

# DSI Sudesh Amman

Investigation into the death of Mr Sudesh Amman  
on Sunday 2 February 2020

> Independent investigation report

## > Investigation information

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Investigation name:	<b>Sudesh Amman</b>
IOPC reference:	<b>2020/131516</b>
Investigation type:	<b>Death or Serious Injury (DSI)</b>
IOPC office:	<b>Croydon</b>
Lead investigator:	<b>Darryl Weaver</b>
Case supervisor:	<b>Amanda Spencer</b>
Director General delegate (Decision Maker):	<b>Catherine Hall</b>
Status of report:	<b>Final</b>
Date finalised:	<b>25 January 2021</b>

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FINAL

## > Introduction

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### > The purpose of this report

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1. I was appointed by the IOPC to carry out an independent investigation into the death of Sudesh Amman. On Sunday 2 February 2020, Mr Amman was shot by armed surveillance officers from the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) after he was seen to attack members of the public with a knife. Mr Amman had been under police surveillance between Thursday 23 January and the date of his death, following his early release from a prison sentence for terrorism offences. This matter came to the attention of the IOPC on Sunday 2 February 2020 as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) referral and was immediately declared to be an independent investigation.
2. Following an IOPC investigation, the powers and obligations of the Director General (DG) are delegated to a senior member of IOPC staff, who I will refer to as the decision maker for the remainder of this report. The decision maker for this investigation is Operations Manager Catherine Hall.
3. In this report, I will provide an accurate summary of the evidence, and attach or refer to any relevant documents. I will also set out the evidence available relating to:
  - (i) the nature and extent of the police contact prior to the death, and
  - (ii) whether the police may have caused or contributed to Mr Amman's death
4. I will provide sufficient information to enable the decision maker to reach a decision as to whether:
  - there is an indication that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. If so, those matters will be investigated

- to make a recommendation to any organisation about any lessons which may need to be learned
5. If the decision maker determines there is no indication of criminality or conduct, the MPS, who will have been sent the report, must then advise the IOPC whether or not it considers the performance of a person serving with the police to be unsatisfactory, and what action (if any) it will take in respect of any such person's performance (if required to do so by the decision maker).
  6. The decision maker will then consider whether the MPS' determinations are appropriate, and decide whether to recommend that:
    - (i) the performance of any person serving with the police is or is not satisfactory; and
    - (ii) that specified action is taken in respect of any unsatisfactory performance
  7. The decision maker can ultimately direct the MPS to take steps to comply with her recommendation.

**> List of pseudonyms contained within this report**

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8. Due to the nature of the work undertaken by many of the officers who had some involvement in this investigation, they were given identity protection for the purposes of the IOPC investigation. As a result, the police officers referenced in this report will not be referred to by name but by a pseudonym they have been allocated. For ease of reference the table below contains an overview of each individual and a brief explanation of their role.

Pseudonym	Role in operation
BX113	Team leader of the surveillance operation on 1 and 2 February 2020.
BX69	Unarmed surveillance officer – authorised to carry taser but not a firearm.

BX75	Armed surveillance officer – authorised to carry taser and a firearm. Discharged firearm on 2 February 2020.
BX87	Armed surveillance officer – authorised to carry taser and a firearm. Discharged firearm on 2 February 2020.
BX89	Armed surveillance officer – authorised to carry taser and a firearm.

9. In addition, three roles specific to armed policing will be mentioned in this report. As the officers performing these roles changes several times during a 24 hour period, the overall role is referred to in this report. An overview of those roles is contained below:

Role	Description
SFC	The SFC or strategic firearms commander is a senior officer, usually at the rank of superintendent, who is in overall command of an incident for which firearms officers may be required or are being used. The SFC is responsible for formally authorising the use of firearms officers during a pre-planned operation.
TFC	The TFC or tactical firearms commander provides advice to the SFC on whether an incident or operation should involve firearms officers alongside the reason for this advice. The TFC will also recommend the appropriate way to utilise the firearms officers in order to achieve the aims of the operation. A TFC will usually be at the rank of inspector or chief inspector.
Tactical Advisor	A tactical advisor is consulted by the TFC before requesting authorisation from the SFC. A tactical advisor will help the TFC to analyse the tactical options and provide advice on the benefits, and limitations, of the options available.

## > The investigation

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### > Terms of reference

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10. Operations Manager Catherine Hall approved the following terms of reference for this investigation on Thursday 11 February 2020:
  - a) To investigate the surveillance operation of Mr Sudesh Amman on 2 February 2020 and his fatal shooting by MPS police officers. Including:
    - the planning and risk assessment for the operation
    - the actions and decision of MPS officers regarding the use of force
  - b) To investigate the MPS's response to the threat posed by Mr Amman following his release from prison on 23 January 2020. Specifically to examine:
    - the nature and extent of any intelligence available to the MPS in relation to Mr Amman and how any such intelligence was assessed
    - the decisions made and action taken as a result of available intelligence
11. The content of this report will focus entirely on the events relevant to Sunday 2 February 2020. A separate report will cover the events of the days leading up to the shooting of Mr Amman, including the nature of the intelligence held by the police and the decision making regarding police action following Mr Amman's release from prison.
12. A separate IOPC investigation is considering a linked incident, in which an MPS vehicle was involved in a traffic accident whilst responding to reports of Mr Amman's terrorist attack and is mentioned here for completeness only.

### > Injured parties

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13. Before Mr Amman was fatally shot by surveillance officers, he was able to use a knife, stolen from a shop immediately before his attack, to injure Person A and Person B.
14. Person A was the first person to be injured. They were walking along Streatham High Road pushing their bicycle, facing away from Mr Amman. Person A received a single puncture wound to their back, close to the shoulder and was released from hospital the same day. A number of witnesses stayed with Person A and supported them following the attack.
15. Person B was also on Streatham High Road and was the other person injured by Mr Amman. Person B received a serious stab wound to the right side of their body [REDACTED]. Person B was kept in a medically induced coma for five days but is now recovering from their injuries. Several witnesses attempted to help Person B after the attack, using their hands and other items to try and control blood loss before police officers were able to take over Person B's care.
16. Ms C and her partner had been walking along Streatham High Road when Mr Amman began his attack. Ms C's partner moved her out of Mr Amman's path but, unfortunately, Ms C was injured as the indirect result of a shot fired by a surveillance officer. The surveillance officer's bullet did not appear to have an effect on Mr Amman but struck a glass panel, causing multiple glass fragments to break away and enter Ms C's upper leg. Ms C received surgery to remove the fragments, [REDACTED].

### > **Background information about Mr Amman**

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17. On Friday 18 May 2018, Mr Amman was arrested on suspicion of preparing for terrorist acts as a result of information provided about his online activities, including reports he had encouraged others to commit an attack and images which indicated Mr Amman might have access to firearms.



18. On Wednesday 7 November 2018, Mr Amman pleaded guilty to 13 offences of making or distributing material which could be used for terrorist purposes. On Monday 17 December 2018, Mr Amman was sentenced to serve three years and four months imprisonment at Her Majesty's Prison (HMP) Belmarsh.
19. During Mr Amman's prison sentence, concerns were raised about his association with other prisoners who had also been convicted of terrorism offences. Prison reports indicated ongoing concerns about Mr Amman's behaviour and beliefs.
20. Mr Amman was granted early release from prison on Thursday 23 January 2020 but kept under license conditions, restricting his movement and activities.

## > Chronology

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21. During this investigation, a volume of evidence was gathered. After thorough consideration of all the evidence, I have summarised that which I think is relevant and answers the terms of reference for my investigation. As such, not all of the evidence gathered in the investigation is referred to in this report.

## > Police and probation concerns about Mr Amman

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22. As a result of the intelligence reports about Mr Amman's behaviour whilst in prison, alongside Mr Amman's upcoming early release date, senior individuals from both the MPS and the Probation Service wrote to the governor of HMP Belmarsh to express their serious concerns about the continued risks posed by Mr Amman.
23. On Monday 13 January 2020, the director of the London probation services wrote to the governor of HMP Belmarsh.
24. The director of London probation services stated there were significant concerns about the risk Mr Amman would pose if he was released into the community and noted the purpose of her letter was to ensure the prison service had taken all reasonable steps to address those concerns.

25. The director of London probation services indicated previous discussions had confirmed there was no opportunity to delay Mr Amman's release. The director of London probation services also emphasised the importance of the prison service reviewing all available information about Mr Amman, to ensure no possibility of extending his sentence had been overlooked.
26. Finally, the director of London probation services noted the probation service were likely to declare Mr Amman to be a 'very high' risk, "... *to reflect the imminence of the risk posed by him upon release*".
27. On Wednesday 15 January 2020, a Detective Chief Superintendent (DCS) from MPS Counter Terrorism Command also wrote to the governor of HMP.
28. The DCS noted his reason for writing to the prison governor was to request that a decision not to take disciplinary action against Mr Amman was reconsidered. The matter in question related to an incident on Tuesday 3 January 2020, when Mr Amman was charged by prison staff with 'intentionally or recklessly endangering the life of others'. This charge was a result of Mr Amman jumping onto netting covering the areas between floors of the prison, in protest at the death of another prisoner.
29. The DCS stated he was concerned that the prison had decided not to proceed with this matter and the charge against Mr Amman, noting the reason he was given was due to the fact Mr Amman was scheduled for early release and it would not be possible for the prison to hold a hearing before his release date.
30. In providing support for his request, the DCS made reference to some of the key pieces of prison intelligence about Mr Amman's past behaviour. These included:
  - Highlighting Mr Amman maintained extremist views and was involved in radicalising other prisoners.
  - Mr Amman associated with other high risk and high profile terrorist offenders, including Umar Haque (sentenced to life for preparing acts of terrorism), Hashim Abedi (brother of Salman Abedi and sentenced to 55 years for helping to plan the terrorist attack at the Manchester Arena) and

Mohiussunnath Chowdhury (sentenced to life for preparing acts of terrorism).

