Hillsborough investigation
We launched an independent investigation into police actions in the aftermath of the disaster one month after the findings of the Hillsborough Independent Panel (HIP) were published in 2012. The HIP concluded that no Liverpool supporters were responsible in any way for the disaster, and supported the Taylor Inquiry finding that the main cause was a “failure of police control”. A second investigation, titled Operation Resolve, was responsible for investigating the actions of all the organisations involved in the disaster. To ensure independent oversight and scrutiny, the elements of the Operation Resolve investigation relating to the police have been managed by us.
The Hillsborough Disaster - The report of the IOPC and Operation Resolve investigations
We published our report of the IOPC and Operation Resolve investigations in December 2025. It explores the circumstances surrounding the Hillsborough disaster, including matters that have not previously been investigated, and summarises the key findings from the investigations across 21 chapters.A snapshot of our investigations
The publication of the HIP Report, and the conclusion of the Goldring Inquests that all those who died were unlawfully killed, were pivotal moments in the campaign for justice and finally established the truth that families and survivors of the disaster had fought so hard for. Although our remit was different to that of the HIP, the findings of our investigations align with their conclusions relating to the actions of the police. We gathered and examined a vast amount of new evidence, which has allowed us to add more detail in support of those findings.
Based on the evidence examined in our investigations, we agree that there were fundamental failures by South Yorkshire Police (SYP) in both the planning for the match and the policing of it, as well as in its response to the disaster as it unfolded. In the aftermath, we found considerable evidence that SYP did not give sufficient priority to the need for openness and transparency. Instead, it adopted a defensive approach and sought to control the evidence submitted to the Taylor Inquiry and West Midlands Police in an attempt to deflect the blame from the police.
Like the HIP Report and the Goldring Inquests, we found no evidence to support police accounts to the media, the Taylor Inquiry and both sets of inquests, which suggested that the behaviour of supporters caused or in any way contributed to the disaster.
We also examined the actions of West Midlands Police (WMP), which had been tasked with investigating the disaster and supporting the Taylor Inquiry. We found this investigation to be wholly unsatisfactory and inexplicably narrow.
We investigated 352 complaints and conduct matters related to the disaster and its aftermath. Each complaint and conduct matter was investigated in line with our legal duties, using all the available evidence and applying the relevant legal tests and police professional standards in place at the time.
We have only been able to uphold complaints or give an opinion for misconduct where the available evidence met the legal thresholds we must apply. However, just over half of complainants have had at least one complaint upheld or, in our opinion, there would have been a case to answer for misconduct for one or more officers, had they remained serving. Our work has been restricted by the challenges of investigating events so long after they occurred.
We were required to assess complaints against the police professional standards at the time of the disaster. These were very different to the standards in place today, which are also supported by a Code of Ethics for policing.
In addition, the legislation in place at the time means that officers who left the police service before 15 December 2017 cannot face disciplinary proceedings, regardless of our findings. We are only allowed to record an opinion on whether an officer would have had a case to answer, if they had still been serving.
When we started our investigations in 2013, a significant amount of evidence had been retained, recovered and reviewed and we were able to use, and add to, the evidence collected by the HIP and used at the Goldring Inquests. However, some records were missing and it was difficult gathering witnesses’ testimonies so long after the events. Unfortunately, some people could not be traced, some preferred not to speak to us, or were unable to recollect events after so many years, and others had sadly passed away.
Where evidence was missing, contradictory or otherwise incomplete, we were unable to meet the necessary legal requirements to uphold complaints or justify an opinion that an individual would have had a case to answer.
Like the HIP Report, our investigations found evidence to support allegations that in the aftermath of the disaster, SYP sought to deflect the blame from the police. We found no evidence to support claims that the behaviour of supporters was a contributing factor. In the majority of cases, we were unable to find that officers had a case to answer for misconduct, because the professional standards for policing at the time did not include a specific duty of candour. Despite the wider public interest to gain answers about what happened, SYP was entitled, within the law at the time, to present its ‘best case’ and be selective with the evidence it presented.
The lack of candour and the fact that our investigations began so long after the disaster has had a significant impact on the decisions we could make.
While the police professional standards have since changed, and now require serving police officers to cooperate with investigations as witnesses, there is currently no requirement for former police officers who have retired or resigned to cooperate with investigations or non-statutory inquiries.
We support a new stronger statutory duty of candour for all public servants, including the police, and await the Government’s future announcements on this. We believe this will strengthen the ability of our investigations to get to the truth.