke (Supt Clarke), who was on duty in SYMAS Control, the SYP Force Control Room received an urgent radio request from the PCB for “a fleet of ambulances”. This was timed at 15:07:15 and followed Supt Murray’s message from the pitch.
The recording of the conversation between PC Rook and SYMAS Control shows that he passed this request on verbatim. Though PC Rook was not able to provide full details, he stated there were a lot of people injured. Supt Clarke replied that they would instigate an initial response and assess the situation.
Several of those who were closest to the perimeter gates have described how the combination of the crowd pressure, the narrow gates and the general level of panic slowed their ability to free supporters.
PS Swift recalled that Gate 4 only opened 90 degrees to form a right angle to the fence. He said that as a result “only two Officers of [sic] a time could efficiently work at pulling people free by approaching from the front and the left hand side. In our obvious frantic efforts to assist we were inevitably getting in each other's way.”
Police Constable Adrian Taylor at Gate 3 had similar issues: “The gate was so narrow, with the gate opening outwards onto the field, it prevented assistance from the right and a lean to support on the left gate pillar prevented assistance from the left of the gate. Three officers or supporters could only enter the gateway at one time to pull because of the tight space.”
He also highlighted further challenges: “The step up from the centre south enclosure caused people to trip over, falling to the ground, then on top of each other. The gate became eight deep in fallen people, so tightly packed that they could not be pulled free. As one supporter was pulled free your momentum followed the supporter back onto the field, other supporters and officers then took your place at the gate pulling.”
Police Constable Martin Cooper was also at Gate 3, and he recalled that a further problem occurred if a supporter became stuck in the gateway for any reason. As some were unconscious, this happened on a few occasions.
At first, injured supporters were carried onto the pitch where officers, SJA volunteers and SYMAS staff—as well as fellow supporters—attempted to provide first aid or resuscitate them. This became a chaotic scene, with many people present and little organisation, as can be seen in figure 5H.
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Figure 5H: The scene in front of the West Terrace, 15:07:04 (Source: SYP)
At 15:05:37—within a few seconds of the referee stopping the match—the Racal system recorded a message from the PCB to the Force Control Room calling for Operation Support to be initiated. Operation Support was a documented contingency under which all available SYP officers would be immediately deployed to assist with an incident. It was generally understood to be used in response to incidents of large-scale disorder.
In his 1989 account, Ch Supt Duckenfield said that he called for Operation Support and evidence has not been found to suggest that anyone else was responsible for the initial request.
Because implementing Operation Support would have a significant impact on operations within the SYP area, the decision to do so required authorisation from the ACC (Operations) or the designated duty chief officer. As ACC Jackson was at Hillsborough Stadium on 15 April 1989, he was in a position to give such authorisation, but he was not in the PCB at the time it was first requested. He arrived a couple of minutes later, of his own volition rather than as a result of a request from the PCB, and authorised Operation Support at 15:09:07.
At about the same time that the request for Operation Support was made, the PCB sent a radio message instructing all available officers at the ground to make their way to the perimeter track at the Leppings Lane end. The message has not been recorded anywhere, but numerous officers have described hearing it. SWFC CCTV footage suggests that the radio message was broadcast at about 15:05:41, as it shows that a number of police officers were standing outside Gate C at that time; they promptly made their way through the gate into the stadium.
Though officers responded immediately, they did not know what they were responding to. Some indicated that the message referred to crowd trouble or disorder; others just assumed this was the explanation. When they saw supporters on the pitch, this appeared to confirm their views.
Inspector John Beresford (Insp Beresford) was dispatched from the gymnasium with Serial 21, to help deal with unspecified “trouble” at the Leppings Lane end. He saw spectators on the pitch and others climbing the fence, but when he arrived at the corner of the North Stand and West Terrace, he could not see the cause. In his 1989 account, he said: “The only police action which seemed obvious to me was to form an open cordon across the touch line from the northwest corner flag towards the goal mouth.” Though Insp Beresford did not explicitly state the purpose of forming such a cordon, it is a relatively standard police tactic to manage the movement of a crowd. On this occasion, the logical reason for establishing one would have been to prevent a pitch invasion.
CCTV footage at 15:06:19 shows Insp Beresford appearing to organise officers into a cordon. However, in his 2013 statement, Insp Beresford recalled that as he neared the goalmouth, he realised that supporters were injured and that “this was no pitch invasion but a rescue operation.” He said his officers quickly left the cordon to assist in different ways.
BBC footage shows the cordon being formed at around 3.06pm but becoming fragmented by about 3.13pm. By 3.16pm, it had fully dispersed.
The formation of this cordon, and others in different locations later, have been the subject of complaints from supporters, on the basis that officers should have been engaged in more practical assistance. The evidence suggests that officers in the cordons felt the same way; they had responded on limited information and followed instructions, but once they saw what has happening, many chose to leave the cordon to assist in the rescue effort.
However, there is also evidence of a further issue emerging: that officers, lacking instruction or coordination, were getting in each other’s way in their frantic rescue efforts.