- [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].
- Mr Amman's cell was searched on 16 December 2019 and a handwritten note pledging allegiance to the leader of Islamic State in Iraq and Lavant (ISIL) was found. This note was written in Arabic.

31. The DCS concluded his letter by stating his concerns were that Mr Amman had maintained extremist views and showed no signs of rehabilitation. The DCS further requested the prison authorities considered any other measures which could be taken to delay Mr Amman's release.
32. The governor of HMP Belmarsh responded to the DCS' letter by email on the same day. The governor explained that the prison service had, in fact, conducted a disciplinary hearing in relation to the allegations against Mr Amman. The allegation was found to have been proved and, as a result, Mr Amman was placed into segregation until his early release date.
33. In his response the governor also explained why Mr Amman could not be held in prison beyond the 23 January 2020. The governor stated the process for increasing the sentence of an individual was independent and such a decision would need to be made by a magistrate. As Mr Amman was due for release, the governor stated there was not enough time to present a case to a magistrate and Mr Amman's release could not be prevented in order to do so.

#### **> Overview of surveillance operation up to 31 January 2020**

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34. In the lead up to his release from prison the MPS and other agencies worked together to put in place measures to manage the risk it was believed Mr Amman could pose. The MPS launched Operation Osmious which was led by their counter terrorism command, known as SO15. The details of this operation, the decision making regarding the management of Mr Amman

following his release and the strategy put in place to manage him will be subject to a separate report by the IOPC. Below, I have provided an overview of Operation Osmious between 23 and 31 January 2020.

35. On Thursday 23 January 2020 Mr Amman was released from HMP Belmarsh and escorted by MPS officers from the Terrorism Offender Management Unit (TOMU) to a residential property, controlled by the Probation Service, on Leigham Court Road in the Streatham area of London. Mr Amman was instructed to live in this property as a condition of his release. Mr Amman was also given a number of curfew hours, during which he was to remain inside. These curfew hours were as follows:
  - between 10.00am and 11.00am each morning
  - between 4.00pm and 6.00pm each afternoon
  - every night between the hours of 9.00pm and 6.00am
36. In addition to his curfew hours, Mr Amman was required to wear an electronic GPS monitoring device and was prevented from entering a number of areas including parts of the City of London, Westminster, Southwark and Lambeth.
37. Between Friday 24 January and Tuesday 28 January, Mr Amman was under surveillance from unarmed MPS officers. This surveillance was during daytime hours only, Mr Amman was not monitored during the hours of his overnight curfew. The decision to monitor Mr Amman was taken based on the fact he was considered to retain a radicalised mindset and his period of imprisonment was not believed to have been successful in diverting him from committing future terrorism offences.
38. The aim of the surveillance operation was to observe Mr Amman's lifestyle and develop any intelligence about his behaviour and any individuals he met. The surveillance officers were also monitoring Mr Amman's compliance with the conditions of his release.
39. On Wednesday 29 January, the surveillance officers were authorised to carry firearms whilst conducting their work. This was the first day any of the officers

had been equipped with a firearm. The decision to move to armed surveillance was made by a strategic firearms commander (SFC) following a recommendation made by a tactical firearms commander (TFC) and tactical firearms advisor based on a perceived change in Mr Amman's behaviour. The SFC believed the officers should be armed for their own protection and the protection of the public due to the danger Mr Amman posed. The surveillance operation remained in place only during daytime hours and no surveillance was conducted during Mr Amman's night-time curfew.

40. On Friday 31 January, Mr Amman was observed browsing knives and other cutlery items inside a shop without making a purchase. This was noted to be a further change in Mr Amman's previous behaviour and, as a result, a decision was taken to increase surveillance cover to 24 hours a day. In addition, a contingency option to have overt armed response officers on standby was put into effect. Armed response officers have access to more advanced equipment and receive further training in the use of advanced tactics which are not available to the surveillance officers.

#### > Saturday 1 February

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41. Saturday 1 February was the first day of 24 hour armed surveillance on Mr Amman. Two verbal briefings were delivered to surveillance officers on this day, one morning briefing at 6.25am and one evening briefing at 6.06pm. Alongside the verbal briefing a PowerPoint presentation containing relevant information about Mr Amman was provided to the officers.
42. The briefing materials from this day confirmed all the information known about Mr Amman, particularly his behaviour whilst in prison which led to concerns that "... (Mr Amman) *maintains an aspiration to carry out an Islamic extremist attack in the UK...*"
43. The briefings focussed on informing the surveillance officers about key information relating to Mr Amman including his description and images of his face, his known associates, details of his approved residence and outlining all of the restrictions he was subject to as a condition of his release from prison.

44. Alongside updating the officers about Mr Amman's personal information, the briefings also outlined the three objectives of the surveillance operation. Firstly, to identify any activity which might indicate Mr Amman was preparing to commit a terrorist attack. Secondly, to identify if Mr Amman breached any of the conditions of his release and finally to monitor his daily patterns and whether he met with any other people who might be of interest.
45. As a result of Mr Amman being seen to browse knives and other objects on the previous day, the briefing on 1 February included tipping points. The tipping points refer to the response of the police officers if Mr Amman carried out certain actions. These had been agreed by the SO15 investigating team along with other agencies and were relayed to the surveillance officers as follows:
- If Mr Amman left a shop with a knife in his hand, he should be immediately arrested with the help of dedicated armed response officers.
  - If Mr Amman purchased a knife but this remained in the packaging, no action would be taken unless the surveillance team lost sight of him. Any decision to stop or arrest would be based on Mr Amman's behaviour at the time. In addition, the next time Mr Amman left his residence, he would be stopped and searched by armed response officers.
  - If Mr Amman breached his overnight curfew he would be arrested by armed response officers.
  - If Mr Amman breached his daytime curfews (in place between 10.00am and 11.00am and 4.00pm to 6.0pm) the breach would be reported to the offender management unit and referred to the Probation Service.
  - If Mr Amman entered any area he was excluded from he would be arrested by armed response officers.
46. To prepare for the fact Mr Amman might need to be arrested at short notice, a dedicated arrest team were placed on standby in addition to the overt armed response offices who had been directed to remain close to the Streatham area.

47. BX69 was one of the surveillance officers at the morning briefing on 1 February. BX69 confirmed he, and other members of the team, had worked on Operation Osmious on three previous days, including 29 January when the officers had first been authorised to carry firearms for their own protection.
48. BX69 further stated he detected a noticeable change in the demeanour of the briefing officer on this day. BX69 noted, "... *you could definitely see that (the briefing officer) was taking the operation in a much more serious manner*".
49. In contrast, BX87 had not worked on Operation Osmious since Tuesday 27 January. BX87 stated, when he received his briefing on the morning of 1 February, the fact this was now an armed 24 hour surveillance operation immediately caused him to believe this was a high threat situation. BX87 also noted he had worked on a number of other surveillance operations with counter terrorism police and that very few of these had required the covert officers to be armed for their own protection.
50. BX87 also commented on the change in the attitude of the briefing officer, noting they seemed much more concerned about this operation and not displaying their usual character.
51. For the remainder of this day there was no further information or updates which changed the intelligence about Mr Amman and the tactic of 24 hour armed surveillance remained in place. An entry on a log maintained by the on duty TFC confirmed the next scheduled review of the operation would occur on the morning of Monday 3 February 2020.
52. At 8.27pm, the armed response officers on standby to support the surveillance changed over. As a result of this change over, the armed officers queried whether or not they were authorised to respond to other incidents. The duty TFC confirmed the officers were directed to assist the surveillance team but were not dedicated to the surveillance operation. This meant the armed officers were required to be close to the Streatham area but they were not prevented from responding to other requests for firearms assistance, if needed.

## > Sunday 2 February


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53. At 5.56am, a briefing was delivered to the officers who would be taking the next shift of armed surveillance. This briefing was recorded, with an accompanying PowerPoint presentation containing key information about the overall operation. The officer delivering the briefing was the same as the previous day and confirmed the intelligence in relation to Mr Amman had not changed.
54. BX113 was acting as the team leader and operational firearms commander (OFC) for the armed surveillance team on 2 February. BX113 stated his team had been deployed on the surveillance operation the previous day, Saturday 1 February, at which time they received a detailed briefing.
55. The briefing officer confirmed the objectives of the continued surveillance operation and highlighted the tipping points which would require further action to be taken against Mr Amman. The objectives and tipping points, alongside the relevant action to take, were the same as detailed on Saturday 1 February.
56. Prior to concluding the briefing, the briefing officer confirmed that authorisation for armed surveillance had been granted, suitable tactical advice had been provided and reviewed and there were nine officers forming the surveillance team for that day. Eight of those officers would be armed with a firearm, and all nine would also be carrying a taser. The overall risk posed by the operation was considered to be low and the surveillance officers were reminded they were armed for their own protection or the protection of the public. The briefing concluded at 6.05am.
57. During surveillance operations of this nature, whilst the officers were in radio communication with each other, these transmissions were not recorded and as a result were not available to this investigation. Instead, one of the surveillance officers was designated as a loggist for the operation. This officer maintained a handwritten log of transmissions made by officers. At the end of each day, the log was reviewed and each officer identified their own transmissions, counter-signing the log to confirm transmissions they had made. In addition, a second



written record of transmissions was maintained by individuals in the police control room.

