Dynamic risk assessments examined after pursuit ends in man’s death – Cheshire Constabulary, March 2022

Police officers from Cheshire Constabulary began to covertly follow a car in their unmarked police vehicle. The car came to a stop a few minutes later. The police vehicle stopped behind the car and officers activated their blue lights, but the driver turned their car around and drove off.

A pursuit was authorised by the force control room. The pursuit lasted for eight minutes and reached speeds of more than 120mph involving two police vehicles. During the pursuit, the car left the road and entered a field. The driver was ejected from the car and suffered fatal injuries. There was no physical contact between the car and either of the two police vehicles during the pursuit.

Police officers from the two vehicles gave the driver first aid and tried to resuscitate them, but this was unsuccessful and the driver died.

We received a death or serious injury referral from the force and decided to independently investigate contact between the police and the driver before the fatal collision.

We examined the actions, decisions and dynamic risk assessments made by the police officers in the lead and second police vehicles, whether the pursuit was carried out in accordance with the drivers’ training and pursuit authority, and the management of the pursuit by the control room. We also examined whether the pursuit was in line with local and national policies and procedures.

The two police vehicles involved in the pursuit were fitted with onboard video recording equipment. This equipment records video continuously, as well as audio when the lights and sirens are activated. The system also provides data such as date, time, vehicle speed and location.

On this occasion, the system fitted to the lead police vehicle failed to record video, though it did capture audio and data. Therefore, there was no continuous video recording of the pursuit. During our investigation, we examined the failure of the lead police vehicle to capture video footage of the pursuit.

We gathered evidence from CCTV cameras on the pursuit route, as well as video footage from the second police vehicle, radio transmissions, and audio and data from both vehicles. Much of the pursuit route was not covered by cameras due to its rural location.

Our investigators obtained accounts from the police officers and staff involved, as well as examining body worn video footage and witness statements.

We concluded there was no indication that a person serving with the police committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner to justify disciplinary proceedings.

Officers acknowledged they were driving at high speed but cited the road conditions, very low level of traffic and absence of pedestrians as reasons why they believed it was safe to continue the pursuit. Our evidence indicated the pursuit was carried out in accordance with the drivers’ training and pursuit authority.

The absence of video footage was an unfortunate technical failure. Officers driving vehicles fitted with this system could not disable the video feed or delete recordings. The system failed to record video not only for this incident, but for the entire shift from the time the car was started.

We also found that none of the officers involved in the pursuit activated their body worn video cameras until they got out of their vehicles at the scene where the crash happened. Force policy on body worn video is clear that body worn video cameras should be activated during police pursuits.

Some officers were aware of this policy but did not activate their cameras because the situation unfolded quickly, and they were concentrating on other elements of the pursuit. The incident was spontaneous and happened at high speed – we found it reasonable that officers activated their body worn video only at the end of the pursuit. We recommended that it would be appropriate for these issues to be considered as potential learning for the force.

We carefully considered whether there were any other learning opportunities arising from the investigation. We make learning recommendations to improve policing and public confidence in the police complaints system and prevent a recurrence of similar incidents.

We did not identify any organisational learning in this case other than that already addressed by the force. This included reminding all pursuit authorised drivers of the requirement to activate body worn video during pursuits and to perform a ‘live view screen’ check as part of their initial vehicle check at the start of duty. Replacement video recording systems were also due to be fitted to police vehicles.