58. Mr Amman did not leave his approved premises on Leigham Court Road until approximately 1.25pm on 2 February. After leaving, he was monitored by various surveillance officers.
59. BX113 stated Mr Amman appeared to be walking through residential streets in the general direction of Streatham High Road. Whilst some officers continued to follow Mr Amman, BX113 instructed two other officers to wait, on foot, in Streatham High Road. BX75 and BX87 confirmed, via radio, that they would be ready to observe Mr Amman if he walked on to Streatham High Road.
60. A map detailing Mr Amman's approximate route between 1.25pm and 1.50pm is shown below. In brief, after leaving his approved premises, Mr Amman walked along Valleyfield Road, Springwell Road, Wellfield Walk, Valley Road and Sunnyhill Road before reaching Streatham High Road. This was a distance of approximately one mile.



61. None of the surveillance log entries between 1.25pm and 1.50pm indicated Mr Amman's behaviour caused any concern, other than the fact Mr Amman appeared to be walking slowly. Mr Amman was also noted to be wearing a white plastic bag across his chest.
62. By 1.50pm, Mr Amman had made his way onto Streatham High Road and begun walking southbound, before turning around and walking back the way he had just travelled. A surveillance log entry at 1.51pm noted, "(Mr Amman) *looks lost on Streatham High Road... and his white bag appears virtually empty*".
63. Surveillance officers BX87, BX75, BX69 and BX89 kept Mr Amman under observation whilst he walked around the high road. BX113 remained inside a vehicle, stationary on Pinfold Road. Other officers were stationary in vehicles on surrounding roads, directed by BX113, in the event Mr Amman got into a vehicle or onto public transport.
64. CCTV from various locations on Streatham High Road captured Mr Amman walking along the footpath. As previously noted by surveillance officers he appeared to be walking at a slow pace compared with other pedestrians. Mr Amman appeared to walk backwards and forwards along the same side of the road for approximately five minutes.
65. At 1.56pm, a further entry on the surveillance log noted Mr Amman stopped and waited outside a Lidl shop before retracing his steps again and walking southbound for a second time. The log maintained by the control room further noted Mr Amman had conducted a 360-degree observation of his surroundings outside Lidl before being suspected to conduct observations through reflections on the window whilst walking back past The White Lion public house.
66. BX69 stated he was walking on the opposite side of the road in the same direction as Mr Amman. BX69 recalled making a transmission stating Mr Amman had turned his head towards the windows of The White Lion as a mirror trap. BX69 explained he believed Mr Amman may have been attempting to use the window as a mirror to discretely observe who was around him.

67. At approximately 1.57pm, the final entry on the surveillance log noted Mr Amman had entered a small shop called Low Price Store. BX69 and BX89 were aware this shop sold a variety of items and BX69 specifically stated he had entered the same shop earlier that day. BX69 made a radio transmission alerting other officers to the fact this shop sold knives and other dangerous items. BX87 confirmed he heard a radio transmission explaining the Low Price Store “...will definitely sell knives”.
68. BX87 stated he began to walk towards the Low Price Store, as he anticipated BX113 would request an officer enter the store in order to monitor Mr Amman. As anticipated BX113 asked for an officer to enter the shop and observe Mr Amman. BX87 stated he immediately volunteered, as he was already walking in that direction.
69. A council CCTV camera located on Streatham High Road captured footage of the Low Price Store entrance. At 1.56.52pm this camera shows Mr Amman walking into the entrance of the shop. A collection of items on the pavement outside the shop obscured the entrance, with only a narrow area wide enough for one person leading off the pavement and into the store. BX87 also stated his view of the entrance was obscured by stacks of household items.

Fig 1



Fig 1 captures Mr Amman (circled) as he was preparing to enter the Low Price Store on Streatham High Road.

70. Whilst BX87 was moving into position to enter the shop at least three other surveillance officers were close by, at other locations on Streatham High Road.

BX89 was located in a fast food restaurant opposite the Low Price Store, BX69 was walking away from the Low Price Store on the opposite side of the road and BX75 was walking toward the Low Price Store from the opposite direction as BX87.

71. A shop assistant inside the Low Price Store recalled Mr Amman entering the shop at about the same time as two other customers. Whilst the shop assistant helped another customer, he recalled Mr Amman suddenly grabbed a knife from a display and ran from the store. The shop assistant stated he followed Mr Amman as he ran outside, watching Mr Amman removing the protective packaging from the knife before discarding it on the floor.
72. Another customer in the shop stated Mr Amman pushed her out of the way in his effort to leave the store, causing her to fall backwards whilst Mr Amman knocked over items in his effort to leave the shop. The customer recalled Mr Amman was attempting to remove the protective packaging on the knife with his teeth.
73. At 1.57.48pm, whilst BX87 was still walking towards the Low Price Store, the council CCTV footage shows Mr Amman ran out of the entrance and turned immediately to his left. Mr Amman was followed out of the store by the shop assistant, who picked up an item Mr Amman appeared to throw onto the floor. Within two seconds of leaving the Low Price Store, Mr Amman had run out of view of the camera.

Fig 2



**Fig 2, an image taken approximately two seconds after Mr Amman ran out of the Low Price Store, shows Mr Amman (red) discarding the protective packaging from the knife whilst being pursued by the shop assistant (yellow) and observed by BX87 (blue). BX69's approximate location (grey) is also marked. BX89 was inside the red fronted fast food restaurant below and to the left of the camera.**

74. BX87 stated, as he approached the Low Price Store, he could hear a disturbance inside before seeing Mr Amman run out of the shop holding a knife. BX87 stated he had no time to transmit over the radio and instead decided to start running after Mr Amman.
75. At 1.57.53pm, five seconds after Mr Amman ran out of the shop, CCTV footage showed BX87 drew level with the entrance of the Low Price Store before beginning to run after Mr Amman.
76. BX87 stated he was approximately 15 to 20 metres behind Mr Amman shouting "*stop, armed police*" and had been sprinting after Mr Amman for approximately two seconds before watching him stab a woman in the back. BX87 stated he had a clear line of sight to see this attack and believed the woman would suffer a fatal injury as a result. BX87 went on to state, "*... at this point it dawned on me that this was an act of terror and the intelligence had been correct*".
77. This investigation has not identified any CCTV footage which captured Mr Amman stabbing Person A.
78. BX87 further stated he heard Mr Amman shout the phrase "*Allah Akbar*". BX87 explained hearing this phrase confirmed his suspicions that Mr Amman was committing a terrorist act, as the phrase had been heard during previous terrorism incidents. BX87 believed the phrase Allah Akbar translated as 'God is great'.
79. Whilst the shop assistant stated he did not hear Mr Amman say anything when he chased him out of the shop, the customer did recall Mr Amman shouting in a language she did not understand. The customer did not provide any further detail about what Mr Amman might have been saying.
80. Two witnesses, Witness X and Witness Y, were the driver and passenger of a blue vehicle travelling northbound on Streatham High Road and both stated

they could clearly see Mr Amman. Witness X recalled Mr Amman was no more than one or two metres in front of her vehicle as he ran out of the Low Price Store and down Streatham High Road. Witness Y noted Mr Amman was running along the pavement slightly ahead of the vehicle.

81. Witness X and Witness Y described Mr Amman's movements as skipping or bouncing down the pavement without staying still or looking around to see what he had done. Witness X recalled Mr Amman was being chased and believed this was the shop assistant from the Low Price Store.
82. Person A provided a witness statement but did not recall much about the incident. Person A recalled hearing footsteps running behind her before being pushed and feeling a sharp pain in her back. Person A heard other members of the public state they had been stabbed and she recalled falling to the floor in a kneeling position outside The White Lion public house.
83. BX75 recalled hearing a radio transmission of "*he's stabbing people*" and believed this transmission came from BX69, a surveillance officer who was not carrying a firearm. As a result, BX75 stated he withdrew his own firearm as he believed BX69 was at immediate risk from Mr Amman. BX75 noted he discounted all other tactical options as his firearm would have the potential to "*...instantly stop the knife wielding suspect*". In addition, BX75 stated he did not believe using a taser was an appropriate option as the weather was very cold. If Mr Amman was wearing several layers of clothing there was a risk the taser barbs would not penetrate through to his skin, making the device ineffective.
84. BX89 who was located in a fast food restaurant, across the street from Mr Amman, recalled moving position in order to try and get a view into the Low Price Store. Whilst doing so, BX89 recalled someone shouting on the radio "*he's stabbing people*". BX89 looked up to see Mr Amman running down the opposite pavement and immediately ran to exit the restaurant.
85. BX113 also recalled hearing the radio transmission stating Mr Amman was stabbing people but he did not know which officer made the transmission. BX113 stated, on hearing this information, he instructed all surveillance officers

- to move forward whilst he contacted the MPS control room to request further armed officers.
86. BX69 stated he did not make a radio transmission about Mr Amman but did recall hearing the same radio transmission described by BX75 and BX89. BX69 turned around to see Mr Amman being chased by BX87 and began to run forwards to assist.
87. BX87 noted he did not initially draw his firearm, instead focusing on shouting after Mr Amman and attempting to draw Mr Amman's attention away from the public. BX87 stated he believed his only option at the time was to close the gap with Mr Amman to get his attention and, by doing so, protect the other pedestrians. BX87 noted he could not have used his firearm in any event, as to do so would have been too dangerous to members of the public and would have required him to try and shoot a moving target whilst also moving at speed.
88. BX87 decided to continue following Mr Amman, rather than stop to provide first aid to Person A. BX87 stated he did this as he believed more people were at risk from Mr Amman, due to the fact the footpath was crowded with other pedestrians.
89. After Mr Amman had stabbed Person A, he continued running down Streatham High Road. BX87 and Witness X both stated they perceived Mr Amman was stabbing out at multiple people. BX87 recalled seeing frantic movements of Mr Amman's upper body, noting it was "*...my perception that he was stabbing numerous people as he ran*". Witness X stated Mr Amman was stabbing out at various people, including children, and recalled his movements were like "*a rabbit... he would jump in and jump back*".
90. Person B, Mr Amman's second victim, was stabbed close to a Cash Converters shop. There was no CCTV or other footage which captured this attack and BX87 did not specifically describe seeing Person B being stabbed.
91. Witness X and Witness Y recalled witnessing Mr Amman stab Person B. Witness X believed there was very little time delay between Person A and Person B being stabbed, possibly up to five seconds. Witness Y did not recall

seeing Person A being stabbed but clearly described Mr Amman's right arm thrusting a knife into Person B's right torso, close to their ribs.

92. An external CCTV camera at Cash Converters captured Mr Amman after he stabbed Person B, showing him running down Streatham High Road. The time reported by this camera is incorrect and appears to be approximately five minutes ahead.
93. Mr Amman ran past with his back to the Cash Converters camera. Three seconds later, BX87 ran past following Mr Amman. BX87 did not appear to be closing the distance to Mr Amman. Mr Amman remained in view of the camera for no more than four or five seconds. An internal camera also captured Mr Amman running past as well as showing a knife like object, held at waist height, in one of Mr Amman's hands.

Fig 3



**Fig 3 shows Mr Amman as he ran past a Cash Converter's shop. The knife he was holding is visible as a small dark line directly below his arm.**

94. BX75 stated as he made his way toward the Low Price Store Mr Amman came into view almost immediately, running towards him with a knife. BX75 felt Mr Amman was about to attack him and, in response, aimed his handgun and fired one shot. BX75 stated this shot did not appear to have any effect on Mr Amman, who kept running in the same direction and passed BX75 to the officer's right hand side. BX75 continued to aim his firearm but decided against firing a second shot. BX75 stated this was because he would have had a very



limited opportunity to hit Mr Amman as he ran past, alongside the fact the area directly behind Mr Amman appeared to be made of glass.

95. Map data shows the shop directly after Cash Converters was a Lidl supermarket, with all of this shop front made of glass. The Cash Converters CCTV footage confirmed Mr Amman ran past the approximate location of the Lidl supermarket and, whilst doing so, made a sudden movement to his left hand side before continuing to run out of view. At the same time, the CCTV footage showed a stationary figure, stood close to the road, focussing on Mr Amman. It is believed this figure was BX75.

Fig 4



Fig 5



**Fig 5 and 6 are taken from the external Cash Converters CCTV footage. The first image shows Mr Amman (red) running towards a stationary figure, believed to be BX75 (green). The second image, one second later, demonstrates the distance between BX87 (blue) and Mr Amman. At the point the second image was taken, Mr Amman began making a sudden movement to his left.**

96. Ms C and her partner, Mr D, were walking along Streatham High Road in the direction of Mr Amman. Both were close to the Lidl supermarket entrance when they saw Mr Amman running toward them with a knife.
97. Ms C recalled Mr D pushed her into the Lidl entranceway, which was recessed in an alcove away from the footpath. As Ms C was pushed against the glass entrance, she saw Mr Amman run past but stated her attention was drawn to a man pointing a firearm. Ms C believed the man was four or five metres away, close to the road, and thought he was pointing his firearm directly at her. Ms C stated this man shouted *"I'm police, I'm going to shoot"* before firing one shot. Ms C stated she did not know what happened to Mr Amman but instantly felt pain at the back of her leg.
98. Mr D recalled seeing a man with a handgun immediately before pushing Ms C into the Lidl entrance. Mr D heard someone shout *"police, we're going to shoot"* followed by a gunshot. Immediately after the gunshot, Mr D noticed the glass panel behind Ms C was damaged.
99. The Lidl supermarket did not have any CCTV footage which covered the outside of the store or the external entrance area. No other witnesses clearly described seeing BX75 fire at Mr Amman close to the Lidl supermarket.
100. After passing Lidl, Mr Amman continued to run down Streatham High Road pursued by both BX75 and BX87. BX75 stated after he fired his shot he continued aiming his firearm, with CCTV footage confirming BX75 followed Mr Amman's path by turning his own body, before beginning to run after him. As Mr Amman ran away from Lidl, BX75 was directly behind with BX87 now slightly further back.
101. By this point, BX89 had left the fast food restaurant and CCTV footage indicates he was approximately 10 seconds behind BX87. BX69 was also running towards the area, with CCTV footage indicating he was approximately

- 15 seconds behind BX87. Other surveillance officers had moved from their positions but none were close enough to assist BX87 or BX75 with the exception of BX113, who remained inside a vehicle on Pinfold Road.
102. Mr Amman continued down Streatham High Road, passing Argos and Peacocks shops. Although no CCTV footage was identified at the Argos, CCTV inside Peacocks captured Mr Amman and the surveillance officers running past.
  103. At 1.57.53pm, Mr Amman ran past the entrance of Peacocks, with no pedestrians visible near him. Within two seconds he had disappeared off camera. Approximately one second behind Mr Amman were two pairs of legs which are believed to be BX75 and BX87. At 1.58.04pm, 11 seconds behind Mr Amman, a final pair of legs, believed to be BX89, ran past the entrance.
  104. Some CCTV footage was recovered from a bus in stationary traffic on the opposite side of the road to Mr Amman. Between 1.58.04pm and 1.58.07pm, one camera showed Mr Amman being followed by BX75 and BX87. The officers were running approximately one shop front behind Mr Amman.
  105. By 1.58.08pm, Mr Amman and both officers ran out of view of the bus camera. At the time they passed, both officers appeared to have their arms outstretched and it is believed BX87 and BX75 were now both aiming firearms at Mr Amman. As the officers passed a Holland and Barrett shop, BX87 and BX75 appeared to be running parallel to each other with BX87 closer to the road and BX75 in the approximate middle of the footpath, directly behind Mr Amman.
  106. At 1.58.06pm, CCTV footage from inside the Holland and Barrett shop captured Mr Amman running past the shop entrance. One second later, BX75 and BX87 also ran past the shop. BX75 appeared to have his arms outstretched, possibly aiming his firearm towards Mr Amman.

Fig 6




Fig 7



**Fig 6 and fig 7 show Mr Amman (red) as he is captured running past the entrance to a Holland and Barrett shop. BX75 (green) appears to have his arms outstretched following Mr Amman. BX87's legs are visible behind BX75's outstretched arms.**

107. Next door to Holland and Barrett is a Boots Pharmacy. An external camera at the entrance to Boots showed Mr Amman run into view. Ahead of him, the footpath was clear of pedestrians. Within one second, Mr Amman came to an abrupt stop, twisted his body around to face towards BX75 and BX87 and began to run back the way he had just travelled. A knife was visible, held at waist height, in Mr Amman's right hand. BX75 and BX87 were not visible on the camera.


Fig 8



**Fig 8 shows Mr Amman at the point he began to turn around to face BX75 and BX87 (off camera).**

108. At 1.58.49pm on the Boots camera, and almost immediately after Mr Amman had turned around and began to run in the direction of the officers, the left hand side of his body appeared to jerk backwards while his left hand moved towards his stomach area.
109. One second later, at 1.58.50pm, Mr Amman fell to the floor. His legs appeared to buckle from under him and he fell forward with the knife still in his right hand. As Mr Amman hit the floor, he rolled over onto his back with his legs in the air before coming to rest with his feet close to the Boots entrance and his head towards the road.
110. A camera inside the Boots shop, pointing out through the entrance, captured some more detail. This camera showed, at the point Mr Amman turned around, at least one surveillance officer was approximately three to five metres behind Mr Amman. Unfortunately, only the bottom half of this officer is visible however, based on previous footage, I believe this officer to be BX75. The internal camera indicates BX87 was stood in the road, close to the curb and slightly to the left of Mr Amman at the point he turned around.

Fig 9



**Fig 9, from a camera inside Boots pharmacy, captures the moment Mr Amman began to advance on BX75 (green) and BX87 (blue).**

111. BX75 recalled the moment Mr Amman reached Boots Pharmacy. BX75 believed Mr Amman was approximately three metres in front when he suddenly turned around outside the Boots Pharmacy. BX75 stated he fired two shots towards Mr Amman's upper body before Mr Amman fell to the floor. BX75 stated he took this action due to his fear Mr Amman was about to attack him.
112. BX87 also recalled Mr Amman's actions outside Boots and described them in a similar way to BX75. BX87 also noted his fear that Mr Amman was now about to try and attack BX75 and himself and decided to fire a shot at Mr Amman, which he believed had no effect. BX87 stated he fired further shots until he felt the immediate threat had ended. Following the incident, it was clarified BX87 fired three shots in total.
113. In Pinfold Road, BX113 moved his vehicle forward to block the road junction between Pinfold Road and Streatham High Road. As he did so, BX113 stated he saw Mr Amman running along the footpath before stopping and turning around outside the Boots pharmacy. BX113 recalled seeing BX87 and BX75 closing the distance between Mr Amman, who was now moving towards them. Whilst BX113 could not say which officers fired at Mr Amman, he recalled hearing two gunshots before Mr Amman fell to the floor.

114. After Mr Amman had fallen onto his back, BX87 stated he kicked the knife away. BX75 noticed the white bag Mr Amman had been wearing had moved to reveal silver bottles attached to Mr Amman's body. Believing this to be a potential explosive device, BX75 and BX87 did not further approach Mr Amman and also warned other surveillance officers to keep their distance.
115. BX113 also confirmed he noticed silver coloured bottles attached to Mr Amman's waist and stomach, which he suspected to be an improvised explosive, and instructed all officers to keep away from Mr Amman's body.
116. Mr Amman remained on the floor and, approximately 20 seconds after falling down, he began kick out his arms and legs whilst moving his body around. Mr Amman remained on his back during this movement, which lasted approximately seven seconds. By the time Mr Amman was still again, he had altered his position and was now lying along the pavement, with his back to the Boots entrance and his face towards the road.
117. At 2.00.37pm, a local council CCTV camera on the wall above the Boots shop altered position and began to review the scene. By this time a majority of the surveillance team had arrived and were beginning to secure the area and keep Mr Amman contained. As they believed he was wearing an explosive device the surveillance officers remained at a distance but aimed their firearms towards Mr Amman, in case he attempted to detonate the device. Some of the surveillance officers noted they could still see movement from Mr Amman, particularly his arms. Other members of the surveillance team began to provide first aid to the two victims injured by Mr Amman, who were already being supported by members of the public.
118. Whilst the surveillance officers were dealing with the incident involving Mr Amman, a number of armed response officers were making their way towards Streatham High Road. The first armed response vehicle containing uniformed firearms officers arrived approximately three minutes after Mr Amman had first run out of the Low Price Store.
119. Body worn video footage from one of the first uniformed armed officers at the scene shows, at 2.01.38pm, three armed response officers approached Mr

Amman with their weapons drawn. One of the officers stated, *“right move up, check for IED’s (improvised explosive device). He’s been shot two or three times, he’s got a vest on his front! He’s got a vest! Vest!”*

120. After checking on Mr Amman, and confirming he was wearing what appeared to be an explosive device, he was not approached again by officers. Instead a number of firearms officers continued to keep their weapons aimed at his body whilst other officers attempted to prevent members of the public from approaching the area. At 2.01.59pm, body worn video footage captured an unknown person stating that Mr Amman appeared to be breathing.
121. At 2.02pm, an entry on the control room log confirmed Mr Amman appeared to be wearing a vest which was being treated as though it was an improvised explosive device. The same entry confirmed no further individuals were approaching Mr Amman.
122. By 2.09pm, it appeared Mr Amman was no longer breathing and his body had not moved position for approximately 10 minutes.
123. As Mr Amman was being contained, additional armed response officers arriving at the scene provided first aid to Person A and Person B. Person B was quickly identified as the most seriously injured however, due to the fact Mr Amman could still be a threat, no ambulances were allowed to enter the area. Ms C had taken shelter inside the Lidl supermarket and it was established she had been injured by glass shards, likely caused by BX75’s first shot which had hit the window behind her.
124. At 2.41.10pm, a specialist officer trained to deal with explosives arrived at the location. Due to the fact Mr Amman may still have been a threat, a team of firearms officers escorted the explosive officer to assess the item strapped to Mr Amman’s chest.
125. By 3.05pm, it appeared clear the device attached to Mr Amman was fake. The item was later shown to be a number of empty 500ml bottles, which had been covered in tinfoil and attached to two leather belts wrapped around Mr



Amman's chest. The white bag initially seen by surveillance officers had been used to disguise the device, pictured below.

Fig 10



Fig 10 is an image of the device worn by Mr Amman.

126. At 3.15pm, the specialist explosive officer conducted a further check on Mr Amman to ensure there were no other hazardous or dangerous items. Following this check, at approximately 3.24pm, paramedics confirmed Mr Amman was deceased.
127. Whilst it has not been possible to accurately confirm the timings of the incident, due to the fact there is no consistency in the timings on the CCTV footage, map data indicates Mr Amman ran approximately 100 yards, or 91 metres, down Streatham High Road between the Low Price Store and Boots pharmacy.

### > Post mortem and toxicology results for Mr Amman

128. On Tuesday 4 February 2020, a post mortem was conducted on Mr Amman.
129. Following the post mortem examination, the pathologist highlighted the following information:

- Mr Amman had two gunshot entry wounds; one to the right lower neck and one to the right abdomen.
  - Mr Amman had one exit wound to the upper right back which corresponded to the entry wound on the right lower neck. There was no exit wound for the bullet which had entered the right abdomen.
  - One bullet cartridge was found inside the bag which had been used to secure Mr Amman's body. The second bullet remained inside Mr Amman's body and was found lodged close to the base of his spine.
  - Two further wounds, which could be attributed to gunshots, were also found. The first wound was on the back of the right arm just above the elbow, described as a 'guttering' wound caused by a bullet passing horizontally across the arm. The second wound was a superficial track or graze to the inner left wrist. Both of these wounds were likely caused by bullets passing over the surface of the skin.
  - The pathologist was not able to say conclusively how many bullets had hit Mr Amman. In the opinion of the pathologist, either four bullets had caused the four separate wounds or three bullets had caused the wounds, with one bullet causing both the superficial injury to the left wrist before entering the right abdomen.
  - There were no substances (for example alcohol or drugs) detected in Mr Amman's body which would have impaired his behaviour.
130. The pathologist believed either the injury to Mr Amman's neck or the injury to Mr Amman's abdomen would have been fatal on their own. Mr Amman's cause of death was recorded as shock and haemorrhage caused by gunshot wounds to the neck and abdomen.

### > **Ballistics report and examinations**

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131. Ms E, a forensic expert with experience in ballistics and firearms, produced a report highlighting her considerations following examination of both Mr Amman

and the scene on Streatham High Road. Ms E considered the evidence from the scene, specifically at Lidl supermarket and Boots pharmacy.

### > Lidl

132. One bullet hole was located in a pane of glass to the left side of the Lidl supermarket entrance, as shown in the image below. Whilst it was not possible to plot the exact trajectory of this bullet, Ms E believed it would most likely have been fired close to a 90 degree angle to the pane of glass.

Fig 11



*Image 1: Lidl doorway; bullet hole identified by green arrow*

Fig 11 is a photograph of the Lidl entrance, taken from the forensic report, highlighting the damage caused to a pane of glass.

### > Boots Pharmacy

133. Seven areas of damage, consistent with gunshots, were noted to the Boots entrance area. Ms E felt these would be consistent with two or three bullets being fired as follows;
- One bullet hole in a single pane of glass to the left of the entrance, approximately 10 centimetres off the ground and a bullet impact to a metal plate on the bottom of the automatic doors. Ms E felt these two areas of damage were consistent with one bullet entering through the

pane of glass whilst the automatic doors were open, striking the metal plate behind the glass.

- Four separate areas of damage spread out around the entrance way, which the expert considered was consistent with impacts caused by fragments of a bullet (possibly one bullet which had fragmented before striking the front of the shop).
- One further area of damage on the metal frame for the automatic security shutters on the right hand side of the entrance. This damage could have been caused by a single bullet or fragment of a bullet.

134. The image below highlights the areas of damage identified to the Boots pharmacy entrance. Ms E was not able to determine the trajectory of the bullets or fragments which struck the shop, except to say they were generally fired towards the shop.

Fig 12



Image 6: entrance of Boots with damage sites identified

**Fig 12 is a photograph of the Boots entrance, taken from the forensic report, highlighting the areas of damage consistent with being struck by bullets or bullet fragments.**

135. Ms E concluded it was likely the first shot fired struck the Lidl supermarket, with a further five shots outside the Boots Pharmacy. Two of the bullets remained

within Mr Amman's body and a further three bullets, or fragments of them, struck the front of the pharmacy. At least one bullet fragmented before striking the shop possibly by hitting the pavement, hitting Mr Amman or coming into contact with some other hard surface.

136. Following the incident, a procedure known as a countback was undertaken to determine how many bullets had been fired by officers based on how many unused bullets each officer still had in their possession. This procedure confirmed six bullets were missing, with BX75 discharging three rounds and BX87 also discharging three rounds.

## **> Policies, procedures and legislation considered**

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137. During the investigation, I have examined relevant national and local policies and legislation, as set out below. This will enable consideration of whether the policies were complied with and whether the existing policies were sufficient in these circumstances.

### **> European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 2 – Right to Life**

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138. The ECHR is applied in the United Kingdom through recognition in Schedule 1 of Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998. The ECHR and the HRA apply in the relationship between the 'state' (that is, the government or those organisations which form part of the government such as the police service) and the individual citizen. The state is responsible for protecting the human rights of the individual.
139. The right to life (referred to as 'the Article 2 right' in this report) is considered to be a qualified right. This means, except in specific circumstances, the state will not take or deprive an individual of their life and will also have a positive and proactive duty to safeguard the lives of the citizens.

140. When the police use force which results in the death of an individual, that death will **NOT** (emphasis added) be in contravention of the Article 2 right when the force used by the police was no more than absolutely necessary to:

- defend any person from unlawful violence
- effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained
- lawfully quell a riot or insurrection

141. Whether the amount of force used was 'absolutely necessary' requires careful consideration of all the circumstances of an incident.

#### > **Criminal Law Act 1967**

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142. The Criminal Law Act 1967, section 3 provides that any person (whether or not they are also a police officer) may use "...*such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, effecting or assisting in the arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large*".

143. This act covers all use of force up to and including lethal force, provided the force used is reasonable in the circumstances.

#### > **Common law principle of self-defence**

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144. The common law is a body of law which has developed through judicial decisions within the court system rather than by being set down in an Act of Parliament.

145. Self-defence is an established common law principle which allows for any individual (whether or not they are also a police officer) to use reasonable force to protect themselves, or another person, from harm.

146. The concept of reasonable force when relying on self-defence was defined within section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. In order to

rely on self-defence an individual must not have acted disproportionately in the circumstances. Where an individual has a genuine, but mistaken, belief about the circumstances their use of force will be judged against the circumstances as they perceived them to be, not the circumstances they were actually confronted with.

### > College of Policing, Authorised Professional Practice (APP) – Armed Policing

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147. The College of Policing is the professional body for employees of the police services in England and Wales. The College aim is to provide officers and staff with the skills and knowledge to perform their roles effectively. One of the ways the College tries to achieve this is through the APP content. The APP is produced by the college as an official source of professional practice, providing police officers and staff with guidance on how to undertake their duties and responsibilities.
148. Whilst police officers and staff are expected to have regard to the APP, the information contained within does not have to be followed if there is a clear reason for departing from it. Where an officer does decide to act in a way which is not in line with the APP, it will be for the individual to explain and justify why they made this decision.
149. Armed policing is a specific and specialist area of policing and the APP recognises that the nature of incidents which require the deployment of armed officers will often be fast moving with rapidly changing circumstances. As a result, whilst the APP tries to provide a basis for training, strategic and tactical management and the deployment of armed officers, “... *Nothing within APP Armed Policing is intended to restrict police officers from taking innovative action to effectively resolve incidents...*”
150. The APP highlights, when a police officer decides to discharge a firearm their primary intention should be to prevent “...*immediate threat to life by shooting to stop the subject from carrying out their intended or threatened course of action.*” As the accuracy of a police officer firing a weapon, under pressure,

during an active incident will be reduced, officers are trained to aim for the largest target they can see. In most cases, this will be the central body mass (or torso) of the subject.

151. The APP highlights that a decision to use force, including lethal force, rests with an individual officer who must justify their decision making by explaining the rationale behind the decision. A number of factors will influence this decision making process and, for that reason, the APP does not use a 'continuum of force' model (this means there is no requirement for the level of force to develop, e.g by attempting a less lethal tactic first).
152. Where is it not possible (or not practical) to aim for the torso, an officer may need to aim for another part of the body. As the officer should have already decided to shoot in order to end an immediate threat to life, where aiming at the torso is not possible the officer can instead aim for the head or another part of the body. Referred to as a 'critical shot', they should only be taken "... *when there is an imminent and extreme risk to life...*"

#### **> College of Policing, Authorised Professional Practice (APP) – Armed support to covert operations**

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153. Armed policing covers a variety of different roles and requirements, with firearms officers undertaking different levels of training and capability depending on the role they are going to be performing.
154. Specifically, in relation to the operation monitoring to Mr Amman, the primary focus was to conduct covert surveillance. Whilst the officers who engaged Mr Amman on Sunday 2 February were trained to carry and use firearms where necessary, they were not dedicated firearms officers and were issued with a small calibre handgun or 'personal defence weapon'.
155. Covert operations which require armed support as a contingency (as in this instance) have two options. Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MAStS for short) are specially trained covert officers who can operate in plain clothes and from covert vehicles. MAStS teams can support both armed and unarmed surveillance officers.



156. Alternatively, where covert surveillance does not require the use of a MASTS team, overt (or fully marked and liveried) police vehicles and officers may be placed on standby to support a surveillance team. These overt Armed Response Vehicles cannot operate covertly and therefore will only be suitable as a contingency in the event the surveillance officers require immediate firearms support.

## > Analysis

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### > Events prior to Mr Amman leaving his address on 2 February 2020

157. On Thursday 23 January 2020 Mr Amman was granted early release from HMP Belmarsh, where he had been serving a prison sentence for terrorism offences. As a condition of his release, Mr Amman was placed under a number of restrictions, referred to as license conditions, including directing where he should live, imposing curfews and requiring he wear an electronic monitoring device. Despite these restrictions, Mr Amman was considered to be a very high risk of reoffending by the police and the Probation Service as he appeared to maintain an extreme ideology.
158. Mr Amman was placed under surveillance by counter terrorism officers from the point of his release, with the tactics for the surveillance operation changing on two occasions. Firstly, from unarmed to armed surveillance and secondly, from Friday 31 January, to 24 hour surveillance. Saturday 1 February was the first day of 24 hour armed surveillance and commenced with a verbal briefing, updating the officers on the most recent developments. A second, shorter, briefing was given on Sunday 2 February as the information and intelligence had not changed.
159. BX87 stated, when he received the briefing on Saturday 1 February, his own assessment of the risks and seriousness of the threat Mr Amman posed was high as the surveillance operation had developed from unarmed to full 24 hour armed surveillance within an eight day period. BX87 and another officer, BX69,

- also commented that they detected a change in the demeanour of the briefing officer which reflected the change in mood and the seriousness with which the briefing officer appeared to be taking this operation.
160. The most important part of the briefings was to highlight the tipping points and defined actions to be taken in the event Mr Amman was seen to purchase a knife. Armed response vehicles were on standby to help ensure Mr Amman could be stopped quickly and safely, should the need arise.
  161. The surveillance officers were armed only for their own protection or the protection of the public. The surveillance officers were not considered to be the appropriate option to arrest Mr Amman and were armed in order to ensure they could adequately protect themselves or others if Mr Amman presented an immediate threat.
  162. The information provided at the briefings had indicated there had not been any reason for pre-emptive action to have been taken against Mr Amman. There were clear concerns about his beliefs and intentions, alongside his previous conviction for terrorism offences, however, there had been no indication he was committing offences or breaching his conditions, which would have allowed the officers to take alternative action against him. Mr Amman was clearly considered to be a significant and credible risk and, by keeping him under surveillance, the MPS hoped to recognise any behaviour which might indicate a planned attack at the earliest possible point.
  163. There was no indication the content of the briefings were not sufficient to allow the surveillance officers to understand the purpose of the operation or the reason why Mr Amman was considered to be a credible threat. Despite BX87 stating he felt the threat posed by Mr Amman was high, the formal assessment of risk for this operation was considered to be low, as Mr Amman had made no specific threats against any group or individual and there was no intelligence indicating Mr Amman was planning an imminent attack.
  164. Mr Amman appeared to be following the conditions of his early release and there was no indication he had acted in a way which could have resulted in his recall to prison before Sunday 2 February. Whilst this report is not considering

the specifics of Operation Osmious, relevant material relating to the conduct of that operation has been reviewed. There is no material which indicates that proactive action, such as an arrest or recall to prison, could have been taken prior to 2 February 2020.

### > Events on 2 February 2020

165. On 2 February Mr Amman was seen to have been walking slowly on his way to Streatham High Road and appeared to be wearing an empty white bag across his chest.
166. The surveillance and control room logs noted Mr Amman was walking slowly, retracing his steps, stopping and assessing his surroundings and potentially using a window as a mirror. None of this behaviour amounted to a criminal offence, it was not in breach of Mr Amman's license conditions and it provided no indication for the actions Mr Amman subsequently decided to take. There remained no information or intelligence to suggest Mr Amman was about to commit an attack.
167. There was also no indication Mr Amman was in possession of a knife or other offensive weapon before he entered the Low Price Store at 1.58pm. Four surveillance officers were in close proximity to the shop, with BX87 already preparing to enter the shop to observe Mr Amman more closely. 54 seconds after entering and whilst BX87 was still several seconds away, Mr Amman stole a knife and ran out of the shop. He then removed the protective packaging from the knife and within seconds proceeded to and stab his first victim, Person A, in the back. Removing the knife from the packaging triggered a tipping point but, due to the speed with which the situation unfolded, none of the officers were able to intervene prior to the first attack.

### > Mr Amman leaving the Low Price Store and BX75's first shot

168. Approximately five seconds after Mr Amman left the Low Price Store, BX87 began to chase after him. BX87 did not recall that he transmitted Mr Amman's attack over the radio and but instead that he ran after Mr Amman whilst

- shouting and trying to draw attention towards them. Multiple other officers did hear a radio transmission as Mr Amman began his attack, although most could not identify which one of their colleagues this was. One of those other officers was BX113, who was inside a vehicle a short distance away and would have been unlikely to hear BX87's shouting and mistake it for a radio transmission.
169. BX87 recalled, after approximately two seconds, he clearly saw Mr Amman stab his first victim. BX87 stated he believed this attack would prove fatal and made the decision to continue chasing Mr Amman, rather than stop to help. BX87 stated he did so as he believed this was the best option in order to try and prevent Mr Amman from attacking other members of the public. BX87 also noted he heard Mr Amman shout 'Allah Akbar', a phrase linked with other terrorist attacks.
170. BX87 further stated he decided not to draw his firearm, believing the risk of doing so was too high as Mr Amman was running at speed with multiple members of the public in close proximity. In addition, BX87 was also moving at speed in order to close the distance to Mr Amman, which would have had a significant effect on BX87's accuracy.
171. Witness accounts from Witness X and Witness Y support BX87, specifically highlighting that Mr Amman was moving erratically and at speed without pausing or slowing down and that Mr Amman appeared to be attempting to attack multiple people on a busy street. BX87, therefore, had little opportunity to attempt to stop Mr Amman beyond shouting to try and change Mr Amman's focus. By shouting BX87 was also drawing attention to the situation, potentially giving other pedestrians a moment of warning to try and make themselves safe.
172. BX87 did not specifically refer to a decision not to use his taser, however, attempting to use this device would have been unlikely to have little, if any, effect on Mr Amman due to the range limitations of the device and the difficulty aiming at a moving target. CCTV footage suggests BX87 had a matter of seconds in which to decide how to respond to Mr Amman's behaviour and that he made a choice based on the circumstances unfolding in front of him.

173. In contrast to BX87, BX75 was on the pavement ahead of Mr Amman. The evidence confirms Mr Amman had a knife visible in his hand and was running towards BX75, who had already heard a transmission confirming Mr Amman was stabbing members of the public. In addition, BX75 stated he believed the transmission was made by BX69, an officer not carrying a firearm. The evidence indicates BX75 had reason to believe Mr Amman was an immediate and ongoing risk to the life of his colleagues as well members of the public.
174. As BX75 believed Mr Amman posed an immediate threat to his own life or the lives of his colleagues or other members of the public, he drew his firearm and noted he discounted all other options to deal with the threat. BX75 confirmed he felt his firearm was the best option to deal with an ongoing attack and noted he discounted using his taser, due to concerns it may not be effective if Mr Amman was wearing several layers of clothing.
175. The CCTV and witness evidence confirms BX75 took up a stationary position close to the Lidl entrance and aimed his firearm toward Mr Amman as Mr Amman ran down the pavement.
176. As Mr Amman ran past the entrance to the Lidl Supermarket, two witnesses who had taken cover against the glass entrance recalled hearing BX75 shout words to the effect of "*police, I'm going to shoot*" before BX75 fired one shot which appeared to have no effect on Mr Amman.
177. Ballistic evidence confirmed one shot was fired at the Lidl supermarket entrance, striking a pane of glass. This bullet damaged the glass, resulting in glass shards causing injury to Ms C's leg. When recalling her memory of events, Ms C stated she could see BX75 behind Mr Amman and believed BX75 was aiming his firearm directly at her.
178. Whilst BX75 recollection was that he fired at Mr Amman before he ran past the Lidl supermarket, the witness and CCTV evidence confirms BX75 most likely fired as Mr Amman ran past him, side on, at an approximate 90 degree angle. Despite this discrepancy in BX75's recollection of exactly where he was when he fired the shot at Mr Amman, the evidence supports his statement that he

took action in an attempt to stop the immediate and life threatening risk posed by Mr Amman.

179. BX75's shot appears to have missed Mr Amman, although the post mortem findings may be consistent with this shot having caused the guttering wound which was found just above Mr Amman's elbow on his right arm. This wound could be consistent with BX75's bullet passing over the skin of Mr Amman's outstretched right arm, which was holding the knife, before striking the glass panel directly behind him and causing injury to the female witness.
180. The law and guidance around lethal use of force is clear and the use of such force must be no more than absolutely necessary to deal with the threat presented. APP is clear there is no requirement for officers to use a continuum of force and an officer needs to be able to choose the right tactic or option for the circumstances. In addition, the APP recognises that the decision to use lethal force is significant and should only be used in situations which pose an immediate threat to life.
181. In addition, the guidance given to the surveillance officers was clear. They were armed for their own protection and for the protection of the public, against an individual who was classed as so dangerous that the use of armed surveillance officers was appropriate.
182. In deciding to use lethal force BX75 was aware that a known terrorism offender, who was believed to retain an aspiration to commit a terrorist attack, was in possession of a knife which was clearly visible in his right hand. BX75 had heard a radio transmission stating Mr Amman had already used this knife to injure members of the public and CCTV footage confirmed there was very little time available for BX75 to make a decision on what action to take in order to protect himself and others.
183. Whilst BX75 decided to use his firearm in a busy pedestrian area where there was risk that his shot could strike a member of the public, given the situation as it presented to him, BX75 made a quick decision, balancing the risks of attempting to stop Mr Amman against the risk presented by allowing Mr Amman to continue his attack unchallenged.

184. The decision maker wish to consider if BX75's decision to draw and use his firearm to attempt to stop Mr Amman outside Lidl supermarket by way of lethal force was justified and appropriate in the circumstances. The following points may assist this determination:

- BX75 was part of a 24 hour, armed surveillance operation with overt armed officers directed to be on standby in the area.
- Mr Amman had recently been released from prison having served part of a sentence for terrorism offences and was believed to remain radicalised with the potential desire to commit further terrorist offences. BX75 was fully briefed on intelligence concerning Mr Amman's intentions to commit a terrorist attack.
- BX75 heard a radio transmission confirming Mr Amman was stabbing members of the public after leaving a shop which sold knives. This corroborated the intelligence contained within the briefings, which stated Mr Amman had previously been observed browsing knives and other potential makeshift weapons.
- BX75 saw Mr Amman running down the pavement with a knife in his hand and had already drawn his firearm in anticipation of the need to use lethal force in order to stop an ongoing attack and protect themselves or others.
- Unlike BX87, who was already running after Mr Amman, BX75 was able to take up a stationary position to aim at Mr Amman.
- Although BX75 did not recall shouting a warning, two witnesses in close proximity clearly heard BX75 shout he was a police officer with a firearm.
- BX75 fired one shot which did not appear to have any effect on Mr Amman but which struck a glass panel directly behind him, causing injury to a member of the public.

- APP guidance confirms lethal force may be a proportionate response to a situation which poses an immediate threat to life. Guidance to armed surveillance officers confirms they are authorised to carry a firearm to protect themselves and members of the public from a potentially dangerous individual.

### > Shots outside Boots pharmacy

185. After BX75's shot, Mr Amman continued along the footpath followed by both BX75 and BX87. At some point after BX75 had fired, BX87 drew his firearm although it is not known exactly when this occurred.
186. As Mr Amman reached the Boots Pharmacy, CCTV and witness evidence confirms he made an abrupt turn and began to move back towards BX75 and BX87. CCTV footage confirmed Mr Amman still had hold of a knife in his right hand at waist height and showed the footpath ahead of Mr Amman was clear of pedestrians.
187. BX75 and BX87 both stated Mr Amman turning around to face them caused them to fear they were about to be attacked. CCTV footage confirms Mr Amman did not pause or hesitate, instead he immediately began to move towards the officers who were now approximately three to five metres away. CCTV footage from the shop next door to Boots indicates the officers already had their firearms aimed at Mr Amman as he turned around.
188. BX75 and BX87 both stated, when Mr Amman turned around to face them, they believed he was about to attack them. Both officers recalled firing at Mr Amman due to the immediate risk he posed to them. BX75 recalled firing two shots at Mr Amman. BX87 could not recall how many shots he fired and stated he felt he fired enough shots to end the immediate risk Mr Amman posed. Following the incident a countback procedure established BX87 fired three shots, all of which are likely to have been discharged outside the Boots pharmacy.



189. Within one second of his change of direction, CCTV footage suggests Mr Amman's body was reacting to being shot and he began to fall to the floor.
190. The post-mortem findings and the ballistic expert's report showed Mr Amman suffered two significant gunshot injuries to his neck and abdomen. Whilst it was not possible for the ballistics expert to determine bullet trajectory, the position of Mr Amman and the description of the injuries suggests it was BX75 who fired the two shots which corresponded to the injuries Mr Amman suffered.
191. In total, six shots were fired at Mr Amman. Of the remaining three shots, the evidence suggests all were fired by BX87 outside of Boots Pharmacy. The damage to the front of the building was consistent with three bullets, or fragments of bullets, striking the entrance area. CCTV evidence suggests BX87 was stood slightly in the road, to the right of Mr Amman and BX75, with his firearm pointing in the direction of the Boots shop front.
192. As with the first shot outside the Lidl supermarket, the law and guidance around lethal use of force requires officers to believe there is an immediate threat to life. In addition, the common law of self-defence is relevant as both officers believed Mr Amman was now about to attack them, having made an abrupt turn and immediately began to advance toward them. The law relating to self-defence confirms the officers should use no more force than necessary in order to protect themselves from harm.
193. The CCTV footage supports the accounts of the officers, highlighting the fact Mr Amman's abrupt turn and the officers' forward momentum meant they had only a matter of one or two seconds to make a decision to fire before they would have been at risk of attack by Mr Amman. CCTV footage does not indicate Mr Amman intended to stop his attack or that he made any attempt to surrender to the officers, as the knife remained at waist height in Mr Amman's right hand.
194. Both officers believed Mr Amman had run down Streatham High Road and potentially attacked multiple individuals. BX87 had witnessed Mr Amman stab Person A and, although neither officer stated they saw Person B being injured, other witnesses confirmed Mr Amman had caused him significant injuries.

- BX87 stated he had been following Mr Amman and shouting in an attempt to draw Mr Amman's attention, without success. Ms C and Mr D had both heard someone, possibly BX75, loudly identify himself as an armed police officer.
195. BX87 and BX75 had a genuine belief they were about to be attacked by Mr Amman and needed to use force in order to protect themselves. Both officers already had their firearms drawn and appear to have had no more than two seconds in which to take action to defend themselves.
196. The decision maker may wish to consider if the use of lethal force on Mr Amman by BX75 and BX87 outside the Boots Pharmacy was justified and appropriate in the circumstances. To assist in this consideration, the following points may be relevant:
- BX75 and BX87 were present at briefings which had contained information that Mr Amman was believed to maintain a desire to commit a terrorist attack.
  - BX87 believed he had witnessed Mr Amman fatally injure at least one member of the public with a knife and perceived him to have stabbed many others whilst running along Streatham High Road.
  - BX87 stated he had run after Mr Amman for the duration of this attack, shouting to try and get his attention without success.
  - BX75 had identified himself as an armed police officer and already fired one shot at Mr Amman which appeared to have no effect.
  - CCTV footage shows Mr Amman came to an abrupt stop and turned around to face the officers outside the Boots pharmacy. The CCTV footage outside the entrance shows the footpath in front of Mr Amman was clear of pedestrians at this point.
  - Mr Amman continued to be in possession of a knife, held at waist height in his right hand. BX75 and BX87 already had their firearms drawn and pointing at Mr Amman as he turned around to face them.

- CCTV shows Mr Amman made no attempt to stop and immediately began to run towards the closest officer, BX75, with only a short distance between them.
- BX75 and BX87 stated they fired at Mr Amman in order to defend themselves, as they now perceived Mr Amman was about to attack them. CCTV footage indicates the time between Mr Amman turning around and falling to the ground was between one and two seconds.

### > First aid considerations for Mr Amman

197. After Mr Amman came to rest on the floor outside Boots, BX75 and BX87 stated they noticed a device attached to his body which had previously been disguised by the white bag across his chest. BX113, who by this time had pulled forward in his vehicle in order to block the road, also stated they could see silver coloured bottles on Mr Amman's chest. Believing this to be an improvised explosive, the surveillance officers kept Mr Amman under observation whilst securing the area.
198. The first armed response officers arrived within approximately three minutes, travelling from the area they had been waiting as directed. The armed response officers approached Mr Amman and confirmed he appeared to be wearing a suspected explosive device. Once removed, the fake device was photographed and matched the description given by the officers.
199. CCTV and body worn video evidence appears to suggest Mr Amman was believed to be breathing at 2.01pm however, by 2.09pm, it was not clear whether Mr Amman remained alive. A specialist explosive officer did not arrive at the location until approximately 40 minutes after Mr Amman had been shot.
200. Police officers who use force against an individual are trained to provide first aid in the event the individual suffers injury, which requires an officer to first assess how safe the area is and whether first aid can be administered. If the area is not safe, first aid should not be attempted until the danger has been controlled or removed.

201. No officers attempted to provide first aid to Mr Amman. The device attached to Mr Amman was considered to be real and therefore an ongoing danger and threat to life until an officer trained in handling explosives had confirmed the device no longer presented a risk. The area around Mr Amman was not declared safe for ambulance staff until approximately 3.20pm.
202. The quality of first aid provided to Person A, Person B and Ms C was not considered as part of this investigation, however, body worn video from the aftermath of the attack was reviewed. It is believed the quality and timeliness of the first aid given to the victims was appropriate.

## > Questions to be answered by the DSI investigation

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203. At no point during the investigation was a determination made, pursuant to paragraph 21A of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, that any person serving with the police:
- a) may have committed a criminal offence; or
  - b) behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings
204. On receipt of this final investigation report, Operations Manager Catherine Hall, acting with the delegated authority of the DG under paragraph 24A(4) of Schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002, is required to finally determine the two matters referred to above.
205. To conclude this analysis, I, as lead investigator, will consider the following:
- a) What evidence is available regarding the nature and extent of police contact with Mr Amman prior to his death?
  - b) What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Mr Amman death?

**> What evidence is available regarding the nature and extent of police contact with Mr Amman prior to his death?**

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206. Mr Amman was under active surveillance by MPS officers between Thursday 23 January 2020 and Friday 2 February 2020, due to the fact he was considered to be a significant risk for committing further terrorism offences.

**> What evidence is available in relation to whether the police may have caused or contributed to Mr Amman death?**

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207. Armed MPS surveillance officers responded to a spontaneous situation in which Mr Amman began attacking members of the public on Streatham High Road, having stolen a knife from a shop. Mr Amman stabbed two members of the public and was perceived to be attempting to stab several others. As Mr Amman ran past BX75, the officer discharged one shot towards him. This shot appeared to miss the intended target, striking a pane of glass and causing leg injury's to Ms C.

208. Several seconds later, five shots were discharged towards Mr Amman after he turned around and began to move back towards BX75 and BX87. Two shots hit Mr Amman and, in the opinion of the pathologist, both of these injuries would have proved fatal.

209. MPS officers BX75 and/or BX87 appear to have been directly responsible for Mr Amman's death, using lethal force to incapacitate him following his attack on members of the public.

210. At the time of writing this report it is important to note an inquest has not been held, which will fully consider the facts surrounding Mr Amman's death. Nothing in this report is intended to determine any matter which will properly be considered as part of the coronial process.

**> Learning**

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211. Throughout this investigation, I have carefully considered whether any learning should be considered by the decision maker. In this case, I have not identified any learning to draw to the decision maker's attention.

## > Next steps

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212. The decision maker is now required to reach conclusions about the investigation. The decision maker will consider the evidence with a view to determining whether the report indicates that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings.
213. The decision maker will also decide whether to require the MPS to determine whether or not the performance of a person serving with the police is unsatisfactory, and what action (if any) the authority will take in respect of any such person's performance. If so required, the decision maker will then decide whether those decisions are appropriate, and whether to recommend (and potentially direct) that the performance of a person serving with the police is unsatisfactory, and, if so, the action (if any) that should be taken in respect of it.
214. The decision maker's conclusions will be recorded on a separate document.
215. The decision maker will also decide whether any organisational learning has been identified that should be shared with the organisation in question.

## > Publication of the report

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216. At the conclusion of an IOPC investigation a decision is taken on whether, and in what form, details of the investigation should be published. At this time, no publication decision has been made.

DSI

Sudesh Amman

Investigation into the death of Mr Sudesh Amman  
on Sunday 2 February 2020

- > Independent investigation report
- > Appendices

## > Appendix 1: The role of the IOPC

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The IOPC carries out its own independent investigations into complaints and incidents involving the police, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Home Office immigration and enforcement staff.

We are completely independent of the police and the government. All cases are overseen by the Director General (DG), who has the power to delegate their decisions to other members of staff in the organisation. These individuals are referred to as DG delegates, or decision makers, and they provide strategic direction and scrutinise the investigation.

### > The investigation

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At the outset of an investigation, a lead investigator will be appointed who will be responsible for the day-to-day running of the investigation on behalf of the DG. This may involve taking witness statements, analysing CCTV footage, reviewing documents, obtaining forensic and other expert evidence, as well as liaising with the coroner and other agencies.

The lead investigator is supported by a team that includes other investigators, lawyers, press officers and other specialist staff.

Throughout the investigation, meaningful updates are provided to interested persons and may be provided to other stakeholders at regular intervals. Each investigation also passes through a series of reviews and quality checks.

The IOPC has three main types of investigation. This case was what we refer to as a Death or Serious Injury (DSI) investigation, which means any circumstances where, or as a result of which, a person has died or sustained a serious injury and:

- at the time of death or serious injury, the person had been arrested by a person serving with the police and had not been released, or was otherwise detained in the custody of a person serving with the police, or
- at or before the time of death or serious injury, the person had contact of any kind – whether direct or indirect – with a person serving with the police who was acting in the execution of his or her duties, and there is an indication that the contact may have caused – whether directly or indirectly – or contributed to the death or serious injury

The investigation aims to identify and obtain the available evidence regarding the nature and extent of the police contact, and whether the police may have caused or contributed to the death or injury.



The possible outcomes of DSI investigations reflect the fact that it is not an inquiry into any criminal, conduct or complaint allegation against any person serving with the police.

### > Investigation reports

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Once the investigator has gathered the evidence, they must prepare a report. The report must summarise and analyse the evidence and refer to or attach any relevant documents.

The report must then be submitted to the decision maker, who will decide if the report indicates that any person serving with the police may have committed a criminal offence or behaved in a manner that would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. If the decision maker decides that there is such an indication, it will be investigated as a conduct matter.

The report will also be given to the appropriate authority (normally the police force), who may be required to determine whether the actions of anyone serving with the police were unsatisfactory and what action (if any) will be taken in respect of any such person's performance. The appropriate authority must inform the decision maker of both its decisions. Unsatisfactory performance will be dealt with through the police force's unsatisfactory performance procedure (UPP). UPP is generally handled by the person's line manager and is intended to improve the performance of both the individual and police force.

If the decision maker considers that the appropriate authority's response is not appropriate, the decision maker has powers to recommend or ultimately direct that the matter is dealt with by UPP. The decision maker will also decide whether to make individual or wider learning recommendations for any relevant organisations.

### > Inquests

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In investigations into deaths, the IOPC's investigation report and supporting documents are usually provided to the coroner. The coroner may hold an inquest, either alone or with a jury. This hearing is unlike a trial and is a fact-finding forum. A coroner might ask a selection of witnesses to give evidence at the inquest. At the end of the inquest, the coroner and/or jury will decide how they think the death occurred based on the evidence they have heard and seen.

### > Publishing the report

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After any possible proceedings relating to the investigation have concluded, the IOPC may publish a summary of its investigation report. Redactions might be made to the report at this stage, for example, to ensure that individuals' personal data is sufficiently protected.